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ABSTRACT
The thesis explores the relationship between the public sector trade unions and the 
government in South Africa from 1992-7. The research is located in debates 
concerning the ANC government's endorsement of the 'free-market1 economy in the 
post apartheid period. The Marxist method of historical materialism is used to explain 
the changing relationship between the state and the trade unions
To expound these issues, a single case study of the Cape Town branch of the 
municipal union - SAMWU - is examined. The case served several functions, it 
illustrated the nature of apartheid, it took account of the government's introduction of 
privatisation in the public sector, and simultaneously provided a vehicle for the 
development of the theory of the state and its inter-relationship with the trade unions. 
The questions that arose from the case were linked to whether SAMWU would engage 
in conflict or conciliation to stop privatisation in the public sector, and whether the state 
would be free to respond favourably to labour's actions and demands. A number of 
key findings were established relating to these areas.
With regard to the state, the materialist analysis developed by the 'state derivation' 
theorists provided a useful tool, but for reasons outlined in the dissertation, neglected 
the basic structural dependence on capitalism. The theoretical conclusion of the thesis: 
was the state was not independent of capitalism, that it - along with business and 
labour - was ultimately bound up with the relations of capital. However, as an integral 
part of capitalism, the state was also affected by the 'contradictions' or potential 
conflict found within the exploitative relations between capital and labour. 
Consequently, in order to control any serious challenge from labour to the system - 
arising as a result of the 'contradictions' within capitalism - the South African state 
had chosen to engage in conciliation with the trade unions, with the aim of minimising 
any overall threat or resistance to the existing system.
As to whether SAMWU would engage in this conciliation, or choose resistance to stop 
privatisation, the answer was viewed as related to the union members' levels of class 
consciousness, and the policies and organisation of their union. The class and 
collective consciousness of SAMWU members was seen as inherently tied up with 
issues of race - in particular their 'coloured' identity. The thesis conceptualised 
apartheid and race as a function of capitalism. It concluded that the continuing use 
made of the 'coloured' identity in the region, to disguise economic inequality, had the 
potential to negate against the members' collective ability to resist privatisation. With 
regard to the acceptance of conciliation, although no clear answers were immediately 
forthcoming by 1997, it was possible to deduce that formalisation and partnerships had, 
at this stage, done little to prevent free market practices from being introduced in the 
workplace. Finally, although the thesis was unable to conclude in 1997, that SAMWU 
would ultimately resort to industrial action to stop privatisation, the re-organisation of the 
union to remain rooted in rank-and-file activity, the campaigns and protests against 
privatisation, plus the declared intention of the leaders and membership during 
interviews to take strike action, all seemed to indicate this would be the case.
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The thesis is concerned with the changing relationship between the public sector 
trade unions and the South African state between 1992-7. The relationship is 
examined using a case study, focusing on the development of a trade union branch 
and its responses to state policies of privatisation. The purposes of the research are 
two-fold: firstly, the case study is employed to evaluate whether the union and its 
members are capable of resisting government policies of privatisation during the 
period under review; secondly, the study is to be used as a reflection on wider 
society, the case being utilised to advance the theoretical understanding of the 
nature of the state and trade unions. Overall, the study contributes to the knowledge 
and improved understanding of public sector trade unions by providing a greater 
awareness of the tensions and contradictions embedded in their relationship with the 
state.
1.2 THE CASE STUDY
The case study is historical, and follows the maturing of the South African Municipal 
Workers Union (SAMWU) in the Western Cape from 1992-1997 - during the critical 
transition from pre to post apartheid. The research focuses on one division of the 
state, the public sector. This area was proving especially difficult for the African 
National Congress (ANC) during this period, but was of importance because the 
sector had been defined by groups within the national liberation movement, as the 
basic foundation for translating into reality the ideals of post-apartheid South Africa. 
The critical problem was one of funding, particularly in local authorities where some 
municipalities were close to financial collapse. The solution proposed by the ANC 
government, as with the old apartheid government in the 1980s, was to adopt the 
strategies and practices associated with the private sector. The Cape Town branch 
of SAMWU became the focus of the study, because throughout the whole of the 
1992-97 period under review, the branch and its union consistently opposed 
government policies of privatisation (Ray and Adair 1998).
1.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical analysis of the state and trade unions is used to assist in evaluating 
whether the public sector trade unions would engage in collective resistance to stop 
government policies of privatisation. The thesis uses a Marxist, essentially historical 
materialist, view of both the workplace and society when analysing the state and 
trade unions within a changing South African public sector. Such a method employs 
a theory of history which places labour at the centre of social change. History is 
seen as a social and material process, with the development of the proletarian class 
consciousness being the dynamic for change.
Within this framework, the theory of the state is explored to help explain the actions 
of governments in relation to labour. The subsequent reasoning provides not only an 
indication of the class nature of the state, but also an understanding of the limits of 
the government's reformist policies under capitalism. Equally, the trade unions, a 
component of the organised voice of the working class, are also analysed. As part 
of the changing South African civil society, unions are seen as contradictory 
organisations: defined as part of bourgeois society - playing a central role in the 
preservation of capitalist civil society - whilst simultaneously providing an arena for 
workers' conflict and struggles. An example of their contradictory behaviour is found 
in the way trade unionists engage both in strike action (conflict), and the more 
conciliatory activities of negotiation and consultation.
Crucially though, it is conflict that is identified in the dissertation as the most 
effective method of challenging state policies of privatisation and deregulation. The 
research perceives the relationship between 'labour and capital' - employees and 
employers - as being exploitative and principally conflictual. It is during the periods of 
struggle between these two classes - labour and capital - that trade union members' 
perceptions of society alter and their collective consciousness, or awareness 
develops (Brecher, 1997). More especially, it is the continual experiences of 
workplace problems and conflicts, that can force trade union members to link their 
own individual struggles with those associated with the state and the system as a 
whole. Or to argue more theoretically, the relationship of specific struggle to wider 
struggle can be deduced from the continual experience of workplace conflict; the 
process of which can increase the collective awareness and -as a consequence - 
potential power of labour. To this end, an analysis of the members' level of 
collective consciousness is considered important, being viewed as an effective
means by which to measure the possible strength of opposition to the government's 
policies, amongst this group.
1.4 QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS:
The theorisation of the state and trade unions, is applied to the case study and used 
to evaluate whether the public sector unions will, or can use collective resistance to 
force the government to abandon its commercial ethos in the state sector. Such 
theoretical deliberation, prompts the further question of whether the state enjoys the 
freedom to respond to such pressures from labour - or to express more directly, 
whether the state can ever be free to determine its own national policy, if it differs 
from those of global capitalism? This in turn, helps to reflect upon whether trade 
unions can realistically improve their members' material circumstances by the use 
of reformist methods (such as the corporatist agreements with the ANC 
government), or whether they will be ultimately compelled to resort to force to bring 
about change.
1.5 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
To obtain an understanding of the changing relationship between the state and public 
sector trade unions in South Africa, the dissertation firstly provides a background - a 
contextual, chapter - detailing events in South Africa prior to the 1994 election (chapter 
2). The aim of this chapter is to locate the black public sector trade unions within the 
wider historical framework. Chapter 3 furnishes, on the basis of an evaluation of the 
existing progressive literature, the conceptual framework for the thesis. The nature of 
the state and trade unions - using a Marxist materialist perspective - are explored, in 
order to facilitate a fuller (theoretical) understanding of the changing relationship 
between the government and public sector trade unions in South Africa. More 
especially, the chapter focuses on the questions and issues needed to be addressed 
in the dissertation. Chapter 4, explores and justifies the research design and 
methodology used in the dissertation.
These early chapters are followed by an empirical examination of the Cape Town 
branch of the public sector union - SAMWU - which although essentially addressing 
whether the union has the collective strength, leadership and organisation to resist 
local government privatisation and deregulation, concurrently acts as an instrument
to advance the theoretical understanding of the state and trade unions. The case 
study is divided into two time periods: the period leading up to, and including the 
abolition of apartheid (1992-4); and the immediate post apartheid era (1995-7). The 
first period, part 1 of the dissertation, initially surveys the social, material and workplace 
background of the SAMWU workers in Cape Town, as a means of understanding the 
factors that contribute to the levels of class consciousness amongst this group (chapter 
5). It then focuses directly on the Cape Town branch (within the general development 
of the union as a whole). It highlights its history and development (Chapter 6), it then 
studies its growth and internal structure (Chapter?), and finally considers the union's 
external activities - associated with conflict and conciliation - within the context of an 
increasingly privatised, deregulated work environment, (Chapter 8). The overall 
period (1992-4) is than analysed (Chapter 9) before proceeding to the second time 
period, 1995-7.
Before moving directly to Part 2 of the analysis of the Cape Town branch however, the 
dissertation provides the reader with a further historical background and update of 
events in South Africa (with regards to the state, the trade unions and the public 
sector) post 1994 (Chapter 10). The SAMWU branch is then once again considered, 
with the same areas as those in part 1, being re-examined (Chapters 11-14). Where 
appropriate, part 2 is compared with part 1, in order to assist in addressing - in the final 
conclusion (Chapter 15) - the areas/questions originally outlined in the conceptual 
framework.
Chapter 2
SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT: 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to locate the black public sector trade unions within a wider historical 
framework, the following chapter explores the development of the apartheid state, the 
black labour movement, and public sector, prior to the 1994 election. The purpose is to 
provide a background to the case study and show how the South African state and 
capital - which had long collaborated to provide a legitimacy for separate development 
- were eventually forced to abandon the system of apartheid. The black trade unions, 
and the racially inscribed institutions of the public sector, are seen as an integral part 
of this transformation. As a consequence the following account considers the historical 
nature of apartheid, from its origins in segregation, through to the birth and collapse of 
its doctrine. The growth and resistance of the black workers movement, receives 
equal attention, especially from the 1970s to the 1990s when the burgeoning trade 
unions and national federation COSATU, contributed to the demise of the system and 
the creation of the *New' South Africa (NSA). Finally, from the mid 1970s, the effects of 
the economic and political crisis in the country, are highlighted, with particular attention 
given to their impact on the public sector and its workforce.
2.2 THE ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
Long before the emergence of the apartheid system in 1948, the South African state 
had denied its black population any political or economic rights. Subjecting its 
overwhelmingly black working class to restrictive controls, the state routinely colluded 
with the gold-mining industry to maintain a cheap, black migrant labour force, without 
trade union or political representation (Lipton and Simkins, 1993). Segregation (and not 
apartheid) was the term used in the early twentieth-century South Africa, for the set of
government policies and social practices which sought to regulate the relationship 
between white and black. Many components of this segregation had their origins in the 
nineteenth-century Boer republics and British colonies (Beinart and Dubow, 1995)
Yet it was the discovery of diamonds and gold, that really transformed South Africa. 
When diamonds were found in Kimberley in 1867, large mining companies quickly 
established control. The most successful being De Beers, whose owner, the staunch 
British imperialist Cecil John Rhodes, first developed the classic system of labour 
control and theft prevention, by confining African miners in closed compounds for the 
duration of their contracts (Callinicos and Rogers 1977). The new prosperity eventually 
helped to establish the first government of the Union of South Africa in 1910 - an 
alliance between mining capital, led by Smuts (English), and big Afrikaner landowners, 
led by Botha (Afrikaner). The union was to face continual challenge, but for now 
appeased the hostile English and Afrikaner constituencies, angered by the Anglo-Boer 
War of 1899(Riley, 1991).
It was from this point that social divisions and separation in society, increasingly took 
on a rigid racial character. The fact that white settlers and indigenous Africans were not 
the only established communities, added to the elaborate form of segregation. In the 
Cape, a group known as 'coloureds' (descendants of the Khoisan, imported slaves 
and settlers) came to occupy an intermediate social position between black Africans 
and whites, whilst the importation of Indian indentured workers into Natal in 1860s, 
gave rise to another legally defined racial group (Beinart and Dubow, 1995).
2.3 SEGREGATION 1920s-1940s
Radical interpretations of apartheid (Wolpe, 1972; Wolpe,1988; Legassick, 1974; 
Legassick, 1995) challenge the view that later twentieth century segregation simply 
represented a survival of prior racial beliefs. For them racial ideas in themselves could 
not explain the development of such a complex system. Instead they extend an 
economic interpretation of imperialism as motivations for segregation; especially 
evident in the early mining industry, where the overwhelming need for cheap labour 
was identified as the chief cause of the introduction of early racist legislation and the 
demise of the African economy (Benart and Dubow, 1995).
2.3.1 Black Labour
The system that had previously allowed African tenants to work the land in exchange 
for paying the white farmers rent was gradually replaced by low wage-labour. The 
African rural economy now supplied the labour power to the advanced capitalist sector, 
but it was migrant and temporary. Africans deprived of any rights or status in the white 
areas, were to return to their separate reserves in between periods of work, in order to 
retain a subsistence level of production in the impoverished African areas (Wolpe, 
1972).
Pass laws directed blacks to areas where employers most wanted labour. The 1911 
Mines and Works Act ensured segregation in employment, further controls were 
reinforced by the compound system, where a rigid social division between white and 
black was assured (Riley, 1991). Such practices were much more then simple 
restrictions, they were part of a composite ideology that legitimised social difference 
and economic inequality in every aspect of African lives (Beinart and Dubow, 1995).
2.3.2 White labour
Most interpretations of segregation emphasise the perceived economic threat to white 
workers posed by rapid African urbanisation - especially as mine owners were 
becoming increasingly anxious to replace skilled workers with semi-skilled whites, or 
even blacks. In response, skilled workers (mainly English) changed the old craft unions 
to industrial unions, whilst emphasising the need for job reservation for whites, 
mobilising the interests of white workers on the basis of race rather than craft 
(Callinicos and Rogers, 1977).
In 1924, the Hertzog, the Prime Minster of the newly formed *Pact Government' (a 
political alliance of white agriculture and labour), replaced Smuts, and committed a 
major share of the surplus from the mines towards white interests. The Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1924, gave considerable rights to white labour, whilst denying 
African workers the power to form registered trade unions. Overall, the state, was intent 
on favouring the white constituency, which although poor had the vote (Callinicos and 
Rogers, 1977).
Nevertheless, throughout the late 1930s and 40s, the government's policy increasingly 
came under criticism from business wanting cheaper, more mobile black labour, and 
liberal whites opposed to discrimination. Moreover the rapid urbanisation and 
industrialisation, fostered by the second world war, served to intensify industrial and 
political resistance from Blacks and 'coloureds'. The Council for Non-European Trade 
unions (CNETU) formed in 1941, and claiming 158,000 members in 119 unions by 
1945, managed to organise a massive strike of over 75,000 African mineworkers in 
1946 (Finnermore and van der Merwe, 1990). Further developments of the squatters' 
movements and bus boycotts, led to the beginnings of the alliance of African, 'coloured' 
and Indian political movements. This in turn engendered the mass political 
demonstrations and the emergence of the militant African intellectuals (Wolpe, 1972). 
For the English-dominated large-scale capital (particularly mining) the solution to the 
threat, implicit from growing African militancy, was to alter the structure of segregation 
in favour of Africans (Wolpe, 1972).
2.4 CONSOLIDATION OF THE APARTHEID STATE: 1948-1960s
It was largely due to the developments in the labour field and the fears of conservative 
white workers, that the National Party was elected to power in 1948. Thereafter the 
ideology of apartheid (Afrikaans word for separation) and the implementation of racial 
divisions would intensify. For some, apartheid simply represented a mere elaboration of 
earlier segregationist measures; for others, so great was the intensification of 
segregationist ideology that it was considered qualitatively different - some even likened 
it to fascism (Bunting, 1969).
The National Party (NP) represented the old alliance of white agriculture and white 
labour reinforced by the rising Afrikaner urban bourgeoisie (Finnemore and van der 
Merwe, 1990). Over the next two decades it used the power of the state to increase the 
status of the Afrikaner over English speaking whites, and reinforced the racial controls 
to protect white labour, agriculture and small business against competition from blacks. 
Yet, apartheid also required a framework of protection to safeguard its implementation. 
An enormous state bureaucracy developed to create and promote import-substitution 
industries, and controls over both capital and labour (Lipton and Simkins, 1993).
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A crucial aim of the policy was to extend the migrant labour system to the African 
working class as a whole; henceforth all Africans were to exist as temporary workers in 
urban areas and cities. The 'modernisation1 of the pass laws under the Natives 
(Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act (1952), and the 
establishment of labour bureaux were used to direct African workers to where white 
employers required them. The Group Areas Act (1950) gave the government sweeping 
powers to remove black people from their homes and expropriate their property. The 
limited rights which Africans and 'coloureds1 had previously won were abolished. The 
revision of old and the introduction of new repressive laws (The 1950 Suppression of 
Communism Act, and 1962 Sabotage Acts), made it illegal to organise any type of 
opposition. Moreover, under the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act (1953), 
strikes were illegal for Africans, with no recognition of their trade unions (Wolpe, 1972; 
Callinicos and Rogers, 1977; Riley, 1991).
2.4.1 The Homelands (Bantustans)
Government policy in the rural reserves had also undergone a change, culminating in 
the programme of self-development. The newly established reserves, renamed the 
Homelands and known as Bantustans, were now to be given independence as 
sovereign nations, and controlled by their own self-governing tribal authorities. In 
reality, the crumbling economies of the African reserves were incapable of sustaining 
the local population and remained effectively South African colonies (Callinicos and 
Rogers, 1977; Callinicos, 1988).
Significantly, the ideological shift from white supremacy to self-determination in the 
Homelands was also accompanied by a change in the ideology of race. Previous NP 
ideology had used biological inferiority of Africans as the justification for its racist 
policies; now it stressed the ethnic differences, emphasising the notion of 'different but 
equal', and replacing race with terms like 'nation1 . This was important, because the 
ideology of racial inferiority was incompatible with the attempts to set up the complex 
machinery of government and administration needed to institutionalise relations 
between the state and the reserves, and to carry out certain administrative functions 
necessary for the continual development of a cheap labour force (Wolpe, 1972).
2.4.2 Black resistance in 1950s and 1960s
The Nationalist electoral victory had a radicalising effect on many black political groups. 
The 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, led to the arrest of large numbers of trade 
unions, and political activists. The subsequent political mobilisation involving several 
stay-aways (stay-at-home protests) and defiance campaigns by the ANC, the SAIC 
(South African Indian Congress) and the South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU) - formed in 1955 with close links to the ANC - intensified (Finnemore and van 
der Merwe, 1990). Of equal significance was the adoption by the ANC, and other 
groups, of the Freedom Charter in Kliptown in 1956. Its purposefully vague anti- 
capitalist rhetoric, setting out basic rights and freedoms, allowed the ANC to establish a 
loosely defined coalition, united around the single cause of dismantling apartheid 
(Murray, 1994).
In 1960 the Pan African Congress (PAC) - a black Nationalist organisation that had 
broken away from the ANC - launched a passive resistance to the pass laws. The 
South African regime responded by slaughtering African demonstrators at Sharpeville 
and Langa. In Sharpeville Police opened fire on 20,000 protesters, killing 67 people and 
wounding 186. The great national 'stay aways 1 that followed were crushed by the 
government' s state of emergency. Attempts by the ANC to reciprocate by forming its 
own armed wing, Umkonto we Sizwe, (Spear of Nation) (MK), was a disaster. The MK 
leadership - Mandela, Sisulu and Mbeki - were captured in 1963 and given life 
sentences, causing resistance to virtually disappear during the 1960s as surviving 
activists fled into exile (Finnemore and van der Merwe, 1990; Callinicos and Rogers, 
1977).
More especially, despite international criticism, South Africa's recovery from the 
Sharpeville crisis was swift as the nationalist regime went on to preside over the biggest 
boom in South Africa's history. Fuelled by a massive influx of foreign capital, the 
economic expansion was used to enrich the white population and finance the 
construction of the most powerful military machine in Africa (Finnemore and van der 
Merwe, 1990; Callinicos and Rogers, 1977; Spence, 1999).
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2.5 APARTHEID IN THE 1970s
By the 1970s the position of whites in South Africa, especially the NP's Afrikaans 
constituency, had been transformed to one of prosperity and stability. However, a 
succession of blows were about to strike the South African rulers, and challenge their 
complacency. Particularly symbolic were the widespread strikes by black workers in 
1973, which erupted in Durban and spread to other centres, bringing industry to a 
standstill. No trade unions were involved, and employers anxious to negotiate, could 
identify no leaders (Finnemore and van der Merwe, 1990).
Equally momentous were the events on June 16th, 1976 when students, protesting 
against the compulsory use of the Afrikaans language in schools, took to the streets of 
Soweto - the vast township outside Johannesburg. The South African Police reacted by 
mowing the demonstrators down; the first victim was thirteen year old Hector Peterson. 
As a consequence, Police brutality turned the demonstration into a riot, which lasted 
for over a year (Callinicos, 1988). After Soweto it became increasingly difficult for the 
state to contain protest and insurrection; a culture of opposition emerged shaped by the 
black consciousness movement (with inspiring leaders like Steve Biko), and the 
industrial militancy of the independent trade unions (Beinart and Dubow, 1995).
2.5.1 Black trade union movement in the 1970s
It was the rise of the independent trade unions in the seventies that seriously 
threatened the hegemony of the apartheid state (Callinicos, 1992a; Andrew Levy 
Associates (ALA), 1993-4). The increasing militancy from the black population 
eventually forced concessions from the white state - resulting in the scrapping of the job 
colour bar in the late 1970s, the recognition of black trade union rights in 1979 and the 
easing of controls over mobility (Callinicos, 1988).
Nevertheless, in the 1970s the formal industrial relations system continued to offer little 
to the majority black workers in South Africa. The main labour legislation - the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1924 (substantially amended in 1956)1 - underpinned the collective 
bargaining process, providing a statutory structure of industrial councils, conciliation
1 The original Industrial Conciliation Act was passed in 1924. Further significant amendments were 
made in 1956 . In 1981 major changes were implemented and the name of the Act was altered to the 
Labour Relations Act of 1956 (LRA). (Finnermore and van der Merwe, 1990)
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boards and works councils, but Blacks remained excluded from such institutions on 
account of being denied the definition of 'employee1 , a pre-requisite for recognition 
under the legislation (Kraak, 1993; Luckhardtand Wall, 1980).
The industrial councils were the cornerstone of the system. Comprising of a registered 
trade union(s) (50% representation), and employers or employers' organisations (50%), 
they recognised only separate white, 'coloured' and Indian workers' organisations. 
They operated at a industry-wide level and negotiated wages, working conditions and 
other procedural issues. Agreements were legally binding on all parties and could be 
extended to non-parties, offering some protection to non-unionised workers in smaller 
companies (Finnermore and van der Merwe, 1990). Yet, African workers lack of 
formal recognition meant they could only really channel their grievances through 
factory-based works and liaison committees, established by the Bantu Labour 
Settlement of Disputes Act of 1953. After the Durban strikes, the Bantu Labour 
Relations Regulation Act (1973) allowed parties to agree legally binding contracts, but 
since the representatives on the committees were often appointed by management, 
they were usually boycotted by black workers in favour of their own more militant, 
unofficial unions (Kraak, 1993).
Wiehahn Commission 1979
The apartheid government, disturbed by the increasing levels of resistance, addressed 
these concerns by setting up the Wiehahn Commission in 1979. Recognising the lack 
of formal structures for negotiation with black workers as the problem, it recommended 
freedom of association for all, along with the abolition of job reservation (Finnermore et 
a/., 1990; Kraak, 1993). The government only adopted a few of its recommendations. 
Under the 1979 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, migrants and commuters were 
still to be excluded from the definition of ^ employee1 ; registration of a new union would 
initially be provisional, and if constituted on non-racial lines, barred. More significantly 
the government retained severe restrictions on the right to strike, especially for those 
workers in essential services - including all central state and municipal workers (Kraak, 
1993).
Some unions registered but most black unions refused, viewing the 1979 amendments 
as more concerned with control than reform. Moreover, despite the employers 
resistance to unregistered unions, the organisations began to flourish to a point where it
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was no longer possible for the government or employers to ignore them. A major 
breakthrough came with the creation of FOSATU (Federation of South African Trade 
unions) in 1979, founded on principles of non-racial and industrial unionism, its 
emphasis was on democratic decision-making and shop floor steward organisation 
(Finnermore and van der Merwe, 1990).
2.5.2 Economic and political crisis in 1970s
The popular insurgency and upsurge in trade union militancy also developed against 
the backdrop of an increasingly serious economic crisis. 1973 was the year when the 
long world boom of the 1960s came to an end. South Africa, was profoundly affected by 
the international recession that followed, especially as Western investors withdrew their 
support fearing their economic interests would be damaged beyond hope of recovery 
(Spence, 1999). Furthermore, the cushion of white settler colonial states around its 
boundaries was beginning to collapse. A coup in Portugal in 1974 led to the collapse of 
Portugal's colonial empire in Africa: Angola and Mozambique; and settler rule in 
Zimbabwe was abolished in 1979. Such events, along with the growing militancy of its 
black population, fuelled the Nationalist government's paranoia that Communists were 
engaged in a 'total onslaught1 against the Republic (Callinicos and Rogers, 1977; 
Spence, 1999).
2.6 APARTHEID IN THE 1980s
It was in the 1980s that the greatest crisis was to emerge. The various elements - 
political reform, economic instability, township rebellion and working-class militancy - all 
came together in September 1984 to precipitate the greatest wave of mass resistance 
to white rule in South African history. Student and community organisations joined with 
political groups and unions to openly mobilise against apartheid. The community-based 
organisation, the UDF (United Democratic Front) became the driving force behind a 
national campaign: formed in 1983 it was a non-racial political organisation, broadly 
sympathetic to the aims of the ANC (Kraak, 1993). For nearly two years the country 
was shaken by township rising, far greater than 1976, and all the more threatening 
because they were accompanied by mass strikes mounted by the growing movement
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of independent unions. The most important of these united in 1985 under the 
federation, COSATU (Congress of South African trade unions).
2.6.1 Black trade union movement in 1980s
By the early 1980s, employers throughout the country had been subjected to 
sustained shopfloor pressure for recognition. Some employers recognised black 
unions, others became critical of the law that prevented them from doing so. In 1981 
the government was forced to revise the legislation. The Industrial Conciliation Act, 
whose name was changed to Labour Relations Act, (but still dated 1956), gave full 
trade union rights to every worker and autonomy to unions in respect of membership, 
but still sought to limit industrial action outside of the formal bargaining machinery, by 
increasing penalties for illegal strikes (Kraak, 1993). The Act was further amended in 
1982, replacing works and liaison committees with works councils. Nevertheless, it was 
still viewed as inadequate by African workers, chiefly because the new liaison 
committees had no legal rights - unlike the old works committees - to negotiate wages. 
Overall, the legislation failed to eradicate conflicts, mainly because reforms in industrial 
relations were not consistent with social divisions in wider society (Finnermore and van 
derMerwe, 1990; Kraak, 1993).
Launch of COSATU (1985)
On the 30th November 1985, a national union federation: the Congress of South 
African Trade unions (COSATU) was formed. The original discussions in 1981 had 
been impeded by opposing attitudes towards registering under the Labour Relations 
Act (Finnermore and van der Merwe, 1990). At the root of some unions' reluctance to 
register was the issue of non-collaboration with formal labour relations structures and 
commitment to worker's control. This was further complicated by political perspectives 
and the question of whether to participate in community politics by affiliating to the UDF 
(United Democratic Front) (Baskin, 1991).
At its launch in 1985, COSATU had acquired 500,000 members (450,000 paid up) 
making it the largest federation in South Africa. It included the former affiliates of 
FOSATU, the GWU (General Workers union), FCWU (Food and Canning Workers 
Union), CCAWUSA (Commercial Catering and Allied Workers union) and a small 
number of general and unaligned industrial unions. The largest affiliate was the
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National Union of Miners (NUM) with 100,000 members. The new federations' 
principles were non-racialism; 'one-union, one industry'; worker control; representation 
on the basis of paid-up membership and co-operation between affiliates at national 
level (Kraak, 1993).
Political alignment of COSATU
Despite temporary set backs the trade unions grew in numerical strength. However, the 
federation's first three years were marked by a bitter internal dispute known as the 
'workerist-populist' debate. It evolved around issues of political orientation and the 
future partnership with the ANC (Callinicos, 1988). 'Workerists1 were those who 
focused narrowly on economistic (wages and hours) issues. Tending to see apartheid 
as a mask concealing capitalist exploitation, 'workerists' still, according to Callinicos 
(1988), failed to grasp the significance of wider political struggles for working-class 
advancement. They rejected the ANC-SACP's, 'two stages' strategy' - which argued 
that national liberation was the necessary pre-requisite before the struggle for socialism 
could take place - and called instead for a socialist revolution at the same time as 
national liberation. Overall, the 'Workerists' aimed to build a strong, politically 
independent trade union organisation, whilst rejecting the need to prioritise the building 
of any political party. Conversely, the popularists or 'nationalists' concentrated on 
community struggles, contending that the proper place for the workers' movement was 
as part of a broad alliance, led by the ANC and concentrating on the national 
democratic struggle against apartheid (Callinicos, 1988; Baskin, 1991).
The 'workerist' led unions such as NUMSA (National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa) were from the beginning outnumbered by the 'populists', who were headed by 
the NUM (National Union of Miners). From the outset the 'populist1 tendency insisted 
that COSATU affiliates swear allegiance to the ANC's Freedom Charter; the 'workerist1 
tendency countered with calls to endorse a Workers' Charter, placing questions of 
socialism squarely on the political agenda. When the Freedom Charter was adopted at 
the Congress in 1987 it was evident that the 'workerists1 had lost and COSATU was 
symbolically identifying itself to the ANC (Murray, 1994). Over time, the growing ties 
between COSATU and the still-underground ANC and SACP, evolved into a 
functioning tripartite alliance (Lipton and Simkins, 1993).
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Union Organisation within COSATU
Throughout the 1980s, COSATU had managed to spearhead the growth and 
development of the progressive trade union movement, achieving remarkable success 
in expanding its membership, particularly among black semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. The black trade unions were involved in three distinct areas, the workplace, 
the sectoral and national levels. At the local level, the struggle for the right to organise 
saw the evolution of independent trade unionism rooted in shop floor structures. Rank- 
and-file organisation not only won influence in the workplace, but later provided unions 
with the ability to influence economic and political events strategically (Catchpowle, 
Stanworth and Winters, 1998). Nevertheless, where once plant-level bargaining was 
the means for building strength, COSATU centrally, now saw it as a dispersal of power 
leading to union difficulties in concentrating their forces. Although, many local shop 
stewards disagreed, the argument became less of an issue when employers opted for 
centralised bargaining in an attempt to minimise wage competition between companies 
and neutralise plant base activity (Kraak, 1993; Murray, 1994).
Consequently, from mid 1980s, the most powerful trade unions turned with increasing 
regularity toward centralized collective bargaining and participation in industrial councils 
to replace plant-level 'bargaining. In practice however, the South African industrial 
relations system was a bureaucratic maze, depending on voluntary participation within 
regional or local industrial councils, and rewarding disproportionately the strongly 
organised trade unions. In reality, it never truly matured into a coherent framework 
regulating industrywide, national collective bargaining (Murray, 1994). Nevertheless, 
the employers still felt the need to undermine it. By mid-1987, the employers changed 
tactics again arguing for the need to switch to local bargaining to match the newly 
emerging decentralised management styles. Attempts to destroy centralised bargaining 
were supported by the government, whose new 1988 Labour Relations Amendment 
Act (LRAA) intended to restrict the unions scope to mobilise, by outlawing solidarity 
action and allowing employers to sue unions for company losses. From this point on 
COSATU x s position on centralised bargaining strengthened and became a core 
principle of the federation (Murray, 1994).
Equally at this stage, COSATU began concentrating its efforts politically at a national 
level. Events around the trade union resistance to the LRAA in 1988 served to draw
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the national organisation into a greater political alliance with the ANC, with distinctions 
on the ground between unions and community organisations becoming increasingly 
blurred, as COSATU assumed leading roles vacated by banned organisations. In reality 
though, it was not really until the 1990s that the trade union movement actively sought 
to secure a voice for itself at a national level (Kraak, 1993).
2.6.2 Economic and political crisis in 1980s
It was during this period - the 1980s - that the economic costs of preserving apartheid 
began to rise. The slow growth of the economy could be attributed to factors like the 
lack of a systematic exporting policy, costly state investment in "strategic" industry, 
inadequate provision of education and skills, and poorly functioning labour markets. 
These problems were further sharpened by sustained political resistance (Murray, 
1994; Moll, 1993). Although, the state of emergency imposed by Botha in 1986 
appeared initially to be effective, its success was short-lived. Moreover, political 
blundering and economic mismanagement during the 1980s eventually precipitated a 
severe crisis in South Africa^s growing foreign debt, rendering the country vulnerable to 
international financial sanctions. Internal and external threats 2 drove South African 
businesses into a closer, though uneasy, working relationship with the government. 
Business used this leverage to press for reforms, first from Prime Minister B. J Vorster, 
then from Pres P.W. Botha, and when these proved inadequate, to lobby for their 
replacement (Callinicos, 1988; Lipton and Simkins, 1993).
By the end of the decade, apartheid was discredited. The response of the West to 
South Africa's unsteady business climate, namely capital flight and the cessation of 
international loans, had put further pressure on political elites to arrive at a possible 
alternative basis for their political legitimacy, especially as the increasing globalisation 
of capital, meant South African business was "losing out" on international inward 
investment "opportunities". The NP^s intelligentsia was the first to recognise this; and 
so with the prospect of losing power, began to consider an alternative ideology to 
apartheid, namely the "free market" and a call for "rolling back of the state" (Lipton and 
Simkins, 1993). As a consequence , constraints were imposed on the state by the
2 Overseas banks, led by Chase Manhattan in New York, refused to roll over South Africa's external 
debts, and the US Congress, the Commonwealth and the European community passed a variety of 
sanctions packages.
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promotion of privatisation, reduced levels of state expenditure, and the adoption of 
strict monetarist policy aimed at cutting inflation and tightening the money supply 
(Murray, 1994; Kibazo, 1994). It was inevitable that the public sector would be most 
affected by these changes, with the local authorities singled out for particular criticism, 
on the grounds of producing some of the most costly inequalities and structural 
deficiencies in the country. (Swilling and Boya, 1997).
2.6.3 The public sector in 1980s
The public sector - a wide term describing the Public service 3 , Departments of Posts 
and Telecommunications, South African Transport Services, parastatal institutions and 
local authorities - had evolved into an extremely complex network of organisations. It 
operated at national, regional and local level, and included central, provincial and local 
government bodies, parastatals (autonomous bodies), public corporations, the 
bantustans (Homelands) and the security and apparatus of the state (SX\/_8,1990a). In 
1984, the system had been made even more confusing by the introduction of a 
tricameral parliamentary form of government - consisting of a newly created ' White1 
House of Assembly, an 'Indian1 House of Delegates and a 'Coloured' House of 
Representatives. All three had separate responsibility for what was known as "own 
affairs" (such as education, cultural matters, housing) - while "general affairs" (including 
defence and the budget) remained centrally determined. The responsibilities of 
governments of the black states fell somewhere between those of the provincial 
administrations and those of the central government (Nattrass.J, 1988; SALB,1990a). 
Figure 2.1 summarises the overall structure of the Apartheid State.
3 The v public service1 is a narrower term describing the administration of Parliament, Provincial 
Administrations, and various government departments such as the Department of Justice, Department 
of Manpower, the various education departments, the South African Defence Force and the South 
African Police (SALB, 1990a).
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Figure 2.1
STRUCTURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID STATE
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The size of its total activities reflected the wide range of responsibilities the South 
African government held. The government was accountable for the maintenance of law 
and order, national defence, education, health care, payment of unemployment and 
pensions, the postal, telecommunications and road networks, the railways, harbours 
airways and power generation. In addition, it was heavily involved in the industrial 
sector, through the corporations producing iron, steel, chemicals, fertilisers, oil, coal and 
enriched uranium. Moreover, with different departments responsible for own-affairs 
(issues that affected individual race groups) and general affairs (issues that affected all 
race groups), the South African public sector emerged as a peculiar mixture of 
centralisation, regional deconcentration and devolution - with its structures fragmented 
along racial lines (Markham, 1987; Me Lennan, 1997). The scope of its activities are 
summarised in Table 2.1 below.
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Table 2 .1
PUBLIC SECTOR ACTIVITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1) CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (First tier) general and own affairs:-
i) General Affairs - matters affecting all race groups (such as budgets and defence). 
examples of Departments:
- Service Departments (South African Police, Defence & Correctional services)
- Civil Departments (Foreign Affairs, Public Works, Finance, Manpower
Transports justice)
ii) Own Affairs - matters affecting separate race groups. Including social services, 
recreational & cultural facilities, health, education, housing, community 
development & local government
2) PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION (Second tier)
Four provincial administrations: Cape, natal, Orange Free State, and Transvaal rendered 
services on a regional level, including:
Health,
Roads,
Community Development,
Environment & Local Government
3) TBVC (commonly known as the black homelands)
Transki, Bophutatswan, Venda and Ciskei
Rendered services in the black homelands, responsible for the administration of all affairs . 
Supposedly fully independent, but major proportion of their funds provided from Central 
Government
4) CIVIL SERVICES OF THE SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES
included: Gazabkulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, Kwa-Zulu, Lebowa Qwaqwa 
Rendered services for the independent self-governing areas
5) LOCAL AUTHORITIES
Rendered all local government services, included:
City Councils or Municipalities, and Town councils,
(including white-controlled local authorities, black local authorities (BLA's) & 'coloured' 
management cttees)
Regional Service Councils (RSC), replaced District Councils in 1987
Other bodies operating at this level included: 
Health cttes.
Regional water service corps. 
Water boards, 
Mgt.cttes for smallholdings, 
Local govt. affairs council, 
Development & services board & mgt. boards of rural areas.
6) PARASTATAL INSTITUTIONS
for example:
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 
South African Bureau of Standards, 
Human sciences Research Council
7) UNIVERSITIES & TECHNIKONS
8) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARDS
9) PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
including:-
Transnet Ltd,
South African Post Office
Telkom.
(N.B In fact any public enterprise in which the State has a majority interest)
Source: adapted from CSS (1993b), P0251: Employment and Salaries and Wages: 
Public Sector Statistical Release, Decembe, pp. 2-3; Heinecken, 1993, pp. 4-6.
Overall, it was possible to conclude that the public sector was poorly co-ordinated - with 
apartheid making the demarcation of various functions of the public sector extremely 
difficult to organise (Markham, 1987; Me Lennan, 1997). Indeed, such a complicated 
structure was highly bureaucratic with the separate departments' attempts to service 
the distinct race groups resulting in costly duplication (Bridgman, Palmer and Wolfgang, 
1992).
Local Authorities
The local authorities were particularly perplexing, with the institutions and functions 
inevitably divided along race lines. Table 2.2 shows the three different types of local 
government in South Africa
Table 2.2
TYPES OF LOCAL AUTHORITY COUNCILS (1987)
Municipalities or city 
councils
Functions varied, usually 
provided similar services to the 
Town and Community Councils 
but on regional basis,
i.e water supply, transport for 
the metropolitan area, 
electricity, fire & 
ambulance services
Town or community 
councils
health,
refuse removal,
sewage,
parks and recreational
security,
water supply,
electricity,
protection services,
fire-fighting
ambulance services,
traffic control,
passenger transport
Regional Services Councils 
(RSCs)
Prior to 1987 District Councils 
were responsible for 
municipal services' in areas 
outside the boundaries of cities 
and towns. 
RSCs (1987) 
aims:
  rationalise the provision 
of services on a sub- 
regional basis.
  channel funds into the 
physical development of 
poorer areas.
Source: Adapted from Marknam, 1987, pp. 89-80
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The entire structure of the apartheid city was governed by the racial regulation of urban 
space, via the Group Areas Act (first introduced in 1950). The act empowered urban 
administrators to slice up the cities into four racial segments reserved exclusively for 
whites, Africans, 'coloureds' and Indians respectively. Each segment was than 
separately governed and administered by a different body of planning, municipal and 
administrative law (Swilling and Boya, 1997). Such a system was not only expensive 
but frequently inept. Even the more affluent white local authorities - such as the 
Johannesburg City Council (JCC), Durban City Council (DCC) and Cape Town City 
Council (CCC) - struggled to deliver adequate services to its poorer, black and 
'coloured1 residents.
Pressure for reform
Whilst the National Party was painfully aware of the need to reform the public sector, it 
was only when faced with demonstrations, rent and rate boycotts and further 
unresolved financial crises in budgeting, that central government began to attempt to 
implement long-standing plans to restructure local government. A radical solution to 
the problems of local authorities and public sector organisation, was mooted in the mid 
1980s , with the intention to introduce the free market into sections of the public sector. 
This represented a fundamental shift in the National Party's ideology, especially since 
its power base historically lay within the state sector, functioning essentially as the 
control mechanism for the apartheid system. Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s the 
party's intelligentsia began to realise that the economic costs of administering the 
public sector was spiralling out of control, and a restriction on public spending - with a 
reduction in public sector employment costs - seemed to be the only solution. (Moll, 
1993; Murray, 1994).
2.7 THE 1990s: TRANSITION TO POST- APARTHEID STATE
In 1990, the continuing economic and political crises resulted in Botha and his regime 
being replaced by de Klerk who instituted far-reaching reforms. He accepted the need 
for negotiations for a new political framework if South Africa was to avoid sliding into 
economic collapse - or even full-scale revolution. It is debatable what factors caused de 
Klerk's turn about, but pressures on several fronts - deteriorating trade, rising
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unemployment figures, declining living standards, growing political unrest, costs 
imposed by international financial sanctions, change in the world order due to the 
collapse of state capitalism in the Soviet Union - must all be taken into account. When 
de Klerk moved into government, he inherited an economic recession with no end in 
sight and a fragile political stalemate, both of which imposed an unprecedented 
pressure on the political elites to find an alternative workable solution to South Africa's 
long-standing crisis (Murray, 1994; Catchpowle, Stanworth, and Winters, 1998).
2.7.1 Trade Unions in the 1990s
At the beginning of the 1990s the black trade unions enjoyed one of the highest union 
densities in the world - at the end of 1993 almost 40% of all workers with jobs belonged 
to a union (Baskin, 1996) 4 . From the 1970s unionisation had grown dramatically with 
the National Manpower Commission estimating the membership increasing from 
700,000, to approximately 3.4 million by the end of 1993 (Andrew Levy and Associates 
(ALA), Annual Report, 1993-4, p.5)
COSATU IN THE 1990s
In 1994, COSATU was the largest, mainly black trade union federation. There were at 
least five national union federations, but only three COSATU, NACTU and FEDSAL5 
were represented at the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC). Table 2.3 shows the share of union membership by national centre
4 This figure rises to 50% if one excludes agricultural workers and domestic service (Baskin 1996)
5 COSATU was, and is unquestionably the single most important player, with its industrially based 
unions dominating most factory floors. NACTU, originally identified itself with the black consciousness 
movement, but in the early 1990s shifted its ideological position from one of blacks only, to that of 
working class leadership, worker control, and a non-affiliation to political parties. Although originally a 
whites only, white-collar union, FEDSAL attempted to change its image in 1993 , by increasing its 
black and blue-collar membership. In 1994 efforts were made, for COSATU, FEDSAL and NACTU to 
form one federation, but the organizations failed to carry their constituencies with them.
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Table 2.3
SHARE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP BY NATIONAL CENTRE (1994)
Congress of South African Trade unions (COSATU) 
National Council of Trade unions (NACTU)
Federation of SOUTH AFRICAN Labour Unions 
(FEDSAL)
Other federations (including South African Confederation 
of Labour (SACOL), Federation of Independent Trade 
Unions (FITU) & unaffiliated unions
43%
11%
8%
38%
Source: Baskin, 1996, p.9.
Race, class and gender composition of COSATU
In 1985 at COSATLTs launch, delegates were mostly urban African manual workers 
employed by the private sector, and migrant workers. There were few white delegates 
but all were union officials. This delegation reflected the membership, which tended to 
be black, occupying low-paid and less skilled jobs. They traditionally sought 
unionisation as a means of strengthening their bargaining power and expressing their 
social and political grievances (Baskin, 1991).
The racial and class character of the federation remained the same until the 1990s 
when mergers began to strengthen the non-racial character of COSATU. In particular, 
large numbers of 'coloured' and Indian workers in manufacturing and services were 
brought into the organisation. There was also a resurgence in white members joining 
unions during this period (Baskin, 1996). Although density for white males had never 
been substantially lower than blacks - due to the apartheid state's active 
encouragement of white unions - the further recent rise in white membership was 
probably linked to increased insecurity felt amongst white workers 6 . In essence, by the 
1990s, whilst the majority of membership continued to be African, the racial mix began 
to mirror more closely South Africa's working class population (Andrew Levy and 
Associates (ALA)1992-4; Baskin, 1996). Table 2.4 outlines the percentage of 
unionisation by race in 1994.
Most whites, especially artisans and less skilled workers in the public service and parastatles, tended 
to join right-wing or house unions, but some openly elected to join black unions on the grounds that 
they were more effective. Clerical and lower level management positions who were increasingly coming 
under threat, particularly in the state sector, were also registering some interest in the more militant 
black trade unions (Baskin, 1996).
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Table 2.4
UNIONISATION % BY ^RACIAL CATEGORr (1994)
Race
Black
Asian
Coloured
White
Total
Total
35.4
32.9
30.3
22.7
31.3
Source: Baskin 1996, p. 12.
The membership in COSATU remained largely male, except for unions like SADWU 
(South African Domestic Workers Union) and CCAWUSA (Commercial Catering and 
Allied Workers Union - now SACCAWU, (South African Commercial and Catering Allied 
Union). With regard to gender there remained a lack of reliable data regarding trends 7 . 
Using early approximations presented by affiliates to COSATU's national women's 
seminar, Baskin suggested that women comprised approximately 36% of COSATU 
membership in 1990 (Baskin, 1991, p.371). The governments October Household 
Survey (CSS: OHS, 1995) suggested that women in 1994, comprised 29.1% of the 
overall union members - although the number was higher for black women with 36% 8 . 
Table 2.5 outlines the percentage of unionisation by race and gender in 1994.
Table 2.5
UNIONISATION % BY RACE AND GENDER' (1994)
Race
Black
Asian
Coloured
White
Total
Men
35.1
32.7
29.5
26.9
32.4
Women
36.0
33.2
31.5
16.5
29.3
Source: Baskin, 1996, p.12.
Baskin (1991) reported that women workers in South Africa - unlike many other 
countries - were no less keen to join unions than men. Many were in the forefront of 
joining the black democratic unions, but whereas women tended to be amongst the 
most militant and dedicated members, they were usually to be found among the ranks 
of shop stewards rather than in the senior positions in the union. Consequently, despite 
determined attempts to introduce changes, the general status of women in the union,
Most figures are estimates and can usually give only an indication of trends and patterns. For further 
discussion as to difficulties of obtaining reliable data see the methodology chapter.
These figures included significant numbers of women in domestic service. This sector remains 
historically difficult to organise, with large sections remaining outside of the formal sector. If one 
excludes this sector, women and men had roughly an equal propensity to unionise (Baskin, 1996).
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throughout the early 1990s, reflected their position in the South African economy and 
society. Women in all sectors performed the lowest-paid jobs, were often temporary, 
and more likely to be found in the informal sector. As a result their claims to triple 
oppression - as blacks, as workers, and as women - were justified, with their standing in 
the black community being as low as in the white society (Baskin, 1991; 
Mokgalo,1995).
Affiliate membership of COSATU
At the end of the 1980s, COSATU affiliated trade unions were at the vanguard of the 
anti-apartheid movement. Ideologically, these unions embraced non-racialism, 
despised capitalism and apartheid and called for the revolutionary overthrow of the 
apartheid state. By the 1990s, such unions had established themselves as the core of 
South Africa's labour movement. Most sectors were dominated by a COSATU affiliate 
(Baskin, 1996). COSATU's long-term commitment was the principle of ten 
broadly-based industrial unions - with one industry one union, In 1985, there were 33 
unions, by 1993, there were 15 (Mokgalo 1995; Andrew Levy and Associates (ALA), 
1993-4). Table 2.6 shows the COSATU affiliated unions in 1993.
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Table 2.6
COSATU- AFFILITATED UNIONS IN 1993.
Union
NUM
NUMSA
SACTWU
FAWU
NEHAWU
SAMWU
SADWU
SADTU
SACCAWU
TGWU
PPWAWU
CWIU
POTWA
SARHWU
CAWU
Sector organised
Mining & Energy
Engineering, Motor, Auto 
Assembly
Clothing, Textile
Food & Allied
State, Health, Education and 
Welfare
Municipal Workers
Domestic workers
Teaching
Service Industry Retail and 
Catering
Transport, cleaning, security
Printing, Pulp
Chemical, Petro-rubber
Communications
Railways, Harbour
Construction
Membership
253,796
237,741
170,000
121,534
40,565
72,342
16,172
74,349
102,234
38,036
37,951
41,462
23,081
41,081
24,300
Head 
Office
Jo' burg
Jo'burg
Durban
C'Town
Jo'burg
C'Town
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg.
Source: adapted from COSATU Affiliates, ALA 1993/4, p. 10.
Public sector unions in COSATU
One sector that became increasing important during this period was the public sector. 
COSATU organised the majority of public sector workers. In June 1986 members of the
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South African Allied Workers union (SAAWU), the General and Allied Workers Union 
(GAWD) and two independent health workers* unions merged to form the National 
Education, Health and Allied Workers union (NEHAWU), with a membership of 9,000, 
they were to represent workers in the health and educational sectors. In October a 
second merger of public sector unions took place. The Cape Town Municipal Workers 
Association (CTMWA), the Municipal Workers Union (MWUSA) and members of the 
SAAWU,(South African Allied Workers union) and GWUSA (General Workers Union of 
South Africa) combined to form a new union, the South African Municipal Workers 
Union (SAMWU), with some 17,000 members (Markham, 1987).
However, it was not until the early 1990s that public sector unionisation was able to 
register a real change in its growth . By this stage the sector included municipalities, 
local authorities, hospitals, educational institutions, telecommunications, and railways 
(ALA, Annual Report, 1993-1994) Table 2.7 shows the increase in membership of 
public sector affiliates in COSATU from 1991 -1993
Table 2.7
MEMBERSHIP OF PUBLIC SECTOR AFFILITATES IN COSATU
(1991 and 1993)
COSATU affiliates
National Education Health & Allied 
Workers Union (NEHAWU)
Posts & Telecommunications Workers' 
Association (POTWA)
South African Municipal Workers Union 
(SAMWU)
South African Railways and Harbours' 
Workers Union (SARHWU)
South Africa Democratic Teachers Union 
(SADTU
Membership 
1991
18110
21 081
60304
36243
N/A
Membership 
1993
40565
23081
72342
41 018
74349
Source: ALA, Annual Report on Labour Relations in South Africa, 1993/4, p. 10
In 1993, the amalgamation of the public sector unions into one industrial union failed to 
materialise and COSATU was eventually forced to consider new strategies for the 
servicing and recruiting of the public sector unions. In essence, the public sector was 
rapidly acquiring a reputation for being a semi-marginalised "difficult" sector to control 
(ALA, 1993/4; The Shopsteward, 1995b).
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Nevertheless, developments in the early 1990s in the public sector appeared to have 
opened up new "markets" for unionisation. In 1993, overall black union membership 
appeared to have reached a plateau and was stagnating - September 1993 figures 
reported that the COSATU membership had fallen slightly, from 1,267,252 in 1991 to 
1,220,232 in 1993 - whereas the public sector membership began to grow at a rapid 
rate (see Table 2.7 above). In particular, public sector unions reported an increase in 
white-collar membership, especially as these - once secure - employees came under 
increasing threats from downsizing and retrenchments (ALA, 1993/4).
COSATITS political aspirations in the 1990s
It was during this period that COSATU increasingly attempted to shape macro- 
economic policy. As a organisation COSATU, had acquired positions on statutory 
bodies such as the National Training Board, National Housing, National Electricity, and 
the National Economic Forums (NEF) - it was its powers of mobilisation that had helped 
it to achieve such national presence. The Labour Accord (1990) - reached between 
COSATU and the Minister of Manpower at national level - had been swayed by 
COSATU's first three-day national 'stayaway' in May 1988 (involving 3 million workers 
on the first day). The agreements in this accord had paved the way for reversing the 
anti-union 1988 Labour Relations Amendment Act (LRAA), and included a commitment 
from government to consult labour - along with business - on key issues concerning 
them. Furthermore, COSATU's anti-VAT (Value Added Tax) campaign, with its nation- 
wide marches and accompanying general strike (November, 1991) opposing taxes on 
basic foodstuffs etc., was often credited with bringing business to the negotiating table. 
It and providing the roots for tripartite forums such as NEDLAC (National Economic 
Development and Labour Council, a national forum for management, unions and 
Ministers) (Seftel, 1995; Catchpowle, Stanworth and Winters, 1998).
More directly though - after the unbanning of the ANC and the SACP in May 1990 - the 
process incorporating COSATU into a triple alliance hastened. The move seemed to 
contribute to the federation's main aim of entering into a reconstruction accord with the 
ANC, in the hope of influencing the future national agenda. However, by 1993 political 
and economical changes, meant the situation had become a little more complex and 
COSATU was increasingly forced to evaluate its role in the tripartite alliance (Murray, 
1994). In the 1980s the main task facing COSATU had been to organise and unite
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black workers. The previous practice had largely been for trade unions to operate as a 
conveyor belt for the popular-nationalist organisations. But replacing the 'struggle for 
liberation' with the new aim of electing the ANC into government was not without its 
complications. By 1992 it was becoming increasingly difficult for COSATU to maintain 
the allegiance of its very diverse membership - with their very different occupational, 
social and political backgrounds - whilst actively campaigning for ANC votes. 
Moreover, some 'Militants' - radicalised during the 1970s and 80s and fiercely 
determined to guard their trade union independence - were quick to express their 
dissatisfaction, when COSATU announced its loss of twenty of its most experienced 
leaders to the ANC's national electoral list (Callinicos, 1992a; Murray 1994).
The COSATU leadership for its part, appeared to be moving away from an earlier belief 
in a system based on workers' control. A pattern was emerging in South African labour 
relations, more reminiscent of the accommodation between national leaders and 
capital, evident in parts of Europe in the 1970s. New union-employer social contracts 
were now being viewed as means, of shifting away from adversarialism in the 
workplace towards co-operation and partnership. Yet, paradoxically, such corporatist 
tendencies were taking place in a period of increased commitment to tight fiscal polices, 
privatisation, and a push for deregulated labour markets (Murray, 1994; Catchpowle, 
Stanworth and Winters, 1998).
2.7.2 Economic and political changes in South Africa in 1990s
The 1990s also brought economic changes. Already in the mid-1980s, it had been 
possible to identify alterations in the workforce structure, with a general African 
movement from unskilled to semi-skilled jobs. From 1965-1985, the number of unskilled 
manufacturing jobs declined from 300,000 to 200,000 while semi-skilled jobs doubled in 
number from 400,000 to 800,000 (Kibazo,1994; Horwitz, 1995). Furthermore, new 
technology and long-term structural adjustments were mainly responsible for job losses 
in mining and manufacturing (Catchpowle, Stanworth and Winters, 1998).
Of significance was the effects of the country's annual average growth - less than 1% 
over period 1983-94 - and much of it accounting for the general decline in formal sector 
employment. With over 5.5 million people unemployed or under-employed, this 
represented a figure of over 40% in some areas (Horwitz, 1995). The levels of 
unemployment were further exacerbated by the decreasing number of job opportunities
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-1.5 million new job seekers could not find work in the formal sector. With such high 
levels of unemployment, trade unionists in particular, had come to represent a 
declining group of relatively well paid workers, in relation to the growing masses of 
unemployed (Andrew Levy Associates (ALA), Report 1993/4, p5.).
More directly, since the early 1990s - economists had been predicting that any 
economic ^upturn' would not be accompanied by increased employment - that the 
process of jobless growth witnessed elsewhere would be visited upon South Africa 
also. Many companies were already introducing participative management' schemes 
such as Quality Circles, Just-in-time and Green Field Site Areas in the hope of securing 
flexible work patterns (Rogerson,1993; Horwitz, 1995) A process, that had emerged in 
the 1980s, was beginning to accelerate in the early 1990s, with local managers actively 
by-passing shop stewards and pushing aggressive strategies of lean production', 
increased sub-contracting and casual working (Murray, 1994; Catchpowle et al .1998.)
Interestingly, whilst national union officials were increasingly involving themselves in the 
principles of decision-making, team-work and co-determination with the newly 
Reformed 1 employers, wholesale retrenchments were being threatened on the factory 
floor if the deregulated flexible work schedules failed to be agreed by the local 
workforce. These economic changes were further exacerbated by the ANC's seeming 
acceptance of the free-market ideology . In truth the ANC had begun to abandon its 
previous commitment to state intervention in the early 1990s, and by the time its 1992 
draft policy guidelines (DPG) appeared, the ANC economic policy had become 
noticeably more business friendly. Little wonder then many black trade union activists 
were experiencing feelings of confusion and mistrust (Murray, 1994; Weekly Mail and 
Guardian (1996b); Catchpowle et a/., 1998).
2.7.3 Public sector in 1990s
Such a shift in the economy - and a change in NP ideology away from state control and 
spending - was sure to have a major impact on public sector employment, especially as 
the state was the largest single employer in the country. CSS figures for June 1985, 
indicated that 1,413,892 were employed in this sector as opposed to 1,346,300 in 
manufacturing and 755,712 in trade and catering. By 1989, this figure had risen to 
approximately 1,684 million, and accounted for at least 15.6% of the economically 
active population (SALB, 1990a, p.78). However, by June 1993, when the numbers
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Table 2.6
COSATU-AFFILITATED UNIONS IN 1993.
Union
NUM
NUMSA
SACTWU
FAWU
NEHAWU
SAMWU
SADWU
SADTU
SACCAWU
TGWU
PPWAWU
CWIU
POTWA
SARHWU
CAWU
Sector organised
Mining & Energy
Engineering, Motor, Auto 
Assembly
Clothing, Textile
Food & Allied
State, Health, Education and 
Welfare
Municipal Workers
Domestic workers
Teaching
Service Industry Retail and 
Catering
Transport, cleaning, security
Printing, Pulp
Chemical, Petro-rubber
Communications
Railways, Harbour
Construction
Membership
253,796
237,741
170,000
121,534
40,565
72,342
16,172
74,349
102,234
38,036
37,951
41,462
23,081
41,081
24,300
Head 
Office
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Durban
CTown
Jo'burg
C'Town
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg
Jo'burg.
Source: adapted from COSATU Affiliates, ALA 1993/4, p.10.
Public sector unions in COSATU
One sector that became increasing important during this period was the public sector. 
COSATU organised the majority of public sector workers. In June 1986 members of the
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South African Allied Workers union (SAAWU), the General and Allied Workers Union 
(GAWU) and two independent health workers' unions merged to form the National 
Education, Health and Allied Workers union (NEHAWU), with a membership of 9,000, 
they were to represent workers in the health and educational sectors. In October a 
second merger of public sector unions took place. The Cape Town Municipal Workers 
Association (CTMWA), the Municipal Workers Union (MWUSA) and members of the 
SAAWU,(South African Allied Workers union) and GWUSA (General Workers Union of 
South Africa) combined to form a new union, the South African Municipal Workers 
Union (SAMWU), with some 17,000 members (Markham, 1987).
However, it was not until the early 1990s that public sector unionisation was able to 
register a real change in its growth . By this stage the sector included municipalities, 
local authorities, hospitals, educational institutions, telecommunications, and railways 
(ALA, Annual Report, 1993-1994) Table 2.7 shows the increase in membership of 
public sector affiliates in COSATU from 1991 -1993
Table 2.7
MEMBERSHIP OF PUBLIC SECTOR AFFILITATES IN COSATU
(1991 and 1993) ____ ____
COSATU affiliates
National Education Health & Allied 
Workers Union (NEHAWU)
Posts & Telecommunications Workers' 
Association (POTWA)
South African Municipal Workers Union 
(SAMWU)
South African Railways and Harbours' 
Workers Union (SARHWU)
South Africa Democratic Teachers Union 
(SADTU
Membership 
1991
18110
21 081
60304
36243
N/A
Membership 
1993
40565
23081
72342
41 018
74349
Source: ALA, Annual Report on Labour Relations in South Africa, 1993/4, p. 10
In 1993, the amalgamation of the public sector unions into one industrial union failed to 
materialise and COSATU was eventually forced to consider new strategies for the 
servicing and recruiting of the public sector unions. In essence, the public sector was 
rapidly acquiring a reputation for being a semi-marginalised "difficult" sector to control 
(ALA, 1993/4; The Shopsteward, 1995b).
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Nevertheless, developments in the early 1990s in the public sector appeared to have 
opened up new "markets" for unionisation. In 1993, overall black union membership 
appeared to have reached a plateau and was stagnating - September 1993 figures 
reported that the COSATU membership had fallen slightly, from 1,267,252 in 1991 to 
1,220,232 in 1993 - whereas the public sector membership began to grow at a rapid 
rate (see Table 2.7 above). In particular, public sector unions reported an increase in 
white-collar membership, especially as these - once secure - employees came under 
increasing threats from downsizing and retrenchments (ALA, 1993/4).
COSATLTS political aspirations in the 1990s
It was during this period that COSATU increasingly attempted to shape macro- 
economic policy. As a organisation COSATU, had acquired positions on statutory 
bodies such as the National Training Board, National Housing, National Electricity, and 
the National Economic Forums (NEF) - it was its powers of mobilisation that had helped 
it to achieve such national presence. The Labour Accord (1990) - reached between 
COSATU and the Minister of Manpower at national level - had been swayed by 
COSATU's first three-day national 'stayaway' in May 1988 (involving 3 million workers 
on the first day). The agreements in this accord had paved the way for reversing the 
anti-union 1988 Labour Relations Amendment Act (LRAA), and included a commitment 
from government to consult labour - along with business - on key issues concerning 
them. Furthermore, COSATU's anti-VAT (Value Added Tax) campaign, with its nation- 
wide marches and accompanying general strike (November, 1991) opposing taxes on 
basic foodstuffs etc., was often credited with bringing business to the negotiating table. 
It and providing the roots for tripartite forums such as NEDLAC (National Economic 
Development and Labour Council, a national forum for management, unions and 
Ministers) (Seftel, 1995; Catchpowle, Stanworth and Winters, 1998).
More directly though - after the unbanning of the ANC and the SACP in May 1990 - the 
process incorporating COSATU into a triple alliance hastened. The move seemed to 
contribute to the federation's main aim of entering into a reconstruction accord with the 
ANC, in the hope of influencing the future national agenda. However, by 1993 political 
and economical changes, meant the situation had become a little more complex and 
COSATU was increasingly forced to evaluate its role in the tripartite alliance (Murray, 
1994). In the 1980s the main task facing COSATU had been to organise and unite
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black workers. The previous practice had largely been for trade unions to operate as a 
conveyor belt for the popular-nationalist organisations. But replacing the Struggle for 
liberation 1 with the new aim of electing the ANC into government was not without its 
complications. By 1992 it was becoming increasingly difficult for COSATU to maintain 
the allegiance of its very diverse membership - with their very different occupational, 
social and political backgrounds - whilst actively campaigning for ANC votes. 
Moreover, some 'Militants' - radicalised during the 1970s and 80s and fiercely 
determined to guard their trade union independence - were quick to express their 
dissatisfaction, when COSATU announced its loss of twenty of its most experienced 
leaders to the ANC's national electoral list (Callinicos, 1992a; Murray 1994).
The COSATU leadership for its part, appeared to be moving away from an earlier belief 
in a system based on workers' control. A pattern was emerging in South African labour 
relations, more reminiscent of the accommodation between national leaders and 
capital, evident in parts of Europe in the 1970s. New union-employer social contracts 
were now being viewed as means, of shifting away from adversarialism in the 
workplace towards co-operation and partnership. Yet, paradoxically, such corporatist 
tendencies were taking place in a period of increased commitment to tight fiscal polices, 
privatisation, and a push for deregulated labour markets (Murray, 1994; Catchpowle, 
Stanworth and Winters, 1998).
2.7.2 Economic and political changes in South Africa in 1990s
The 1990s also brought economic changes. Already in the mid-1980s, it had been 
possible to identify alterations in the workforce structure, with a general African 
movement from unskilled to semi-skilled jobs. From 1965-1985, the number of unskilled 
manufacturing jobs declined from 300,000 to 200,000 while semi-skilled jobs doubled in 
number from 400,000 to 800,000 (Kibazo,1994; Horwitz, 1995). Furthermore, new 
technology and long-term structural adjustments were mainly responsible for job losses 
in mining and manufacturing (Catchpowle, Stanworth and Winters, 1998).
Of significance was the effects of the country's annual average growth - less than 1% 
over period 1983-94 - and much of it accounting for the general decline in formal sector 
employment. With over 5.5 million people unemployed or under-employed, this 
represented a figure of over 40% in some areas (Horwitz, 1995). The levels of 
unemployment were further exacerbated by the decreasing number of job opportunities
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-1.5 million new job seekers could not find work in the formal sector. With such high 
levels of unemployment, trade unionists in particular, had come to represent a 
declining group of relatively well paid workers, in relation to the growing masses of 
unemployed (Andrew Levy Associates (ALA), Report 1993/4, p5.).
More directly, since the early 1990s - economists had been predicting that any 
economic 'upturn' would not be accompanied by increased employment - that the 
process of jobless growth witnessed elsewhere would be visited upon South Africa 
also. Many companies were already introducing participative management' schemes 
such as Quality Circles, Just-in-time and Green Field Site Areas in the hope of securing 
flexible work patterns (Rogerson,1993; Horwitz, 1995) A process, that had emerged in 
the 1980s, was beginning to accelerate in the early 1990s, with local managers actively 
by-passing shop stewards and pushing aggressive strategies of lean production1 , 
increased sub-contracting and casual working (Murray, 1994; Catchpowle et al .1998.)
Interestingly, whilst national union officials were increasingly involving themselves in the 
principles of decision-making, team-work and co-determination with the newly 
'reformed' employers, wholesale retrenchments were being threatened on the factory 
floor if the deregulated flexible work schedules failed to be agreed by the local 
workforce. These economic changes were further exacerbated by the ANC's seeming 
acceptance of the free-market ideology . In truth the ANC had begun to abandon its 
previous commitment to state intervention in the early 1990s, and by the time its 1992 
draft policy guidelines (DPG) appeared, the ANC economic policy had become 
noticeably more business friendly. Little wonder then many black trade union activists 
were experiencing feelings of confusion and mistrust (Murray, 1994; Weekly Mail and 
Guardian (1996b); Catchpowle et a/.,1998).
2.7.3 Public sector In 1990s
Such a shift in the economy - and a change in NP ideology away from state control and 
spending - was sure to have a major impact on public sector employment, especially as 
the state was the largest single employer in the country. CSS figures for June 1985, 
indicated that 1,413,892 were employed in this sector as opposed to 1,346,300 in 
manufacturing and 755,712 in trade and catering. By 1989, this figure had risen to 
approximately 1,684 million, and accounted for at least 15.6% of the economically 
active population (SALB, 1990a, p.78). However, by June 1993, when the numbers
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employed fell to 1,636,207, there appeared to be evidence that an earlier 1986 state 
policy of freezing jobs in the public sector was starting to have an effect (CSS: 
PO251,1993a - Total figures used).
However, viewing the composition of the public sector in terms of overall quantitative 
figures is far too simplistic and fails to highlight the racial dimension of the state sector. 
Table 2.8 shows the racial breakdown of the public sector in December, 1993:-
RACIAL BREAKDOWN OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR, Dec. 1993*
Category
General 
Affairs
Own Affairs
Provincial 
Affairs
Self- 
Governing 
Territories
Parastatals 
Institutions
Agricultual 
Marketing 
Boards
Public 
Corporations
Local 
Authorities
Universities/ 
Technikons
TOTAL
White
147, 815
75,063
63,424
nil
7,050
1,289**
87, 947
48, 599
20, 542
451,729*
Coloured
32,743
57,462
32,382
nil
1 150
98**
17,223
36,403
3,871
181, 332*
Asian
6, 512
15,581
7,407
nil
137
58
3,324
7,321
1,545
41,885
Black
179,266
19,600
110,102
261,003
9,234
495
68,290
80,403
10,103
738,496*
Unspec- 
ified
1,991
5,940**
132,231
45, 251
9, 838
195, 251*
Total
368,327
167,706
213,315
216,003
23,511**
1,940**
309,015
217,977
45,899
1,608,693*
Source: CSS (1994b) P0251: Employment and Salaries and Wages , Public Sector Statistical 
Release June, pp. 5-16.
n.b. CSS full-time equivalent figures used.
- - = data not available
* = revised figures
The figures indicated that blacks dominated in all areas of the public sector, yet the 
distribution and location of the power was far from proportional to their size. Although, 
Blacks were the largest racial group in the public sector in 1993 - approximately 48% 
of the staff were 'Africans', 36% were whites, 11% were coloureds and 3% were 
Indians - they were still disproportionately represented in skilled and managerial
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positions, especially in comparison to whites. For example, whites ritually held the 
most senior positions in the public sector: of the top 3,239 public servants in 1991, 
only 4.5% were non-white, of which 0.6% were black (Me Lennan, 1997, p. 101). More 
especially throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the public sector continued to be 
largest employer of white labour: a third of all whites were engaged in state 
employment, and over half - the majority of Afrikaners - were employed by the state. 
Consequently, any serious attempt to reduce jobs in the public sector would have 
affected the white, especially the Afrikaner community, disproportionately. Since the 
apartheid government obtained the majority of its support from these groups, any 
significant downsizing of public sector jobs, especially in the crucial months leading up 
to the election, would have been political suicide for the National Party. It was for this 
reason that the state's intentions to commercialise the public sector appeared - on 
closer scrutiny - to have been largely rhetorical. Table 2.9 shows that the public sector 
employment figures from June 1993 to Mar 1994 remained in reality, fairly constant.
Table 2.9
TOTAL NUMBER OF WORKERS EMPLOYED IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR (June 1993-Mar 1994)
Total Number of
Workers
June 
1993
1 636 207
Sept. 
1993
1 631 652
Dec. 
1993
1 633 452
Mar 1994
1 630192
Source : CSS (1994a)" P0251: Employment and Salaries and Wages
- Public Sector Statistical Release March , p.16. * Based on revised figures
2.8 1994 ELECTION - THE NEED FOR CHANGE.
On the 27th April a new interim Constitution replaced the existing constitution of 1984. It 
ushered in the Government of National Unity (GNU), which was to run until the 
finalisation of the national constitution by the Constitutional Assembly, in 1999. From 
1994 the Republic of South Africa (RSA) was to have three Government Capitals: 
Pretoria(administrative), Cape Town (legislative); Bloemfontein (judicial). Central 
government (first tier) was to consist of the following (Table 2.10):
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Table 2.10
STRUCTURE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 'NEW SOUTH AFRICA
  Chief of state and Head of government - Executive President (Mandela) and
  2 Deputy Executive Presidents (Mbeki & De Klerk)
of government consisting of-
- 400 seats (200 from regional lists proportional to 
population and 200 from a national list)
members nominated by the 9 provincial parliaments
The second tier of government was the Provincial Parliaments - there were to be nine 
administrations (Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Eastern Transvaal, 
PWV, Northern Transvaal, North-West, Kwazulu-Natal, and Orange Free State), to 
replace the previous four provincial administrations (Cape, Transvaal, Natal, Orange 
Free State), the four homelands (Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, Venda) and the six 
independents states (Gazankulu, Kangwane, KwasZulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa). The 
provinces were to enjoy exclusive powers and effectively rule themselves. Its powers 
were to include making laws affecting agriculture, education, the environment, health, 
housing, local government and provincial police, transport, regional planning, tourism, 
trade and industrial development (Argus, 1994b; Argus, 1994c). The third tier was to 
be local government. If the national and provincial tiers of government were to create 
the structures to facilitate sustainable growth, than local government was to deliver the 
mechanism for improvements in housing, health care and infra-structural development. 
In July 1993, the Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF) published it 
recommendations - transition would take place in three phrases : the pre-interim phase 
would replace the existing local authorities with nominated, but more representative, 
local government structures; the interim phase would take place after the 1995 local 
elections for transitional local government; and phase three, the final local government 
dispensations, would be implemented after the adoption of South Africa's final 
constitution by the Constituent Assembly in 1996 (Pycroft, 1997).
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The New South African (NSA) public sector was to offer the prospect of greatest 
change. Issues regarding the role of the public sector in civil society, the nature of 
participatory democracy, local accountability, the management of human resources, 
and affirmative action programmes all had to be addressed. Public servants would no 
longer be permitted to act solely in the interests of the white minority - there was to be 
fundamental realignment of the apartheid bureaucracy. Its basic orientation would no 
longer be one of control, but democratic representation and political accountability. 
These changes would necessitate a complete reversal in the form and style of service 
delivery and a reorganisation of the racial composition of the sector (Reddy and 
Bendix, 1993).
'Unbundling* the apartheid public sector with its various homeland and central 
components was to prove one of the most complicated tasks facing the New South 
Africa (NSA). The new Public Service Commission (PSC) and its Administration 
Minister, Zola Skweyiya had the task of repealing no fewer than 21 laws, including a 
host of Public Service Acts, in order to dismantle the old apartheid public sector and the 
homelands administration. Restructuring was to be complicated by the need to 
integrate a series of racially and ethnically defined departments and services into either 
national or provincial or local departments, with consolidated service outputs and 
employment practices. The human resource management implications were immense. 
The transfer of staff and administration powers to the newly established provincial 
government, would entail a costly harmonisation of terms and conditions of 
employment between the centre and the regions (Ryan, 1994). From the beginning this 
task implied a battle over resources, between existing and new departments and the 
different levels of government (Me Lennan, 1997).
Local government in the NSA
It was the issue of local government, a strategic part of the public sector which was of 
interest here. Its transformation went to the heart of the expectations raised in black 
households, but its reorganisation was to prove an imposing task. No other case could 
be found where a national-level constitutional transition had been accompanied by 
complex local-level transition (Swilling and Boyd, 1997). In theory, the emergence of 
organised local government gave the individual municipal worker and township resident
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a voice and afforded them the opportunity to participate in the national and provincial 
political areas. In reality the sector was in crisis with some municipalities already close 
to financial collapse. Much of this was due to the design of the old structures, but the 
reorganisation and amalgamation strains had also taken their toll. In many municipal 
areas, particularly the rural areas, the population was simply too small, with little 
economic activity to be financially viable. The tax base was insufficient, the residents 
too poor, and debts too immense to allow the municipalities to raise sufficient money to 
function effectively (Swilling and Boyd, 1997).
Chapter three furnishes a historical background to the subsequent case study. The 
account of the historical development of the apartheid state, had shown that the system 
of apartheid was not simply a racist ideology, but a doctrine which - for many decades - 
sustained and reproduced the segmented social relations within a capitalist framework 
of production (Wolpe, 1972). For that reason, the election of Nelson Mandela, the 
repeal of the apartheid legislation, the enfranchisement of the majority, all appeared to 
signal, in 1992, a fundamental shift in the trajectory of South African history 
(Murray, 1994).
However, the ANC's apparent failure to construct a socio-economic restructuring 
programme independent of the existing world-wide capitalist system was already 
forcing them to comply with the conventions of the market-driven doctrine. As a 
consequence, the twin objectives of restoring business confidence and attracting 
foreign investment were now beginning to dominate. Nevertheless, the ANC was not 
solely a political party, it had pledged itself to a coalition - a formal tri-partite alliance - 
with the SACP and COSATU, and so this noticeable paradigm shift in socio-economic 
discourse and policy discussions, had major implications for its partners, especially 
COSATU.
The historical struggles of South Africa's trade unions had provided for its members 
unprecedented rights in the post-apartheid era. Unions crushed in the 1960s, re- 
emerged in the 1970s and 80s and managed to secure a role for themselves in the 
workplace and broader anti-apartheid movement. Many shop stewards were politicised
by the specific historical circumstances of the struggle and managed to pose a serious 
challenge to local managerial control and the political domination of the apartheid 
regime. The black unions of the 1990s owed much to this shop floor militancy which 
almost certainly contributed to the high union density - significant even by international 
standards (Baskin, 1996).
It was the development of such a strong labour movement from 1970-1990s - and 
COSATU's political alliance with the ANC and the SACP - which explained why the 
post-apartheid government could not simply ignore the black trade unions. More 
notably, it clarified why the ANC were forced to implement a formal, conciliatory system 
of industrial relations - beneficial to the trade unions - alongside its free market 
policies of work intensification, deregulation and privatisation. Such a model was 
highly contradictory, and despite the emergence of a 'union friendly' employee 
relations culture, the broader issue of COSATU's relationship with the ANC - and what 
it would mean in practice to share a tripartite alliance with the 'new1 government - was 
beginning to surface in 1992.
The public sector had become a focus for much of this confusion and dissent. The 
sector had historically been used to maintain and perpetuate the apartheid state, but its 
high cost and notoriously inefficient organisation made it a prime target for free market 
restraint and cutbacks. Yet, the issue of adequate financing - particularly for local 
government (a strategic part of the public sector) - went to the very heart of 
fundamental change for many black people. Thus a reluctance on the part of a newly 
liberated black government to fund this sector, was emerging as a source of conflict 
between the 'new1 state and the public sector unions.
To enable a fuller evaluation of these issues the next chapter provides a theory of the 
state and trade unions. The following theoretical framework, developed on the basis of 
a critique of the existing progressive literature, will then be used to aid an empirical 
examination of the Western Cape branch of the public sector union, SAMWU, which in 
turn will help further the conceptual understanding of the state and trade union
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The aim of this chapter is to establish a theoretical framework which can be used to 
aid the exploration of the empirical data of the SAMWU branch in Cape Town, whilst 
concurrently advancing the theoretical understanding of the relationship between the 
state and public sector trade unions in South Africa. Accordingly, the analysis centres 
on an comprehension of the state, the trade unions and capitalism in South Africa. 
The Marxist method of historical materialism is used to explain the mode of their 
changing relationship, with conflict and contradiction being viewed as integral to the 
process, and therefore central to the overall discussion (Ferner, 1988).
The discussion of the state, using a Marxist perspective helps to assess the class 
position of the ANC government and analyse its relationship with the South African 
trade unions. The analysis is presumed important because it reveals the state's 
autonomy from global capital and denotes its freedom to adopt policies that favour 
trade unions (labour), as opposed to the employers (capital). The transformation of 
the South African public sector is seen as an integral part of this process because of 
the structural, organisational and workforce changes that had taken place within it, 
both before and after the 1994 election. As a rule, government ideology and its 
subsequent policies are applied stringently in the state sector, owing to the 
Government's desire and ability to *set an example '. As part of the state: the public 
sector's logic of action, and the functioning of its industrial relations, can be 
understood in terms of the place it occupies within the state structure.
The trade unions are also considered fundamental to the discussion. In the 1992-97 
period, the South African state was being confronted by a powerful labour 
movement, perceived as a branch of the newly emerging South African civil society. 
Traditionally used to open conflict with the state and employers, the post-apartheid 
trade unions were experiencing a period of containment. The state and business 
were being forced, in the short-term at least, to accept compromise with labour by 
engaging in corporatist experiments designed to contain any major resistance to the
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system. Such reformist arrangements ran contrary to prevailing world-wide 
economic trends, but appeared essential if the ANC was to secure the mediating role 
of the unions, and maintain its legitimacy with the black electorate.
In addressing these issues, the following sections of the chapter firstly explains the 
theory of historical materialism, the conceptual framework which guides the overall 
analysis within the dissertation. Secondly, the author elects to use the materialist 
approach contained within the state derivation theory - in preference to other radical 
analyses - to explain the nature of the state. And, while support for the theory is not 
uncritical, it is initially applied to the Yeal world' of South Africa, with particular 
emphasis on apartheid and the subsequent adoption of free-market polices in the 
post-apartheid public sector. Thirdly, the Marxist analysis of historical materialism - 
as developed by Gramsci - is used to explore the nature of trade unions. It explains 
the notion of civil society and collective consciousness, whilst highlighting the role of 
trade unions within this framework, and their direct contribution to the development 
of a class consciousness. The account ends with an examination of the trade union 
tactics of strike and conciliation in South Africa; the aim being to explore the 
contradictory behaviour of trade unions within civil society, and assess the 
seemingly inconsistent policies - corporatism and free market - of the ANC 
government.
The Marxist method of historical materialism is used to explain the process of social 
change in the relationship between the state and public sector trade unions in South 
Africa from 1992-97. The dissertation takes a materialist approach to the subject and 
perceives capitalism as comprising not of things' but of 'relations'. The central 
insight of historical materialism is that in the final analysis all history depends on the 
production of the necessities of life; that every advance in the effectiveness of the 
production alters the social relations between people and their ideological and 
political circumstances (Callinicos, 1983).
For Marx, material production is identified as the dynamic in society that moves the 
relations and society in a specific direction, since such a force is perceived as having 
the tendency to achieve cumulative development on its own. For example, the output 
of material production is wealth or resources - it is this which allows lives to be free
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from material deprivation. The desire for such an outcome provides the momentum 
for new forces of production to develop (tools, machines, access to raw material), 
which can increase the output of labour, produce more profits, and create the 
desired wealth . But, since production is organised socially , the process also entails 
adopting new ways of working, with humans finding new methods of relating to each 
other. Initially, these changes are so small they are barely noticed, but as they 
continue they bring about a qualitative change in the whole of the social structure. In 
sum, changes in the way material production takes place, leads to changes in the 
relations of society in general (Harman, 1998)
To expand, however, such a process is not conflict free. In developing a theory of 
historical change, Marx interpreted Hegel in a radical way, using the dialectical 
critique of positivism (or enlightenment rationality) as a means of explaining the 
changes taking place in society (Harman, 1998). The method involved three 
principles: totality, change and contradiction. Each of these on their own do not 
constitute a dialectical approach; they only become dialectical when they are taken 
together (Cooper, Smith, Taylor and Catchpowle, 2000; Callinicos, 1983).
The method views all change in society as being generated by the contradictions 
internal to that system. Change is not the same as the 'cause and effect', commonly 
found in positivist theorising, this usually entails pure description and fails to explain 
the how or why. This approach seeks to find the cause of change within the system - 
the cause is seen as internally generated, the result of contradictions internal to the 
system (Rees, 1998; Callinicos, 1983).
The main depiction of this contradiction under capitalism, can be found in the mutual 
but exploitative relations between the opposing classes of "labour and capital 1 - a 
relationship of a 'unity of opposites'. For Marx, society was comprised of these 
'unity of opposites 1 , it was the historical development of the struggles of these 
'opposites' which creates change from one form of society to another. Under 
capitalism each class is dependent on each other, yet only exists in its antagonistic 
relationship to the other. Capital is inseparable from wage-labour, since the latter 
creates the profits which capital lives off, but it is also an exploitative relationship 
because one class exploits another opposing class (Cooper et a/, 2000; Callinicos, 
1983).
40
Such a contradictory relationship cannot be understood in isolation. The notion that 
society forms a whole and its change can only be understood historically is central to 
the Marxist theory of dialectical materialism. The dialectical method means taking a 
holistic approach to changes in South Africa and analysing all the parts and all the 
relations of that system. We need to view the complete picture, the ' totality', over a 
period of time, and in the course of historical development, to be able to fully explain 
the actions of states and labour in South Africa during this period (Callinicos, 1999). 
In sum, the dialectical method contained within the theory of historical materialism is 
essentially what guides the overall analysis contained within the thesis. Within that 
framework we now turn initially to the debate concerning the nature of the state
In order to understand and explain the actions of the ANC government during the 
1994-7 period, the class nature of the state is examined. The progressive theoretical 
literature associated with the 'theory of the state', provides a useful means of 
assessing the states independence and appraising whether the corporatist policies 
being implemented by the ANC government in 1994 would benefit the labour 
movement.
The research gives priority to the work of the state derivation theorists (Bonefield and 
Holloway,1996; Burnham, 1991; Burnham,1996; Burnham,1997; Bumham2001; 
Clark, S, 1988; Clark.S 1991; Holloway 1996; Holloway and Picciotto, 1977; 
Holloway and Picciotto 1980), who develop a materialist not an economic hypothesis 
of the state. The political superstructure of the state is not viewed as separate from 
its economic base, but rather the economic and the political are both forms of social 
relations, assumed by the basic relation of class conflict in a capitalist society. This 
is in keeping with Marx's ideas that the economic categories are the abstractions of 
social relations of production (Marx and Engles, Collected Works, 1975, vi. 165). 
The basis of the material 'real world 1 is the class conflict found in the relationship of 
production assumed by the 'employers - owners of the means of production' - on the 
one hand, and 'workers - sellers of labour power1 - on the other (Callinicos, 1983).
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Economic and political divide
The 'state derivation1 theorists (Burnham 1996; Holloway, 1996; Holloway and 
Picciotto,1980), disagree fundamentally with the traditional belief that the political 
superstructure is a reflection of the economic base. They particularly criticise the 
economic determinist view of Yaffe and Bullock (1975): who see the superstructure 
as a reflection of the base, and reject the supposition that economics and politics are 
separate. Such a determinist approach sees limitations imposed on state action by 
nature of its relation to the process of accumulation. By focusing exclusively on one 
aspect of these limitations, namely that state expenditure represents a deduction 
from total social surplus value, Yaffe and Bullock (1975) propose that the state is 
restricted by the competing claims of private capitals on that surplus value, which 
must be met if accumulation is to continue. Within these limits, the determinist 
school assumes the state acts rationally in the interest of capital. However, the state 
derivation theorists claim such an 'economic determinist1 approach remains limited, 
because the argument fails to explain why individual states periodically take actions 
which do not appear to be in the interests of capital (Holloway and Picciotto, 1980, 
p. 13); for example a number of post-war European governments adopted corporatist 
policies, that could be construed as giving labour rather than capital a greater 'voice1 
in the managing of the national economy (Palmer, 1983).
'Separate superstructure ' theories of the state.
The 'state derivation' theorists view can also be distinguished from the more 
common view of 'the state as a separate superstructure ' (Holloway and Picciotto, 
1980: pp 3-10). Pre-capitalist societies regarded political power as overtly tied to 
class rule, with political rights being restricted to members of economically and 
socially privileged groups. Unlike the aristocracy of feudal time, the capitalist class is 
in the first instance an economic class whose position does not automatically accord 
political power. This helps to explain the general acceptance of a political and 
economic divide in society (Hyman, 1975).
Such theories (often associated in the U.K with the journal, New Left Review) see 
the state as possessing a separate superstructure to the economic base, and being 
external to the capitalist economic system. Miliband (1973,1983), argued an 
'instrumental' view of the state, it being tied to the capitalist class only because its 
leading personnel comes from the same group as the owners of private capital. The
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state may develop historically to provide the political prerequisites for capitalist 
production (police, services, etc.), but is distinct from the system itself. This 
separation was used to argue for the autonomy governments have, and explained 
why state actions may not always be in the interests of capitalism.
Poulantzas (1969,1972, 1978) equally viewed the state as a separate 
superstructure, but challenged Miliband on the grounds that the state's character 
was greater than those who controlled its top structures. Poulantzas took a 
'functional' view of the state: it fulfils the needs of the society of which it is part; and 
since this is a capitalist society, it is a capitalist state. As a function of that society, a 
change in that system would mean it could still find expression through the state. 
Poulantzas argued that the state was not just called upon to meet the needs of 
capitalist accumulation; but to also maintain stability in a class-divided society by 
being a 'symbol of legitimacy1 for all groups. The notion led to the concept of 
'relative autonomy', driven directly from the dual functions of the state - the securing 
of accumulation and legitimisation. Legitimacy being possible only if the state was 
seen as separate from the direct control of capital (Ferner, 1988).
Harris(1986) also developed the thesis that the state was separate from capital. 
Whereas, capitalism was viewed as global, being free to pursue profits without being 
restricted, the state was seen as a geographically based political entity, whose 
confines cut across the operations of individual capitals. Capitalism may have 
originally grown up within a particular nation state, but now operates within any 
states(s) willing to accommodate its needs (Harman, 1991). Nevertheless, whereas 
the nation state was once a necessary instrument for one stage of capitalist 
development - a superstructure essential to capital accumulation - this did not imply 
the state was about to decline. Instead there has been a redefinition of the state, 
with its bureaucracy remaining and developing interests of its own (Harris, 1996, 
p169). These interests invariably include a nation state striving to maintain a 
balance of class interests, attracting capital, building up its military strength; or more 
notably using its national boundaries to restrict trade in a way, which at times, proves 
irrational to capitalism.
However, whilst it is possible to be critical of Yaffe and Bullock - considering it 
necessary to consider other limitations on state action than just state expenditure - it 
is equally possible to query the 'state as a separate superstructure' claim. Writers 
such as Zeitlin (1985), question the 'relative autonomy' of the state on the grounds
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that if such an autonomy was authentic there would be nothing to prevent individual 
states from adopting non-capitalist policies, yet he finds little evidence to support this 
proposition. Perhaps even more significant is the deduction from the * separate 
superstructure 1 theory that the problems and events that arise in the political sphere 
are somehow separate and distinct from those that arise economically (Harman, 
1991). More directly, the 'state derivation1 theorists accuse the proponents of the 
'state as separate' of neglecting the essential structural links between the 
bourgeoisie and the capitalist state, arguing that the modern nation state is not 
autonomous or simply related to the 'economy', but intrinsically capitalist because it 
is part of the wider social relations whose overall form is (as explained in Marx's 
section in Capital Vol. III. chapter xlvii.) determined by the manner of surplus 
extraction (Bumham, 1996, p.93).
State as a form of social relations
The state derivation theorists argue that the state is not to be understood as a 'thing 1 
in itself, but a form of social relations. They use the analogy of physics where there 
are, despite appearances, no hard categories or separations - energy can be 
transformed into mass and mass into energy. To understand social phenomena in a 
similar manner is to view it as forms of social relations between people, uneven and 
changeable but, rigidifying into certain forms; forms which appear to acquire their 
own autonomy, their own dynamic. The state then is a rigidified form of social 
relations, with the major question being (posed by the so-called state derivation 
debate) why do social relations rigidify in this way? (Holloway, 1996, p119).
Part of the answer - for the state derivation theorists - lies in the historical change in 
the form of the state, which occurred gradually as political revolutions overthrew 
sovereign power and social struggles prompted and became expressions of 
changing social relations of production. In the process these struggles abolished the 
direct political character of civil society - relations were now to be characterised by 
modem private property relations subject to the rule of money and law. 
Simultaneously the turmoil effected the separation of the state from civil society and 
produced the modern political state (Burnham, 1996.p.99). The capitalist state is 
characterised by an institutional separation from the immediate process of 
production. What remains distinctive about the 'state derivation' theory is its 
emphasis on the differentiation between economics and politics, not the dominance 
of the 'economic' over 'polities'. The form or particularisation of the state is seen as
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being peculiar to capitalism - a product of the historical separation of the state and 
civil society' - achieved by the gradual disintegration of feudal social relations 
(Burnham, 1996).
This differentiation between the economic and political, although important, is not 
seen as a fundamental one; the rule of law and the rule of money are equal, defined 
as two aspects of the rule of capital. They are not two totally distinct logics; such 
capital relation 'forms' whilst enjoying a separate existence, spring logically and 
historically from the nature of that relation (a sort of 'two heads on one body1 ). In fact, 
the enforced separation of state and civil society is seen as an institutionalised 
illusion. The state as a 'political' sphere presupposes the 'depoliticising' of civil 
society, yet the very act is itself political and obscures a reality founded on the basis 
of private property (Burnham, 1996 p101). Therefore, the development of the political 
sphere is not to be seen as a reflection of the economic, but is to be understood in 
terms of the development of the capitalist relation of class exploitation in capitalist 
production.
Marx's view of 'capital as self-valorizing value', (Marx, 1978,185) helps make this 
point clearer. Marx understood capital as a 'movement1 , a circulatory process, not 
as a static thing. He recognised the successive transformations of capital - for 
example, money-capital into labour-power and means of production, being used to 
produce commodities, which are sold to produce larger sums of money etc. - as the 
different circuits of capital. Money capital and commodity capital do not denote 
separate branches of business, rather they are particular functional forms of 
industrial capital, which are assumed at any one time during the 'circulation sphere1 . 
Accordingly the Marxist tradition equally refuses to fetishize either the 'market1 or 
the 'state', instead focusing on the changing character of the form of the 'political' in 
relation to the circuit of capital (Burnham, 2001. p104-5).
Therefore, the 'state derivation' theorists' rejection of the 'primacy of economies' 
means a rejection of the determinist school (Yaffe and Bullock, 1975), with their 
fundamental error of only being able to understand social relations of production in 
terms of technical economic relations (Burnham, 2001.p105). Equally they reject the 
functionalist's theses purported by Poulantzas (1972,1978), because the state is not 
seen as being compelled to functionally serve the capitalist system. Likewise, the
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state in capitalist society, is not - as the instrumentalists9 (Miliband, 1973,1983) 
would argue - the result of the class composition of the personnel of the state 
apparatus, but rather the position occupied by the state in a capitalist mode of 
production. Instead the 'state derivation' theorists argue that the focus should be on 
the changing character of the form of the 'political' in relation to the circuit of capital. 
The state is not seen as autonomous of the economic base, rather it is an aspect of 
a wider more fundamental set of social relations based on the separation of labour 
from the conditions of production. Any limitations on state action arise from the 
nature of the structural relation between capital and state, a process which is 
capable of restricting or rendering state action in the overall rational interests of 
capitalism (Burnham, 2001).
Equally, globalisation is not seen as a 'defeat1 of the state by the world market. Such 
a perspective exaggerates the actual decline in state power vis-a-vis the market, and 
tends falsely to see them as two distinct areas, modes of power or social logics, 
rather than aspects of a wider thing: the rule of the bourgeoisie and capitalism. More 
importantly it understates the degree to which the 'roll back of the state' is itself a 
deliberate political project conducted by states (Burnham 1996). A similar argument 
is made be Clark, I (1996), when he suggests the withdrawal of state regulation in 
the economy and labour relations in Britain in the 1980s is not, as the free market 
theorists would imply, a complete separation of the state from the dynamics of 
capitalist production, but rather a political project of the state aimed at removing the 
state from direct involvement in post-war social democracy and collectivism.
The 'state derivation ' debate, therefore helps to provide a clearer materialist 
understanding of state actions. It is possible to recognise that the state is capitalist 
because it is part of the whole 'bourgeois society1 . As a form of capitalist social 
relations its existence depends on the reproduction of those relations, with any 
changes in its various modes of regulation being ultimately founded on the tensions 
and contradictions intrinsic to the capital labour relations. The modern state is not 
just a state in capitalist society, but a capitalist state, since its entire existence is tied 
to the promotion of the reproduction capitalist social relations as a whole (Burnham 
1996; Holloway, 1996).
9 The 'Instrumentalists' are also classified as 'functionalists', the leading personnel identified in their 
theory as being there to functionally serve capitalism
Critique of the 'State derivation ' theories
Nevertheless, whereas the materialist approach of the 'state derivation' theorists 
provides a more discerning approach to the actions of states than the 'economic 
determinist1 and 'state as separate superstructure' arguments do, the theory still 
neglects to address a number of related issues. Firstly, because of the abstract 
nature of the theory, the state is usually only conceptualised in a singular 'form'; 
Secondly (and this is linked to the first criticism), for the 'state derivation' analysts, it 
is the structural differentiation of state and business, the 'distinctiveness' of politics 
and the state from the business of 'economic' exploitation and the mechanism of 
money, that makes the state capitalist. Yet precisely because two distinct but equal 
forms are defined in society, difficulties occur. Such an abstract analysis fails to 
provide for the precise causal links between the two modes of regulation: it is not 
clear what actually causes the capitalist system and the state to shift from the 'rule of 
law' to the 'rule of money? More importantly such a distinction between the 
economic and political, completely rules out the state ever merging with, or acting as 
capital. The state can never take the lead and impose its will on the private business 
class, or even totally usurp the business class, which makes it impossible to explain 
the experiences of Nazi Germany, or Stalin's Russia. An understanding of such 
events are essential, especially as capitalism is not made up of a single state but a 
world system of different states, with the competition between the multiplicity of 
capitalist states having an influence on the form the capitalist state takes (Barker, 
1978p.118)
A third related criticism, is that for the 'state derivation' theorists (in particular, 
Holloway and Picciotto, 1977; Holloway and Bonefield, 1996) the policy of the state 
is the result of class struggle - the state is an aspect of the capital relations, and that 
is itself a relation of class struggle. But herein lies part of the problem, because such 
an approach only allows for part of the answer, it only recognises the capital-labour 
relations. The very number of different relations 'within' and 'between' the capitalist 
classes, are not really considered. Although the 'state derivation 1 approach takes 
account of the 'vertical' capital-labour relationship, it tends to neglect the 'horizontal' 
struggles between exploiters (capitalists), and even between the different states 
themselves (Barker, 1978, p120; Catchpowle, Cooper and Wright, 1999).
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Whilst these criticisms will be further addressed in the thesis, its useful to initially 
apply the * state derivation' theorists' materialist analysis of the state (outlined above) 
to South Africa - since such a supposition embodies only the form of the explanation. 
To truly understand how change occurs the theory must relate to the concrete, 
empirical conditions in society, especially as an approach rooted in dialectical 
materialism entails constantly empirically studying the world by utilising the 'actual 
world 1 rather than the x ideological' world of Hegel.
APARTHEID STATE
Apartheid had traditionally been seen as a reflection of racial ideologies or a simple 
extension of segregation. For others, apartheid represented so great an 
intensification of segregationist ideology and practices that it could be considered as 
qualitatively different (Bunting, 1969). Whatever the merits of this argument, 
apartheid was a rigorous and totalizing ideology in a way that segregation had never 
been, and by the 1960s had come internationally to symbolize the evils of racist 
exploitation (Beinart and Dubow, 1995. p. 13)
The transition from segregation to apartheid was addressed in the 1960s and early 
1970s, when a group of Marxist intellectuals (Leggasick, 1974; Wolpe, 1972) insisted 
that apartheid could only be understood as a function of capitalism. Wolpe (1972) 
argued that apartheid was not a mere reflection of racial ideologies, but rather a 
doctrine sustaining and reproducing capitalist relations of production in a particular 
social and economic context. Wolpe^s hypothesis explained how South African 
capitalists were able to secure cheap labour through the system of migrant labour, 
owing to the fact that African workers accepted paltry wages on account of being 
subsidised by their families maintaining subsistence agriculture in the reserves. The 
relationship between the state and capital was further strengthened in the post-1948 
era, when a coercive homeland policy of tighter controls was instigated to safeguard 
the continuing supply of cheap migrant labour for South African industry.
Although the theory was challenged, it led to further writers on the left (for example, 
CTMeara, 1975; Webster, 1985;Callincos, 1988) to develop an economic and material 
explanation of race in South Africa, and to doubt whether the apartheid state could 
ever be abolished without a socialist revolution to tear out the roots of apartheid in
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capitalism. Consequently it came as a surprise when in 1990 the NP, led by F.W. de 
Klerk , agreed to negotiate with the ANC, leading perhaps to the conclusion that the 
apartheid state enjoyed an independence separate from its capitalist base.
Yet, an alternative reading of the situation could simply be that South African 
business, realising its competitive interests were no longer served by the racist 
policies of apartheid, put pressure on the South African state to reform the system. 
The objective was to take full advantage of the changing markets and, or even 
perhaps, to avoid further full scale resistance to capitalism in that country. Therefore, 
in keeping with the 'state derivation' theorists' analysis, although the state 
appeared to be taking independent action it was in reality only making changes in 
order to safeguard its business community, and by inference (because the two share 
basic relations to capital) its own interests. All of which strengthens the view, that 
the state is not independent from, but an integral part of, the evolving logic of 
capitalism in South Africa. This observation immediately raises questions as to 
whether the ^New' South African state can ever favour its trade union alliance 
partners, if that policy runs (in the long-term) contrary to world-wide economic trends 
and practices of the capitalist system.
POST-APARTHEID STATE
A further example of how the state is an integral part of capitalism is clearly evident 
in the ANC African governments conversion to the free market, in the post-apartheid 
period. The ANC has traditionally been influenced by statist traditions, with origins in 
both Fabian and Communist thinking. However, the transition to the market economy 
in formerly communist countries, and pressures from international business 
appeared to have influenced the ANC, forcing it to abandon state policies of 
intervention and to retreat to policies associated with neo-classical economics. 
Therefore, unable to implement a programme for socio-economic restructuring, 
independent of the existing world-wide capitalist consensus, the ANC leadership 
began complying with the rules of market-driven orthodoxy (Stoneman, 1993).
In short, the changes in the ANC policy appeared to support the state derivation 
theses: that because there has been a shift in the balance of capitalist power back 
towards the Yule of money1 , the South African government, as an integral part of the 
capitalist system, was also forced to change its mode of regulation. Above all, this 
change in state policy and ideology was particularly evident in the South African
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public sector where the debate regarding the effects of the ANC's changing 
ideological position had become even more notable.
Public sector
The multiple functions the public sector performs - defined as a provider of services, 
employer of labour, and political institution for national, regional and local voice - has 
often contributed to a tension between the public sector as a vehicle for effective 
service delivery, or a political institution. Since the 1980s, this tension has become 
increasingly acute throughout the world, due to a changing political ideology 
emphasising a transformation in the structure of government and the control of public 
expenditure (Leach, Stewart and Walsh, 1994).
The new ideology was directly linked to the influence of the 'new institutional 
economies' which sought to remodel the machinery of government according to the 
idealised concept of competitive market system (COSATU 6th National Congress 
Report, 1997a). The theory replaced that of the 'Keynesian welfare state' which had 
previously stressed the role of the state in extending social welfare and combating 
market failure, and providing a balanced partnership between the state and the 
market to achieve economic growth and full employment (Bacon and Eltis, 1976). 
Instead, a powerful new ideology ('Government by the market') was used to outline 
the strategy for slimming the public sector - charged with 'crowding out' productive 
private investment. Instead the public sector was urged to promote the use of 
privatisation, subcontracting to private firms, and 'commercial' market-orientated 
approaches in central and local government, health and education. Fundamental to 
the policy was the challenge to the established interests of the public sector 
employees and their unions. Governments, especially in the U.S and U.K, engaged 
in successive confrontations with public service workers. These attacks, associated 
with claims to make improvements in the public service, were (are) strongly driven by 
the ideological goal of changing the balance between labour and the market in the 
crucial and once impregnable public sector (Bishop, Kay and Mayer 1994; Self, 
1993).
Implications for South African public sector
Such a shift in paradigm, had huge implications for South Africa. The transformation 
of the public sector and its institutions had been viewed by the ANC as fundamental
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to building a new democracy, before 1994 (Swilling and Boyd, 1997). The apartheid 
public sector had come to symbolise the immense inequality between whites and 
blacks in South Africa, especially as the control of the public sector had been 
essential to the preservation of the apartheid system. The machinery of the state 
was needed not simply to provide services for capitalist enterprise, but also to 
reproduce a compatible racist-capitalist state apparatus. Conversely, the vision of 
the 'new' public sector was to be one of moving away from its regulatory role 
towards that of a developmental agency (Wooldridge and Cranko, 1997).
A recurrent ANC argument had always been that apartheid, inequality and capitalism 
were integrally related, and a strong state was needed to create a more equitable 
and acceptable economic system. There was to be less emphasis on economic 
growth, and more on nationalization as a means of redistributing wealth in the 
country. The public sector was to play a strategic role in this process (Nattrass, N 
1994). The ANC^s new demand driven programme, the RDP (Reconstruction and 
Development Programme, 1994), especially emphasised the need to shift the 
delivery of basic services to previously marginalized communities. It prioritized 
greater democracy and stressed the importance of enhancing the quality of life of the 
poor, by calling on the public sector and local government organisation to meet the 
^new' material and democratic demands. Yet indicatively, budgets provided by the 
ANC for such projects, showed very little prospect of growth (Wooldridge and 
Cranko, 1997).
In reality, since the 1994 election the ANC government had been moving at an 
increasing pace away from developmental strategies like the RDP, towards the 
implementation of privatisation. It made no references to restructuring or regulating 
the financial sector and even proposed that the role of the public sector might be 
reduced through privatization! Although this was quickly revised to reducing the 
public sector in certain areas in ways that will enhance efficiency, advance 
affirmative action and empower the historically disadvantaged (Nattrass, N 1994), 
the overall tone was highly supportive of market forces, with the public sector 
earmarked as one of the main recipients of the free market ideology (Catchpowle 
and Cooper, 1999).
Undoubtedly from the beginning, it was clear that the public sector was going to be 
an area of conflict for the ANC, chiefly because the trade unions were championing 
the sector'...as the critical arena in the struggle for social solidarity and social justice
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against the market1 (COSATU 6th National Congress Report, 1997a). Although, up 
until mid 1995, the government managed to avoid using the "p" word, opting instead 
for the term "restructuring of state assets", they were forced in May 1996 (due to a 
crisis in the rand) to announce the appointment of advisers to privatise state assets. 
It took until August 1996 before advisers were actually appointed; part of the reason 
for the delay was a political struggle over who would control restructuring and 
privatisation, but the prime reason remained COSATU's opposition to privatisation 
(Financial Mail, 1994d).
Consequently - and to return to the 'state derivation1 theory - it is possible to argue 
that because the state is not viewed as separate but as an integral part of 
capitalism, a shift in capitalist ideology back to the Yule of money1 means the South 
African government will also retreat to the doctrines associated with neo-classical 
economics. Equally though - as events in South Africa concerning the slow 
implementation of privatisation has shown - if the power and activities of labour 
(represented in this case by the black trade unions), are strong enough to threaten 
the labour-capital relations, it too can influence state actions. Especially, as the 
capitalist social relations can be altered by the tensions and contradictions intrinsic to 
the capitalist labour relations (Burnham, 1996; Holloway, 1996). Class struggle 
therefore lies at the heart of Marx's account of accumulation since capitalism must 
not only extract surplus from labour in the production process, but also ensure the 
successful reproduction of the total social circuit of capital (Burnham, 2001, p.104).
Thus according to the 'state derivation' theorists, trade union struggle can also 
affect government policies if their organisation and members are perceived as strong 
enough to threaten the stability of capitalism. It is useful to analyse the nature of the 
trade unions further in order to explore this presumption. The legitimisation and 
institutionalisation of trade unions and labour relations in post apartheid South Africa 
was obviously a historical victory for the labour movement, but the effects of such a 
change could only really be measured in terms of the trade unions' ability to 
persuade the government to decide policies in their favour. The following 
evaluation, gives a materialist analysis of the trade unions in relation to the state - 
within the exploitative relationship between labour and capital.
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The historical achievement of the April 1994 elections owed much to the black trade 
unions, whose contribution to the national liberation struggle served as the backbone 
to South Africa's mass movement. As a consequence of the mass action, on the 
part of many different and varied sections of the South African civil society, 
previously disenfranchised groups were now demanding a 'voice' in the 'New South 
Africa 1 . The trade unions were being viewed as pivotal to this process owing to their 
central role in the past 'struggle'. However, in order to conceive of the position of the 
trade unions in the newly emerging civil society, the next section initially explains the 
nature of civil society, the role of historical materialism, and their links to a 
development of a collective consciousness, based on the tensions and 
contradictions intrinsic to capitalist - labour relations. Secondly, it highlights the trade 
unions as a part of that civil society, with its contradictory role in such society 
demonstrated by its engagement in activities of both strike and conciliation.
Civil society, especially in South Africa context, is sometimes taken as a separate 
and autonomous entity to the state. Civil society10 was first seen by the
enlightenment philosophers as a realm outside of the state where individuals 
pursued their private economic interests. For Hegel it was a product of the modern 
world, arising out of individual needs in society. He was the first to contrast civil 
society with the state, seeing it as the outcome of a historical process and somewhat 
separate and independent from the state (Nina, 1992).
Gramsci's interpretations of the state and civil society provides further useful tools to 
comprehend the situation. He argued that the state was 'political society plus civil 
society' (Hoare and Smith, 1971, p.262). Gramsci understood the state as a dual 
entity in which the rule of the bourgeoisie could be exercised either via coercion or 
by consent (Nina, 1992). 'Political society', usually seen as the ordinary state, or as 
Gramsci sometimes called 'the state-as-government', uses direct domination
10 The term was used by eighteen century Scottish philosophers such as Ferguson (1767) to 
mean 'civilisation'.
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exercised through the state or juridical 1 government (armed forces, courts, prisons, 
administrative departments such as the social security). But this is only one among 
many of the defences used by the capitalist society, the other institutions are found 
in "civil society1 - church, trade unions, schools, political organisations, family. They 
are a network of voluntary organisations and situations that pervade every-day life 
and influence the consciousness of the individual and how they conceive of the world 
(Simon, 1988).
Such institutions and ideologies are an integral part of bourgeois society used to 
buttress the capitalist state and the system. Such a model comprises 'the entire 
complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only 
maintains its dominance but manages to win the consent of those over whom it rules' 
(Hoare and Smith, 1971, p. 244). It is the method by which capitalism achieves 
ideological dominance or what Gramsci called "hegemony1 in a modern society 
(Simon, 1988).
Historical materialism
Gramsci"s interpretation of the role of civil society arose out of a Marxist, materialist 
analysis of social relations. The organisations which make up civil society were (are) 
the result of a complex network of social relations. Capitalist society is composed of 
three sets of social relations: the relations of production (the basic relation between 
labour and capital); the coercive relations which characterise the state; and other 
relations which make up civil society - such as local, regional or bureaucratic forms 
of domination, where certain power is exercised and is given a material form in 
institutions and organisations (Simon, 1988).
Yet, at a practical, or even a theoretical level, one should not take the distinction 
between civil society and the state as though physically divided with boundaries. 
Each is composed of social relationships and is part of the same, what Gramsci 
called the "integral state'. Gramsci uses the term "integral state' to include both civil 
society (the sphere of hegemony) and the state (sphere of coercion). Whereas he 
distinguishes between the two, he is also grouping them together in the "integral 
state'. He is using the term in both the ordinary sense and in a sense of power. 
What he wanted to suggest is that the social relationships of civil society are 
relations of power just as (but in different ways) to the coercive relations of the state 
(Boggs,1974; Simon,1988).
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But, whereas Gramsci saw both types of power as essential, with no modem 
capitalist society being able to survive without exercising both coercion and consent 
it must - in order to have adequate stability for the ruling classes - rule mostly 
through raising a level of consent from the non-dominant sectors. A political 
equilibrium must exist in which the bourgeoisie (the minority), incorporates certain 
claims from the non-dominant (majority) sections of society. For this reason civil 
society is not an uncontested terrain (Simon, 1988). This relationship between the 
political structures, and the institutions and popular ideologies that support it, can 
change (Boggs, 1976).
Development of class consciousness
Gramsci believed civil society, however powerful, could not escape from the complex 
contradictions and conflicts in the network of relations of social forces, dominated by 
the central conflict between capital and labour. Although a sphere of control, power 
or hegemony for the capitalist classes, civil society was also a sphere of conflict, 
integral to the system because of the exploitative class relationship that lay at its 
heart. Gramsci believed that despite the strength of the ruling classes' dominant 
ideology, the majority's consciousness was uneven. It often included more than one 
understanding of the world - bourgeois and socialist. The socialist conceptions of 
reality being implicit in the workers everyday practice within the process of 
production - where the underlying conflict between capital and labour came to the 
surface (Callinicos,1999; Boggs, 1976).
The extent and control of that conflict or struggle remains ambivalent to the ruling 
classes. In times of crisis, the variables protecting the ideological hegemony of the 
ruling elite can be stripped away. The upheaval can, according to Gramsci, 
jeopardise the modern state because it reduces it to a 'economic-corporate' 
existence, which reveals to the working classes the state's role in oppression. Such 
an erosion of ideological hegemony; therefore offers possibilities for the collapse of 
the old consciousness and the society it sustains, moving the majority towards a new 
set of belief systems and a corresponding social order (Boggs, 1976).
Yet there is nothing inevitable in this process, Gramsci stressed that for change in 
consciousness to be authentic it needed to be total and conceived of as an organic 
process. It was not one event or events but embraced all aspects of society, all
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dimensions of human existence. Despite the insecure position of the dominance of 
ruling ideology, Gramsci still believed the conquest of such a highly developed 
modem society would require an elaborate strategy. In this Gramsci called for the 
more complex 'war of position' (he was making comparisons with the trench warfare 
of 1914-18) - the gradual capture of individual positions - as opposed to the crude 
'war of manoeuvre1 , or direct frontal assault on the state. For that reason he did not 
focus on one single aspect such as economics but introduced instead the notion of 
^ensemble of relations'that incorporated all economics, politics, culture, social 
relations, ideology etc. Like Marx, Gramsci's work was a 'totalising 1 theory that 
embraced all aspects of society, incorporating the method of dialectics to explain and 
achieve change. As a consequence no realm of bourgeois society was outside of 
the class struggle, each dimension was closely interwoven with all the others. The 
struggle to change one area was inevitably bound up with the struggle to change all 
(Boggs, 1976).
Gramsci's early critiques of the trade unions provided a useful springboard for many 
of his theories. Trade unions were viewed as an integral part of civil society, a prime 
institution through which the bourgeoisie sustained its hegemony. Such 
organisations in civil society were defined as strategically limited, if not co-operative 
with their narrow fragmented definitions of economics and politics serving only to 
articulate a notion of labour as a commodity to be brought, sold and negotiated. Yet, 
although trade unions advanced only the limited economic demands of a particular 
sector, Gramsci still believed they could be areas of defiance and struggle. Trade 
unions were viewed as areas of ambivalence, capable of co-option but equally areas 
of potential resistance (Boggs, 1976; Simon, 1988).
For this reason trade unions have sometimes been defined as principal arenas for 
Gramsic's 'war of position 1 ; but Gramsci rejected such a suggestion, for him trade 
unions remained a central element of bourgeois hegemony in civil society, capable 
only of functioning within its logic because of originating from a bourgeois society. 
Gramsci did not claim that trade unions would overturn bourgeois legality, or even 
challenge the essence of wage labour as an aspect of capitalist exploitation. To 
seek anti-capitalist, revolutionary objectives within such an forum was dangerous 
and served only to create the illusion that socialism was possible under capitalism 
(Boggs, 1976).
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In fact, in support of Gramscrs rejection of trade unions as vehicle for revolutionary 
change, he claimed that as the unions expanded they would become more like other 
corporate structures, increasingly bureaucratic and remote from the mass of the 
workers. They would fail to challenge the issues of self-management or workers 
control, since its very articulation would challenge the power of the union leadership 
and almost certainly undermine the vested interests of its bureaucracy. He was not 
alone, Luxemburg also criticised the trade unions and their leadership, whose 
involvement in every day tasks, she described as blocking their wider horizons of the 
struggle (Frolich, 1972 p. 138). But although Gramsci reasoned that trade unions 
could never transcend the logic of capitalism itself, he still viewed them as important 
institutions that could be used as tactical means of reaching the masses (Boggs, 
1976, Simon, 1988). Luxemburg for her part, despite describing trade unions as 
organised defences of working classes rather than weapons of attack (Frolich, 1972, 
p.58), still believed they could provide the militant body needed to spark off a mass 
strike (Frolich, 1972,)
It is worth exploring the paradox or contradictory character of trade unions in civil 
society further, by examining the two main lines of actions open to unions in civil 
society - conflict or conciliation. Such actions - although not always entirely 
exclusive on account of being possible phases of 'regulated' industrial relations - 
are more commonly described as two contradictory, or opposing elements within the 
industrial relations forum. The events surrounding 'regulation' or 'strife' are reflected 
in the capitalist social relations of production. In terms of conflict, the fact that 
labour is treated as a commodity is at the root of the friction in the workplace. 
Rational attempts by workers (the majority class) to increase wages and improve 
conditions are a cost to the employer (the minority class), and must be reduced if 
control over the production process and profits are to be maintained. Consequently, 
there exists a conflict of interests between the two classes which underlies 
everything that occurs in industrial relations. The strike is the ultimate response to 
these diverging interests and represents some attempt on the part of workers to claw 
back an element of control (however small) over the production process and their 
own lives (Hyman, 1975).
However, governments have come to realise that union activity is far less dangerous 
if it is assigned a level of legitimacy through legal protection and formal consultation. 
Activities outside of the law and institutions are more likely to involve an explicit
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challenge to the political regime, whereas the institutionalisation of trade unions 
allows the integration of sections of the working class into the capitalist society, 
acting as a mechanism of social control. Such collaborative relations between the 
state and trade unions are most developed during periods of corporatist 
experiments. The need for such inter-dependence is usually greatest when the 
working class is strongly organised, yet adversely affected by changing economic 
policies (Hyman, 1975). The following sections attempts to analyse these different 
strategies - strikes and corporatism - within the context of a changing South Africa.
In considering the power of the trade unions it is important to deliberate on one of the 
major weapons open to the trade unions -the use of industrial action. Whilst, it is an 
undeniable fact that not all trade union struggles lead to conflict between the classes 
at the level of society - especially as those taking industrial action rarely consider 
social transformation, aiming instead for more modest goals of changes in wages or 
work practices - such action still has the potential to threaten the control of the 
minority (Hyman, 1971).
It is Rosa Luxemburg's writings on the The Mass Strike1 (1989) that are most 
often quoted in Marxist literature on South Africa, especially during the 1980s when 
events on the ground appeared to offer a real prospect of a fundamental change. 
Historically, Rosa Luxemburg had been able to show - by tracing the mass 
revolutionary strikes of 1905 in Russia to a string of mostly wages and hours strikes 
dating back to 1896 - how workers were often drawn to socialist ideas by economic 
or social struggles. As a consequence of this process work-groups developed a 
sense of being part of a class as opposed to just a collective, the economic issues 
surrounding the strikes were therefore generalised to include political issues. The 
importance of genuine mass strikes for Luxemburg was they arose from the workers" 
own activity, often initiated by unorganised layers of the class, and tending to unite 
the whole of the proletariat across sectional divisions. Such actions exceed the 
barrier between politics and economics and pose the question of state power 
(Callinicos, 1988; Moody, 1997).
Usually in the workplace a symmetry exists between the two main classes - labour 
and capital - which represents a formal or informal class compromise, often 
embodied in rules or institutions, common to civil society. Periods of mass strike
reflect the disruption of such equilibrium and can challenge the subordinate position 
of workers. There is a realisation that as workers they form part of a working class 
whose problems and potential solutions can be found within their class position. 
Therefore, what distinguishes Luxemburg's 'mass strikes' from any other form of 
action is the historical events surrounding such activities expose the character of 
'class' (Brecher, 1997).
The mass strike usually entails three related processes: the challenge to existing 
authorities, the tendency of workers to begin to take over the direction of their own 
activities, and their development of solidarity with each other. The sources of these 
processes are the same: control of production. The real issue is an attempt by 
workers to wrest at least part of the power over their working lives away from their 
employers and exercise it for themselves. The end result is the sense of being part 
of a collective with solidarity developing the individuals' control over their lives. More 
especially, during this process workers are transformed from people competing for 
jobs, to people co-operating in pursuit of common interests. From this perspective 
the mass strike can have a revolutionary potential: its outer demonstration lies in 
contesting the power of existing authorities, but its inner conceptualisation is the 
transformation of society, where the managers are replaced by self-management 
with individuals working together to meet their own needs by meeting each others 
(Brecher, 1997).
Strikes in apartheid South Africa
Despite Luxemburg's theorisation of the links between the economic and political 
strikes, and their potential to achieve fundamental changes in society, the 
undeniable proposition that not all basic struggles lead to political class conflict or 
class consciousness has led to a dismissal of such economic struggles. Yet the 
struggle for the right to organise in South Africa by an independent trade union 
movement, with shop-floor structures clearly orientated towards addressing both 
economic and political issues, appeared to challenge this view - for a while at least 
(Moody, 1997).
For the black trade unions the early waves of mass strikes brought not only collective 
bargaining and rapid union growth but also a broader fight for political inclusion. The 
dynamics of these struggles forced the trade unions to link the workplace conflicts 
with much wider struggles in the townships and communities. At various times and
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places, the black trade union federations' power to mobilise national stoppages, 
resembled in an rudimentary way, Rosa Luxemburg's strategic conception of the 
'mass strike'. Such activities pulled the unions towards other sectors of the working- 
class and helped them to emerge as a broader class-based movement, calling for a 
radical change in the infra-structure and society as a whole (Moody, 1997).
Yet on closer examination, a number of fundamental elements were missing. For 
example the 'stay-aways 1 " were not mass strikes, they were extensions of
community action, based on township organisation rather than workplace discipline 
and solidarity. They did not arise from the workers' own initiative based on 
workplace organisation. Consequently, all too often the township struggles tended to 
radicalise bitter confrontations with the state, while the workers' movement remained 
confined to the trade union struggle. Even when major disputes did occur in the 
workplace, they did so in isolation from the broader political issues. The idea of 
linking concrete economic struggles with the broader movement for national 
liberation was never part of the ANC strategy (Callinicos, 1988; Callinicos, 1990).
A further major problem was a lack of conception of how to build a political 
alternative to the ANC, an essential task if COSATU was to later avoid becoming an 
appendage to that organisation. One obvious choice was the South African 
Communist Party (SACP), but this organisation had failed to exist as a viable 
alternative to the ANC for decades, especially as it had long chosen to attach itself 
to the political fortunes of the ANC. Consequently, even if the mass strikes had 
managed to pose the question of power in South Africa, that would not in of 
themselves have solved it. The experience of Solidarnosc in Poland (much studied in 
South Africa) confirmed this point - without an alternative party fighting within these 
organisations to win a majority for the seizure of power, even the greatest of 
workers' movements can be defeated (Callinicos, 1988; Murray, 1994).
11 A form of action unique to South Africa - involving the positioning of pickets at railway stations, bus 
depots and taxi (mini bus) ranks. The aim was to prevent workers leaving the townships in order to 
travel to work
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Strikes in post-apartheid South Africa
Nevertheless, although the strikes engineered by the black trade unions did not 
result in the revolutionary transformation of society, they doubtless played a decisive 
role in raising the class consciousness of black workers, giving them the power and 
confidence to contribute to the abolition of apartheid. But, whether this 
consciousness, raised during apartheid, could still be a force for change in the post- 
apartheid public sector, remained an essential question - and one pertinent to the 
dissertation. For certain though, the ANC's shift to the free market ideology and its 
new policy of tough fiscal discipline, did appear to be opening up the possibilities of 
further conflict within the public sector (Ryan, 1994). 1995 was particularly notable 
for strikes in the state sector, with two especially bitter disputes involving nurses and 
municipal workers (Mabogoane, 1995).
3.4.4 Corporatist experiments
Free market initiatives were only part of the state's strategy in the post-apartheid 
period. In 1994, the South African state appeared to be initiating a policy of state 
intervention, more reminiscent of the accommodation between labour movements 
and capital, common in Europe in the 1970s. The policy stemmed from the view that 
the democratisation of the post-apartheid state should include the representation of 
civil society to share in decision-making. The National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (NEDLAC) - a national forum for management, unions and 
government - was seen as epitomizing the governments' enthusiasm for 
incorporating 'civil society1 in formal decision-making institutions, (Friedman & 
Reitzes, 1996). Whereas, the Labour Relations Act of 1995 - providing for the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), bargaining councils 
and workplace forums - represented the government's commitment to social 
partnership in the workplace (Bramble and Kuhn 1999). This section considers the 
radical arguments for and against the use of corporatism in South Africa, within the 
context of the ANC's equal commitment to free market policies.
Corporatist experiments defined by Palmer (1983), as prescriptions that call for 
active state intervention and joint decision-making machinery involving, governments 
with employer and employee representatives, have been the subject of much 
contention in South Africa. Liberal-pluralist theories of the state and many trade 
union leaders debating the merits of corporatism in South Africa, view such activities
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as permitting labour to exercise its voice within the corridors of power (Nattrass, N, 
1994; Baskin, 1993a; Maree, 1993; Schreiner 1994 and von Holdt, 1992,1995). In 
contrast, others see co-operation with such social contracts, as 'state-structured 
class collaborations' used to enforce union bureaucratization and exclude the 
poorest of the population (Callinicos, 1992a; Vally, 1992; Desai and Habib, 1994; 
Murray, 1994).
Radical advocates of corporatism in South Africa12 also suggest that genuine 
^bargained corporatism 1 is possible in situations when labour is strongly organised, 
when the state does not have the power to be coercive and when capital interests 
are divided (Crouch, 1977). Within South Africa , Alexander (1996) points to 
Friedman(1991), Bird and Schreiner(1992), Godongwana (1992), Saul (1992), and 
von Holdt (1994) as "radical reformers" who argue - not dissimilarly to Crouch 
(1977) - that "there are good social contracts and bad ones" and that whether a 
positive outcome follows will largely depend on "continued mobilisation around a 
programme of radical reform" (Bird and Schreiner, 1992:25, in Bramble and Kuhl, 
1999).
Further groups in South Africa, supporting the 'democratic road to socialism' 13 , yet 
advocating more conventional support for corporatism (Cameron, 1984; Korpi, 1983; 
Stephens, 1979, Baskin, 1993a; Von Holdt 1995) concede that whereas not every 
labour-inspired reform will usher in socialism, social contracts may still promote 
some of the short-term interests of workers within capitalism. Baskin (1993a,b), is 
amongst those who advocate such an approach, arguing for 'bargained corporatism' 
to create 'building blocks' for socialism where conflict and struggle are channelled 
into an institutional form to bargain for influence and reforms, in return for restraint 
and compromise. 'Bargained corporatism' is seen as being accompanied by 
'strategic unionism', a dominant strategy among a increasing number of South 
African unions, involving a shift from economistic resistance, to conciliatory tactics 
aimed at achieving reconstruction, during a period of economic crisis. That given,
Gall (1997), explains that the majority of trade unionists and left-thinkers in South Africa see 
themselves not as social democrats but as radical socialists. Nevertheless, he views such groups as 
still espousing various reformist ideas.
13 Supporters advocate gradual reforms within the existing capitalism system, as opposed to a total 
revolutionary transformation of society
Gall (1997) contends that such a strategy has more in common with the 
Scandinavian model of social democracy, than any prototype for socialism.
Nevertheless, even 'left' academics and theorists debating the value of corporatism, 
not just with regard to South Africa but more generally, have recognised that the 
actions of capitalist states are often contradictory and their policies may have 
unpredictable outcomes, which benefit labour. Zeitlin (1985) stressed that one of 
Marx's central insights was the idea of unintended consequences of state action. 
State polices designed to 'incorporate' labour may end up strengthening trade 
unions and weakening the power of employers. For example, involving the trade 
union organisation in corporatist projects may secure a short-term reduction in 
conflict as part of the political exchange between state and unions, but may in the 
longer term provide more workers with the resources to conduct conflict against 
their employers 14 .
Despite these arguments there is still a strong body of opinion criticising the use of 
corporatist policies. Panitch, (1976) asserts that social contracts are detrimental to 
working class interests, because social democratic parties, whilst introducing such 
policies, are invariably forced to adapt their programmes to operate within the 
confines of the capitalist state and economy. He accepts that the 'capitalist state 1 
enjoys a transitory degree of autonomy from the ruling class, that it can respond to 
working-class pressure (within limits), but he still maintains that corporatism is a 
'state-structured class collaboration'. He shows how failure of coercion in Britain in 
the early 70s led to new efforts by the state to revive corporatism. Unions agreed to 
the policy, only after exacting the promise of industrial democracy and a framework 
of progressive legislation. He views the gains from these reforms as illusory; with 
unions enmeshed into the apparatus of the state and effectively 'policing' a policy of 
wage restraint, which reduced the value of real wages for their members. A process 
referred to by Crouch (1985) as "incorporating labour's organisations within the 
structure of economic regulation".
Upchurch (2000) is also critical of the collaborative aspects of corporatist models, 
emphasising instead the value of a return to conflictual class relations. He explains
14 For example a number of state incomes policies have disintegrated in a wave of large and 
disruptive strikes, (Britain in 1969-70, 1974 & 78-9).
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how in Germany the introduction of the 1952 Works Councils Act, served only to 
consolidate the power of the entrepreneur, and evict the trade unions from the plant 
(Upchurch, 2000, p.67). The unions were only given protected status in law and 
rights to co-determination in the larger industries, in return for a 'peace obligation 1 
with the trade union leadership. The leadership themselves, then orchestrated the 
control of the rank and file through self-imposed restrictive strike balloting rules 
(Upchurch, 2000, p.69)
Within, the South African context, Gall (1997) also argues against corporatist 
strategies stressing that tripartism and codetermination promotes the ideas of social 
partnership, whilst forcing workers and their trade unions to take responsibility for 
state polices. Friedman and Reitzes (1996) question corporatist experiments, 
explaining that whilst there appears to be greater access to state decisions, the 
ability to use it is not equal. The pluralist theory, which sees formal democracy as a 
system in which all interests have an opportunity to influence decision-making, fails 
to acknowledge some groups have far greater capacity to influence the process than 
others. In the final analysis, an employer has the power to take his business 
elsewhere, and whereas individual workers may move, a whole labour force has no 
such option. Under this system, labour appears to have considerable formal power 
and political leverage, but in reality cannot match the strength or resources (the full 
force) of capital (Hyman, 1975).
Corporatism or the free market?
In reality though, despite a formal state commitment to corporatist experiments it was 
the free market ideology that commanded the support of many South African 
employers and the government, during the post-apartheid period under review. On 
closer examination, the South African state was removing itself from the direct 
management of the economy and embracing policies associated with free market 
regulation. Issues of rationalization and competitiveness at decentralized company 
level, plus flexibility of labour were now just as crucial as the central control of labour 
at national level (Horwitz, 1995; Fernerand Hyman, 1992).
Yet, this paradox of corporatist policies being implemented along side free market 
strategies in South Africa, can be more fully explained by the argument that 
governments do sometimes introduce polices that appear irrational to the interests of 
capitalism. In terms of the 'state derivation' theory, the policies of the state are often
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the result of tensions within the capital and labour relationship. In the case of South 
Africa, despite a need on the part of ANC to preserve the conditions that allow for the 
dominance of the surplus-appropriating class (policies that favoured the business 
community), they were also being confronted by the class contradictions of 
capitalism (the conflictual relations between labour and capital). Thus, the prime 
reason for the introduction of formal structures of corporatism in South Africa 
remained the strength of the black union movement. The power of this group meant 
that the unions - as a leading force in society - could not easily be ignored by the 
government without risking a damaging industrial and political black-lash. The 
development of institutionalised social bargaining with the trade unions was an 
acknowledgement of this fact (Callinicos, 1996). Therefore, the idea that class 
struggle is of importance in influencing the policies of the state remains significant 
(Miliband, 1983).
Reflecting still further, corporatism and free market policies may not necessarily be 
incompatible. Indeed such a model may accommodate the needs of capitalism in 
South Africa, especially as what government and business require, in pursuit of their 
neo-liberal economic programme, is a disciplined union federation whose leadership 
is willing to accommodate the free market in return for a 'voice1 in the political 
structures. Interestingly though, Schreiner (1994) contends that the inclusion of the 
market alongside corporatism may also benefit the South African working class. He 
criticises the advocates of traditional social democratic corporatism as 
unsophisticated and underdeveloped, arguing instead for the 'marginalised groups' 
to be included along side the usual three agents - state, trade unions and business. 
The recognition on an equitable basis, of such class 'groups', or inter-and intra-class 
groups, is viewed as strengthening civil society in South Africa. Within this context 
Schreiner (1994) sees a role for the market, with a strong competitive economy 
providing jobs and high wages . Such an economy has no place for nationalisation or 
state regulation, accepting instead short-term job losses and restructuring in order to 
obtain sustainable rapid growth in the long-term (Gall, 1997). The key question for 
South Africa labour though, is whether such corporatist structures, however different 
or sophisticated, may simply be acting as a political shell within which neo-liberal 
economic polices can be more easily implemented (Bramble and Kuhn, 1999).
65
As a precursory to addressing the changing relationship between the state and 
public sector unions, the theses conceptualised the nature of the state and trade 
unions within the transformation of South Africa. The explicit aim was to establish a 
theoretical framework which could be further examined - using the empirical data of 
the SAMWU branch in Cape Town - to produce a clearer understanding of the nature 
of the state and its relationship with public sector unions.
The Marxist method of historical materialism was used to explain the changing 
relationship between the ANC government and trade unions. The dissertation takes 
a materialist approach to the subject and perceives capitalism as comprising not of 
things' but of 'relations'. The central insight of historical materialism being that 
history is a material and social process, that depends on the production of the 
necessities of life (commodities), and whose advances alters the social relations 
between people, their ideology and politics (Harman, 1998; Callinicos, 1983). The 
proletarian class consciousness, is one of the major dynamics for change in this 
society. Change under capitalism is generated by the contradictions internal to that 
system, found essentially in the mutual but exploitative relations between labour and 
capital 1 . Yet undoubtedly, to truly understand change, all the relations of that system 
- the complete ' totality' - over a period of time, and in the course of historical 
development, needs to be viewed (Rees, 1998). Such an approach helps explain the 
actions of the state and trade unions in the South African public sector from 1992-7.
Within this context, the state is not viewed as separate from the basic relations of 
capitalism, it lives off the surplus obtained by the exploitation of labour just as much 
as the direct exploiters. Such an analysis is used to explain the actions of the South 
African state, both during and post apartheid. For example, although apartheid has 
commonly been associated with race ideology the dissertation views apartheid, 
rather as a system specifically designed and supported by the state in order to 
sustain and reproduce the capital relations of production in a social and economic 
context (Wolpe, 1972; Leggasick 1974). Similarly, in post-apartheid South Africa, the 
ANC government as an integral part of capitalism, is complying with and driving the
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current world market-driven orthodoxy. Given this inference that the state is an 
integral part of capitalism, the immediate question must be whether the state can 
ever favour labour if its aims run contrary to the interests of capital?
State derivation theories
In reality, the form of the political superstructure rarely changes automatically in line 
with the economic base. An explanation of state action is more complex than this 
and linked to the contradictions internal to the capitalist system, primarily located in 
the mutual but exploitative relationship between the opposing classes of labour and 
capital. The materialist approach taken by the state derivation theorists makes the 
explanation clearer by analysing the state as a rigidified form of social relations. The 
political superstructure of the state is not perceived as separate from its economic 
base, but rather the economic and the political are both forms of social relations, 
assumed by the basic relation of class conflict in a capitalist society (Holloway, 
1996). And, precisely because the state is an integral part of capitalism, it is also 
directly enmeshed in the class contradictions between 'labour and capital 1 . Which 
means the government is sometimes forced to over-ride the immediate interests of 
capital, by granting concessions to labour to prevent any real resistance to 
capitalism.
Nevertheless, the thesis is not uncritical of the 'state derivation' theorists analysis. 
Firstly, the abstract nature of the theory tends to only conceptualise the state in the 
singular; secondly, and this is linked to the first criticism, the level of abstraction 
which identifies two distinctive but equal forms - economics and politics - not only 
fails to make clear what actually causes the shift in regulation from the 'rule of law1 
to money, but also serves to illustrate the point that the state derivation' theorists 
conceptualises the state in the singular. In particular, such an approach rules out the 
state ever usurping or acting as capital, making it impossible to explain the concepts 
of different types of states such as Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia. Finally, 
although the 'state derivation' approach takes account of the 'vertical' capital-labour 
relationship, seeing the policy of the state as the result of class struggle - it tends to 
neglect the 'horizontal' struggles between the multiplicity of exploiters (capitalists), 
and even between the different states themselves.
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The thesis also used GramscPs theory of historical materialism, to understand the 
nature of trade unions within the newly emerging South African civil society. His 
analysis of trade unions, as contrary organisations within capitalism - performing a 
central role in the preservation of bourgeois civil society, whilst containing the 
nucleus for strife and solidarity - provides a useful framework to analyse their 
activities of strike and conciliation, two resources employed to cope with this 
contradiction.
Strikes
The experiences of strikes are identified in the thesis, as changing the working- 
classes' perception of the world and society, and developing a class consciousness, 
which challenges the existing order or status quo. Despite the absence of 
Luxemburg's classical ^mass strike' and revolutionary change, strikes nevertheless 
played a large part in defeat of the apartheid. This surely prompts the question, of 
whether it can, or will be used as an effective weapon in the struggle against 
privatisation in the post-apartheid period? (Callinicos, 1996; Catchpowle etal. 1998).
Conciliation
Nonetheless, because of the disruptive nature of strikes to workers and employers, 
both seek to make open conflict an exception rather than the rule. Co-operation aims 
to institutionalise the conflict via rules and systems, and achieves its highest form 
with corporatism. The question here though, is whether corporatism runs contrary to 
the ANC's prioritisation of free market polices in South Africa? The answer may 
well be no, since it is conceivable that the state can still achieve the illusion of 
working-class influence, via corporatist institutions, whilst simultaneously 
implementing the neo-liberal agenda, with little opposition from unions (Bramble & 
Kuhn,1999). Such an observation raises the further question of whether corporatist 
polices are really beneficial to trade unions in South Africa.
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In sum, a number of areas materialised from the discussion within this chapter, and 
will need addressing in the dissertation if a fuller understanding of the changing 
relationship between the state and public sector unions is to be obtained:
a perception of the class nature of the state is crucial to understanding 
whether governments can, or will adopt policies that favour labour over capital. 
The 'state derivation1 theory provides a useful analysis of the state but still leaves 
unanswered a number of questions (which will need further exploration and 
discussion) about the nature of the state,
a clear understanding of the nature of the state will help address the 
related issue of whether corporatism is a deliberate attempt on the part of the 
government to placate a strong labour movement, and thereby weaken its 
resolve to oppose privatisation; which prompts the question of whether such 
reformist policies are detrimental to South African trade unions.
the question of whether the public sector trade unions (in this case the 
Cape Town branch of SAMWU) will use conflict (strike) rather than formal 
conciliatory methods to stop privatisation, needs consideration. The answer is 
linked to an understanding of the class consciousness of this group - in particular 
the influence of the 'coloured 1 identity in Cape Town - plus the ability of the trade 
union organisation and leadership to effectively develop and engage the collective 
solidarity of this group.
The next chapter, chapter 4, outlines the research process used to explore these 
questions further. It describes the research design and methodology used to report on 
the fieldwork, and process the data analysis. The rest of the dissertation will then 
present the findings and evaluation of the study's empirical research.
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The general aim of the research is to contribute to the knowledge and improved 
understanding of public sector unions, by exploring the changing relationship between 
the state and the public sector unions in South Africa. The research is located in 
debates concerning the current state ideology, and the ANC government's apparent 
shift from a policy of nationalisation to the endorsement of the 'free-market' economy.
The dissertation takes a critical, essentially Marxist, materialist view of the workplace 
and society. In short, it uses the Marxist method of historical materialism to explain how 
change occurs in modem capitalist society. Within this framework the main areas of 
deliberation focuses on the state, the trade unions and the public sector. The research 
questions that emanates from the theoretical discussion are>
i) whether the state is free to decide its own national policy if it differs from global 
capital - or more theoretically whether a state's political superstructure can ever 
be independent of the capitalist economic system?
ii) whether the trade unions - viewed as part of the newly emerging civil society - 
have enough power to persuade the government to abandon its free market 
policies in defiance of current international policies and trends?
iii) whether reformist methods of corporatism are detrimental to strong labour 
movements
The Cape Town branch of SAMWU (South African Municipal Workers Union) is the 
focus of the research. It is within the changing historical and theoretical framework, that 
the branch (within the general context of the union) is used as a means of advancing
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the theoretical understanding of the relationship between the state and the public sector 
trade unions in South Africa.
The research is based on a longitudinal study, from 1992-1997. It focuses on two 
contrasting time periods: immediately prior and during the democratic election (from 
1992-4); and subsequent to the election from 1995-7. The timescale is considered 
important because it allows for an investigation of how the state's rapidly changing 
economic policies and ideologies, impacted on the public sector trade unions. To this 
end, an exploration of the members' home environment and workplace, along with the 
structure, democracy and activities of the branch, are used as a means of assessing 
both the organisation and leadership of the union, and appraising the collective 
consciousness, solidarity and power of the membership.
The aim is to secure an explanation of events taking place in the South African public 
sector over this period, by interpreting the experiences of local municipal workers in 
Cape Town during apartheid, and over issues of privatisation. The study of this distinct 
group of workers in Cape Town is used to illuminate changes in wider society, and 
offers the possibility of achieving an insight into the complex nature of apartheid, and 
the continuing conflictual relationship between the state and trade unions in the public 
sector.
The distinctive characteristics of the union, and its members, are chiefly explored 
through qualitative inquiry. The case is both representative, yet atypical. The Cape 
Town City Council (CCC), the largest employer of labour in the area, was unusual with 
its supposedly 'liberal' reputation, but nevertheless still continued to implement racist 
employment practices, common to the apartheid public sector as a whole. Equally the 
council, along with many public sector employers, increased its use of free market 
polices after the 1994 election.
The Cape Town Branch itself, was unique in being a founder member of the national 
union, SAMWU, and as such was rare in influencing both policy and activities of the 
union, generally. Yet, in common with the rest of the union, the changes in the 
demographics of the country and the institutionalisation and legitimisation of the black 
trade unions, were producing strains on the organisation and activities of the branch.
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However, with the majority of the Cape Town members being defined as 'coloureds', 
the membership displayed a complex, and often contradictory collective consciousness. 
Within apartheid 'coloureds' had historically occupied an unique status - enjoying a 
privileged position over Africans, whilst being oppressed by 'whites'. It was this position 
that accounted for the conservative reputation of 'coloureds' (the majority of whom 
resided in the Western Cape), and helped to explain their overwhelming electoral 
support for the architects of apartheid, the National Party (NP). Yet the membership - 
as with many black public sector trade unionists - continued to experience low wages, 
poor working conditions, an improvised home environment, and on the whole limited 
control and autonomy over their workplace, or neighbourhoods.
The conservative reputation of the 'coloured' community - from which Samwu 
members drew their roots - was in direct contrast to the radical image of the Cape Town 
branch; a characteristic it shared with many other black trade unionists during this 
period. Its origins may have grown out of the Cape Town Municipal Workers union 
(CTMWU), a 'coloured' only union, but it was from the beginning an ardent opponent of 
apartheid in the region. Furthermore, since the early 1990s the branch as part of 
SAMWU, had been one of the most militant in the public sector, consistently opposing 
policies of privatisation and expressing reservations about social contracts and 
codetermination. Such a contradictory consciousness on the part of its membership, 
reflected the uneven consciousness, demonstrated by the working-classes generally.
In sum, the aim is to use both the unique and typical characteristics of the study, to 
facilitate interpretation and reflection of the issues highlighted in the theoretical 
framework. Ultimately the case method, perceived as an instrument of insight, is used 
to refine and advance the theoretical understanding of the state and its relationship with 
the public sector unions.
i) whether SAMWU would reject strategies of corporatism and conciliation, and 
use instead rank and file resistance as the main agency for opposing state 
policies of privatisation.
ii) whether the Cape Town branch of SAMWU and its members possessed the 
organisation and class consciousness to resist government policies, or
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iii) whether the peculiarly skewed membership (mainly Coloured') would affect the 
members' class consciousness, and as a consequence the ability to use 
resistance to stop privatisation.
Nevertheless, although increasingly popular as a form of research the case study 
approach does contain limitations as a research tool. Firstly, investigators using case 
studies are often accused of straying from using objectivity and rigour, and producing 
studies of insufficient precision, largely due to the fact that the traditional approach to 
the research design is often quite Moose'. However, it should be acknowledged that 
the strength of case studies are their flexibility, and ultimately this method was chosen 
because it allowed for change and modification, albeit with proper justification (Yin, 
1994). Secondly, a sample of one, or a few number of cases, are unlikely to be a strong 
representation of others. Nevertheless, although an attempt was made to select a 
case which contained typical as well as unique characteristics, the purpose was not 
to conduct sampling research. As Stake (1994) explains, the aim is not to study a case 
primarily in order to understand other cases. The first obligation is to understand this 
one case, and although it remains important to consider the uniqueness and contexts 
of alternative selections, the choice of a single - or even a small number of cases - 
does not depend on being able to defend their typicality.
A third limitation to consider is generalization. Case studies are a poor basis for 
generalization, particularly as only a single or few cases are usually studied, albeit at 
length. Nevertheless, generalisations can be gleamed from the study by identifying 
certain activities, problems, or responses which come up time and again. However, 
damage occurs where the commitment to generalize becomes so strong, the 
researcher's attention is drawn away from the main features or characteristics 
essential for understanding the case itself. Consequently, in keeping with case study 
research protocol, the prime aim of the Cape Town case study was not to represent 
the world but to represent the case (Stake, 1995).
Finally, leading on from generalisations, it is important to emphasise the problems 
associated with interpretation.. The function of the researcher is to maintain vigorous 
interpretation, and on the basis of data, draw conclusions. But as Stake (1995) 
explains: it is not uncommon for case study researchers to make assertions on a
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relatively small database, invoking the privilege and responsibility of interpretation . 
Since the interpretations of the researcher are more easily highlighted than the 
interpretations of those people being interviewed or observed, it is important that the 
case researcher maintains the authenticity of the case by presenting the numerous 
different, and contradictory views of all the people involved in the case study. 
Nevertheless, such objectivity continues to be problematic; and although a process of 
interpretation using formal rules of evidence and logic are useful, adequate guidelines 
do not exist (Stake, 1995).
In conclusion, although case studies have limitations in terms of 'looseness', sampling 
, generalisability and interpretation, a single case study was still considered 
appropriate. Especially as a study of this area allowed for the depth of analysis and 
particularization needed to illuminate the political and racial complexity of South Africa, 
during this period. The overall aim being, to examine the unique character of the 
case for its intrinsic value, as well as using it as an instrument to provide a general 
understanding of the theory of the state and its relationship with trade unions.
The bulk of the data collection took place between 1992 and 1998 and involved the use 
of a variety of empirical materials as a means of understanding the changes taking 
place during the period under investigation. The primary research - predominately 
qualitative - was collected on two separate occasions, namely September 1993 until 
May 1994, and Summer 1997. The study encompassed interviews with both the 
SAMWU leadership, lay officers and rank and file membership, augmented by further 
interviews from other trade union members (NEHAWU), management consultants, and 
the users of the services. This data was subsequently enriched by the use of 
documentary evidence, various academic, trade union and government studies, and 
newspaper and journal articles.
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A multi-method approach was adopted, with the collection of secondary data being an 
important component of the research plan. The secondary data consisted of both 
quantitative and qualitative information collected between 1992 and 1998. The original 
aim was to provide detailed background information to support the interviews, but was 
(as discussed below) an imperfect source of information. Secondary sources were 
varied and included official statistics, academic studies, trade union documents, 
consultancy reports, government documentation, newspaper articles, government (local 
and national), and non government organisation (NGCTs) and trade union web sites.
Official Government data
The research used official statistics which emanated from the Central Statistics 
Services (CSS), a government body authorised since the Statistics Act of 1976 to 
collect, process and publish official statistics on a nation-wide basis. The main sources 
included the CSS Bulletin of Statistics, the population census from 1991, the 1993 and 
1995 October Household Survey (OHS) and preliminary estimates from the 1996 
Census and the final adjusted Census results (1998). Further CSS statistics included 
Manpower Surveys (Statistical Release PO201); Labour: Employment, Salaries and 
Wages (Summary (PO200) and most importantly the Employment & Salaries & Wages: 
Public Sector Statistical release (PO251). Other data used included the Development 
Bank of South Africa (DBSA) and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) - a 
government agency
When using the various sources of CSS data a number of problems were encountered 
that require discussion here. The CSS Bulletin of Statistics, one of the country's oldest 
journals dating back to 1922 was a key source. Originally, a monthly it has been a 
quarterly since 1967 and was available at the end of March, June, September and 
December. Although it offered a coherent perspective for any single year, 
methodologies for data gathering varied - especially in the years before and following 
the elections - making accurate comparisons difficult, although overall trends were 
possible.
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Overall, flaws were identified in all the CSS data used. The main reason was linked to 
the apartheid government's lack of dependable information about the black and 
coloured1 population - with many of the conclusions reached on the basis of racist 
assumptions endemic in the apartheid system. In particular, the 'new' 1994 CSS 
management believed that the model originally used by apartheid regime, in the 1991 
census - to adjust the actual count of people - probably overestimated growth rates in 
the country, resulting in an over-estimation of the size of population and numbers of 
households. This had a further consequence of overestimating the labour market. This 
affected the 1995 and 1996 data because both used the 1991 census as a baseline.
The 1995 October Household Survey (OHS) - using the 1991 census, OHS 1993 and 
1994 questionnaires - made some effort to overcome the sampling problems which had 
occurred. However, the CSS reported that when implementing the new sampling plan, 
field workers became confused about the exact geographical boundaries within which 
they were operating. Problems were compounded because the field work took place 
when staff were busy demarcating boundaries for the 1996 census. Consequently, 
since different methodologies were used to draw the samples in 1994 and 1995 for the 
OHS, and further diverse problems were encountered as a result of varying sample 
techniques the CSS warned against directly comparing the data.
The 1996 Census was also limited because it initially provided only preliminary 
estimates of the size of the South African population. The aim was to make selected 
summary data available as quickly as possible, especially as South Africa had lacked 
reliable demographic information during the last 20 years of apartheid. The remainder 
of the census was to be made available in late 1998.
Further problems resulted from the fact that many of the statistics in the immediate post 
1994 period excluded the former TBVC (Homeland) states, whereas earlier statistics 
included these. This made comparisons very difficult, especially as the contributions 
from the former TBVC states, were usually not incorporated until the first quarter of 
1996. In particular, surveys such as the 1994 Manpower Survey were inadequate 
because they failed to record the former TBVC states (or their unemployed) rendering 
the statistics unrepresentative of the economically active population.
Whereas the figures on the public sector as a whole were available in the PO251 
releases, detailed final figures on particular groups within this sector - such as the
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public service or local government - were not always available at the time of publication 
and so estimates were provided. Where possible the researcher used the updated 
figures, but the releases were not always consistent and different figures were often 
recorded. Moreover, data from a number of 'new' provinces were not yet available, 
which rendered the data obtained from the other 'new1 provinces inadequate - making 
comparisons with the previous (pre-1994) provinces meaningless.
Another weakness was that the data used in the dissertation initially used a simple 
(total) count of the number of workers. The number of full-time equivalent workers (the 
number of full-time, the number of half-day and the number of hourly workers) has 
since been made available, but the dissertation did not use this data for reasons of 
consistency. However where a different definition was used, this was indicated.
Overall the main problem remained one of reliability of official statistics. The 
reorganisation of the central government and local authorities in 1994 made it 
impossible to use the CSS to make direct comparisons between 1992 and 1997. What 
exists is essentially to be seen as snapshots, the trends being accepted as indicative of 
the broad patterns of change in households in South Africa in general, and the Western 
Cape in particular, without being wholly reliable.
With respect to the other official data used in the research - for example the 
Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA), and the Human Sciences Research 
Council (HSRC) - the published data on demographic and labour force trends are once 
again inconsistent. The DBSA uses different classifications to the CSS data so direct 
comparisons cannot be made. Overall, the empirical bases used in these studies are 
often contradictory and largely dominated by inappropriate racial classifications.
The biggest difficulty in interpreting the data, particularly with the public sector 
employment patterns and trends, was the quality of available data . For example wage 
statistics remained patchy and are widely criticised by, amongst others, the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Standing, Sender and Weeks, 1996, pp.185- 
187). Data on the structure and trends of employment and unemployment are viewed 
as unreliable in South Africa and guestimates (approximations) are frequently used. At 
least two definitions of unemployment are adopted in South Africa: the strict (taken 
steps in the last 4 weeks to find work) and the expanded (desire for work) definition - 
the expanded definition was used in the dissertation. Moreover, realistic estimates in
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South Africa really depend on whether the informal sector is included in the statistics, 
but accurate information about the informal sector remained difficult to collect 
(ALA, 1994/5).
Consequently, it was problematic to gather reliable data on essential areas like wage or 
occupation trends in the local authorities, with the collection of more detailed data on 
the Cape Town City council proving even more impossible 15 . Particular problems were 
experienced when trying to obtain accurate information regarding the number of 
permanent and casual workers employed by the council. This was for several reasons: 
the deliberate avoidance of apartheid censuses on the part of the black population 
made it difficult to estimate the number of (im)migrants or their activities; apartheid 
recording meant certain groups were excluded or even discounted, usually for political 
reasons; and finally researchers found it dangerous (and so were often reluctant) to 
regularly visit hostels or townships to collect accurate figures.
Trade union data
The second major source of information used in the research was gathered by the 
trade union federation - COSATU - and its union affiliates. The distrust of official data, 
notably because of its association with 'unjust1 government regulations and restrictions, 
meant that many official statistics before 1994 were treated with scepticism. Hence data 
provided by the trade unions and other labour-aligned research projects have been 
widely used by South African researchers. Nevertheless, although often viewed by 
international observers (ILO; IDS) as the only legitimate source of information on trade 
unions during the apartheid era, these data have their limitations.
Trade union research is written with a particular constituency in mind, and sets priorities 
and agendas on this basis. Moreover, the political climate of South Africa, with many 
trade unions operating under oppressive circumstances, or at the very least only 
beginning to obtain a level of stability and legitimacy, meant that the collection of long- 
term reliable figures were difficult. Many of the figures collected prior to the end of
15 Despite repeated requests to the CCC for more detailed information on "coloured 1 and African 
employment, they reiterated that no such long-term data was available - although they were hoping to 
rectify this situation in the future
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apartheid, even on the part of the union federation, COSATU, relied on guestimates 
(approximations) (Baskin, 1996), and could only provide an indication of trends and 
patterns.
Industrial relations consultants
A further source used data provided by the Industrial Relations consultants Andrew 
Levy and Associates - a respected firm of labour consultants, which since 1997 has 
published jointly with the U.K consultants, Incomes Data Services (IDS). The 
information came from both primary (interviews with consultants and researchers) and 
secondary sources. The latter consisted of newspaper and journal articles and statistics 
(supplied by the Department of Manpower and the National Manpower Commission). 
Therefore any shortcomings already indicated can equally be applied to the official 
sources used by Andrew Levy. Nevertheless, the consultants have experience in 
interpreting such data and have acquired an international reputation for objectivity, 
especially during the latter years of the apartheid era, and are widely quoted by 
academics and trade unionists alike.
Newspapers, journals and the Internet
Newspaper clippings, collected on a daily (1993/4) and weekly (1995/7) basis provided 
an additional resource. Some sections of the South African press were openly critical 
of the apartheid government and as a consequence acquired credibility as a source of 
information and independence. Still, the newspapers cannot be viewed as truly 
objective, and are more meanfully interpreted as being representative of different 
interest groups during the apartheid era. Nevertheless, the author elected to use this 
rich and varied source of data. Papers like the Weekly Mail and Guardian (WM&G) - a 
liberal independent newspaper and a critic of the apartheid government - was widely 
consulted. Local newspapers were also utilised to document the differing opinions and 
in some cases prejudices of the local population: the 'Argus' and 'Cape Times' 
represented the mainly white and 'coloured' communities, and'South', the black pro- 
ANC constituency.
Journal articles were also widely used. The South African Labour Bulletin (SALB), and 
the now defunct Work in Progress (WIP) were excellent sources of information on trade 
unions and labour relations. Other journals referred to included the Financial Mail, a
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mainstream conservative source that produced highly respected factual surveys and 
reports.
Finally from 1995-7, the Internet provided a key resource. Since the 1994 elections, 
South Africans had increasingly used the Internet as a means of showing their 
commitment to a new open and democratic society. Useful web-pages included those 
provided by COSATU, SAMWU, the ANC, University of Cape Town, the Weekly Mail 
and Guardian, the Financial Mail and Cape Town Council. As with the newspapers and 
journals the internet provided a useful source for divergent opinions and sentiments. 
Nevertheless, the information had limitations and cannot be viewed as entirely 
impartial. Moreover, with many of the web-sites presenting the acceptable 'public face' 
of the organisation, especially in the months leading up to the 1994 elections it was 
possible that the tensions and ambiguities associated with the changing South African 
government and economy were glossed over.
In total, 82 interviews were completed in 1993/4 and 1997, respectively. 
lists all the individuals interviewed, by first name and in alphabetical order.
Phase one
The first period of field research took place in South Africa from Aug 1993- May 1994 (9 
months). During this stage the researcher interviewed 35 people (See 
15 of these were SAMWU members, based mainly in 
Cape Town. They included full-time officers at the Head office in Athlone in Cape Town, 
a selection of lay-officials and members working in the Cape Town City Council (CCC). 
These interviews were supplemented by others: Interviews with the Cape Town City 
Council Industrial Relations consultant, other union members in the area (for example, 
the public sector union, NEHAWU - the National Education, Health and Allied Workers 
Union) and ordinary users of the services of Cape Town City Council (from both the 
township and city).
The effects of the changes and policies in South Africa were explored in the 
conversations and interviews. In the process of describing both their routine and 
problematic moments in their lives - both in their homes, workplace and union - such
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South Africans managed to provide an understanding of the events that moulded their 
consciousness. A comprehension of this, all too often uneven, consciousness, was 
used to understand the various and complex influences that might lead public sector 
unionists to resist state policies of privatisation and deregulation.
Access was initially quite difficult. Many full-time trade unionists appeared tired of 
answering yet more questions from white overseas academics, whilst even more 
stewards and members were understandably suspicious of what they may have 
perceived as a white middle-class woman, requesting information about their lives. 
However, the main SAMWU contact, Hennie (a steward, first met in 1992), guaranteed 
the researcher's credentials, as a trade unionist activist - and as a result a number of 
interviews with individuals (Hennie knew and trusted) were secured.
Entry to the townships and 'coloured' areas was somewhat more problematic (and at 
times dangerous). It was not until the months immediately preceding the election that 
the researcher was able to stay over night in the main township, Crossroads; and then 
only accompanied by a guide (recommended by local political activists) who ensured 
the researcher remained within the ANC controlled areas. Throughout this period the 
Pan African Congress (PAC - a black consciousness liberation organisation) territory 
remained strictly out of bounds for whites in the Cape Town townships. Attempting to 
enter this locality during this period would have been dangerous for the guide, the hosts 
and everyone involved. The 'coloured' areas were moderately more accessible, but 
once again it was necessary for a white woman to have her own transport, a definite 
appointment and not to travel after dark.
The length of the interviews varied considerably, those with the full-time officials and 
stewards usually lasted between one and two hours. The other main interviews (listed) 
ranged from 30 minutes to one hour. Further interviews (not listed) were either 
unproductive or consisted of short transitory comments. The organisation and 
approach to the interviews were adjusted in the light of experience. The questions 
were initially semi-structured. The original aim was to obtain an insight into what 
SAMWU members thought about the policies of privatisation being implemented in the 
council, and to gauge the possibility of resistance to those policies. However, despite 
the author's best efforts to encourage the interviewees to 'keep to the question' it soon 
became evident that SAMWU members were determined to provide the interviewer 
with a wealth of information about their personal and working lives, much of which
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concentrated on the forthcoming elections and the stupendous change that was about 
to take place in their country. It was clear that the focus of early interviews was too 
narrow to encompass the reasons and understand the dynamic of change taking place 
in South Africa during this period.
Consequently, because of the limitations of the original strategy, the interviews were 
modified to include open-ended questions and allow for answers to reflect the full 
breadth and richness of personal experiences, working environment and trade union 
activities. The topics discussed generally (and where appropriate) were divided into the 
following areas (see Table 4.1).
  economic and social aspects
  how apartheid affected their lives
  views on the ANC and the forthcoming election
  as an organisation that provided services and as an employer (terms & conditions, politics, 
ideology etc.).
  change including the effects of privatisation and de-regulation in the council.
  general information on the structure and organisation of the union.
  perceptions of the strength and power of SAMWU at both the grass roots organisational and 
leadership levels (non-SAMWU members were asked to give their general impressions of the 
union).
  the association with other public sector unions, the national federation, COSATU and the new 
ANC
  experiences of struggle, and their perceived ability and willingness to resist the changes 
posed by policies of privatisation and the free market
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Phase two
The researcher returned to South Africa in Aug-Sept 1997 in order to review the 
process and experience of change. During this stage the researcher interviewed 47 
people (see 20 of these were 
SAMWU members, based mainly in Cape Town. They included 4 full-time officers, a 
selection of members, working in the Cape Town City Council (CCC) and 
Johannesburg. Once again these interviews were supplemented by others: non- 
SAMWU union members in the area, and ordinary users of council services (from both 
the townships and city). Where possible, during this second visit the same people were 
interviewed However, 
because a number of members had 'moved on 1 , retired or were retrenched this was not 
always feasible.
New interviewees included the Johannesburg Regional Secretary and Branch 
Secretary, a number of lay-members from both Cape Town and Johannesburg, the 
new NEHAWU branch secretary, a white NEHAWU steward, users of the Cape Town 
council services (city and townships), and finally residents from a township in the 
Johannesburg and Durban areas
The researcher discussed similar issues to those addressed in phase 1, but now 
attempted to place them within a post-apartheid context (See Table 4.2)
the effects of the new government (State),
the National Party in the Western Cape Provincial government
the trade union relationship with the ANC and the social accords and labour legislation
public sector in the "New South Africa, both as employers and providers of the services.
the position of so called 'coloureds' in the NSA.
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Limitations of the primary data
Initially it was hoped that a full ethnographic study could be conducted, observing 
SAMWU workers both in their home, work and especially in their union meetings. 
Several events made this objective naive and impractical - and served only to highlight 
the limitations to research in the context of radical social change. Christmas 1993 was 
a particularly difficult period, on account of the tensions and uncertainty during the 
progress of the negotiations. Following the brutal murder of an US researcher, and the 
bombing of a local mixed race bar in Cape Town, the researcher found a number of her 
guides reluctant to escort her into the townships, or allow her to travel to isolated sites. 
However, events were made tolerable in the weeks leading up to the elections and 
valuable information was acquired during visits to the 'coloured' and black areas.
In 1997 the interviews were easier with many more SAMWU workers willing to talk then 
in 1993. This was mainly due to the researcher's increased knowledge and 
experience, rather than a decline in tensions. For example, it was more productive to 
arrive at offices and depots and wait, rather than make appointments. However, 
problems of access to townships and remote districts remained difficult, especially as 
the increased violence, along with the development of gangland crime, in many 
'coloured' areas made ethnographic study dangerous.
The interviewer also experienced difficulties encouraging lay members to speak to her. 
It transpired that the Councils use of the so-called 'entrapment officer1 , contracted to 
'catch on video' employees illegally selling council property, meant the interviewees 
were reluctant to trust strangers. On one occasion, it was only the researcher's 
willingness to make tea for the workers on site, that finally convinced them she was 
worth talking to.
A further problem persisted throughout the period of research. The researcher 
sometimes found it difficult to understand the local 'coloured' afrikaner dialect common 
to this area, whilst the interviewees almost certainly found the researcher's - albeit slight 
- Birmingham accent, strange. Evidence to support this statement was supplied by the 
researcher's South African companion who explained that the group of workers - whom 
she had been interviewing for the past 2 hours - wanted to know what language she 
spoke. Overall there remained a question over whether the extracts from interviews 
should be edited in order to make the meanings clearer. But finally it was decided that
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the interviewees should be reported verbatim, although at times, for reasons of clarity, 
the structure of the sentences are changed.
Limitations of selection of interviewees
Interviews were used throughout the research because they were considered one of 
the most common, and powerful means of obtaining data (Fontana and Frey, 1994). 
Nevertheless, there were limitations with regard to the selection of interviewees which 
need to be highlighted. Firstly, there was no endeavour to use a stratified sample, 
which obviously raises questions over representation and ability to generalise to a 
wider population. The research design used entailed the researcher selecting 
randomly from a sample of Samwu leaders, shopstewards, trade union members, 
users of public services in the township and city, and finally consultants and 
researchers, in the area. This sample was suggested by a small number of contacts in 
the area - usually insiders, or members of the group studied. The individuals - for 
example, Hennie, a SAMWU shopsteward - were often willing to be informants, acting 
as guides to, and translator of cultural norms, including at times jargon or language. 
Such contacts recommended other contacts, and other sources of valuable data, all of 
which may possibly been obtained without these people, but ultimately saved time and 
avoided cultural mistakes. A stratified sample was never used because it would have 
required a complete - easily accessible- frame from which to select respondents. Yet, 
for the reasons outlined above, regarding the difficulty of carrying out field research 
during changing and volatile periods, this would have been difficult to achieve.
However, such a methodology highlights the limitations of interviews - particularly as a 
source of primary data. Problems over bias are obviously common to this approach. In 
particular, the interviewer's own background is capable of influencing the 
interpretations and analysis of interviews, raising questions over validity and objectivity. 
Furthermore, such a method relies on the skills and sensitivity of the interviewers, 
with the course of the interview often being decided by the interviewer when asking 
open-ended questions or probing supplementary issues - thus leading to further 
accusations of subjectivity and unreliability (Fontana and Frey, 1994). Therefore, in 
recognition of the limitations of interviews, and in particular the lack of a stratified 
sample, the interview data was supplemented by the collection and analysis of further 
secondary materials and records (see secondary data section). Such empirical data,
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although not aiming to be generalisable to any wider sample, did allow for further 
clarification of the issues under investigation.
In sum, the overall aim of the research was to contribute to the knowledge and 
improved understanding of the relationship between the state and the public sector 
unions . The research used a case study of the Cape Town branch of SAMWU, from 
1992-7, in order to understand the nature and power of the public sector unions, and 
their ability and willingness to challenge the government and its policies of privatisation 
and deregulation. Equally, the case method also served as an instrument of 
interpretation, used to refine and advance the theoretical understanding of the state and 
its relationship with the public sector unions.
It is to the case study of the union SAMWU, that we now turn. Workers such as those 
in SAMWU were centrally positioned to experience the contradictions and the 
pressures associated with changing relationship with the state, during the period 
1992-7. Apart from its regular functions as a trade union, SAMWU had historically 
concentrated on the organs of local government and emphasised the unequal division 
of resources. Opposition to privatisation was a central theme in this discourse.
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In an attempt to progress the theoretical understanding of the changing relationship 
between the state and public sector trade unions in South Africa, the Cape Town 
branch of SAMWU was studied from 1992-7. The South African Municipal Workers 
union (SAMWU) was one of the largest and most prominent trade unions in South 
Africa. Its growth had been substantial, its national membership grew from only 14,000 
at its founding Congress in 1986, to 122,000 in 1997 (Baskin, 1996). The nucleus for 
this growth had originated in the Cape Town region, where almost two-thirds of the 
original membership had been located. From the beginning the Cape Town City 
Council branch was different from the Emerging1 African unions, principally because its 
Coloured' membership had allowed it union recognition since 1961 -'coloureds1 , 
unlike Africans had been permitted by NP to form their own trade unions.
The membership of the branch reflected the ethnic and demographic patterns of the 
region - the majority of South Africa's 'coloureds' resided in the Western Cape 
Province, whilst blacks were in the minority. Yet, Cape Town was distinctive in that, 
despite the conservative reputation of the 'coloured' population, the region had enjoyed 
a history of struggle against apartheid. In the 1980s, the United Democratic Force 
(UDF), the internal arm of the then banned ANC, was particularly strong in 'coloured' 
areas. Apartheid may have left deep divisions in the Western Cape by granting 
'coloureds' marginal privileges over blacks, but at certain points these divisions 
disappeared with 'coloureds' deliberately identifying themselves with the 'black 
struggle' (Makhanya, 1994; Callinicos, 1996).
However, evidence of increasing militancy amongst the 'coloured1 workers in the 
Western Cape could be contrasted with their overwhelming support for the National 
Party (NP) in the first democratic elections of 1994. The rest of South Africa was visibly 
shocked when the majority of the 'coloureds' voted the NP into Provincial Government 
and Hemus Kriel, a 'hard-line1 Nationalist Party member, won over 800,000 votes. 
These figures confirmed what many knew, the party that invented the apartheid system, 
that had uprooted 'coloureds' from their homes and arbitrarily disfranchised them, had 
won the support of many 'coloureds' (Neill, 1994). Once again racism and fear 
appeared to have played a role. 'Coloured' workers in the Cape, believing the ANC
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were about to reduce their meagre wages in order to uplift the black population, had 
voted for the white Afrikaners
This example of an uneven consciousness amongst the 'coloured' community, was 
further complicated by the evidence that SAMWU in Cape Town, the largest and most 
prominent branch in the Western Cape, with over 90% 'coloured1 membership, 
persisted in distinguishing itself from other unions by consistently opposing 
government policies of privatisation and deregulation. Since the late 1980s, and 
throughout the 1992-7 period under review, prominent members in the Cape Town 
branch highlighted the threats posed by the introduction of the free market in the public 
sector. Moreover, by the end of 1994, their opposition and readiness to strike against 
privatisation had become policy, for both the branch and the national union. As a 
consequence, the probability of direct resistance from SAMWU to the government's 
free-market programmes emerged as a central theme in the research.
To provide an insight into this resistance - and in the process glean an understanding of 
the changing relationship between the state and public sector trade unions in South 
Africa - the research focuses on the Cape Town branch from 1992-7. The case study is 
divided into two time periods: the period leading up to, and including the abolition of 
apartheid (1992-4) and the immediate post apartheid era, 1995-7. Each respective part 
provides a brief introduction, summarising the aims and objectives of the branch during 
that period, followed by an outline of the chapters covered. In each case, the individual 
sections provide a survey of the social, material and workplace background of the 
SAMWU workers in Cape Town - along with a description and evaluation of the 
changing history, internal structure and external activities of the branch, within the 
development of the union generally. The aim is to examine the organisation, leadership 
and balance of class forces within the union, with the purpose of evaluating the 
potential strength of opposition to state policies of privatisation - whilst advancing the 
theoretical understanding of the changing relationship between the state and public 
sector trade unions in South Africa.
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The section firstly provides - by way of an introduction - a summary of the branch's 
general aims, objectives and strategic opportunities from 1992-4. This is followed by an 
outline of part 1 of the case study, with a rationale for the inclusion of different 
chapters provided.
In 1992, the Cape Town branch was poised to take advantage of the enormous 
transformation of the country. SAMWU nationally, had been the first union within the 
local government sector to embrace non-racialism, and so was well placed to welcome 
all workers regardless of their hierarchical positions, colour or social standing. SAMWU 
had grown steadily throughout the 1980s, and with the expansion of the public sector 
membership in the 1990s, and the much rumoured merger of all public sector unions, 
it planned to expand still further. The Cape Town branch hoped to be a beneficiary of 
these changes.
The branch itself was unusual, its overwhelmingly 'coloured' membership accounted 
for the 'conservative' reputation of the branch nationally, whilst its resistance to 
apartheid and consistent opposition to privatisation earned Cape Town an equally 
radical standing. Such resistance was linked to the aims it shared with the national 
union - namely achieving fundamental change in local government, and a longer 
term commitment to transform the nature of South Africa by striving for a socialist 
society. Yet, equally implicit in this thinking was a gradual acceptance - during this
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period - that the ANC leadership no longer intended to defeat the South African ruling 
classes and their system; and the union would be forced to challenge the 'new' 
government if it was to reform local government - let alone change society (Interview, 
Roger Ronnie, 8/10/93).
Nevertheless, despite the transformation of the country opening up new and different 
prospects and challenges for the union, it was evident during the 1992-4 period that 
the ability to cope with any changes, would be restricted unless the problems and 
issues associated with - firstly - the internal organisation of the union - and secondly - 
the external activities of the union, were addressed (Interview, Lance, 10/11/93).
Internal structure and organisation
In 1992/3 the internal structure of the union was giving cause for concern. Although the 
change in government and the prospect of increased membership was welcomed, it 
was also imposing greater strains on the overall structure and organisation of the union. 
As early as 1992, the new role for the independent unions - within the newly emerging 
industrial relations system - was beginning to generate new demands. As a 
consequence there was recognition on the part of SAMWU that a re-organisation of 
their structures and organisation would be essential if they were to meet the increasing 
demands. In particular, a greater emphasis was to be put on formal lines of 
communications between the leadership and their members - as well as giving 
prominent consideration to the general 'bread and butter1 issues in the workplace. 
Moreover, the leadership was expressing a need for the branches to provide better 
administration and services for their members to meet these challenges (Lance, 
interviews, 10/11/93; Roger, interview, 8/10/93; SAMWU Congress Report: 
Organisational Issues, 1997a).
The move to accommodate these new demands meant the existing union structures 
were increasingly coming under review. Of concern, was the uneven size and power of 
large branches (like Cape Town), in relation to regions; and the possibility of the 
development of a layer of trade union bureaucrats at a local level. Overall, it was 
acknowledged by the union leadership that many of the stronger branches had simply 
outgrown the regions, to the point that regions were not functioning effectively (Lance,
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interviews, 10/11/93; Roger, interview, 8/10/93; SAMWU Congress Report: 
Organisational Issues, 1997a).
External activities
In terms of its external activities, both the branch - and union as a whole - was changing 
during this period. Whereas opposition to apartheid and national liberation still 
continued to dominate the political ideology and actions of the branch, there was 
equally a willingness to look to the future and the economic and social prospect of a 
'new1 South Africa (Etkind and Harvey, 1993). Of crucial importance to SAMWU was 
the attainment of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) - the ANC's 
macro-economic policy (RDP), supported and formulated by COSATU for the post- 
apartheid economy. When the document was first unveiled in January, 1994, it claimed 
to make far reaching changes to the fabric of South African life by tackling poverty and 
deprivation - plus a commitment to nationalisation, and state intervention (Argus, 
1994a). In addition, the document emphasised a role for trade unions in national 
economic planning, and local decision-making. SAMWU welcomed such a role, which 
was directly linked to an alliance between the trade unions and the new ANC 
government (Cargill, 1993).
Yet, alongside such overt political aspirations SAMWU was equally determined to 
address economic issues. Crucially, the independent local authority unions still lacked a 
centralised bargaining council - this emerged as one of SAMWU's main goals from 
1992. It was hoped that national negotiations would assist in reducing some of the 
inequalities created by apartheid - especially for the low paid. For that reason the union 
began concentrating its efforts on tabling national demands for a "living wage", the 
eradication of the apartheid wage gap between blacks and whites (Andrew Levy and 
Associates, 1993/4).
Finally, of particular concern to SAMWU and the Cape Town branch was the issue of 
privatisation. From the beginning those branch members interviewed in 1993 seemed 
aware of the dangers of privatisation and deregulation. Members expressed a feeling of 
vulnerability about their jobs as a result of the free market ideologies and practices in 
the public sector. Considerable anger was especially directed towards any employer or 
state that intended to privatise. As the period under review progressed, this issue 
increasingly became the focus of the branch's activities, and had the potential to
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effect their future relationship with the ANC government. The following structure will 
be used to explore these main aims, objectives and challenges more fully
Part 1 of the case study considers the Cape Town branch within the general 
transformation of SAMWU, and South Africa, from 1992-4. The aims of the following 
chapters are to explore Cape Town's ability and willingness to fight privatisation. 
firstly provides a description of the social and material position of the 
'coloured1 workers in the Western Cape - along with the structure and organisation of 
the Cape Town City Council (CCC). Whilst the purpose is to provide a backdrop to the 
development of the branch in the region, it also permits a fuller understanding of the 
possible influences on the thinking, values, and class consciousness of the 
membership.
, shows the historical development of the branch, from its origins in the old 
established Cape Town Municipal Workers Association (CTMWA). An understanding 
of the branch history and its attempts to build a national union, assists in explaining 
why Cape Town remained so central to the organisation of SAMWU nationally.
explores the internal structure of the union . It examines the growth in 
membership; the problems associated with the unions changing structure and 
democracy; the servicing of its members; and the need for improvements in all these 
areas. An analysis of this overall area is important to assessing whether Cape Town, 
indeed the union as a whole, was developing the organisational ability and leadership 
to mount an attack on the government's privatisation policies.
considers the union activities and struggles during the 1992-4 period. In 
particular it highlights the increasing formalisation of the branch, alongside the 
continuing levels of conflict, made all the more acute because of government plans to 
increase privatisation and deregulation in the public sector. The purpose is to assess 
the activities and strategies of the branch, whilst evaluating the members' power and 
ability to stop privatisation.
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Finally, chapter 9 reviews the 1992-4 period. It summarises the changing social and 
economic environment in Cape Town, whilst acknowledging the tremendous effects of 
apartheid on the branches Coloured' membership. Secondly, it evaluates the internal 
structure and external activities of the branch; and finally concludes by considering - at 
this stage - SAMWLTs relationship with the ANC.
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The description of the social and material position of the 'coloured' worker in the 
Western Cape - along with the structure and organisation of the Cape Town City 
Council (CCC) - whilst placing in context the development of the branch, also permits a 
fuller understanding of the possible influences on the thinking, values, and class 
consciousness of the membership . The chapter, firstly describes the location, 
demographic profiles, population and HDI (Human Development Index - a measure of 
the quality of life), of the Western Cape. This is followed by an account of the SAMWU 
workers' employers (the Cape Town City Council - CCC), including a general 
description of the local authorities that existed in the Western Cape; the structure and 
organisation of the CCC; along with the control and employment issues within the 
council. The overall purpose is to provide the reader with a understanding of the home 
and work environment of the SAMWU membership, and by inference its effects on the 
organisation of the branch and its levels of class solidarity
The Cape Town branch of SAMWU was located in perhaps one of the most 
spectacular areas of South Africa, - the Western Cape province (see Map 5.1)
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The Province occupied 129,386 km2 or 10.6% of South Africa's land area, and 
contained 12% of the country*s arable land. The region was different from the rest of 
South Africa because of its winter rainfall, pleasant 'mediterranean' climate and 
stunning indigenous vegetation (Bridgman, Palmer, and Wolfgang, 1992). It was
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second most important economic region in South Africa. The bulk of South African 
wine estates, deciduous fruit, wheat, vegetables, and cut flower production were (and 
are) found here, and its west and south coasts supported inshore and deep-sea fishing 
industries. The area had a strong manufacturing base, with a high technology 
component, relatively important financial and insurance services, a large sea port - 
with historical roots in the Dutch seaborne empire, two major airports, and some of the 
most dramatic scenery in South Africa, supporting a developing tourist industry 
(CSS:1991 Census; 1993 OHS; 1995 OHS).
The population of the Western Cape, from which the 'coloured' SAMWU workers drew 
their origins, were distinctive. The displacement of the indigenous Khoisan peoples 
(herders), resulted in slaves being imported - many from Indonesia- as a source of 
labour. By the turn of the twentieth century the working class, largely of Khosian and 
slave origins were called 'coloured' rather than 'Native'. The predominant language of 
the farms and streets was a form of Dutch, the forerunner of Afrikaans. Islam, carried 
by those sections of the slave community from Asia, survived in the face of a dominant 
Christianity. Historically, 'coloureds' either rejected the cultural hegemony of the whites 
to take up Islam or accepted the terms of white society and adopted Christianity. 
(Beinart, 1994; Ross, 1989).
The entire peninsula on which the province was situated, was bounded in the north by 
Atlantis, Paarl and Wellington and in the east by Franschhoek, Stellenbosch, Somerset
West and Gordon's Bay. At the heart of the Province was the provincial 
capital and the main metropolitan area - which was until 1904 the largest city in 
Southern Africa (see Map 5.2). Racial divisions were relatively fluid, and 'coloured' 
people moved more rapidly than Africans to the towns, on account of sharing the same 
agrarian and social worlds as Afrikaner. The Cape originally had few African reserves, 
but with the huge inflow of African people in the 1950s, the city had come to share the 
demographic and linguistic characteristics of most other South African cities (Beinart, 
1994).
This area of the Western Cape was not only an important agricultural region but a 
political, cultural and intellectual centre. Some of the earliest advocates of Afrikaner 
nationalism came from these old agrarian heartlands which had lived longest in the 
imperial shadow. It was around the secondary cities of the region - Paarl and
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Stellenbosch - that intellectuals defined the Afrikaans language as separate from Dutch 
and the first Afrikaner history of the country was written. In 1992 the area was 
considered a desirable area for whites to live and property development was an 
important source of growth (Bridgeman, Palmer and Wolfgang, 1992; Beinart, 1994).
THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER CAPE TOWN
RSC BOUNDARY 
BOUNDARY
RECOMMENDED
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area was of strategic importance to the province. The high 
levels of urbanisation in the area were true for all race groups. A well developed 
settlement arm stretched from the City to the south and north-eastwards. These 
suburbs contained urban environments with a diversity of residential, commercial and 
industrial functions - along with a relatively well developed transport and infrastructure. 
To the west and south-west of the city centre lay the Atlantic suburbs and the southern 
peninsula - these white dominated upper-income residences, especially around areas 
like Seapoint, were among the finest in the world. In sharp contrast the Cape Flats in 
the east were sandy areas with old and new housing estates, inadequate social and 
recreational facilities, and only a few industrial centres. Expansion in this direction had 
resulted in the establishment of new townships stretching to the 'south-east sector'. 
Overall the suburbs on the Cape Flats remained isolated from employment, divided by 
major roads and allocated on racial lines to mostly poorer African and 'coloured' people 
(Bridgman et a/, 1992).
Developments in the Cape Flats and south-east sector included the poor to middle- 
income Coloured 1 suburbs of Mitcheirs Plain and Blue Downs, where a large number 
of SAMWU workers resided. Many 'coloureds' were forcefully evicted to this area in the 
60s when apartheid was rigorously applied resulting in large-scale removals of people 
from proclaimed 'white' areas. District Six, a mixed area close to the city centre, was 
perhaps the most notorious. Other areas on the Cape Flats embraced the 'coloured' 
townships such as Bonatelhauwel and Hanover Park, the airport industrial zone, the 
African townships of Nyanga, Gugletu and Crossroads, the Philippi farming area and - 
further still from the city centre, the black township, Khayelitsha (Bridgeman et a/, 
1992).
Of the approximately 2.5 million people resident in Greater Cape Town in the early 
1990s (DBSA, 1991), 30% resided in the higher-income, predominantly white 
residential areas of the City bowl, the older suburbs and the new-income northern 
suburbs. 70% were settled outside on the Cape Flats (32%) and the south-east sector 
(38%). In debates regarding the development of the province, the housing crisis was 
often cited. Much of the discussion centres on the quantitative shortfall in proper1 
housing for Africans and, to a lesser extent, 'coloureds1 . Although, still a major problem 
during the early 1990s, the housing of ^coloureds' went through its most difficult phase 
during the 1960s and 1970s, when ^coloureds' resorted to building spontaneous 
settlements because of accommodation shortage (Bridgeman et al, 1992: Smith,
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1987). Nevertheless, during this period, the area had seen an enormous population 
increase, often far from adequate housing schemes, and only relatively little 
improvement of the commercial and social facilities in this area (Bridgeman et a/, 1992).
In general though, the Western Cape during the 1992-1994 period was a region with a 
good infrastructure, high employment, strong economic activity and a high level of 
taxation. It was one of the best resourced provinces in terms of health facilities, and its 
literacy rate was high (71%) - with education resources above the average. However 
this generalised picture masked the disparities within the region: the standard of living 
of whites in the Cape ranked among the world's top five developed countries, whilst the 
'coloureds' in the rural areas were amongst the lowest in the world, with some of the 
highest incidences of tuberculosis of any province (CSS 1993 OHS; 1995 OHS)
In many respects the demographic profiles in the Western Cape - from 1992-4 - were 
similar to the rest of South Africa, but they departed from the national picture in a 
number of significant areas (OHS, 1995,- using 1991 census and 1993, OHS). It is 
useful - as a means of establishing the economic and social background of the 
'coloured' SAMWU worker in Cape Town - to analyse these figures further. The 
following section considers the population and Human Development Index (HDI), a 
measure used to determine the quality of life in the area.
The CSS (OHS, 1995 - using 1991 census; OHS 1993 & 1994/5 questionnaires) 
estimated the size of the South African population to be approximately 41 million people 
16 . KwaZulu-Natal is the largest province in South Africa, whereas the Western Cape is 
fifth. Table 5.1 shows the population by province
16 Estimates of the South African population prior to 1994 differ greater. The reason is linked to the 
over-estimation of the black population on the part of the apartheid census in 1991 - see a clearer 
explanation in the Methodology chapter
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Province
KwaZulu-Natal
Gauteng
E.Cape
N. Province
W.Cape
North W.
Mpuma
Free State
N.Cape
Size of the population in 
millions
8.8
7.1
6.6
5.6
3.7
3.3
3.0
2,8
0.7
Africans constituted the majority of people in all provinces, except in the Western and 
Northern Cape, where 'coloureds' were in the majority. Therefore, the population 
groups in Western Cape remained markedly different from the rest of South Africa, as 
Table 5.2 indicates,.
Race
Africans
White
Indian
Coloureds
South Africa
Three-quarters
1 in 7
1 in 30
1 in 10
Western Cape
1 in 5
1 in 4
small
more than half of the pop.
% of pop.
in
South
Africa
76
13
3
9
% of Pop.
in the
Western
Cape
18
24
1
57
(because of rounding may not always add up to 100%) 
Like all cities in South Africa the population of the Western Cape could not be 
separated from the economic and political considerations of apartheid planning. The 
segregation of towns and the use of so-called 'coloured reserves' divided the society in 
this area and led to a 'developmental dualism1 . 'Coloured' people in Cape Town were 
amongst the primary victims of the early apartheid years (OHS, 1995; Beinart, 1994).
In poorer Cape suburbs, 'racial' barriers had been penetrable, along the Peninsula's 
Main Road 'coloured' people occupied common residential areas with poor whites.
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Yet, Nationalists had long agitated for their segregation, by attempting to exploit white 
fears using notions of 'miscegenation'. This was a concept that played on the idea of 
purity -especially that of white women - and Social Darwinist fears that mixing would 
result in racial decline. The easy social interaction, and in some cases inter-marriage 
between 'coloureds1 and poor whites became a prime target for such an ideology. 
These concerns led to legislation: the Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality 
Act (1950), which prohibited marriage and extra-marital sex across racial boundaries. 
Further classification under the Population Registration Act of 1950 caused many 
families to become divided, as relatives were re-classified into different race groups 
(OHS, 1995; Beinart, 1994) 17 .
Unlike Africans though, it was difficult to develop a discourse of separate nation-hood 
for the Cape 'coloureds', especially as many Afrikaner and 'coloureds1 shared not only 
a common language but in some cases a common ancestry - although this was seldom 
admitted. Nevertheless, the Nationalists remained consumed with making race and 
nation congruent, and set out to intensify 'coloured ' self-awareness (Beinart, 1994). The 
Group Areas Act (1950), allowing for setting up of separate geographical racial zones, 
came to exemplify such attempts. Its effects impacted most on 'coloured' and Indian 
people - an estimated 600,000 were removed over three decades as Cape Town and 
Durban were redefined along racial lines (Beinart, 1994; Smith, 1987)
Population removals under the Act were often justified by the South African government 
as slum clearance. District Six, at the foot of Table Mountain (named after the old sixth 
district of Cape Town) became symbolic of such apartheid oppression, when in 1966 it 
was re-defined by the NP, as a white zone. For many of the SAMWU workers 
interviewed, the area with a one time population of 60,000, was closely associated with 
the history and culture of the 'coloureds'. Old 'coloured' and Malay areas were 
destroyed and their population moved out of the city onto the Cape Flats. Most of the 
areas were subsequently cleared, houses were demolished, with only the historic 
Malay Quarter remaining. The quality of the housing into which the residents were 
moved may have been superior - as one brochure advertising the new town for 
'coloureds' explained...
17 The Population Registration Act provided for compulsory classification on a national register. 
Documents would be issued to all stating their racial group; a Race Classification Board adjudicated on 
disputed cases. The race classification determined the public and private rights of any individual 
(Beinart, 1994, p141).
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...The kind of people who are buying houses at Mitchells Plain are the 
kind of people you would be glad to have as friends and neighbours. 
They are all people just like yourself who want to live a clean decent life; 
taking a pride in your home and garden; bringing up your children to 
appreciate the better things in life; helping each other in a spirit of 
fellowship; getting together for discussions, entertainment, Church and 
Club activities, etc.
But human relationships, in places like the Cape Flats were considered more 
impersonal, social deprivation more evident, and personal safety less secure than in the 
traditional 'coloured' areas of Cape Town (Beinart, 1994; Smith, 1987). One* coloured' 
student, interviewed in 1993 explained why...
You must understand that for many Coloured' people in Cape Town, 
and that includes many of the SAMWU workers you Ye speaking to, 
District Six is part of their history, their struggle... District Six was a slum, 
very few of the properties belonged to the 'coloured' people, they were 
mostly Indian and white landlords. Many of the properties were 
overcrowded, rents were often collected by floor space, it was a way of 
making lots of money...yet the ultimate losers were still the 'coloured' 
working class families, many were simply torn from their roots and 
scattered across the Cape Flats. They still talk about it today, just go 
down to the shebeens that 'coloureds' frequent and its not long before 
they start talking about the District Six clearances.
In the early 1990s, the demographic picture of the area in which SAMWU workers of 
the Western Cape resided, remained a reflection of the apartheid polices of the past. 
The legacy of upheaval and segregation was everywhere to be seen, but it was also an 
area undergoing substantial change. Up until the mid-1980s the composition of the 
population in the region had been affected by the influx controls of the 'coloured labour 
preference1 policy. Africans could only be employed if there were no 'coloureds' 
suitable for the work. Later, the abolition of the policy reverberated into a much faster 
migration of Africans, primarily to Greater Cape Town but also to the fringe and 
periphery towns, and to a lesser extent the farming areas. The inflow of labour resulted 
in the mushrooming of informal settlements, initially near the African townships but later 
scattered around the metropolis. Estimates from the 1991 census and Bridgman et al 
(1992) predicted a rapid increase in the African population, from 14.7% in 1980 to
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33.5% in 2010, whilst whites would decline from 29.8% in 1980 to 19.8% in 2010, and 
Coloured' people from 55.5% to 46.7% over the same period (OHS, 1995; Bridgeman 
efa/, 1992).
During this period (1992-1994) the Western Cape enjoyed one of the highest human 
development indexes in the country - this is the representation of life expectancy, level 
of education and income. The following section considers these areas - although 
because of lack of data on incomes for Africans and ^coloureds' in this area during 
this period, employment trends and patterns have been substituted as a determinant of 
the quality of life.
LIFE EXPECTANCY
According to the CSS (OHS, 1995) the life expectancy for the Western Cape was 67.7 
years, the highest expectancy of all the provinces, well above the national average of 
62.8 and Gauteng's (Johannesburg area) average of 66. Yet such crude figures 
masked the racial differences - the whites in Western Cape had a 10-year longer life 
expectation than other group, there was a fairly rapid ageing of the Coloured' 
population, yet interestingly the African age profile departed from the typical age 
pyramid of developing countries 18 .
The age profile of the Africans in the Western Cape was one of the peculiarities of the 
area. Unlike the rest of South Africa, the largest proportion of Africans were not among 
infants and young children, but amongst the 20-44 age group - males (49%) and 
females (48%) - with the proportion declining with increasing age. The reason was 
linked to the apartheid influx controls, traditionally imposed on Africans entering this 
area. While young African adults appeared to migrate to the Western Cape from the 
rural areas in search of work, their children remained at home for nurturing and 
education (CSS: OHS 1995). Likewise - in contrast to the rest of South Africa - more
18 The extent of underdevelopment that Africans endured more generally under apartheid is clear 
from the age distribution. The age-pyramid is typical of poorer countries - a large proportion of people 
are infants and young children, while among those aged 15 or more, the proportion of people in each 
age category steadily decreases
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males than females were found in the 20-64 age group, which was a further indication 
that migration played a role.
By far the most surprising age expectancy profile in the Western Cape was that of the 
'coloured1 race group. The CSS figures revealed an interesting picture emerging, 
somewhere between developing and developed countries (CSS: OHS.1993; 
OHS.1995). The proportion of 'coloureds' found in all age groups was fairly consistent 
until the age of 35, when the proportion started to fall and finally decreased sharply after 
the age of 40 - with only 2% of 'coloured' males being found in the age category 60-64 
years. Such statistics clearly indicated a declining number of 'coloureds' surviving to an 
older age (CSS:OHS, 1995).
The causes for this age anomaly were difficult to establish from the figures, but it is 
possible to speculate that the lower life expectancy was linked to the poorer standard of 
living and working conditions of 'coloureds', as compared to whites. One SAMWU 
member was clearly worried about this, and communicated his fear of dying young.
'Who knows if I can enjoy my old age, life is getting tougher at the 
council, why more and more 'coloured' workers are dying within a few 
years of retiring'
Overall, whites enjoyed the highest life expectancy of all the race groups in Western 
Cape (with 16% of white males and 19% of females being aged 60 years or more), 
followed by 'coloureds1 and finally Africans. Nevertheless, since the Western Cape has 
one of the highest levels of life expectancy in South Africa, it may be possible to 
conclude that all race groups benefited to some extent ((Bridgeman et a/, 1992; CSS: 
OHS, 1995).
LEVEL OF EDUCATION
Another indication of the quality of life is education. This area demonstrated clear racial 
and gender differences. Whites enjoyed the best educational attainment in Western 
Cape, with males achieving the highest (73%) education to secondary level compared 
with the females (67%). Within the 'coloured' population, only half of the coloured 
females and males (50% and 53% respectively) had received some secondary
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education. Whereas, Africans males and females - despite educational disadvantages, 
especially on the part of the women - attained 45% and 53% (respectively).
Racial variations were clearly evident in education. Amongst Africans in the Western 
Cape (aged 20 years or more), 9% of African males and 7% of females had received 
no education at all, whereas for 'coloureds' the figures were 7% (male and females), 
and whites 0% (male and female). The figures - in the case of Africans - contrasted 
well with the rest of South Africa where 20% of African women and 14% males had 
received no education at all. Once again the reasons appeared to be linked to migration 
- many literate Africans from the TBVC (homeland) states moved to the Western Cape 
for work. Racial variations could also be found in post-school education: 7% of African 
females and 6% of African males, have attained a post-school qualification, while only a 
small proportion of 'coloured' females and males (5% each) have attained an 
educational level higher than matric. The reasons for this may have been partly 
explained by the comments of one SAMWU worker interviewed..
...during the apartheid regime they (the 'coloured' workers) were more 
interested in material gains.... he took his child out of school put them in 
a factory in order to further those material gains that they wanted to 
make. What they find now is that black people are much more educated, 
much more professional.
Therefore, although whites obviously attained the highest standard of education, 
interestingly Africans - despite their material disadvantages - still managed to achieve 
higher levels of post-school education than 'coloureds1 during this period.
PATTERNS AND TRENDS OF EMPLOYMENT19
This section considers the influence of the 'coloured1 labour policy, the sectors of 
employment, occupations and unemployment in the Western Cape.20 According to the
19 Data on the structure and trends of employment and unemployment are unreliable in South Africa 
and guestimates are frequently used. The reliability of such data is discussed further in the 
methodology chapter
20 Owing to lack of data on the breakdown of income in this area during the 1992-4 period, patterns and 
types of (un)employment, were substituted as a good indicator of the overall quality of life with which to 
measure the HDI.
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CSS (OHS, 1995 - using 1991 census, 1993 OHS and 94 questionnaires) 64% of the 
15 plus population were said to be economically active 21 . The figure was high in 
comparison to the entire country (55%). Of those economically active people in 
Western Cape, 81% indicated they were gainfully employed either in the formal or 
informal sector, whilst 19% said they were unemployed (using the expanded definition 
22 ). Once again such figures concealed the racial differences prevalent in the province.
The * Coloured ' Labour preference policy
As outlined, one of the distinguishing racial features of the Western Cape's labour 
market has been the apartheid government's use of the 'coloured labour preference 
policy1 in this area from 1955 to 1984. Employers who wanted to employ Africans 
needed a certificate from the Department of Labour showing there were no suitably 
qualified 'coloured' workers available. Its purpose was to prevent the movement of 
Africans from the homelands to the Western Cape in order to protect 'coloured' labour 
from African competition; and to preserve the province as a numerically dominant white 
area. F.R. Thomlinson, chairman of the Tomlinson Commission of 1951 (whose 
mandate was to study ways of developing the homelands economically), recorded his 
shock at the extent to which Africans had taken up residence and employment in the 
area and recommended.
The Western Cape must be declared a white area so that there is at 
least one region in the country where no point of friction can be created 
between Africans and White. This entails a slow repatriation of the 
natives from the Western Cape'
Further controls were increased in the 1960s to squeeze out 'illegal 1 Africans, with the 
government undertaking to reduce the African population in Cape Town by 5% annually
21 Economically active refers to those available for work either employed or unemployed
22 At least two definitions of unemployment are used in South Africa - the strict (taken steps in the last 
4 weeks to find work) and the expanded (desire for work) definition.
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from 1966. The controls stratified the workforce into two distinct groups: a population 
qualified to live and work permanently in the Western Cape; and another group of 
African, temporary contract workers. Most of the temporary workers were forced into 
manual unskilled and more dangerous jobs. Since the Coloured' labour preference 
policy was operative for almost thirty years until September, 1984, it was fairly evident 
that most SAMWU workers, would have benefited - to some degree - from the policy 
(Kraak, 1993).
Humphries (1989), however, doubts if the policy was truly effective for the whole of the 
period. Over time the policy became unworkable, the effects of natural population 
growth and the ability of Africans to circumvent the influx control machinery, meant that 
the policy became partially redundant. Moreover, economic expansion in the 1960s 
and 1970s meant more - not less - cheap labour was needed. This appears to have 
taken precedence over the goal of reducing the number of Africans in the area 23 . 
Consequently, since the 1970s the 'coloured preference policy' was usually upheld for 
its symbolic political value, rather than it's effective labour market controls (Humphries, 
1989).
Sectors of employment
In the early 1990s, after Gauteng (37.7%) and KwaZulu-Natal (14.8%), the W.Cape 
(13.7%) was the largest contributor to South African GDP. Although it lacked a mining 
sector, it compensated with manufacturing, agriculture, property and financial services, 
as well as tourism and public-sector services (CSS: OHS, 1995). In 1990, the 
Developmental Bank of South Africa (DBSA) identified the following sectors operative in 
the Western Cape (see Table 5.3)
23 Evidence to support this point, is provided by the reaction of Prime Minister Vorster in 1969 to a 
delegation of academics concerned about the effective implementation of the policy. Vorster appears to 
have given the delegation short shrift, stating it was 'difficult enough keeping industrialists in the 
region'(Humphries, 1989)
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Table 5.3
THE SECTOR STRUCTURE IN THE WESTERN CAPE AND RSA (1990)
Sector
Agriculture
Mining
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas & water
Construction
Trade & accommodation
Transport & communication
Finance, insurance etc.
Community/social services
Total GDP (R million)
Western Cape share of RSA
Western 
Cape %
7.8
0.2
24.6
2.7
4.2
15.7
9.9
15.1
19.8
35000
13.0%
South Africa
5.6
12.9
24.2
4.1
3.6
12.8
8.9
11.1
16.8
268 000
Because of the wide range of economic sectors, the labour market in the Western Cape 
had been less prone to the violent cyclical fluctuations, common to regions with a 
dominant mining industry. In particular, in the public sector - one of the largest 
employers in the Western Cape - employees historically benefited from its stable 
market environment. The community, social services sector (which included the public 
sector) had boosted this region during the recessionary years of the 1970s and 1980s, 
and although it was set to decline in 1990s, remained important. In contrast, however 
Cape Town's famous clothing industry (part of the manufacturing sector) and the 
construction sector, were habitually subject to fluctuations in market demand 
(Bridgman, et al 1992).
Occupations
Nevertheless, the type of work within these sectors remained segregated along race 
and gender lines. A large proportion of both 'coloured' and African workers occupied 
elementary jobs such as cleaning, garbage collection and agricultural labour. However, 
in common with the rest of South Africa, a movement from unskilled to semi-skilled 
work, especially amongst the 'coloured1 occupations was evident in the 1990s 
(CSS:OHS, 1995). Whereas, a large proportion of employed 'coloured1 males (39%) 
and females (48%) still worked in elementary occupations, there was a movement 
among males to more skilled artisan and craft jobs (22%). This figure compared well 
with South Africa as a whole, where 23% of all coloureds males were found in artisan or 
craft jobs. A small proportion of 'coloured' workers of both genders (2% of males and 
1% of females) were also to be found in managerial posts, which was slightly less than
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the overall figures for South Africa - 3% of 'coloured' males and 1% of females. 
Nevertheless, this probably reflected the large numbers of 'coloureds' found in this 
area. Figure 5.1 shows the occupations of 'coloureds' in Cape Town.
In common with 'coloureds', a large proportion of Africans were to be found in 
elementary occupations, yet the percentage in the Western Cape - males (49%) and 
females (57%) - was higher than South Africa as a whole - 34% male and 50% female. 
This probably indicates the relative position of Africans in relation to 'coloureds1 in the 
Western Cape labour market, a racial group absent in large numbers in the rest of 
South Africa. Figure 5.2 highlights the occupations of Africans in the Western Cape.
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Overwhelmingly though, whites dominated the high skilled and well paid occupations: in 
white-collar jobs, white males were usually found in managerial positions (22%), with 
those in blue-collar jobs occupying the top tier, requiring longer-term training (25%). A 
further large proportion of white males were present in semi-professional and technical 
positions (16%). White females predominantly occupied clerical positions (43%).
Overall, the breakdown of occupations in the Western Cape followed similar 
discriminatory patterns to the rest of South Africa, although it was further distorted by 
the x coloured labour preference' polices. Still the limited and discriminatory data 
provided by apartheid gave very little information about the work and earnings of 
'coloured' and African groups, in particular the quality of the labour inputs, the dynamics 
of the occupational structure and perhaps more significantly those un(der)employed in 
the labour market.
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Unemployment
The Western Cape's unemployment figure of 19% (using the expanded definition), is 
lower than elsewhere in the country and compared favourably with South Africa's 
overall figure of 29% (CSS, OHS, 1995) 24 Several reasons could be advanced for this. 
It may have indicated more work opportunities in the Western Cape than elsewhere in 
the country; that the levels of education and literacy were higher; or simply because a 
greater proportion of the population lived in urban areas, transport to work was cheaper 
and more accessible than other regions.
The figure is low for both unemployed males (14%) and females (24%) in the Western 
Cape compared with other provinces - the highest unemployment rates were to be 
found in the Eastern Cape (36% males) and the Northern Province (52% females). 
However, half the people (50%) who were unemployed in the Western Cape had never 
had a job, and 23% were previously employed in the already oversubscribed 
elementary occupations such as domestic work and gardening. Table 5.4 highlights 
the levels of unemployment by previous occupation.
Previous occupation
Elementary
Operators/Assemblers
Artisan, Craft
Professionals
Sales/Services
Managers
Clerks
Semi-professional
No previous occupation
Other & unspecified
%
23%
4
8
1
7
1
4
1
50%
2
24 Figures on unemployment differ greatly in South Africa, depending on whether the informal sector is 
included in the statistics. See Methodology chapter for further discussion.
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Predictably, differences can be found between racial groups and gender. 45% of 
African women in Western Cape were unemployed compared with a figure of 23% for 
African men; 3% for 'coloured' females and 15% for 'coloured' males; and 14% 
unemployed white females compared with 3% white males.
During the late 1980s, the informal sector in Cape Town - along with many other cities 
in South Africa - was rumoured to have grown 25 . This was mainly due to the NP's 
change in policy, which allowed 'controlled deregulation' of the 'informal1 section of the 
economy. The lifting of legal restrictions along with selective state support for black- 
owned small businesses were said by the government to have produced discernible 
results. According to a Human Sciences Research Council study (1992), an estimated 
six out of ten unemployed South Africans were now involved in informal-sector activities 
(Murray, 1994).
Free-market theorists hailed the growth in the informal sector as solving the escalating 
unemployment problem. Aspiring Blacks were encouraged to unleash their 
entrepreneurial skills and create new employment opportunities for the jobless masses. 
However, critics claimed that the soaring informal sector merely reflected a deeper 
structural crisis, with the multi-layered ranks largely filled with people driven by a 
desperation to survive, rather than a thirst for profits (Murray, 1994)
In reality dependable data on the structure and trends of unemployment, during the 
apartheid period (1992-4) were unavailable. In particular, the lack of official statistics 
about the informal-sector or the amount of 'second jobs' or moonlighting made it 
impossible for the apartheid government to assess the full extent of unemployment in 
the Western Cape. Nevertheless, finding a solution to the unemployment and 
underemployment represented the single greatest challenge to both the government 
and the council.
25 Informal sector is a term used to convey a range of work activities that are hard to regulate, typically 
irregular, low income , and often on the border of legality (Standing et al, 1996). Reliable data on the 
informal sector is traditionally difficult to find, and was especially so in South Africa during this period
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Overall, opinions differed as to the Western Cape"s growth potential during this period. 
Whereas some predicted a promising developmental path for the area, others saw a 
stagnant region, with the growth of the black population in the province rapidly 
outstripping the demographic resources and potential for job-creation (Bridgman etal 
,1992).
At the beginning of the 1990s the Western Cape offered a modified variant of racial 
and gender disparities present elsewhere in the country - but to a lesser extent. The 
reasons were in part found in the higher rate of urbanisation, better access to facilities, 
education and employment. However, inequalities between the population groups 
remained central, with the single most significant characteristic of the Western Cape, 
being the atypical race composition - the majority of South Africa's "coloureds" 
continued to reside in this region.
As a consequence, crucial to any real understanding of the economic and social status 
- and possible class consciousness - of the "coloured1 municipal workers in this region, 
remained the development of the * coloured1 identity. For over 80 years such an identity 
had not only influenced the material position of * coloured' workers but had also been 
the prime focus for ideological and political division in the Western Cape, with the notion 
of "coloured 1 changing over time as it concurred with the needs of the ruling elites 
(Luckhardt and Wall, 1980). In many ways it could be argued that the "coloured1 
workers - and that included SAMWU members - had historically benefited from the 
apartheid policies of this region. Traditionally the National Party tried to divide 
"coloureds1 off from the rest of the South African working class by offering concessions - 
in Parliament the Tricameral System of 1984, gave Indians and "coloureds1 their own 
parliament' and in the workplace, they had higher wages and better terms and 
conditions - nevertheless, the life style of the majority of 'coloureds' was in no way 
affluent.
In truth, during the apartheid regime "coloured1 workers remained oppressed by racist 
policies, forced to accept their second-class life of scant privileges as rewards for 
having lighter skins, then those of third-class blacks. As a result the destruction of 
racially mixed communities, the segregation of housing, the enforcement of job 
reservations - and other apartheid measures - prejudiced the world of every "coloured1 
worker in this region (Murray, 1994 ;The Economist, 1995). Moreover, these same 
policies governed the institutions of the Cape Town City Council (CCC), and needless
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to add, had an equal potential to influence the class consciousness of the workers who 
were employed there. The next section - examining the Cape Town local authority - 
considers further the probable influences of the structure and ideology of the council, on 
the collective awareness of SAMWU members
In 1992, the Cape Town City Council (CCC), was by any criterion, the most important 
local authority in the area of Greater Cape Town - with 62% of the total 'coloured' 
population of Greater Cape Town falling under its jurisdiction. It was the largest 
employer of labour in the area, with the majority of its staff (77%) being * coloured1 . The 
council was traditionally dominated by the Democratic Party and politically maintained a 
consistent - although not always unanimous - hostility towards both the central 
government and the NP controlled, second tier of government, the Cape Provincial 
Administration (CAP) (Terreblanche, 1993). The next section details the types of local 
authorities in the Western Cape and the structure and organisation of the Cape 
Town City Council (CCC).
The members of the Cape Town branch of SAMWU were employed by the Cape Town 
City Council (CCC). In 1993 the council was the largest and most important provider of 
services in the Province - but it was not the only provider. The Region had been 
divided into three main settlement segments: the metropolitan fringe which was 
administered by the Regional Services Council (RSC); the peripheral towns and rural 
areas covered by the RSC and a number of small town councils; and finally Greater 
Cape Town, serviced in the main by the CCC (Bridgman, et al 1992). Map 5.3 shows 
the different types of local authorities in the province
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Map 5.3
THE STRUCTURE OF THE METROPOLITAN AREAS WITH THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES
PAARL BRANCH OF RSC
BRANCH OF RSCMelKbosatrand
^ ^SS'MON 'S 
FALSE BAY
The Apartheid system with its reformed tricameral parliamentary system 26 , had 
produced an extremely complex, and dysfunctional system of local government. The
26 Parliament was reformed in 1984 and three Chambers (White, 'coloured' and Indian) were created 
under the control of a State President and his Ministers" Council
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various tiers of government - central, the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA), the 
Western Cape Regional Services Council (RSC), Black local authorities (BLA's), 
'Coloured' management committees, White controlled local authorities - and the Civic 
Associations all contributed to a haphazard delivery of local services in the area 
(Bridgman et a/. 1992).
Central government departments administered regional development incentives and 
prepared guide plans for the metropolitan area. White, Coloured' and Indian councils 
and management committees were (in theory) responsible for their own separate race 
groups - although in practice there was a great deal of overlap. The Cape Provincial 
Administration (CPA) assumed responsibility for a number of African areas in the 
Western Cape. The whole network presented as a perplexing and bewildering structure 
(Bridgman et a/. 1992).
Regional Services Councils (RSC's)
Further attempts by central government in 1987 to rationalise and co-ordinate the 
provision of services by introducing Regional Services Council's (RSC's) in selective 
parts of the country, only served to complicate the system even more. The Western 
Cape RSC, Overberg RSC, Breede River RSC, and the Western Coast RSC, all had 
responsibility for the areas falling within or across the boundaries of the Western Cape. 
With representatives from, the councils in the African townships, 'coloured' and Indian 
management committees, and white municipalities - and a chair person appointed by 
the provincial administrator - they had dual functions of an 'own affairs' (matters 
attaining to race groups) within local government, and a 'general affairs'(matters 
affecting all groups) function in providing services regionally. The overall aim was to 
increase direct state control over local authorities and expand the financial reserves 
available, partly through levies and partly by the Cape Provincial Administration. In 
reality they were fairly ineffectual (Bridgman et a/, 1992).
White - controlled Local Authorities
In truth the most powerful groups in the Western Cape were the white-controlled local 
authorities. All local authorities in RSA were graded 1-15 according to a prescribed 
formula developed by the national United Municipal Executive, and determined by 13 
factors - for example the number of water and electricity meters and sewage
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connections, housing, water and sewage purification, ambulance and even library 
books. There were 65 white local authorities in the Western Cape, 19 of whom were in 
Metropolitan Cape Town, but it was the CCC that was the core local authority and 
provided most of the regional services. In 1992, although Cape Town was the largest 
municipality in the country based on the population it served, its population had the 
lowest average income of all the large white-controlled local authorities in South Africa. 
This was because 70% of its population were 'poorer1 coloured people (Bridgman et 
a/., 1992).
'Coloured 'Management Committees
Another sphere of local government in the Metropolitan Cape Town area was the 
management committees for 'coloured' areas. They had very little political support, with 
no direct responsibility in the provision of services as these functions, since these 
functions were retained by the white local authorities or RSCs (Bridgman et a/., 1992). 
The management committees in Cape Town had a highly controversial history. For two 
decades the CCC had refused to acknowledged their authority. CCC declined to attend 
the Group Areas Board hearings, which were designed to sanction the mass removal of 
'coloureds' to new racial areas, and establish new 'coloured' management committees 
to govern the regions. Such moves were not entirely egalitarian (Pinnock, 1989)
The City Council, renowned since the 1950s for its notable absence of Afrikaner 
professionals or workers, often comprised of professional people, landlords and small 
businessmen, whose party allegiance usually lay with the United Party - the official 
opposition to the NP. Many of these landlords and businessmen, were not only 
opposed to being told what to do by a government they did not support, but perhaps 
more pointedly, were opposed to the removal of 'coloureds' because of the exorbitant 
rents and cheap labour that the existing 'coloured1 communities provided in the area. 
Local Afrikaners, for their part, were intent on achieving separate 'coloured' councils 
because they feared that the 'coloureds' - some of whom still retained their municipal 
voting rights 27 might gain control of strategic wards and councils and threaten the 
position of whites in the Cape (Pinnock, 1989).
Although, 'coloured' and Indian voters had been removed from the parliamentary roll in 1956, and
the Provincial Council membership in 1961, those who were not weekly tenants still retained their 
municipal vote in the Cape until 1971.
Legislation in 1959 28 , forced the council to partially concede to drawing up separate 
racial areas for 'coloureds'. By the mid-1960s more than 300,000 'coloured 1 people had 
been resettled in state housing schemes on the Cape Flats - leading to a massive fall in 
the number of ^coloured' people with the municipal vote, in the remaining white urban 
areas (Pinnock, 1989). Nevertheless, the management committees, governing the new 
areas remained little more than adjuncts to the CCC consulting with white councillors 
on most issues, although for housing and other social development they reported 
directly to the House of Representatives (part of the Tricameral system). By the 1990s, 
the whole arrangement had served only to introduce a further complicating factor in the 
administration of local government (Bridgman etal., 1992).
Black Local Authorities (BLA x s)
Another tier of local government in the Western Cape was the Black Local Authorities 
(BUVs). In 1982, the Black Local Authorities Act transferred administrative authority 
and financial responsibility for the African areas to the black local authorities (BLA). 
There were twelve BLA^s in the Western Cape province, but a number on the periphery 
had ceased to operate and were being governed by administrators appointed by the 
Cape Provincial Administration (CPA). (Bridgman et a/1992; Murray, 1994).
From the mid - 1980s, central government was increasingly forced to subsidise these 
areas on a massive scale. Finance was needed to transport millions of South Africans 
across large distances to work (Murray, 1994; Swilling and Boya, 1997). Further 
expenditure was also needed to restructure the water and sanitation systems. Often 
residents in the informal settlements had no choice but to deposit their waste in pit 
latrines which threatened to poison the underground water tables and rivers. It was 
clear that these, and many other problems would not be resolved without a major 
structural adjustment to local authorities (Swilling and Boya, 1997). As one black 
student interviewed explained...
Under the legislation the state could claim property from the council for worker housing and then
hand it over to a management committee under the Coloured Affairs Department.
119
few white people visit the townships... they've no idea what it's like. 
There are few paved roads, when the rain comes its impossible to walk 
... because of the poor sewage system the smell can be unbearable in 
the Summer.... there is very little access to electricity ..I could go on but 
I'm sure you've seen the pictures'.
Tankeiso, Interview, 20/10/93
Civics
As a consequence - and in the absence of a democratic local government in African 
and 'coloured 1 suburbs - local civic associations, or 'civics' as they became more 
popularly known, grew out of the need for proper representation. Table 5.5 identifies 
the most important ones in the area
Western Cape United Civic Organisation (WECUCO) - an umbrella body representing ANC aligned 
civics
Federation of Cape Civic Associations (FCCA) - the umbrellas body for the New Unity Movement- 
aligned civics
Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC) - a federation of civics located mostly in Coloured 
suburbs
Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA) - a federation of civics engaged mostly in African areas
Western Cape United Squatters Association (WCUSA) - a federation of squatter organisations
Western Cape Hostel Dwellers Association (WCHDA) - an organisation representing hostel dwellers
Although the civics stood outside the official apartheid structure of local government, 
they became enormously powerful organisations which local councils - and eventually 
governments - were forced to recognise as a legitimate voice in the community. The 
aim of the civic movement was to build links with trade unions and other community 
groups to foster their own non-racial self-government at the local level. In 1992, the 
South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) was established to consolidate all 
the civic movements nationally. In March 1993, they played a strategic role in the 
launching of the Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF) - a body empowered to 
create a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and financially viable local government 
system (Murray, 1994; Pycroft, 1997).
Overall though, what was evident by the early 1990s was local government in the 
Western Cape had grown into an immense network of increasingly impotent
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administrations. Most of apartheid's local councils and committees in the area were 
seen as being wrecked by an urban crisis in housing, transport, economic development 
and environmental issues. The widespread duplication of services and resources - as a 
result of almost 70 local authorities operating in the area - was rapidly deteriorating into 
a waste of valuable manpower and resources. Consequently, local government in the 
region - and that included CCC - faced a crisis of confidence with, according to the 
deputy Mayor Clive Keegan of the Cape Town County Council (CCC)......
"a disturbing tendency towards the emergence of corrupt, violent, 
nepotism, inept and inarticulate elite, largely self-appointed and 
answerable to no democratic process"
The next section considers the structure and control of CCC, plus the employment 
issues and relations within the council.
Cape Town City Council (CCC), was the most important local authority in the region, in 
terms of the grading system it was the highest - with a grading of 15. It provided many 
regional services, including the operating of the water supply system for the 
metropolitan area, treating the wastewater from outside the boundaries, and playing a 
leading role in the transport planning of the area (Bridgeman et a/, 1992). The Cape 
Town City Council (CCC) had long been seen as a liberal council displaying an 
internationally renowned opposition to apartheid for over 40 years and enjoying a status 
as an equal opportunities employer since 1946. As a supporter of the Democratic 
Party, the council had often identified with the English business community that 
dominated the area. The National Party, at central government level had habitually 
disparaged the council, perceiving it firstly to discriminate against Afrikaans-speakers, 
and secondly possessing a politically progressive reputation that was in need of control 
(Cameron, 1994). As Larry Palk of Andrew Levy Associates 29 , and Labour consultant 
for the CCC explained
A respected firm of Labour consultants in South African. Since 1997, they have published jointly with the U,K"s
Income Data Services (IDS) on South African industrial relations
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..you must understand most of the people at the Council are Liberal 
Democrats which have an affinity with England, they identify with the 
English, you only have to look around the City.
Yet, despite this reputation - and subsequent Mayors' attempts to distance themselves 
from the apartheid regime - the real power lay with a limited group of people: the 
executive committee (interesting, elected from the councillors) the town clerk and the 
heads of departments. Many of these people - although not always Afrikaners - 
continued to maintain a strict Afrikaner bureaucracy, which usually included 'whites 
only1 control of senior positions.
In 1992, the CCC operated a management committee system of control. This scheme 
provided for a cabinet-type structure with the authority concentrated in a single 
controlling executive (EXCO), rather than in the council as a whole. The position of the 
Chief administrative/executive official and the town clerk was particularly strong under 
this system, on account of being the main channel of communication between the 
officials of the council and the EXCO (Cameron, 1994).
Further evidence of this centralisation was found in the traditional local government 
administration, comprised of strong separate departments and committees, loosely co- 
ordinated by chief executive officers and/ or policy committees. This tended to 
concentrate power into the hands of heads of departments and their chairs. The result 
was a strong departmentalism with little interdepartmental co-ordination. Overall, the 
procedures, like the rest of South Africa were based on regulatory frameworks and 
scientific management practices which assumed that there was only one rational 
response to each issue. The result was a over-reliance on rigid regulatory frameworks 
which centralised power in the hands of senior management (Wooldridge and Cranko, 
1997).
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In 1992, the CCC, along with the rest of South Africa, had inherited a British-type 
separate personnel system. However, this had not always been the case. The type of 
system that characterised the CCC up until 1980 was a "hands on " provincial 
intervention, with a minority of councillors wielding tremendous power in the City 
Council. During this period the CCC operated a Multiple Committee Structure, with the 
council divided into a number of committees, each with responsibility for supervision 
within a particular function area. Officials reported directly to the relevant committee, 
although general control rested with the council as a whole (Cameron, 1994).
In the 1960s the council and the Multiple Committee Structure became the subject of 
government investigation after certain irregularities of staffing practices became 
apparent. These irregularities were mainly due to the blurring of executive and 
legislative functions under the Committee Structure, which meant the councillors were 
involved in the actual running of staff affairs of the CCC, and had the ability to influence 
staff appointments (Cameron, 1994). The Slater Commission - investigating the 
functioning of CCC organisational structure - found the system gave the council almost 
unfettered power over staff and allowed for some dubious staff practices. Following its 
recommendations in 1965, the Multiple Committee was replaced by the Management 
Committee system The position of the Chief administrative/executive official of local 
authorities, and the town clerk was strengthened considerably under this system (see 
fig.5.3 above) - being the main channel of communication between the officials of the 
council and the management committee (Cameron, 1994).
It was not however, until 1981 that the CCC's autonomy was seriously affected. A full- 
time Municipal Service Commission (MSc) was set up in the CCC, by central 
government - with vested powers to make appointments and promotions up to a certain 
salary level. Provision was also made for representatives from the two recognised 
unions, SAAME (white union) and the 'coloured' municipal union, CTMWA to be 
consulted on the matter. The exclusive right to appoint and dismiss staff had been 
removed from the council. Senior promotions were however, to remain under the 
control of the CCC's executive committee (EXCO), and the town Clerk was appointed 
by the general council (Cameron, 1994).
The CCC never really accepted the legitimacy of this body and in 1990, the Town Clerk 
was eventually permitted to take over all the functions and powers of the MSc, and in 
1992 a new Department, of Human Resources was created to manage the personnel
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matters. Yet, Cape Town remained unique in that it was the only authority whose 
employer/employee relationships had been largely managed by a centrally controlled, 
administrator-appointed body. Furthermore, Cameron (1994) believed the 
government's chief motivation was not to prevent nepotism in recruiting senior staff, but 
to contain what it perceived as a dangerously "radical" local authority. Especially as, in 
1980, only 6.9% of the top posts in the CCC were from Afrikaans-speaking people 
(Cameron, 1994).
Yet, further attempts were made by central government, in the early 1990s to change 
the council's structure. With approaches borrowed from the U.S and British private 
sector, central government prescribed that departments - not just in Cape Town, but the 
whole of local government - should become cost centres, with departmental heads 
being managers first and professionals second. Paper-based directives, rules and 
reports were replaced with financial accounting and zero-based budgeting. However, 
the management approach was never properly implemented, leaving a concoction of 
both the old professional and new corporate management models - and limited support 
for training managers. Moreover, the racial composition of the council, with its 
subsequent down-sizing and active employee resistance, further frustrated the 
implementation of any alternative management techniques (Cameron, 1994; Swilling 
and Boya, 1997).
5.4.4 Employment issues within the CCC
As the principal local authority in the region, with wide ranging responsibilities, CCC 
was also the largest employer of municipal labour in the area. From 1992-4 
employment issues and relations in the council reflected the crisis of organisation that 
had emerged as a result of the apartheid structuring of local government and its 
inescapable racist labour market segmentation.
Racial composition of the workforce
In 1992, out of a workforce of approximately just over 15,000 employees -11,500 Cape 
Town City council employees were 'coloured', 3,500 were white and only 500 were 
black. Employment in the local government had generally been patterned on the basis 
of white male dominance in management, professional and technical occupations, with 
workers of other ethnic groups, especially women being confined to lower occupational
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levels. In the CCC the implementation of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy' 
resulted in very few blacks employed at any level. 7% of management and supervisory 
posts were held by 'coloureds1 , well above the national average of about 1.7%. In 
terms of women, the Council's 11.5% in top posts was almost double the national 
average. However, Africans and Asians did not fare so well - only 0.6% of managerial 
positions were African and 0.6% Asian - this compared with the national average for 
companies of 2.5% for Africans and 2% for Asians (Terreblanche, 1993; Younge and 
Bendix, 1994; Robinson 1994a)
Industrial relations
The industrial relations in Cape Town Council also epitomised the unequal racial 
configuration of its workforce. Although professing to be a liberal regime the city council 
had historically favoured its habitually white, conservative trade union as opposed to 
the more militant mainly 'coloured' union, who described itself as independent, non- 
racial trade union.
In 1992, the Council was an active member of its Employer's Association - the 
Municipal Employers' Organisation (MEO). The Association had been established in 
June 1968 to include all Transvaal employers (known then as Transvaal Municipal 
Employers). Later in 1985 its jurisdiction was extended to Natal, and by 1992 any local 
authority was entitled to become a member. Although, its origins had been 
conservative, in the 1990s the Municipal Employers' Organisation (MEO), claimed not 
to discriminate on grounds of race, colour or creed - and symbolically included an 
increasing number of black municipalities (South African Municipal Year Book, 1993).
Since the mid-forties the city council had operated a closed shop policy. As late as 
1992, it only employed members of the traditionally white, South African Association of 
Municipal Employees (SAAME), and the mainly 'coloured', South African Municipal 
Workers Union (SAMWU). In effect, membership of one of the two trade unions was 
compulsory - it was a condition of employment. However, in 1994, the Council was 
forced to change its policy, and recognise a separate professional staff association. 
The agreement followed a three year battle by small number of senior staff, after an 
industrial court ruled the council's closed shop was unfair labour practice. Despite this 
small change, the two original unions continued to dominate employee relations in the 
council (Robinson, 1994b).
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SAAME
The South African Association of Municipal Employers (SAAME) was the second 
largest municipal union in the council (and in the local government sector). It had first 
been registered in 1924 under the Industrial Conciliation Act of that year, and was now 
included under the LRA (1956). It had members in all local authorities in South Africa, 
except Johannesburg and Durban, who had their own union. Its membership was 
approximately 3,500 in Cape Town, out of a national membership of 50,000 in 1993 
(ALA, 1993). It was a member of the Federation of South African labour unions 
(FEDSAL), and participated in the Federation of Municipal trade unions - which 
included the Johannesburg and Durban Municipal Employees Association and the 
Cape Province Municipal undertaking (Official 1993 South African Municipal Year Book; 
Robinson, 1994b).
Although, in 1992 SAAME opened its membership to all municipal employees - other 
than subsidised labourers - it had long been considered a conservative, white municipal 
union. SAAME had for a long period played a crucial role in the process of "job 
reservation" in the council. It employed tactics such as vetoes on the employment of 
members of non-white ethnic groups. The union performed a limited role on the 
question of local government restructuring - with its first concern being to seek 
guarantees for its members (Younge and Bendix, 1994).
Its stated aim had always been to regulate relations between members and the 
employers and to provide legal assistance to its membership. At its Annual General 
Meetings it usually elected an executive committee of 30 members and an action 
committee of 5 members. As, a recognised union, it had access to bargaining rights on 
the industrial council and was entitled to have its disputes settled at industrial council 
conciliation boards. At the industrial councils it had equal representation to the 
employer's MEO, where most disputes were usually solved amicably (Official 1993 
South African Municipal Year Book; Younge and Bendix, 1994).
However, with the emergence of stronger black unions, the overall picture was 
becoming less peaceful, and SAAME in an effort to retain members was being forced to 
take a more militant stance. Nevertheless, even with its traditional non-political identity 
(its full title being, SAAME [non-political]) it still succeeded in developing a highly
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antagonistic relationship with the council's other major union, SAMWU - a union openly 
committed to linking political and economic issues (South African Municipal Year Book, 
1993; Younge and Bendix, 1994).
SAMWU
By far the largest union in the council was the South African Municipal Workers' union, 
launched on the 24/5 October 1987. It was one of the first progressive municipal 
unions. Although SAMWU was largely a 'coloured' union, the orientation of the union 
centred on its opposition to apartheid and its support for 'real' political change. 
Nevertheless, a prominent issue addressed by SAMWU in the CCC - even in the pre- 
1990 period - was the National Party's attempt to privatise local government services. 
The union was fervently opposed to such policies, perceiving them as undermining the 
levels of service, increasing the costs to the poor, and reducing the much needed jobs 
of members (Younge and Bendix, 1994). By 1992, SAMWU's main orientation 
continued to be its determination to achieve complete and absolute change in the 
apartheid structures of local government, and to fight privatisation.
From the beginning it was the acceptance of close links between economics and 
politics that was central to forming SAMWU's position on both privatisation and local 
government restructuring. It was concerned not only with economic issues, but with 
locating these within a broader political context. Such an ideology appeared to have 
influenced its whole approach, its way of organising and attitudes (Younge and Bendix, 
1994). As Roger Ronnie (a senior SAMWU shop steward) explained..
Clearly we also do not see ourselves being restricted to the question of 
working conditions. We also have a role to play as an organisation in the 
broader environment. We see local government as an area for 
advancing the policy of socialism. The people themselves should have 
access to control local government, although there is not the classic 
means of production in local government, there are certain elements 
which lend themselves towards socialised control
From the beginning this ideology had the potential to bring the union into conflict with 
not only the Cape Town employers, but also the apartheid government. More
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profoundly it was a policy that would later bring it into dispute with a future ANC 
government.
In sum, the Democratic Party (DP) which traditionally controlled the City Council, 
presided over a plethora of management committees, town councils and wards, and 
was said to be widely influenced by the unaccountable and outmoded business vote. 
Such fragmentation had made it impossible to manage local services effectively, and 
had led to the isolation of expanses like Table Mountain, and the stagnation of areas 
like District Six - now left empty and derelict after the evictions of the * coloured1 
communities. More profoundly though, the lack of legitimate local government 
structures were seriously hampering, not only the economic development of the 
Western Cape, but more directly the individual material circumstances and quality of 
working life of SAMWU workers in the Cape Town Council (Maurice, 1993).
Considered historically, to be a liberal employer, the control of the city council remained 
in the hands of a relatively few senior officials, who consistently colluded with the 
apartheid system by discriminating against Africans employees, and favouring white 
trade unionists over 'coloureds1 . Such an environment, characterised by an excess of 
bureaucratic management structures, unaccountable councillors, widespread corruption 
and financial crisis, impacted on the councils employee relations which continued to 
mirror the inequality and discrimination common to the rest of local government in 
apartheid South Africa (Maurice, 1993).
The first section of the case study has attempted to provide an insight into the home 
and work environment of the SAMWU worker in the Cape Town from 1992-4. The aim 
was to gleam an understanding of the social and material position that 'coloured' 
workers held during this period - and its possible influence on their thinking and class 
consciousness. The overall depiction was ambiguous in that, whereas the evidence on 
the one hand pointed to the influence of a conservative 'coloured1 identity promoted 
and sustained over time by the apartheid system, this was contradicted on the other by 
the militant image of the 'coloured' SAMWU members in the workplace.
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In general, the Western Cape was a region of prosperity, with a good infrastructure, 
high employment and strong economic activity. Yet this popular image tells us little of 
the material position of * coloured' SAMWU workers. Whilst the Western Cape's 
'coloured labour preference policy1 may have initially benefited 'coloured1 workers - 
giving them priority over the employment of Africans in this area - it served in the longer 
term, to engender economic and political division for this group, potentially dividing 
them off from the solidarity and support of other black workers
This ideology was especially evident in the employment relations at the Cape Town 
Council, which continued to typify the unequal racial position of its workforce. The 
response of the council's largest union - SAMWU - to this situation was to call for 
complete radical change, the total economic and political transformation of the whole of 
local government. In theory, SAMWU was only fulfilling its mandate as a COSATU 
union by concerning itself with both economic and broader political issues. In practice, 
such a resolute commitment to genuine change in the public sector was destined to put 
an enormous strain on any future relationship between the ANC government and the 
union.
More directly though, the success of union strategies would ultimately hinge on the 
support of its rank-and file membership. This in turn depended on the members being 
sufficiently class conscious, to link the organisation of the council and their individual 
regressive living and working conditions, with the wider task of reforming the whole of 
the public sector. To this end, it was still not clear in 1994 whether SAMWU workers 
would make the 'connections' between their own personal material circumstances in 
the Western Cape, and what was happening generally at workplace level, and across 
the country as a whole. However, all the indications were - evidenced by the continuing 
examples of racism in the area, and support for the NP in the 1994 elections - that the 
majority of 'coloured' workers were currently choosing to divorce their own personal 
ordeals, from the wider black working class struggles in South Africa.
Yet, it is the SAMWU branch that remains primarily of interest here. With their demand 
for a complete transformation of local government and a commitment to fight 
privatisation, the question of whether the union members could override the 
conservative image of the 'coloured' community and mount a successful challenge to 
privatisation, was paramount. Such a move would rest on the collective consciousness 
of its membership being developed enough to enable the links to be made between the
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material events in the individual workplace and home, with broader political changes 
taking place amongst the working class and society as a whole. Whether SAMWU 
would have the organisation and leadership to articulate and guide this shift in 
consciousness - to successfully challenge the governments free market policies - was 
debatable. It would largely depend on the question of whether the black trade unions 
were still capable of expressing opposition to the power of capital, or had simply 
become just another means of incorporating working-class resistance. The following 
chapters of part 1 of the case study proceeds to explore these issues further by 
focusing directly on the Cape Town branch, within the general development of the 
union. The next chapter, firstly considers the historical growth of the branch, prior to 
1992. The aim is to understand the immense difficulties surrounding the building of a 
national union, and the important role played by Cape Town in the maturing of the 
union.
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COSATLTs decision in 1986 to organise local authority workers in the public sector, 
was to produce favourable growth in membership. Yet surprisingly - even by this date - 
little was known of the local authority workers' organisations, and their role in relation to 
the state, as an employer. It was SAMWU (South African Municipal workers Union), a 
union created to represent employees in local government, that was to change this 
scenario. Its formation had been onerous, but the old established Cape Town 
Municipal Workers Association (CTMWA), had managed to perform an essential role in 
the development of the new local government union. An understanding of the history 
and political maturing of CTMWA in Western Cape; its attempts to build a national 
union; the development of the SAMWU branch in Cape Town from 1987-90 - in 
particular the role played by its first major strike, gives a further indication of the 
character of the union, and the class-position of its members in Cape Town.
The predecessor to the Cape Town branch - the Cape Town Municipal Workers' 
Association (CTMWA) - began in 1928 as a conservative, registered union, running a 
Closed shop' for 'coloureds'. Yet despite these orthodox beginnings the union 
possessed a rich history of struggle, and by the early 1980s was one of only a few, 
progressive - yet established - unions in the public sector. The CTMWA had drawn its 
membership from the proletarianised Coloured' workers in Cape Town. Whereas their 
origins could be traced back to the x coloured1 rural labour who had migrated to Cape 
Town in the early 1860s, the root of their political consciousness were to be found in the 
racial segregation, common to the area. In 1890, the 'coloureds' - or as they became
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known 'Cape1 Boys - had virtually been replaced by cheaper African labour in heavy 
manual work in the docks and quarries. In turn the number of 'coloureds' defined as 
'Hottentot', 'mixed race' and 'Malay' increased in industrial and commercial 
occupations. Overall, the majority of 'coloureds' remained unskilled, domestic or 
industrial labourers, vulnerable to wage undercutting by Africans (Golden, 1987).
It was the 'coloured' artisans that became one of the first groups in this area to be 
subject to the historically notorious 'colour bar1 . White stonemasons, many of whom 
were immigrant workers with an experience of craft unionism, instituted a closed shop 
in 1900, that excluded the 'coloured1 worker. Yet interestingly, the increased attacks on 
the 'coloured' community - far from engendering notions of solidarity - served only to 
develop a distinct race identity, which aimed to exclude Africans from any of their 
unions or organisations (Luckhardt and Wall, 1980).
Nevertheless, despite early attempts on the part of 'coloured' workers to form separate 
unions, especially via the African Political Organisation (APO) 30 , a more successful 
political organisation superseded it in 1919 - the Industrial and Commercial Workers 
Union (ICU). The union embraced both 'coloured' and African workers, initially 
organising in the Cape Town Docks, but rapidly becoming a general, rather than a craft 
or industrial union (Beinart, 1994; Luckhardt and Wall, 1980). Yet this organisation was 
still not immune from segregation. By 1926, possibly as a result of the African 
leadership's black nationalist beliefs, the ICU had reversed its commitment to overcome 
race divisions and expelled the "coloured* leadership. In short, even despite the ICU 
failure to survive the depression of the thirties, the 'coloured' radicals now found 
themselves excluded from African mass organisations (Goldin 1987; Finnermore and 
van der Merwe, 1990).
After 1948, the NP was completely committed to the ideology of apartheid and as a 
consequence began actively excluding 'coloureds1 from the Afrikaner volk31 . The 
position of most 'coloureds1 was set to decline, although they were still to retain a 
social and material superiority over Africans. Moreover, any attempt on the part of the
30 The APO was a separate 'coloured' political organisation that attempted to mobilise and resist urban segregation.
But despite its name it sought only to advance the interests of the Malay artisans and petty-bourgeois (Luckhardt and 
Wall, 1980).
31 This ideology attempted to bind together the white, Christian Afrikaner both politically and economically
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"coloureds1 to identify with the disenfranchised and segregated people, defined as 
* African' was to be met with oppression (Goldin, 1987). Almost certainly these attacks 
on Africans in the area led to the re-emergence of the 'coloured1 identity amongst 
'coloured' workers - with the passing for 'coloured' becoming even more essential than 
before. Nevertheless, some resistance to this ideology did occur amongst "coloureds1 
under the leadership of the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) - and perhaps to a 
lesser extent, the sister organisation of the ANC, the South African Coloured Peoples 
Congress (SACPO)32 (Golden, 1987; Fine and Davis, 1990).
The NEUM - tradition was particulary strong in the Cape Town Municipal Union 
(CTMWA). Politically, Cape Town had always been the stronghold of South African 
Trotskyism, and it was the Trotskyist Fourth International Organisation that played a 
leading role in the formation of the NEUM. The NEUM was important to "coloured1 
resistance and organised vigorous protest against "coloured1 quangos like the notorious 
Native Representative Council (NRC) and the Coloured Affairs Council (CAC). Later in 
the sixties, it evolved into the "Unity Movement' which mobilised resolute opposition to 
the apartheid regime in this area (Luckhardt and Wall, 1980).
Nevertheless, although sections of the CTMWA membership could be said to have 
demonstrated a commitment to the politics of the NEUM, the union itself was only really 
radicalised in the mid-60s, when a few NEUM aligned individuals, including John 
Emtzen (the General Secretary and later to be SAMWU"s first General Secretary) took 
over the leadership33 From 1964 to 1983, the CTMWA remained one of the unity 
movements most ardent supporters 34 (SALE 1984; Friedman 1987).
The SACPO met with strong opposition from 'coloured' radicals and Trotskyists in the Unity
Movement who rejected the idea that "coloureds 1 should be organised separately. SACPO also refused 
to boycott the election of a 'coloured1 representation, who according to the terms of the Separate 
Representative of Voters Act of 1956 had to be white, although elected by 'coloureds1 . The SACPO's 
support for the white candidate, communist member Piet Beyleveld, led to the NEUM campaign against 
the election. The NEUM's successful boycott was seen as a major defeat for SACPO and their politics 
(Fine and Davis, 1990)
Previously there had been problems of worker democracy and control and it was only following a
long and bitter struggle that the existing leadership was expelled and replaced.
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Although the Unity Movement was driven into exile, along with the ANC and the PAC it returned with 
the upsurge of struggle in the eighties. The organisation was publicly relaunched in Cape Town in April
A neic1985.
Throughout the 1980s, the union continued to involve itself in anti-apartheid activities. In 
Cape Town attempts to introduce the tricameral parliamentary system and cement 
'coloureds' into the apartheid system were unsuccessful. Moreover, responses to 
segregation in the 'coloured' areas were markedly different from those in the 1950s and 
60s. 'Coloureds1 were no longer keen to distance themselves from Africans, this group 
now actively supported the resistance to the system. And when the notorious 
'Coloured labour preference policy1 was finally abolished in 1984, it constituted a major 
political victory for all forces in the Western Cape - including the CTMWU - that had 
struggled to fight against racist segregation in the area (Golden, 1987)
However, by the early 1980s - despite the association with radical politics - the union 
itself was experiencing problems and emerged as organisationally weak. This may 
have been due in part, to the political influence of the Unity Movement politics. The 
NEUM had traditionally generalised from its experiences of peasant struggles - seeing 
the peasantry as the majority in South Africa and concentrating its energies on winning 
their support rather than that of urban workers 35 . Moreover, the number of faction 
fights, owing to the leadership encompassing a variety of political perspectives - 
including those of the ANC - made organising exhausting at times (Callinicos, 1988).
Nevertheless, the existence of political in-fighting did not seem to entirely distract the 
leadership from building a larger union. It was CTMWA along with the Municipal 
Workers of South Africa (MWUSA) - an black union - that was later to become the 
driving force behind the launch of a national municipal union (Friedman 1987). As the 
first general secretary, John Emtzen explained...
The need to organize the unorganized was one of the primary roles we 
had to play... the need to build structures nationally became important 
as well. Allied to that was the question of not just organizing the 
workforce, but gaining the recognition associated with that, from local 
authorities. This then led to the lifeblood of the union, through 
subscription., it had been a painstaking process to build the union to 
where it is today
35 It concentrated on the peasantry, to the point of denying, even as late as the 1970s, the existence of 
a stable black working class in South Africa
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The attempts to build a national union in the 1980s were difficult from the beginning. 
Whereas, the Cape Town City Council had recognised the CTMWA - on the grounds of 
being a racially defined 'coloured' union - no such rights were extended to black 
workers. Many black trade unions in their fight for recognition found their progress 
blocked by closed-shop arrangements granted to usually, white 'sweet-heart' unions. 
Furthermore, each area of local government had its own unique system and structures, 
making the building of a national municipal union difficult (Swilling and Boya, 1997)
Yet, if the CTMWA was to grow into a national union - and distance itself from its 
narrow image of only organising Cape Town 'coloured' workers - it would need to focus 
on building links with African unions. But this would not be easy, especially as most 
black municipal workers were isolated and on temporary contracts. The migrant 
system had a long history in local authorities. The traditional pattern being for the 
workers to live in a compound or dormitory, returning home after the completion of his 
contract (usually one year), only to shortly leave again for another. Strict racial 
segregation, low-paid unskilled occupations, with few employment rights or benefits all 
made it difficult to organise unions in this group (Smith, 1987).
Johannesburg was the largest city, and therefore crucial to the development of any 
national union. But the nature of the workforce and the poor working conditions had 
made union organisation problematic for several decades. One migrant worker - living 
in the Newtown Hostel in Johannesburg - described how conditions in the 1960s had 
made life intolerable, and union solidarity difficult. Up to 36 workers would sleep in a 
small room with usually no mattresses and only wooden planks to sleep on, with no 
cupboards or stoves provided. Management control was strict, with compound security 
excluding all visitors, except council workers with special access cards. By the 1970s 
conditions in the hostel were little better, whereas only 13 workers now shared a room, 
there were still no cupboards and the men were not permitted to talk after ten, or 
allowed alcohol or visitors (Nkoenyane ,1993).
In the 1980s, no union recognition existed for black workers in the Johannesburg City 
Council (JCC) and Africans were excluded from Industrial councils (bargaining forums 
established by the LRA, 1954). The weaker 'liaison committees' - unrepresentative 
consultative bodies - were used for communication with black workers, but often
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excluded unskilled and semi-skilled labour. (Markham, 1987). It was really only after the 
1980 strike - organised by the independent Black Municipality Workers Union 
(BMWU)36 - that events started to change. Although the strike was eventually lost and 
a thousand workers were forcibly deported back to the 'Homelands', it managed to 
highlight the major issues to be addressed if local government unions were to survive. 
Despite the employers' hostility to black unions and their ability to deport strikers, the 
most crucial weakness was the lack of organisational and material resources 
(Markham, 1987; Friedman, 1987).
The lessons learnt from the dispute was that far greater power was needed if the 
employers and the state were to be challenged effectively. In particular, they needed to 
extend their organisational and solidarity links beyond their own immediate council. It 
was this recognition of the need for unity - along with historical events in South Africa as 
a whole - that accounted for the rise of a national municipal union (Markham, 1987; 
Friedman, 1987)
The period post-1980 saw a growing consolidation of independent progressive unions 
organising local authority workers. But in many senses it was lagging way behind the 
private sector unions, in terms of gaining recognition rights or negotiation around 
substantive issues. There were many reasons for this, not least the political significance 
of the public sector as a custodian of the apartheid system, and hence the need on the 
part of management to sustain and control a compliant workforce (Markham, 1986). 
The type of work carried out by unskilled local authority workers - with small gangs 
being employed on dispersed work sites - provided little scope for major technological 
advances to be used as a method of regulation. Therefore, a more overt system of 
direct management was needed relying on the presence of supervisors, tame unions, 
and a high level of repression at the black compounds. In all areas of the public sector, 
local and central, a divisive, disorganising and discriminatory employment strategy was 
applied with the aim of reducing labour costs and stifling any united action (Markham, 
1987)
36 The BMWU later split into two factions , the breakaway group went to join South African Black 
Municipal and Allied Workers Union (SABMAWU), with those remaining eventually forming the 
Municipal and Transport Workers Union of South Africa (MGWUSA) and later merging with Natal 
based municipal union to form the Municipal Workers Union of South Africa (MUSA). The MUSA was to 
merge with the CTMWA and other unions to form the SAMWU.
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Although management's divisive tactics did not go entirely unchallenged, other factors 
continued to impede the co-ordination of a progressive, national municipal union. 
Principally, municipal workers lacked a national identity, due partly to being organised 
with other workers in non-municipal unions - such as the Transport and General 
Workers Union. Another factor was the political disunity between those unions 
organising municipal workers - some adopted the programme and tactics of the ANC, 
others were aligned to the politics of the NEUM, while still others were committed to the 
strategies of black consciousness. Only with the launch of COSATU in 1985, did these 
issues receive attention (Markham, 1987; Younge and Bendix, 1994).
From the beginning the CTMWA had affiliated to COSATU. Politically the union - after 
fierce opposition - had moved from its NEUM orientation, towards the ANC politically 
aligned Congress movement. It was inevitable that affiliation to COSATU, would bring 
the union into greater contact with the Congress movement. Moreover, following 
increasing contact with newly emerging democratic unions the CTMWA's highly 
bureaucratic structure had been countered by building effective shop-floor structures. 
By the mid-eighties, it had managed to develop a strong shop steward's committee and 
- with up to three Shop stewards in each municipal department - it was poised to help 
launch a national local authority union (Markham, 1987;Baskin, 1991.)
The new local authorities union, SAMWU was established in 1987. The leader of the 
Cape Town Municipal Workers Association, John Emstzen was to become SAMWU's 
first General Secretary. Other unions which formed part of the merger included the 
General & Allied Workers Union (GAWU), South African Allied Workers Union 
(SAAWU), Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), and the Municipal Workers 
Union of South Africa (MWUSA). The union had been a long time in coming and 
represented an accumulation of struggles throughout the local authorities (Baskin, 
1991). Most important was the role of the Cape Town union, CTMWA which - despite 
having to contend with another long established white trade union, the South African 
Association of Municipal Employees (SAAME) - was growing. With its 11,500 
members, the Cape Town union had been COSATU's second largest affiliate in the 
Western Cape, and provided the bulk of the 15,000 national SAMWU membership 
(Pillay, 1990;Baskin, 1991).
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6.4 DEVELOPMENT OF SAMWITS CAPE TOWN BRANCH (1987-1990)
The Cape Town branch of SAMWU had been the major mobilising force for the national 
union of SAMWU - with the majority membership coming from the Cape Town 
Municipal Workers Union. Yet, the membership in the Cape Town branch had not 
grown substantially since its merger in 1987 (11,500) - by 1994, it still had only had 
approximately 11,500 members in Cape Town City Council. Nevertheless, with its 
approximate density of over 76% in the council, it was one of the largest and most well 
organised of SAMWU branches (Interview, Roger Ronnie, 8/10/93).
In the late 1980s the branch had begun to develop and mature. There were still a 
number of challenges facing it, including: fragmented bargaining structures; problems of 
in-house unions; low wages; racist abuse, bad working conditions, and crucially 
casualisation and privatisation. However, it was the issue of privatisation and the 
members willingness to protest against it, that was to eventually alter the branch's 
reputation and prominence in the region (Markham, 1987).
In March 1990 - in Cape Town - SAMWU, joined thousands of other public sector 
workers from the COSATU's affiliated trade unions and marched to oppose the 
government's privatisation plans. POTWA (Post Office and Telecommunication 
Workers Association) NEHAWU (National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union) 
SARHWU (South African Railways and Harbours Workers Union) and SAMWU (South 
African Municipal Workers Union) were all part of an on-going national campaign to 
stop privatisation. This stand against privatisation on the part of SAMWU members in 
the Western Cape, was to herald the beginning of a consistent campaign of opposition 
to government plans to privatise and commercialise the public sector. It was in direct 
contrast to Cape Town's other municipal union, SAAME, whose highly publicised 'non- 
political' identity meant it traditionally distanced itself from such campaigns (Pillay, 
1990).
The major turning point for the Cape Town branch was the strike in June 1990. Up until 
this point the 'coloured1 working class - that made up over 90% of the branch - had a 
reputation for relative passivity, but the dispute in 1990 transformed this image, and in 
the process smashed the 'liberal1 standing of the Cape Town Council (Pillay, 1990).
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The strikers were demanding a living wage', better working conditions and an end to 
the councils plans to privatise services. It was Cape Town's first municipal workers' 
strike, the first ever in the branch's 62 year history. It lasted 13 days (13-26 June) and 
involved up to 10,000 council workers. The Cape Town strike followed previous protest 
in the public sector, and although illegal, forced the council to negotiate more seriously 
in the future (Pillay,1990; Cape Times, 1990).
The SAMWU Cape Town strike took place amidst a national climate of heightened 
political consciousness and mobilisation. Coming after COSATLTs anti-LRA, living 
wage and anti-privatisation campaigns, and other regional and national strikes it had - 
according to then Senior shop steward, Roger Ronnie - flayed a major role in raising 
workers' expectations of a real change in the council and society generally. The 
national LRA march in Aug 1989 had been particulary successful in Cape Town - and 
contrary to expectations, COSATU had managed to mobilise all affiliates in the region 
(Pillay,1990).
On Wed. 13th June, the first day of the strike, 10,000 workers occupied the Civic 
Centre, whilst the union delegation met with council officials to resolve the strike. The 
effects of the strike were dramatic. 90% were absent from the traffic department, 
council nurseries, recreation, construction and maintenance departments, waterworks, 
the city abattoir, rent offices, sewerage plants, administration and the refuse and 
removal departments; and ambulance workers participated in a 'go-slow' The vast 
majority of the strikers were 'coloureds', including both blue and white collar workers, 
and even the usually conservative housing branch, city treasury and library. The 
union's 200 white members - mainly professional staff - were not immediately obvious 
but the, then Cape Town branch chairperson, Salie Manie believed many supported the 
strike (Pillay, 1990).
The occupation of the Civic Centre - which was later to emerge as a tradition during 
disputes - served to consolidate the strike. The 200 police were immediately apparent 
because they carried shotguns, tear gas, grenade launchers and batons. A water 
cannon and riot vehicles were parked nearby. Nevertheless, despite this formidable 
'show of strength' the council, did eventually concede to a lot of the strikers' demands. 
The council moved only slightly on wages, increasing its offer to labourers, from R4.19 
to R4.25 - which amounted to R845 (approximately £180) a month minimum, and to
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non-labourers from 13.5% to 14%. But the union achieved much more on negotiations 
around conditions: the council agreed to reduce the hours of work, make casual 
workers permanent, give an additional days' leave, provide housing allowance, fill the 
vacant posts, not to victimise any of the striking workers, and finally pay the workers for 
the last day of the strike. On balance, the action was seen as a resounding victory, 
especially as this was Cape Town's first strike (Pillay,1990).
The strike acquired a political significance in the area, with strong support from the 
various organisations in the black community - although a generally hostile reaction 
from the white population. The strike reflected a leap in the solidarity and collective 
consciousness of 'coloured' workers. This was expressed in their confidence to openly 
challenge their employers and the authority of apartheid.(Pillay, 1990). Moreover the 
changes were, according to Salie Mann (branch Chairperson), accompanied by a 
distancing from the influence of the New Unity Movement towards the more dominant 
political tradition of the ANC/SACP. For his part Roger Ronnie (senior shop steward), 
felt the politicisation came through the shop stewards and workers' participation in the 
marches and mass meetings. But perhaps of equal significance was the number of 
SAAME (the predominantly white union/staff association) members that had expressed 
a desire to join SAMWU. The branch was now strategically placed to organise local 
authority workers in the Western Cape (Pillay, 1990)
The Cape Town branch of SAMWU had been the major mobilising force for a national 
municipal union, with the majority of the membership coming from the branch's 
predecessor - the Cape Town Municipal Workers Union (CTMWU). Despite its long- 
standing reputation as a 'coloured' conservative union, the CTMWU had by the 1980s, 
become a radical opponent of apartheid.
Although historically, the political consciousness of the CTMWU's membership had 
been influenced by racial segregation common to the area, the more politically 
progressive tradition of the NEUM had emerged as influential in the Cape Town 
Municipal Union (CTMWU), from the 1960s to the mid-eighties. Moreover, it was this 
union - along with the Municipal Workers of South Africa (MWUSA) - that recognised 
the need for solidarity with all black and 'coloured' municipal workers. And it was their
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linking of struggles throughout councils nationally, that helped launch the national 
municipal union
It was only in the late 1980s however, that the branch truly began to mature and 
develop a progressive identity. More precisely, it was its militant opposition to issues 
like privatisation, that was to provide the union with a radical reputation. This image had 
been cemented during Cape Town's first municipal workers strike in 1990. The strike, 
although pushing for an improvement in pay and conditions, acquired a political 
significance, which according to the branch's leadership helped to develop a greater 
solidarity and collective consciousness amongst the 'coloured 1 workers (Pillay, 1990).
The 'coloured' workers in the CCC were now able and willing to use industrial action. 
Yet, this action was not only directed towards the employers, but also represented 
broader opposition to policies of privatisation in the public sector. In 1990, 'coloured' 
members appeared to be clawing back some modest control over their working lives, 
by linking their individual economic needs to the broader collective demands of the 
group and the wider community - in the way local government was to be financed and 
organised. The 1990 strike - according to reports from the branch leadership, Salie 
Manie and Roger Ronnie - had managed to engender an increase in class solidarity 
amongst their members, which in short had helped achieve a victory against the council 
(Pillay, 1990). The main point being, at this stage in the branch's development, rank- 
and file strike action had emerged as one of the most effective ways of wresting power 
from the employers, and challenging changes in the financing of local government.
The following chapters (7 and 8) explore this theme further, in the process of 
considering the internal structure and external activities of the union from 1992-4. The 
aim is to provide a narrative of the development of the branch within the national union, 
in order to assess whether the levels of organisation, leadership, and collective 
solidarity and action can facilitate, or impede the branch's opposition to privatisation.
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The following section surveys the internal organisation of the branch. Its growth and 
membership, internal structure and democracy (including the national, region and 
branch organisation), and the servicing of the members are all considered; along with 
the overall changes that were taking place during the 1992-4 period. The purpose of 
the chapter is to document the changing internal structure of the branch, and union; 
and to analyse its ability to develop an effective organisation and leadership, capable of 
challenging state policies of privatisation.
SAMWLTs growth in national membership figures had been impressive, especially 
given its membership had only been 15,406 at the founding Congress, and had 
reached 100,000 by 1994. Table 7.1 shows the increase in the national membership 
from 1987 to 1994.
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Membership Total
15,406
23,638
29,529
59,014
67,178
69,156
73,342
100,410
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However, the membership of the Cape Town branch had remained fairly static since 
1987. In 1993/4 there were approximately just over 11,500 SAMWU members in the 
Cape Town branch - the overwhelming majority of whom were 'coloured1 . Membership 
and density was high in the council because Cape Town City Council (CCC), 
historically operated a closed shop agreement with its unions. Since 'coloureds1 could 
form their own union, workers in the CCC were compelled to join the CTMWU, a 
'coloured' union.
Yet, the density of members was also high for the whole of the province. In 1990 the 
national membership had increased to nearly 60,000, with approximately half of the 
membership coming from the Western Cape Region. After the Garment Workers union 
- SAMWU was the Province's second largest, COSATU affiliated union (Pillay, 1990). 
Overall, levels of unionisation in the Western Cape province continued to grow 
throughout this period, and by 1994 were only just below the national average of 
31.3%. Table 7.2 shows the unionisation by province in 1994.
Province
Gauteng 
E.Cape 
Mpumalanga 
Northern
KZ/Natal
WCape 
Free State
North West
N. Cape
Nat. Average
Union Density
37.6 
31.8 
30.6 
30.6
30.6
29.7 
27.0
23.7
15.9
31.3
Although the closed shop agreement at the council had ensured that nearly all 
'coloured1 workers were union members, it did not automatically mean all the 
'coloured' municipal workers identified with the union. The type of union membership, 
uneven and contradictory in nature, had more often than not reflected the conservative 
nature of the 'coloured1 community in the region. In fact it was probably only after the 
branch's first strike in 1990 that an increasing number of members began to identify 
directly with the union as a whole (Pillay, 1990)
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During the 1980s the membership of SAMWU nationally, had grown rapidly, despite 
the severe economic conditions, and the repressive climate of harsh, conflictual 
industrial relations. In the early 1990s - and in sharp contrast to unions in the traditional 
industries of metal and mining - SAMWU, along with the other public sector union, 
NEHAWU, continued to grow dramatically. Moreover, in 1993 the much publicised 
single public sector union, actively encouraged by COSATU, was perceived as having 
the potential to attract even more members (Macun, 1993).
Such changes, it was hoped, would also have an effect on Cape Town. On the eve of 
the first democratic elections of 1994, the branch had organised predominantly 
'coloured' blue collar, unskilled and semi-skilled workers. But stewards interviewed in 
1993/4 predicted an increase in white membership, as their jobs became increasing 
threatened by rationalisation in the public sector, and expansion outside of local 
government, due to the public sector union merger (Hennie, interview, 3/9/93).
(See p. 146 for figure 7.1: Diagram of the structure of the union with regions, branches and the 
relationship to COSATU, 1993)
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COSATU
COSATU 
REGIONS 
(i.e Western Cape S.)
SAMWU National Congress
National Executive Committee
SAMWU Local 
Govt. Regional 
Sub-Committee
Shop Steward Locals, 
includes stewards 
from all unions in 
the area
SAMWU REGIONS (Executive) x 6 
Based on:
-Transvaal -South & North;
- Western Cape - North & West;
- & 376 local authorities
CCC Branch Executive
Branch Shop stewards Council
Shop Stewards Committees 
Civic Centre & 9 others
NCC (National Co-ord.
Cttee)
National Office Bearers
(NOBS) include:
General Secretary
Ass. Gen. Sec.
President
Vice President
National Treasurer
SAMWU Area 
Councils - co-ord. 
rural branches
The culture and organisation of the Cape Town branch influenced the union as a whole. 
In 1992, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between the branch and the national 
unions head-quarters. This was not simply because they occupied the same building - 
the same offices as the old CTMWA in Athlone, Cape Town - but mainly because the 
national union had partly grown out of, and initially relied heavily on the Cape Town 
branch to provide the resources and personnel for the future local government union 
(Interview, Hennie, 3/9/93).
The branclfs political influence was particularly evident, and key figures including 
future General Secretaries - such as John Emtzen, Salie Manie and Roger Ronnie - 
emerged from the ranks of Cape Town. In keeping with the political convictions of the 
branch, and COSATU generally, there was a strong tradition of rank-and-file power and 
democratic accountability. This commitment to worker's control, dominated the 
organisation and structure of the union, but was none the less undergoing a re- 
organisation. In particular, the changing national, regional and branch structures - as a 
result of the transformation of the structure of post-apartheid local government - was an 
important part of this re-organisation.
The highest policy making body of the union nationally, was the National Congress. At 
the beginning of the 1990s it was convened every three years. The national Congress 
was the supreme power in the union although, as with most unions, it elected a 
National Executive Committee (NEC) to carry out the policies of the union between 
congresses. The NEC met every three months to deal with administration and other 
urgent matters (Interview, Roger, 8/10/93; SAMWU National Congress (1997a): 
Organisational Issues).
Whereas, the union had 50 to 60 full-time union employees, the NEC itself was chiefly 
made up of shop stewards. The regional secretaries were included but had no vote. A 
National Co-ordinating Committee also met regularly with National Office Bearers 
(NOBs) (on occasions twice a month). The Constitution during this period, made 
provision for five National Office Bearers: General Secretary, Assistant General 
Secretary, President, Vice President and National Treasurer (South African Municipal 
Year Book 1993; Interview, Roger, 8/10/93; SAMWU National Congress: 
Organisational Issues, 1997a)
147
In 1992, the national union had six regions based on Transvaal -South and North; 
Western Cape - North and West; and 376 local authorities. During this period most 
regions were relatively weak, and only really developed as the structure and 
boundaries of the x new" South Africa changed. Most urban areas - with the majority of 
the membership - had strong and powerful branches, and usually dominated the 
weaker rural areas who were co-ordinated by Area Councils. In practice, in large 
municipal areas like Cape Town, branches were so large their powers were practically 
the same as those for regions. This kind of arrangement was already a source of 
problems, as the organisation grew and the country re-configurated (Interview, Dennis 
Arendise, 5/11/93; SAMWU National Congress: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
The backbone to the labour movement in SAMWU, was the branches with their 
democratic shop-stewards' movement, often painfully built by ordinary members. The 
hallmark of branches like Cape Town was their emphasis on worker control and strong 
shopfloor structures - directly answerable to the membership. By 1992, the branch had 
managed to develop a fairly militant shop-steward and executive system with a strong 
tradition of accountability and mandating. As Larry Palk, (Labour Consultant for the 
Cape Town City Council) explained, the large grassroots stewards' organisation had 
been the unions strength which had enabled it to grow, even during periods of severe 
repression.
There^s a large shop stewards' infra-structure, who operate very much 
on worker control. They deliberately did this because in the past 
hundreds of leaders were simply arrested by the Police and they could 
render the organisation helpless simply by taking out the leadership. 
They learnt from this and developed a large cadre.
Yet local accountability and power was not only distinctive to the Cape Town^s shop 
steward committees. Under the previous union federation - FOSATU - provision had 
been made for worker control of affiliate unions at all levels. In 1981, part of the
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structure included the implementation of shop stewards* councils or * locals', these were 
specifically formed to discuss local strategy. They brought together all shop stewards 
from various committees, depots, and plants in a particular area. The aim was to use 
the experiences of the stewards to strengthen the organisation and support each 
others' struggles in the workplace and the local community. Such worker control and 
co-operation later emerged as central to the COSATLTs constitution. All affiliated 
unions - which included SAMWU - were expected to be active in their area 'locals' 
(Kraak, 1993;).
The shop stewards in the Cape Town branch were no exception and ware particularly 
energetic. Not only were they accountable to their own shop-stewards' committees and 
members' meetings - but they participated in their area 'locals'. Such forums usually 
developed them politically by exposing them to wider arguments and theories which 
could be applied to their own activities in the workplace (Gabriels, 1992). There were 
ten shop stewards' committees in Cape Town, representing the different departments, 
i.e housing, electricity, construction and maintenance, cleansing, waterworks, 
ambulance, fire service, Parks and Forests, Abattoirs, and the civic centre. The civic 
centre was interesting because the stewards usually represented a floor - which could 
include workers from different departments (Jeremy, Steward, Treasury Dept. 
Interview, 10/9/93).
Local meetings of shop stewards committees and members were sometimes held in 
the civic centre, but many more took place at the individual depots. This was part of a 
general strategy, to improve links with the local members and grass roots of the union. 
As part of this drive for democracy at the beginning of the 1990s, all meetings were 
addressed in Afrikaans instead of English, making communication with its majority 
Afrikaans-speaking 'coloured' members much easier. The question of report backs and 
mandates remained central (Gabriels, 1992).
However, such structures did not mean that the branch was entirely immune from 
bureaucratic tendencies. Increasing amounts of authority and power - concentrated into 
the hands of a relatively few number of unions officials, with little accountability or recall 
from the membership - had already been noted, amongst even the most militant South 
African trade unions. Labour sociologist, Eddie Webster, reported in his famous study 
of the Metal Workers union...
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There is evidence that decisions that go beyond the immediate 
concerns of the shop floor are made at leadership level with limited 
participation outside this group
Some of the SAMWU stewards interviewed in 1993, also expressed concerns over the 
development of a separate layer of full-time branch officials willing to accept 
concessions with management in return for time-off facilities. As one steward 
explained..
certain members have made an interesting compromise. The Chair and 
Vice-Chair are trading (100%) 'time-off facilities for agreeing to 
'contract1 working in the council.
Another member was concerned about the council's attempts to 'hive-off competent 
shop stewards to future management positions. As one steward noted, the appraisal 
system appeared to be being used for this purpose
the 'appraisal system is for everyone, but it's a way of assessing the 
capabilities of the best shop stewards and draining them into 
management.
More specifically the steward, Hennie, complained about the lack of democratic recall 
on the part of the steward system. The inadequacy of the re-election procedures meant 
a number of members obtained positions and remained there for excessively long 
periods.
Once comrades are elected to senior union positions they remain there. 
I tried to pass a motion to stop officials standing time after time, but 
although there are elections of a sort its a formality and people simply 
get re-elected. I wanted to stop people standing after 3 times, but on this 
I was very isolated.
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Therefore, - even with independent unions like SAMWU - there was a possibility of 
power being centralised, with union leaders separated from their membership on 
account of receiving better working conditions and opportunities, or even higher pay. 
The dangers associated with such a trend became apparent in July 1994, when the 
Financial Mail reported a Crisis of leadership1 caused by the departure of hundreds of 
COSATU officials, 'not only to high offices of state, but to the private sector and 
academia' (Financial Mail, 1994a). Just how significant this was in SAMWU is difficult 
to ascertain - but concern was expressed in the local papers when Cape Town's own 
SAMWU leader, Salie Manie left the council to become an ANC M.P (Robinson, 
1994a).
Nonetheless, despite a lack of evidence to support increasing bureaucratisation of the 
branch (with leadership increasingly separated from the membership), what was 
becoming increasing evident by 1994 was both the branch - and the union nationally - 
were beginning to grow and develop into more formal, legitimate organisations. 
Although Cape Town, unlike many other branches of SAMWU, had been recognised 
since the 1926, it still largely remained outside the formal industrial relations structures, 
and deliberately set itself up, in opposition, against the apartheid state and its system. 
However, with the inevitable election of the ANC, SAMWU's role as anti-apartheid 
liberation organisation looked set to be replaced by a more tradition union structure - 
with an increasing focus on 'bread and butter1 issues located within the workplace. An 
acceptance of such a shift in emphasis inescapably meant a greater importance being 
placed on the facilities and services, in order to attract and retain members.
By 1994, SAMWU had managed to improve many of the services it offered. It was 
actively involved with projects set to track the membership and monitor finances, 
improve benefits and perhaps most important of all increase staff support for members. 
Cape Town inevitably benefited from all of these initiatives because of its close 
proximity to the head office (i.e it shared the same building).
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The SAMWU Membership Unit was launched in May 1994. The original intention of the 
project co-ordinators, COSATU was to provide a generic membership tracking system 
common to all COSATU affiliates. SAMWU (along with NUM, TGWU, CWIU and 
NEHAWU) was one of the original pilot projects of the membership system. The 
motivation for adopting such a system included: the desire to ensure financial 
self-sufficiency through improved subscriptions collection; to provide the union with 
accurate membership listings to forestall strike ballot interdicts; to achieve greater cost 
efficiency through the economies of scale of a single system; and finally to boost 
political unity and co-operation by using a single membership system throughout the 
federation . At this stage the system was relatively new and so it was impossible to 
predict its long-term success or suitability (Interviews, 1993; SAMWU Organisation 
Reports 1997a).
One of the major concerns for SAMWU - and black trade unions generally - had been 
the need for financial self-sufficiency. Unable to cover all their expenses from members' 
subscriptions alone, the main trade unions remained dependent on outside funding - 
usually overseas. SAMWU had become troubled that such funding would not always 
be available, and began adopting measures aimed at increasing subscriptions. Subs in 
SAMWU were deducted by stop-order deduction, which were obtained via a facilities 
agreement with the different councils. Previously subs had been collected by hand, but 
this had led to inaccurate records and suspicion over allegedly corrupt activities (Dennis 
Ardenise, Organiser, Interview, 5/11/93)
In 1993 SAMWU^s subs were 0.5% of a members salary - or 2R if less than R400 was 
eamt. However, the changes included a move to increase them to 1%, with a ceiling of 
R3. As table 7.3 indicated this compared relatively well to other unions
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Union
NUM
SARHWU
SAMWU
TGWU
NEHAWU
POTWA
COSATU
SUBS
1%
0.9%
0.5%
R8 (a month)
R5
R5
25c/member
By the early 1990s benefits had become essential. The aim was purely and simply to 
attract and retain membership. For political reasons SAMWU was more reluctant than 
other unions to involve itself in many of the commercial ventures that were becoming 
increasingly popular during this period. However, the members expected at least a 
national provident fund and loan scheme - which meant SAMWU was forced to provide 
these benefits. Yet its involvement in these enterprises remained limited (Interview 
Frank Pontax, SAMWU Administrator, 4/1/94; SAMWU Report on organisation Issues, 
1997a).
The Loan schemes existed in a selection of regions throughout the country, in particular 
the Western Cape used a local Unibank scheme, which adopted a low rate of interest. 
A national funeral benefit scheme operated from 1992, but although compulsory it 
usually failed to function because of the limited support for the scheme from the 
regions. Generally, the Cape Town branch appeared at the forefront of administering 
these schemes - but as previously explained, this was probably due to being housed at 
head quarters (Interview Roger Ronnie, 8/10/93; SAMWU Report on organisation 
Issues, 1997a).
Linked to the administration of these services was the issue of staffing. As Table 7.4 
indicates, this had clearly grown during this period:
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Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Total staff
10
17
38
54
76
81
103
Total members
23638
29529
59014
67178
69156
73342
100410
Staff as a % of 
Members
0.04%
0.06
0.06%
0.08%
0.11
0.11
0.10%
Ratio of staff: 
members
1:2364
1:1734
1:1553
1:1244
1:910
1:905
1:975
In 1993, there were usually seven to eight people based permanently at the offices at 
Athelone. They included administrators, the occasional lay shop stewards and full-time 
officials. Lack of administrative support was the most common complaint on the part of 
both the branch and head office. It was therefore agreed that a full-time post of 
Administrative Secretary should be created. The position was to have overall 
managerial control of the office. It was hoped that such a role would eventually be 
extended to the Regional offices - with the aim of improving efficiency and 
accountability (Dennis, SAMWU Organiser, Interview, 5/11/93).
During this period the union began to experience a number of changes, many of which 
were related to the increased national membership. By 1992, the union leaders were 
complaining of being overburdened. Full-time officials and staff, both in the branch and 
head office, were servicing an expanding national membership (Interview, Lance, 
Education Officer, 10/11/93). The shop steward in the Treasury department in the Cape 
Town council, explained the difficulties associated with attempts to build an efficient 
union organisation, whilst continuing to fight the apartheid system.
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.. it is extremely difficult from the point of view of the leadership, you see 
there's just too few hands. Obviously, apartheid puts tremendous 
strains on the union organisation........ At the moment we see many
serious issues such as the socio-economic problems of the country.
The pressure to accommodate an expanding membership meant that the structure of 
the union was under review. Of greatest concern was the role of the branches, some of 
whom - including Cape Town - had outgrown the regions. The reason lay with the extra 
resources given to white urban authorities, making them in reality the largest employer 
of municipal labour in any particular area. The other small, mainly black local 
authorities, employed relatively few workers in comparison, making it inevitable that the 
branch with the largest membership should dominate the region (SAMWU Report on 
organisation Issues, 1997a).
In an attempt to consider branch demarcations and the definition and scope of shop 
steward constituencies and committees, a National Organising Forum under the chair 
of the President - Petrus Mashishi was launched in 1994. It was co-ordinated regionally 
by a Regional Organising Forum, its brief being to consider structural changes, 
although it chief focus was to address the power of the branches (SAMWU Report on 
organisation Issues, 1997a).
A further change during this period was the recognition of the need to elect women to 
leaderships positions in the union - especially as relatively few stood as shop stewards, 
particularly in the rural areas. In 1990, there were 4 national office bearers of which 
none were women. Indeed of the 83 national office bearers in the whole of COSATU- 
affiliated unions only 8 were women (Baskin, 1991, p372).
In essence, these were new and exciting times with the probability of a black 
democratic government, bringing the prospect of a real transformation of society. Yet, 
this was also a period of uncertainty with the threats of workplace restructuring and 
rationalisation, looming large. The effects on the SAMWU, were at the same time both 
exhilarating and daunting. It was to be a period of adjustment as the independent 
unions shifted from a position of all out opposition, to one of inclusion and acceptance. 
As one member in the Cape Town planning department explained..
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Trade unions will find it very difficult to adjust to the new era. They will 
have to acquire more skills..... as for the role of trade unions at the local 
authority level, perhaps things won't change much...but the 
expectations of members and the civics are still rising ... so the unions
will have to respond to these
A full-time organiser also expressed ambivalence with regard to the future. He was 
concerned not only about the changes that were taking place in local authorities, but 
with the union itself, its structures, and even with his job in the union...
Perhaps our greatest fear at present is the changing structure of the 
Metropolitan system. The Council see themselves as being the major 
players, currently creating senior posts for themselves but at the end of 
the day we don't know how this will affect our members .... Or even how 
it will affect the union structures, it could mean that our jobs in the union 
could also go, especially as there are plans for a public sector union 
next May, which could include Health, Education, Railways, Telekom 
etc.
From 1992 to 1994, the Cape Town branch continued to organise mainly 'coloured1 
blue collar, local government workers. But with the large scale structural changes - both 
in the country and public sector unions - the branch expected to organise many more 
white-collar workers and other groups of public sector employees in the future.
Throughout this period the Cape Town branch continued to dominate both the region 
and the union as a whole. The reason for its influence, was not simply its size but its 
political ideology - which traditionally focused on a strong rank-and-file power and 
democratic accountability. The large grassroots stewards' organisation had been the 
branch's strength which had enabled it to grow, even during periods of severe 
repression.
Yet, although this commitment to workers control remained as strong as ever, it was 
acknowledged by those interviewed in 1993 and 1994, that the trade union organisation 
was undergoing a transformation. This change meant trade unions were no longer part 
of a national liberation movement - operating outside of the system - but were instead
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rapidly being viewed as a socially acceptable participants in a new industrial relations 
structure. Such developments meant the Cape Town branch would be increasingly 
compelled to give greater attention to the (economic) 'bread and butter" issues. In the 
process the provision of services to members, the structures of the union at local and 
region level would all need to be reviewed.
Whether the branch, indeed the union as a whole, would successfully make these 
changes was unclear at this stage. But what was certain, failure to address such 
issues could potentially threaten the development of an efficient internal structure - one 
strong enough to facilitate constructive resistance to the state's commercialisation of 
the public sector. Nonetheless, the union was more than its internal structure and 
organisation, in short a much fuller understanding of the power of the branch , could 
only really be grasped by considering, in parallel, the union's external activities and 
struggles. It is to this topic we now turn.
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It was during the 1992-4 period that SAMWU began to solidate its external policies and 
activities. Its main demands, by 1994 included a commitment to secure a centralised 
bargaining council; a call to end apartheid discrimination in the public sector by securing 
a "living wage"; and finally a pledge to oppose all forms of privatisation. In order to 
secure these demands SAMWU - and its Cape Town branch - began engaging in 
more formal conciliatory relations, alongside its more traditional conflictual strike 
activities.
The shift to a more formalistic, conciliatory style of industrial relations, had become 
increasingly common - particularly in the private sector. At a national level, some of 
the leading trade unions (MUM, NUMSA) were gradually moving away from an old style 
'militant abstention ism 1 to closer collaboration with management. Known as 'flexible 
accommodation', or 'strategic unionism' the approach was intended to secure a more 
legitimate role for the independent trade unions allowing them to negotiate individual 
reforms of the existing system. Since the move was increasingly being encouraged by 
the COSATU leadership - public sector unions like SAMWU were expected to 
participate (Baskin, 1996).
Yet, such partnership arrangements were in sharp contradiction to the privatisation and 
workplace changes increasingly imposed on black workers. The overall response from 
the trade union movement was one of militant opposition, tinged with confusion. If 
there was to be any effective resistance to privatisation in South Africa, it would have to 
be led from within trade unions. More especially, there appeared to be a strong belief,
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particularly on the part of the members interviewed in Cape Town, that only strike 
action could prevent privatisation.
We threatened them with industrial action and so they backed down 
from complete privatisation.
In an attempt to examine these issues further, the following chapter firstly explores the 
formal activities in Cape Town; followed by an account of the increasing levels of 
privatisation and deregulation being introduced in the council, and taking place within 
the context of the continuing levels of conflict and resistance. The purpose is to chart 
the changing activities and tactics of the branch, whilst assessing its overall power and 
ability to resist free-market policies.
In 1992, SAMWU was only just beginning to frame many of its formal activities. Up until 
this point industrial relations remained largely conflictual, with most activities centring 
around local collective bargaining. Throughout the 1992-4 period, the union's main aim 
was to establish a national collective bargaining forum - otherwise there was very little 
evidence to support a shift towards new forms of consultation or partnership 
arrangements with management. The following section considers the collective 
bargaining and changes in pay and conditions during the 1992-4 period
As a general rule most industrial relations conducted in the councils were adversarial, 
with local bargaining dominating communications between black unions and 
managers. Access to such procedures had not been conceded freely. Most had been 
secured by strike action, during periods of extreme repression. From the 1970s the 
leading trade unions had pursued a strategy of steady expansion in the workplace, with 
the aim of increasing participation in centralised collective bargaining at the sectoral 
level. The policy, though time consuming, had achieved appreciable gains for 
organised workers and bolstered the self-confidence of the labour movement. As an
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affiliate to COSATU, SAMWU was committed to such a strategy and pushed for 
involvement at both local and national level (Murray, 1994; Markham, 1987).
Recognition agreements varied between local authorities, with most local councils - 
prior to 1990 - engaging in perfunctory negotiations with the independent unions, 
preferring instead to negotiate with x tame' staff associations (Murray, 1994; Markham, 
1987). However, disputes like those in Cape Town in 1990 served to change this. In 
an effort to settle the - albeit illegal - strikes, many employers were forced to enter into 
genuine negotiations with the black trade unions (SALE, 1990a)
In SAMWU, the numbers of recognition agreements began to accelerate. Whereas, at 
its launch in 1987 the union had only achieved recognition with 22 municipalities, by 
1993 the number had increased to 308 recognition agreements (South African 
Municipal Year Book , 1993). However, by 1994 the independent local authority unions 
still lacked the right to bargain centrally for local authority workers.
we Ye pushing for the establishment of the national industrial council and 
our involvement in it.
In Cape Town, collective bargaining had traditionally been dominated by demands for 
higher wages along with a shopping list of general demands - hours of work, public 
holidays overtime, bonuses, shift allowances etc. By the early 1990s, the national union 
- along with other major public sector unions - took a lead and began pushing its 
branches to concentrate on tabling demands for a "living wage". This focused on 
eradicating the apartheid wage gap between blacks and whites, and became one of 
SAMWUs chief demands (Andrew Levy and Associates (ALA), 1993/4).
Progress was initially slow, especially as such negotiations usually meant a call for a 
35% to 100% pay rise. However, by 1992 the negotiating agenda for all public sector 
unions was beginning to shift. Bargaining strategies were becoming more 
sophisticated - encompassing broader macro-issues such as job creation, trade policies 
and job security (ALA, 1993/4)
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Yet, historically the inequality and unevenness of pay and conditions - not only in Cape 
Town - but throughout the public sector prevailed. The legacy of apartheid in the local 
authorities meant complex grading structures were characterised by an extraordinary 
number of job categories with a correspondingly complex system of wages and wage 
differentials. The result was a stark differentiation in terms of pay and conditions of 
service between whites - in higher staff categories - and other racial groups, in the 
lower categories (Standing, Sender and Weeks, 1996).
Inequalities - especially in pay - existed not only between races but also between local 
authorities. As most bargaining took place in separate local Industrial councils - 
negotiation on a sector basis was impossible. Consequently, richer large cities like 
Cape Town tended to pay more, with wages further from the urban centres being much 
lower. In 1990 Cape Town had the highest minimum rate, R720 per month, but its 
poorer surrounding BUVs often struggled to pay a minimum average of R300 
(SALB,1990b, p9)
Overall, though all black workers - whichever council they were employed by - started 
at an extremely low base, with most wages being below the living wage level. 
'Coloureds' and Indians fared better, but were still strategically placed below those of 
whites. Although in 1990 improvements had been achieved, with between 16%-122% 
pay rises (the 122% being reserved for those earning R250), real progression was 
blocked, and the historical legacy of apartheid wages maintained. Table 8.1 shows the 
average salaries per month between the race groups in different sections of the public 
sector, in March 1994. Although 'coloured' workers employed in Cape Town - a city 
council - would have earned more on average than those 'coloureds' working in local 
government as a whole, they still earned (on average) considerably less than Asians or 
whites.
Category
City Councils
Local Authorities
Total pay in the 
public sector
White
4573
4544
4062
Coloured
1 914
1 852
2369
Asians
2870
2852
3522
Black
1 279
1 275
1 879
Unspecified
2611
2610
3317
Total 
average
2442
2428
2784
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Wages were not the only area of discrimination, conditions of employment also varied 
substantially. Although, formally there was no discrimination in the Cape Town Council, 
most African and 'coloured' workers conditions were inferior to whites. Usually, 
Africans were employed as temporary' workers - and could in fact remain temporary 
for the whole of their working lives - with almost zero prospect of promotion. Their 
temporary status usually excluded them from benefits, such as pensions and housing.
In contrast, although 'coloured' workers were more likely to enjoy job security than 
blacks, they were still less likely to benefit from promotion than whites. In practice 
promotion and merit increases, were at the discretion of the management, who 
invariably made such decisions on the basis of race. Further discrimination in working 
conditions and facilities ranged from racially separate canteens, to being informed of 
rights in disciplinary hearings in an alien language (Terreblanche, 1993; interview, 
Archie, 4/1/94).
In 1993, SAMWU challenged the Cape Town City Council's (CCC) inconsistency and 
'white only' control of senior positions The council had declared itself committed to an 
'affirmative action' policy designed to address racist and sexist recruitment and 
promotion in the council.. Yet in spite of such a commitment the council had still 
neglected by 1993, to introduce many of its programmes, opting instead for the less 
effective (and presumably cheaper) method of informal implementation (Terreblanche, 
1993).
In reality, despite professing to be a liberal institution, nepotism had been prevalent in 
the CCC for years. Until the early 1990s, the City Council held an agreement with the 
previously 'whites-only' union South African association of municipal employees 
(SAAME), which allowed the union to veto any appointments they disliked - this usually 
meant people not classified as white. The Chairperson of SAMWU in Cape Town - 
Salie Manie - remained resolutely opposed to such tactics and argued instead for the 
setting up of a formal affirmative action board, with its activities overseen by the union.
Whites still hold nearly all senior positions and vacant senior positions 
still go mostly to whites. You cannot deal with affirmative action in an 
evolutionary way, it needs intervention and extraordinary steps to 
correct imbalances. SAMWU wants an affirmative action Board, and in 
light of the money shortage, a budget solely for affirmative action should 
be part of the deal. All appointments from then on should be done
162
against a definite affirmative action agreement and we want to oversee
the process'
Interestingly, SAMWLTs suggestions did not meet with the opposition it expected. The 
City Council agreed with the new policy and responded favourably to their ideas. The 
reasons are open to conjecture. The chair of SAMWU, Salie Manie, was rumoured to 
become a future ANC M.P, and this may have been a reason why the Democratic Party 
dominated council - with its newly established council caucus - appeared keen to 
embrace employee relations policies that were now more * politically acceptable1 
(Terreblance, 1993).
For many SAMWU members the existing system of pay in local government was 
inadequate, serving only to perpetuate the long established discriminatory apartheid 
reward structures. Furthermore, the existing methods of negotiation and consultation 
remained unworkable and incapable of eradicating the inequalities of the past. 
Consequently, many black and 'coloured' employees demanded real change in the 
formal structures that had long served the exclusive needs of the few. For that reason 
SAMWU workers in Cape Town - interviewed in the year leading up to the 1994 
election - were calling for an entirely new formal system of industrial relations, one that 
could deliver rapid and decisive change. Most remained suspicious of the existing 
negotiating machinery and demanded a complete reconstruction of the system - one 
with 'new' people, skills, attitudes, ideologies and legislation (Interviews, 1993).
Unfortunately, apartheid government's view of change did not concur with those of the 
municipal workers. Since 1985, the National Party's vision of transforming the public 
sector employee relations - and local government as a whole - was to be achieved by 
using 'responsible fiscal housekeeping and efficiency' (Catchpowle and Cooper, 
1999). Such comments, inevitably meant the government was intent on privatisation as 
an engine for change - which was also rumoured to be accompanied by the radical 
downsizing of staff in the local authorities. The following section considers the changes 
in work organisation on account of the introduction of privatisation, commercialisation 
and deregulation - including a move to increase rationalisation of jobs and increase 
flexible-working.
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The economic and political crisis of the eighties had forced the apartheid government to 
consider the implementation of privatisation in the state sector. Initially - in the mid-80s - 
its main efforts had been to privatise parastatals - Transnet, SASOL, ESKOM, and 
ISCOR - but by the early 1990s other sections of the public sector were to be included. 
In February 1990, the Government pushed local councils harder to consider 
privatisation. In Cape Town, Larry Palk (labour consultant for CCC) explained how the 
local press focussed their attention on the council, the inefficiency of services was a 
major theme:
CCC has it own power station but it simply didn't run at all...It was often 
said the facilities at the beaches should be privatised because private 
companies can run them much more efficiently and make profits.
From the beginning SAMWU, opposed such plans to privatise, on the grounds of 
protecting services and job security. On the 30th March 1990, thousands had marched 
in Cape Town to oppose the government's privatisation plans. Many SAMWU members 
directly equated privatisation with job cuts, and were prepared to protest in order to stop 
it.
The feelings in the workplace are strongly against privatisation, 
especially when it effects their job security.... the council can't give 
long-term guarantees that their jobs will be secure.
SAMWU members, were said by Larry Palk, to be so fearful of the jobs cuts that such 
a policy might bring, they refused even to discuss the issue of privatisation with 
management.
..unions in CCC just won't discuss privatisation as an option, it was 
really a parochial attitude, one of job security.
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Yet, although job security was the prime motivation for opposing such policies, SAMWU 
members interviewed, also showed more general social and political concerns about 
the effects of privatisation. One worker explained the feelings amongst members ..
The general feeling among members is that privatisation is not on! For 
two reasons, one its a question of job security and so there is a general 
opposition to the private sector and what they see happening. Secondly, 
its a question of provision of services, the concept of services for profit in 
fact is not acceptable.
Yet such views were not entirely uniform. One member interviewed, expressed the view 
that privatisation might genuinely lead to efficiency.
You see Tm not necessary against privatisation, especially if it is used 
as an efficiency model. Sometimes the selling of assets makes sense 
because the private sector can deliver more effectively. Often the 
council has been forced to use external labour because they don't have 
their own expertise. However, privatisation is not a universal panacea.
Still others saw the privatisation schemes as providing work for people who would 
otherwise be unemployed, and feared opposing such schemes in case jobs were cut.
Well, even in the Cape Town Civic Centre the cleaning is privatised, but 
people are reluctant to challenge it because it provides jobs for the poor.
But ultimately, it was the issue of unemployment and insecurity that was more likely to 
drive SAMWU workers to oppose privatisation. Whereas, the formal sector of the labour 
market had experienced a gradual upgrading of skills in the early 1990s - with more 
secure employment and rising real wages for skilled workers - larger numbers of 
unskilled and semi-employed workers had suffered a steady decline in employment 
opportunities. This combination of growing unemployment for some workers and more 
stable, better-paid jobs for others, not only created new lines of division within the South 
African working class, but also instilled rational feelings of fear on the part of the 
unskilled and semi- employed (Murray, 1994).
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In the case of SAMWU workers in Cape Town, the majority - with the exception of the 
new skilled, clerical and supervisory positions - continued to suffer poor pay, chronically 
inferior conditions and socio-economic deprivation (Interview, Roger Ronnie, 1993). 
And although, with approximately 40%- 50% unemployment in the country, secure work 
in the formal sector - however poor - amounted to a privileged status (Murray, 1994), 
most SAMWU members interviewed remained acutely aware of their precarious 
position in the labour market. Consequently, many were unwilling to consider any 
programme that might lead to rationalisation or a shift in their position, down towards 
that of the unemployed or casual.
^Contracting-out'
Increasingly, though ^contracting-out' of services to private companies - as opposed to 
wholesale privatisation of the council, was pushed as a solution to high labour costs. 
One union official in the waterworks department explained how the contracts could be 
used to implement privatisation piecemeal.
..the alternative is Contracting out' buying in alternative labour. In fact 
only recently has things changed and legislation been passed to allow 
gradual privatisation of more services, so there is a possibility that things 
could take an upturn....
But others saw nothing new in these practices, and explained how the council had been 
using contracted labour for years.
.. the council has used private labour for many years upstairs in the 
Housing Development.
Yet, other interviewees also saw contracting-out as a real threat, essentially associating 
it with insecurity and a deterioration in terms and conditions of working.
....it is important that members^ jobs aren^t affected. The security guards 
at the civic centre are Contracted-out', they belong to the T&G and they 
have tremendous problems negotiating with their management
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you find people who have been working for 20/30 years but still have no 
tenure
Despite opposition to such moves, some members expressed a preference for such 
contracts if the alternative was to be rationalisation of jobs.
The extent of privatisation in CCC
The council still appeared - by 1992 - to be sluggish in their commitment to wholesale 
privatisation. In the CCC, it was never clear just how enthusiastic the Cape Town 
Councillors were towards privatisation - some SAMWU members argued that projects 
had really been forced on the council by the National Party
Abaco, a private company owns most of the abattoirs across the country 
and already the state is putting pressure on the City Council to sell. 
They are expected to comply with state requirements/standards 
otherwise they will taken away from them. This will cost the council R1 
mill so you can see its difficult
One SAMWU organiser believed the council, and especially the senior management, 
were highly reluctant to privatise for their own personal reasons. The local authorities 
were financed according to a national grading of 1 to 15, in accordance with the number 
of services they ran, larger authorities would have higher grades and by implication 
more financial resources and higher wages.
What this has meant is the salaries of the town clerks and the next layer 
of senior managers have been linked to the grading of the local 
structures and other aspects such as the types and numbers of services 
run by the local authority. So you see privatisation never really got off 
the ground because town clerks had a vested interest in maintaining the 
provision of services....the outright sale of local authorities never really 
happened.
But the Council's reluctance to privatise was also influenced by the forthcoming 
elections. The DP controlled council was unlikely to want to make any major changes 
in the run up to the election. Larry Palk explained the dangers....
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Local Government Negotiations Forum state that 50% of CCC could be 
transferred to another council, so it appears the present Cape Town 
Council days may be numbered. Therefore, the Council is reluctant to 
make any changes that could result in political suicide
Such electoral considerations appeared also to have influenced the National Party's 
privatisation polices in the public sector. There was little evidence to support the claim 
that reductions in personnel were taking place (see chapter 2). The Government's 
intention to maintain the state as a source of jobs and privilege for the white elite was 
still apparent from the fact that provincial and central state employment (where the 
majority of white employment was concentrated) remained relatively stable. Most of the 
jobs that were lost were in the parastatal enterprises, with education and health 
remaining desperately understaffed (CSS, Employment & Salaries & Wages, public 
sector releases, 1993 and 1994)
Nevertheless, the issues of privatisation were not about to disappear. Interestingly a 
number of senior stewards interviewed during this period believed privatisation would 
continue to be a threat, even after the election on April 27th. They based this 
assumption on the experiences of privatisation in the U.K
Privatisation will always be a problem. Spomet Services have been cut, 
tariffs have been increased. In Telekon services are worse, there is no 
job security. These are things we are learning from the U.K, there are 
certain areas we can't let go. We must remain autonomous as a labour 
movement if we are to fight it
Nonetheless, although there appeared to be a reluctance to adopt wholesale 
privatisation in the public sector, the forthcoming election did not deter the council from 
reducing costs in other ways. Overall the council seemed to be actively pursuing 
changes in work organisation in order to save labour costs, many of which - including 
flexible working and evidence of some limited rationalisation - were viewed by 
SAMWU member's as just as threatening as privatisation.
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Rationalisation
On the surface, large scale retrenchments (redundancies) did not seem to be a issue, 
especially as there did not appear to be an attempt on the part of the council to cut 
substantial numbers of posts. One union organiser commented:
there has been few retrenchments at the council, no negotiations have 
ever been mentioned, and the/ve never brought documentation to the 
bargaining table. No its not a major problem.
However, the members' reluctance to push for higher wages, for fear of retrenchments, 
indicated - said Larry Palk (CCC Labour Consultant) - that workers felt insecure about 
their jobs, and harboured concerns that increased demands would threaten their 
security of employment
Many accepted lower wages in return for very few if any 
retrenchments.... the union has been anxious to preserve that.
This insecurity was well founded. Ever increasing demands from municipal workers for 
higher wages were met with strong criticism from the local community. Moreover, it 
could be argued that such demands were diametrically opposed to the interests of 
many of the black and Coloured 1 communities the union was claiming to support 
(Younge and Bendix, 1994). And, although full-scale retrenchments (redundancies) 
were not taking place throughout the council, there was evidence of attempts to reduce 
labour costs by redeployment, freezing of posts, increasing the use of temporary 
workers, and even job cuts. For example in the electricity department, the steward 
reported...
jobs are being frozen for 2 years, and because people can^t cope, 
contract workers have been brought in. 300 jobs are about to be lost. 
With cutbacks in services, jobs are being streamlined - where there was 
16 there are going to be 3. Redeployment is taking place...
Other members reported similar activities in their departments. An organiser in the 
waterworks department explained that job freezing, and the use of casual labour was
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increasing. The introduction of new technology was reported, by another member in 
the treasury, as being employed to reduce staffing costs - the changes had also been 
accompanied by an increase in members' workloads
... in the treasury there has been a freezing of posts and the workloads 
have increased. Also we appear to be moving from manual labour to 
the introduction of new technology, more use of computers. For 
example, people will now be able to pay their water or rates debts at the 
Supermarket, PICK & PAY.
The steward in the Electricity Department also expressed fears over the introduction of 
pre-paid meters and computers. Such a move was viewed as replacing the jobs of 
meter-readers
... pre-paid meters will be installed in all the black areas and customers 
will buy their electricity in bulk. Householders will buy a card and there 
will nolonger be a need for meter readers. Plus they are intending to 
automate the whole of the system. Instead of using a little black book 
they will use mini computers 
Hennie, Sept, 1993.
Flexible-working
Flexible working was intended to save labour costs. Cape Town's original document 
on privatisation described the need for job descriptions to promote greater flexibility 
(Cape Town Municipality Bulletin, 1988)37 . Yet, their use remained uneven, and varied 
depending on the department. More especially, it was debatable whether such moves 
were fundamentally changing the organisation of work. Whereas one member working 
in the electricity department in the civic centre, reported that flexible working was 
increasingly being introduced along with three month contracts, other members argued 
that there was nothing new about flexible working. A member in the waterworks
37 South African policy-makers, academics and employers, have adopted some terms of the 
international debate on "labour market flexibility" enthusiasm, yet the term still remains ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, a conventional definition - and one used here - is the idea that employers would like to 
be able to change employment quickly and easily. A distinction is made between functional and 
numerical flexibility, the former hinging on flexibility of working practices, job structures etc, and the later 
to changes in the number of workers (Standing, 1996, p.6).
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department explained that the council had been using flexible labour for many years - 
especially for 'coloured1 and African workers.
Moreover, some members even believed that flexible working might be a good thing. 
Employers were now demanding that a larger portion of the annual wage increases be 
linked to productivity improvement, entailing different methods of working and changes 
in terms and conditions. Such changes were being sold as helping to close the 
apartheid wage gap, by allowing greater use of variable skills and scope for promotion. 
One SAMWU steward explained that in some cases members openly welcomed such 
flexibility
Flexibility? Well we adhere as much as possible to the existing job 
description and deal with problems via grievances or upscaling. 
However - often members want to do extra jobs to increase chances of 
promotion... if they do the same job for 5/6 years, they simply get 
passed over. Only in certain jobs do they get promotion
Overall, the concerns of many SAMWU workers interviewed were consistent with the 
views expressed by unionists world-wide - former state owned enterprises would be 
sacking large sections of their workforces and introducing more temporary and "flexible 
working". Already in South Africa flexible methods of working were increasingly being 
tabled in negotiations with trade unions, with the possibility of the already vulnerable, 
low paid, workers being further exploited. In truth though, what was happening in the 
council - and South Africa as whole - was an attempt to deregulate what was viewed 
as a Yigid1 labour market, but as Guy Standing of the ILO pointed out, the notion that 
the South African labour market was rigid was beyond belief
'Most workers experience unemployment and income insecurity, with 
low wages and poor working conditions.. Those arguing that economic 
growth is impeded by an "inflexible labour market" are affluent and 
privileged and so before they advocate making the wages and working 
conditions of the poor more flexible, they should be very confident of 
their evidence1
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Nonetheless, Larry Palk (Andrew Levy Associates Ltd) believed such practices were 
set to increase in the 'new1 South Africa
..this is certainly a thing of the future especially if the private 
sector is introduced.
The key point though, was in a country with a rumoured 50% Year unemployment, 
such changes were cause for serious concern, especially as economists were 
predicting that any economic 'upturn' would not be accompanied by increased 
employment. In sum the process of jobless growth witnessed elsewhere in the world 
was sure to be visited upon South Africa in 1990s (Catchpowle et a/., 1998). What the 
response of the Cape Town branch would be to these changes - greater use of formal 
procedures or increasing strike action - was difficult to assess, although the public 
sector unions' increasing use of conflict to defend its interests was evident from 1993. 
The following section considers the types of resistance - in particular the levels of strike 
action - taking place in Cape Town Council during this period.
In 1992, crucial developments were taking place in public sector industrial relations - 
with many black and 'coloured' workers increasingly resorting to militancy in order to 
achieve their aims. As a result, by 1993, the state was forced to make concessions on 
wages, recognition of unions, right to strike, and even commitments not to privatise. 
What had become abundantly clear during this period was that public sector unions - 
like the private sector unions before them - were using industrial action in order to pose 
a direct challenge to the employers and government.
Strike figures
Although overall strike figures in South Africa in 1993 had fallen to 3.6 million days, 
from a figure of 4.2 million days in 1992 - a 14.3% decrease - the year had been 
marked by a series of large strikes concentrated in the public sector. The strikes were in 
notable contrast to the private sector, where strike days had fallen considerably (ALA, 
1993).
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With the passing of the Public Sector Labour Relations Act in August 1993 - which 
allowed for genuine collective bargaining in this sector - the government had anticipated 
that unions would resort more readily to strike action 38 in order to redress past 
injustices, but the scale was still unexpected. Most significant was the prolonged 
teachers' strike, which accounted for 895,000 days. The countrywide municipal wage 
strikes added a further 162,994 to this figure (ALA Annual Report on Labour Relations 
in South Africa 1993-4).
SAMWU members in Cape Town also showed a willingness to take action. More 
especially since the 1990 strike, when the branch had managed to consolidate its 
reputation for militancy. Other forms of resistance during this period (1990) included 
Cape Town's participation in anti-privatisation marches and occupations. The effects of 
such action at the national level, were credited as forcing the state to temporarily 
retreat from the privatisation of many state enterprises such as ESKOM, Posts and 
Telecommunications and Transnet (SALB,1990b). The branch also took action from 2- 
6 August, which included joining the four million strong national protest against 
apartheid on 3-4 August 1992, thereby convincing the National Party that the unions 
were determined to use mass action to defeat apartheid. Other local action, in 1992, 
meant the Cape Town abattoir was the last to be privatised in the country. As the 
SAMWU organiser explained, this was a resounding victory for SAMWU because the 
council had been forced to retreat from full-scale privatisation of the abattoir.
We threatened them (the CCC) with industrial action and so they 
backed down from complete privatisation..... they are now faced with 6 
options, which are being put to the abattoir workers. What it will mean, if 
workers are not happy they can transfer, then if they're still not satisfied 
they are given the option of taking retrenchment
38 Public sector workers were permitted to strike, and could not be dismissed for 30 days unless the 
strike was conducted in a unlegal or unfair manner. Where the strike was illegal strikers could be 
dismissed within 4 days. Although, workers involved in essential services were still prohibited from 
embarking on strike action.
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Labour Consultant Larry Palk supported this statement...
The resistance has been great. Cape Town is the only Council in the 
country to have an Abattoir, every other one has been privatised. Last 
year they wanted to sell off the Abattoir, they guaranteed the unions no 
retrenchments and redeployment for anyone. But the union, SAMWU, 
still said no! There's a compelling economic reason to sell off the
Abattoir, it needs R60m spent on it in order to upgrade.
Nevertheless, it was the strike from 2-6 August 1992 that provided solid evidence of 
increased levels of militancy in the Cape Town Branch. This strike was different from 
the 1990 strike (experienced earlier in Cape Town), because the management now 
seemed prepared to use greater force to defeat the union. Moreover, although not fully 
a national strike, it was viewed by many members in Cape Town as a test of their 
union's ability to 'pull off such action, at a later date. The demands were for a 20% 
increase in pay and a right to central bargaining. Johannesburg - one of many other 
local authorities in negotiations - had reached deadlock. Workers there had been 
offered 10% (7.5% immediately and the rest later) - but Cape Town, who had direct 
negotiation with the City Council, had only been offered 6.5% (Inteview, Hennie, 
3/9/93).
Events quickly escalated, and despite the strike being illegal, 23,000 people in Western 
Cape and 70,000 across the country went on strike. Most major cities were at a 
standstill. The ANC gave their support. The strike was significant because divisions 
between the rank and file and leadership began to emerge . One shop steward, Hennie 
explained how circumstances led to divisions arising between the negotiating 
committee (which consisted of the executive members of the branch and one national 
full-time official) and the majority of the shopstewards.......
'In Cape Town there was agreement between the negotiating team and 
management, on the understanding that the workforce did not occupy 
the building later than 10 a.m in the morning, but the membership 
refused and wouldn't leave the building. The leadership had to negotiate 
with management not to call in the Police. The occupation started to get 
out of control, people were drinking and the negotiating team agreed 
with management to send people home. This was their first major 
mistake. The 40 shop stewards remained and occupied the Executive 
Suite of the Council, they refused to move until they got a satisfactory 
answer, they were even prepared to go to jail. The Chairperson (of the
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union side) then talked independently to the councillors which resulted in 
a tremendous division between the negotiating committee and the 
stewards. 1
The Chair later stopped the negotiations and tried to calm the situation. All shop 
stewards were then encouraged to attend a Branch Shop Stewards' Council Meeting in 
order to vote to end the strike. At the meeting they were instructed to go and tell the 
workers that the strike was over. As Hennie explained, the response of the workers to 
such news was one of anger and fury towards the negotiating team ....
'the workers were supposed to return to work. Some did go back to their 
depots, but others didn't know they were supposed to return and so 
came to the civic centre and so I called a meeting. I told them that the 
low paid were to get 6.5 % and 5% for the others. The workers were 
furious and demanded to see the leadership. The negotiating committee 
were brought down and the Chairperson warned me that if the workers 
didn't go back I would be held responsible. The leadership simply 
assumed that the workers didn't know what was happening!'
The strike was large, of the 11,500 members branch members 8,000 had struck, with 
many members arguing it was a workers' initiative as opposed to a union initiative. 
Many members throughout the Western Cape were furious with the union's 
compromise. In the rural areas riot squads were sent in when workers occupied the 
premises in disbelief. Many members in Cape Town blamed the subsequent job losses 
on the failure of the strike. Jobs were frozen, there were no early retirement or 
retrenchment packages, and more contract workers were brought in - 300 jobs were cut 
and most of the services streamlined. Members began to fear further job cuts and even 
privatisation (Hennie, interview, 3/9/93). Hennie, a local steward was particularly 
concerned about the proposed privatisation of the electricity Parastatal, Eskom, and 
how it would affect jobs in the council.
'The City Council has a debt to Eskom, if Eskom becomes privatised 
they may not tolerate this debt, already 28% of the energy is sub-let and 
they're getting ready for expansion in Africa. Many believe the 
Metropolitan Council will bring in many changes. I'm concerned about 
this and I've spoken out about it many times but there is very little 
fightback from the trade union bureaucracy. 1
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Significance of the strike
This result of this strike contrasted sharply with the strike of the 1990. Then the council 
had appeared genuinely surprised at the 'coloured' workers growing confidence and 
willingness to engage in direct action, so much so that they agreed to many of the 
unions' demands. In 1992, the council had learnt several lessons and were more than 
prepared to resist the union's strikes. Nevertheless, there did also appear to be some 
unease amongst the membership, over the union leadership's willingness to concede 
more readily to management's threats than in 1990. However, this analysis needs to 
be considered within the context of the events that were taking place in Cape Town 
Council at that time.
In the year immediately prior to the dispute, the Executive Committee of the council, 
(the EXCO) which consisted of 5 to 6 people had been accused of being inefficient. 
The council was seen as overstaffed and were described by the local media as having 
weak labour relations and * lacking the guts to take on the unions'. A pressure group 
had been formed to lobby the council, with the hope of forcing a resignation, as Larry 
Palk explained.
Arthur Wienburg was the leader of this pressure group and a councillor, 
and although now he's seen as yesterdays' man, at that stage he had 
the media behind him and was therefore quite powerful. The rates were 
set to rise 300% (the council had made a complete 'balls up'), and so 
the pressure group began to lobby them.
All this happened between August and November 1992 - during the period of the 
strike. As a consequence the EXCO were certainly under great political pressure not to 
concede to the strikers, so it was hardly surprising that the council stood firm. 
Nevertheless, such attempts at macho-management, eventually turned out to be 
fruitless, especially as the EXCO were shortly replaced by a more 'politically correct' 
leadership - very different from the pressure group formed to get rid of the original 
EXCO. As Larry Palk the Labour consultant for the CCC explained
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...in the end because of all the pressure put on the EXCO by the media, 
all but one of the members resigned. They were replaced by the Mayor, 
Chris Keegan, who was elected the new Chair of EXCO - Chris Keegan 
has an history of struggle he's ex NLISAS and was retained during the 
repression years. Obviously, Wienberg had been trying to get into this 
position, but failed.
Despite what appeared to be an eventual 'climb-down1 on the part of the council, a 
number of members remained unhappy with the outcome of the strike. Many rank and 
file members expressed reservations over the level of success of the strike, especially 
the ability of management to leam new tactics.
People are angry, people are thinking of joining SAAME (South African 
Association of Municipal Employees)... Now Management are cutting 
jobs and dismissing people, they certainly leamt a lot from that strike!
The consultant from ALA supported this point
..local authorities unions are supposed not to strike but SAMWU went 
on strike for 5 to 6 days and did in fact have the power to bring the City 
to a halt. The council handled it well and in fact the council employees 
didn't gain much and lost a weeks' pay... the interesting fact is that 
every time the union goes on strike management become more and 
more experienced at handling them. There was a 3-day strike last year, 
once again the union didn't gain much economically although in their 
perception it was seen as successful. They were showing the council 
that they had the power and in the past the council would have been 
frightened and conceded to the unions, now I'm not so sure.
A number of members also openly expressed their disgust at the rank and file being 
'controlled' by the leadership, encouraging them to take strike action only when it suited 
their own aims. Larry Palk of ALA, commented on this issue.
This is an interesting point. If one looks at the labour movement in South 
Africa in the last 2 years there's been a tendency to use it simply as a 
tap, switching it on and off. During the VAT campaign members were 
urged to come out, they did, then they were urged to go back. There is a 
possibility that the leadership could be side tracked, in fact the line
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taken by the leadership now at recent congresses is one of controlling 
unguided missiles... if we can utilise the rank and file we can stop this 
happening,
He also raised the possibility that unions in the future would be less likely to take strike 
action, especially if the COSATU leadership established itself as part of the new civil 
society. Although he did concede later that this was probably unlikely at this 
immediate point in time; Larry Palk, commented:
You see COSATU is a large organisation.... They have a history of 15 
years of militant trade unionism, no one can take that away from 
them....there's the unfilled aspirations of the lower classes,.... as long as 
there's free enterprise, strikes will thrive. The biggest threat is the IMF, 
privatisation and the World Bank in South Africa.
His final analysis contained an element of truth. Following the strike in 1992, the 
branch appeared to develop a stronger degree of opposition to privatisation. The 
'coloured' members, in the CCC - despite expressing concerns over the leadership 
manipulation during the 1992 strike - declared an willingness (during interviews in 
1993) to use industrial action to defend their interests, not only against their immediate 
employers, but also government policies of privatisation. The leadership too, declared 
a similar intention. By using the same tactics employed whilst attacking apartheid, the 
union began to adopt a policy of mass campaigning with links to the community , but 
did not rule out strike action. As one official explained
We've campaigned in terms of resolutions which give a clear position 
opposing privatisation, meetings with communities and getting fully 
involved in building up civic structures, creating an awareness via 
propaganda, either collectively via COSATU or via the public sector 
forum......but in the end it may come to strike action
Perhaps more significantly, what was beginning to distinguish this union from many 
other COSATU affiliates was its ability - even at this early stage - to recognise the long 
term threats of privatisation to their union and its members. However, simply
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recognising the dangers did not necessarily mean the union would resist privatisation - 
or even if they did whether they would be capable of stopping state privatisation.
By 1994, SAMWU appeared to be developing into a different kind of organisation: On 
the one hand, its increasing focus on organisation, services and institutions, reflected a 
growing formalisation of the organisation. On the other, the linking of socio-economic 
and political debates, the insistence on 'core campaigns' and active rank-and-file 
struggles as the ultimate means of fighting issues like privatisation indicated the union's 
recognition of the importance of mass resistance - and its willingness to engage in 
open conflict - at this stage - with its employers.
In the early 1990s, militancy among all groups of public sector workers - not just in 
Cape Town - had been high, with considerable gains being achieved (SALB, May 
1990a; Baskin, 1991; Callinicos, 1996). Industrial relations in the public sector, 
continued to be characterised by a high degree of mistrust between management and 
unions (Interview, Larry Palk (ALA))
Yet despite these increases in strike action, union organisation of disputes remained 
very fragile, with officials and workers sometimes lacking experience. Moreover, such a 
volatile climate of industrial relations seemed to contrast with events in the private 
sector, which had been experiencing a more peaceful industrial relations climate since 
1992. This was due primarily to some of the larger unions in COSATU entering into 
more complex agreements with management, resulting in a trade-off of lower wage 
demands for economic restructuring (Murray, 1994).
This change was not accepted by all unions but restricted to a small number who were 
able to sell such offers to their members. For example in Mining, Steel and 
Engineering, and Automobile sectors, negotiations were being settled without resort to 
industrial action, and with what Andrew Levy Associates described as, ^a degree of 
restraint during particularly harsh economic climates in their respective industries' (ALA, 
1995 p.30). The Labour consultant from Cape Town believed such a model of 
compromise was reminiscent of the German model of social partnership
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At the moment the unions are trying to model themselves on the 
German system, it preparing to give up its militancy for a greater say. At 
the moment they Ye mainly involved in wages and dismissal
However, a number of SAMWU leaders interviewed in 1994, remained wary of such 
initiatives, fearing that unions could well be subjecting themselves to the dangers of 
collaboration and binding agreements with employers. They stressed the need to 
remain separate from management if they were to hold on to the gains they had made
The role of the unions in participation, is the need to maintain our 
democratic and militant tradition. Once we lose that, the battle on all 
fronts will be difficult. We need to formulate specific demands, we have 
a history of being clear of who sits on either side of the table, never a 
blurred issue. We should not get away from this tradition. The 
capitalists who developed what is called the x round table working-group' 
were extremely shrewd, but unless we can dislocate ourselves from this 
we've got a problem.
Furthermore, formal conciliatory arrangements between unions and management 
seemed to contradict the traditions of the South African workers' movement, which had 
developed a healthy climate of rank and file control and willingness to take industrial 
action if negotiations failed. The future General Secretary, Roger Ronnie expressed a 
need to retain this power of opposition, if workers jobs were to be protected
This is a personal opinion, we must get rid of the myth that engaging in 
opposition will threaten the security of jobs... that there is an inability to 
fight the changes, so we must enter into a separate agreement with the 
authorities and capital. This is not the case, there needs to be a clear, 
separate position developed by the union.
The following chapter (9), reviews and evaluates these and other issues - discussed 
throughout part 1 of the case study - more fully, with the aim of summarising the 
whole of the 1992-4 period, leading up to and including the end of apartheid.
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The following chapter analyses and reviews the main elements of the 1992-4 period. 
The account perceives the 'coloured' identity, as a significant influence on the 
material and social conditions of the SAMWU membership in this area. The 
transformation of the Cape Town branch is also highlighted, with the shift from a radical 
anti-apartheid organisation, to an accepted position in the newly emerging South 
African civil society, forcing a change in the internal structure of the branch and its 
external activities. As a consequence, the branch and the union, in 1994 continued to 
present a contradictory picture, with on the one hand its increasing involvement with 
formal, conciliatory methods of trade unionism, being contrasted with its continuing 
strikes and potential conflicts around privatisation , drawing it ever closer to a future 
confrontation with the 'new5 ANC government.
During the 1992-4 period, an important characteristic of the branch was its atypical race 
composition - the majority of South Africa's 'coloureds1 resided in the Western Cape. 
Therefore, any analysis of the branch - or evaluation of its members' willingness to fight 
privatisation - must include an appreciation of the apartheid 'coloured' identity. Such an 
identity helped to shape the material and political ideology of the 'coloured1 workers 
whilst producing a segregated home environment and prejudicing the world of every 
'coloured' worker in this region (Murray, 1994; The Economist ,1996).
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Apartheid had been more than restrictive legislation. It was a composite ideology, a set 
of practices which legitimised social and economic inequality in this region (Beinart and 
Dubow, 1995). Above all, radical interpretations (Wolpe, 1972: Leggasick, 1974) 
challenged the notion that twentieth century segregation was simply a survival of prior 
racial beliefs. Instead they offered an economic interpretation of apartheid as a product 
of rationalisation of economic imperatives, with the economic and political benefits of a 
cheap and controlled migrant labour force, common to mining industry, being extended 
to the growing manufacturing sector from the 1960s. The racial divisions in Cape Town 
could equally be said to have served such an economic purpose. By protecting the 
'coloureds1 from African competition in the labour market, it not only attempted to 
preserve the Western Cape as area where whites could be numerically and materially 
dominant, but more especially, enabled the government to justify the regulated, 
inferior position of 'coloured' labour" in the market, in relation to whites (Humpheries, 
1989).
This division was equally visible in the workplace. The CCC was the largest employer of 
'coloured ' labour in local government. Yet, despite having a liberal image, the council 
historically pandered to the National Party's racist policies of segregation, favouring the 
employment of 'coloureds1 over blacks, and whites over 'coloureds 1 . In common with 
the rest of apartheid's public sector it presented, by 1992, a totally unaccountable, 
fragmented, apartheid institution - one in need of complete transformation (Maurice, 
1993).
It was the Cape Town branch of SAMWU that emerged as a mobilising force for 
change in this racist environment. Throughout this period, opposition to apartheid and 
its institutions continued to dominate the ideology and actions of the branch. As one 
shop steward in the treasury explained...
because Apartheid still divides it's difficult to take up other issues. 
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Despite, the branch's reputation as a 'coloured1 conservative union, SAMWU, and its 
predecessor the CTMWU, had on account of its anti-apartheid activities in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, acquired a standing as a radical opponent of the apartheid. As one of 
the founding branches of SAMWU, Cape Town had managed to overcome the racism 
of apartheid by linking the struggles of 'coloured' workers with those of the oppressed 
black majority. On the 3-4 August 1992 - when COSATU launched its Mass Action 
Campaign against apartheid, the Cape Town branch was part of the millions of 
workers who joined the massive political general strike. After this demonstration the NP 
could no longer harbour any doubts that the unions would not use their power to bring 
an end to apartheid (Callinicos, 1996).
Nevertheless, with the inevitable demise of the apartheid regime, SAMWU 's role was 
set to change. It would soon be accepted as an integral part of the newly emerging civil 
society, with its anti-apartheid stance likely to be replaced by a more traditional focus on 
terms and conditions in the workplace. An acceptance of such a shift meant a greater 
emphasis was being placed on the internal structure of the union and the services 
offered to its members.
What was becoming increasing evident by 1994 was the fact that both the branch - and 
the union nationally were beginning to grow and develop into a more formal, legitimate 
organisation. But, such internal changes - although essential - brought the prospect of 
greater bureaucracy and dangers of power being centralised into the hands of union 
leaders. Already, some new black trade union leaders were beginning to demonstrate 
characteristics similar to Rosa Luxemburg's classic analysis of the labour bureaucracy. 
This group was said to exist in all mass workers' organisations and used to mediate 
between the two conflicting classes - the ruling class and the workers. In the South 
African context, the role of the trade union leadership was coming under closer scrutiny, 
especially as an number of the newly empowered COSATU leadership, had left to 
become MPs, senior government officials, and private sector managers in the months 
leading up to the election.
Just how common this was in SAMWU was difficult to ascertain, but was certainly 
cause for concern for at least two of the shop stewards interviewed in 1994. Despite 
such fears, it may be equally true to argue, that given the racially structured inequalities,
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massive poverty, and inadequate public services, South African unions and their 
leaders, were probably unlikely to become 'normal1 unions in a western European 
sense for some time yet.
Overall the external activities and struggles of the branch remained contradictory. 
Despite the supposed shift to more formal conciliatory methods of communication 
between trade union leaders and employers, the public sector had experienced a 
sudden explosion of industrial action in 1993 - Cape Town was no exception. A local 
strike from the 2-6 August, 1992 had already secured the branch a reputation for 
militancy, subsequent disputes over the privatisation of the abattoirs had resulted in a 
'climb down1 from the council; and finally its highly publicised willingness to campaign 
and strike further against privatisation, had helped it to secure a radical identity in the 
area
Nevertheless, the end of apartheid inevitably provided opportunities to influence the 
'new* labour friendly government, the ANC. The new industrial relations system meant 
the possibility of greater legitimacy and acceptability, but also posed the question of 
union commitment and obligations to the ANC. Not only SAMWU, but the whole of the 
previously disenfranchised trade union movement would be developing relations with 
the government. SAMWU collaborated with COSATU and its affiliates when 
formulating policy with the ANC. In particular, the branch leadership perceived the 
importance of campaigning with other unions over the threat of privatisation
.....We've tried to broaden the struggle by trying to link up with the
privatisation in the South African railways, postal services, although we 
do see the municipal sector as slightly different...... we mustn't see it
solely as a Cape Town issue, it should be a national campaign. At the 
moment it's too piecemeal. Our NEC argued to consider privatisation 
on a national basis. We need to get support from the community and 
the political alliances. The trade unions greatest support is COSATU 
At this stage SAMWU saw little difference between their resolve to fight privatisation 
and that of other unions. Although they were critical of co-operation with privatisation 
when it occurred and, COSATU's lack of leadership
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I don't think there's a difference..... However, the main problem is there 
is no common position, especially from the COSATU. Take the question 
of electricity privatisation, ESKOM. We agree that the reorganisation 
may help economies of scale but the major question is one of control, 
what kind of structure is important to ESKOM, who is going to control 
the vast monopoly, who will benefit from the large amounts of money 
thaf s generated. But in COSATU some of the other unions are going 
full steam ahead to accept ESKOM privatisation
Another official interviewed, was also concerned that some of the unions appeared 
more concerned to recruit members in the newly privatised companies, than fight 
government privatisation
they see it in terms of a narrow union perspective, see themselves 
gaining thousands of members as workers transferred over, for 
example, NUMSA stands to gain many members. However, we see it in 
terms of the effect it will have on public sector, on the control of services
By 1994 SAMWU appeared to have become even more critical of the other public 
sector unions and openly expressed fear over the lack of solidarity ....
We tend to be going into our little cocoons, public-sector privatisation 
remaining a public sector issue, not seen as a real issue to others. 
NUMSA and the NUM conduct their own campaigns, the question of 
solidarity action is lacking with regard to privatisation 
In reality, the problem was deeper than a lack of solidarity in campaigning against 
privatisation. There was evidence of COSATU unions already investing in the private 
companies themselves. SAMWU was opposed to such projects, but acknowledged 
that as the black unions achieved greater acceptance in the main stream economy, it 
would be difficult to stop these processes. Even the prospect of a public sector union 
merger was not seen as a guarantee that they could influence the actions of other 
public sector unions (Ronger Ronnie, Interview, 8/10/93).
185
The key issue though - and of interest here - was SAMWLTs potentially conflictual 
relationship with the 'new1 state. SAMWLTs commitment to industrial action in order to 
defend their interests was potentially a major problem for a future ANC government. 
Already, the ANC was emphasising institutionalised involvement of COSATU in 
'tripartism' with employers and the state. In keeping with this, it urged unions to enter 
into equal co-operative arrangements with employers, particularly on issues like public 
sector reorganisation (Murray, 1994, Callinicos, 1992). For SAMWU, this was an 
anathema - being keen to maintain its independence - it saw the only reason for taking 
part in these talks in the first place, was to secure the greatest gains for the workers
Take our role in the local government negotiating forum we push the 
position of a two-sided table, the statutory side and the non-statutory . 
We had major uproar from the ANC on that, they said we needed a 
round table discussion, as inclusive as possible. We said you can be 
inclusive but we need to know who sits on either side of the table... we 
have now managed to devise clear processes to deal with the two 
sides... its only because of the activities of trade union members that 
we've managed to make such gains
SAMWU, equally saw a need to make such clear demands on the new reconstruction 
and development programmes - the ANC's electoral programme for change in South 
Africa. Unlike the "new1 government, the union did not see it as a jointly determined 
programme between the capitalists and unions, instead they saw it as a programme of 
negotiation - one on which trade union leaders had to be clearly mandated by their 
members
It must be a process of negotiation which we refer to our members. It 
will become more and more difficult to do but we must maintain it
However, despite being concerned about the ANC's tactics during the negotiations, the 
same trade union official did not think it necessary - when prompted - to make 
comparisons with the corporatist experiments in Britain in the 1970s. In particular, he 
seemed to see clear differences between the experiences of South African Trade 
unions and those experienced in Britain.
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In South Africa its different, the material conditions are different to when 
the Labour Party came to power. There's the concept of a liberation 
struggle having taken place, the prevailing consciousness of people 
being involved in a struggle.
This was partly correct: the trade unions in Britain in the 1970s had certainly not led a 
mass liberation movement that had succeeded in replacing an oppressive apartheid 
state, with a newly liberated black government. But equally comparisons could be 
made between the ANC, and the traditional reformist politics of the British Labour Party. 
From 1992 - 4, the use of mass action had allowed the ANC to show the regime how 
powerful they were, as well as allowing their increasingly angry and impatient 
supporters to let off a bit of steam1 . Yet, the closer the end of apartheid approached, 
the further the goal of nationalisation and government intervention receded from the 
rhetoric of the ANC leaders. As a consequence, even before they took office in May 
1994, it was already clear that the ANC would introduce only limited changes in the 
social and economic structure of South Africa.
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The post-apartheid period signalled a new relationship between the public sector 
unions and the state. The power and position of trade unions had changed significantly 
and the state not only recognised but sanctioned their legitimacy in South African civil 
society. Yet, such momentous changes were contradictory because they masked a 
more profound development - the stated changing ideology towards the public sector 
and its employees. The ANC government's declared intention to accept 
commercialisation and deregulation in the public sector served to reveal the dialectical 
relationship between the state and the trade unions; the nature of which was becoming 
increasingly conflictual as the state shifted its economic policies in order to 
accommodate the global changes taking place in production (Friedman and Reitzes, 
1996). .
The 'new1 South African government seemed at first to recognise the prominence of the 
public sector by inscribing into their new constitution a commitment to the building of 
services to provide the benefits necessary to life, for all sections of the population - 
irrespective of race or class. By 1997 - just three years after the general election - 
these promises appeared to have been forgotten. For the Cape Town Branch of 
SAMWU the changes were especially striking, in that the predominant question was no 
longer the role it should play in the expansion of local government but ironically - as in 
1992 - how it could stop local government privatisation and deregulation in the Western 
Cape.
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Before, however returning directly to the case study, Chapter 10 firstly provides a 
background to events in South Africa, subsequent to the 1994 election. The aim, as 
in Chapter 2, is to locate the black public sector trade unions within the changing 
historical, political and economic environment. As a consequence, the chapter 
considers the economic and political character of the 'new' South African state, in 
particular its shift in policy from the demand driven RDP (Redistribution and 
Development Programme) to the supply driven model of GEAR (Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution). It then proceeds to consider the effects of this 
ideological change on the public sector, especially given the ANC's pledge to 
reduce its commitment to public expenditure. Finally, it details the state's changing 
relationship with the trade unions in light of this transformation. Special emphasis is 
given to the effects of increasing formalisation and institutionalisation of the 
industrial relations system, alongside the government's increasing adherence to 
privatisation and deregulation. Overall, the purpose of the chapter is to provide a 
background to events during the 1995-7 period, in order help the reader better 
comprehend, why the ANC adopted the economics of free market, and how this 
transformation affected the public sector trade unions, and their aspirations for 'social 
partnership1
Post -apartheid South Africa was being theorised as a 'new' type of state - one which 
operated within the current deregulated world market, whilst simultaneously employing 
the institutions of corporatism (Baskin,1993; Shaw, 1994; Webster, 1995). Yet, at the 
root of this new model lay a series of severe economic problems, which threatened to 
consign the country to a permanent 'third world' status.
Five years after Mandela's release the ANC faced a challenge almost as formidable as 
the struggle to overthrow apartheid. Few countries, if any, had managed to achieve 
such a complex political transition, but it was the question of the macroeconomic 
balance - providing favourable economic conditions for international capital whilst 
satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the majority, who had suffered under apartheid - 
that went to the very core of the dilemma facing the new government of South Africa. Of 
all the statistics that illustrated the immensity of the task, few were as illuminating as the
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unemployment figures. In 1995 there were 4.7 million South Africans without jobs, 
nearly 40% of the work force - with half of them under 30 (Holman, Matthews and 
Suzman 1995) .
To this must be added the high rate of inflation, which had risen to over 10 per cent; the 
unrelenting violence which discouraged investment; and the devastating lack of 
housing, welfare, and infrastructure. To redress the legacy of apartheid the government 
would have to achieve a growth rate of between 8 to 10 per cent, comparable to the so- 
called Asian tigers. For even the best structured economy this would be an ordeal, but 
for a country skewed by 40 years of racism and mismanagement, South Africa*s 
economy was ill-equipped for the task (Holman, Matthews and Suzman, 1995).
The contentious issue was how to forge a process of accelerated development that 
would raise the country to a higher status and relieve the socio-economic backlogs and 
imbalances acquired from the past. Failure to address this problem would result in an 
unstable economy and almost certainly affect the political stability of the country. The 
solutions which the ANC were likely to advocate would depend upon the way in which 
they chose to frame the problem. The dominant view at this stage seemed to be that 
only long-term fixed investment would suffice and for this South Africa needed foreign 
investors (Catchpowle and Cooper, 1999).
In the post apartheid era of democratic government there were at first expectations of a 
return of the much needed foreign investment. Instead, the economy produced capital 
outflows from mid 1994 until the end of 1995 and was estimated to have attracted less 
than 1% of the total of FDI, with most foreign firms establishing branch offices in South 
Africa only showing an anticipatory presence rather than a firm commitment to invest. 
The bulk of foreign interest was in the financial sector, where international investors 
appeared to be enthusiastically gearing up in anticipation of a lucrative privatisation 
bonanza. The form that this bonanza would take was, at this stage, highly contested - 
despite the privatisation programme in South Africa having already begun, the ANC 
government was mindful not only of its concern to keep business happy but also to 
continue, often in opposition to privatisation, its programme of black empowerment and 
redistribution (Catchpowle and Cooper, 1999).
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The ANC government's progressive Reconstruction and Development Programmes 
(RDP) had originally spelt out the need for the redistribution of wealth in the economy. 
Although somewhat vague on macro-economic strategy, it emphasised the centrality of 
basic needs in economic policy-making and the role of the public sector to facilitate the 
development and delivery of services to all citizens of South Africa (Financial Mail, 
1994b) However, since the election the ANC had been steadily moving away from such 
developmental policies, and the RDP economics had been supplanted by the 
unequivocally market driven policies found in the government's 'Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution1 (GEAR) strategy (Financial Mail, 1995b; Saul, 1999)
In March 1996, the RDP Office was closed down, and the RDP fund relocated within 
the Ministry of Finance. By assigning the RDP to an already overloaded department, 
the ANC was making clear its lack of long-term commitment to development 
programmes. Now if the basic needs of the community were to be met, it was more 
likely to occur as the result of the indirect trickle-down effects of a very different kind of 
economic strategy, one rooted in the dictates of the market (Saul, 1999)
It was privatisation that attracted the most controversy. Although it was now the policy 
of the South African government, there are still many active debates about what type of 
privatisation should take place, or even - in some circles - whether privatisation should 
take place at all. COSATUs opposition was especially problematic for the ANC 
government, not simply because it had pledged to fight privatisation, but in the sense 
that it had more direct power than the ANC's other national liberation partners - such as 
the SACP or the 'civics'. Although the ANC had travelled a huge distance in its attitude 
to privatisation, its image as a policy which led relentlessly to heavy job losses, plant 
closures and windfall capital gains for a minority of shareholders, meant that most 
politicians were reluctant to openly express their support for such policies. Instead they 
preferred to approach the issue - especially with the trade unions - using less highly 
charged terminology such as 'restructuring of state assets' or 'strategic partnership'. 
(Matthews.and Suzman, 1995; Catchpowle and Cooper, 1999)
In early May 1996, the rand suffered a severe crisis; this was followed by increased 
pressure from industry for the government to provide "firm direction on policy issues 
such as privatisation, exchange control, fiscal and monetary policy" (Dave Mohr, chief
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economist at the Old Mutual39). As a response the government went out of its way to 
emphasise its commitment to the privatisation and reducing government debt (Financial 
Mail, 1996d).
Perhaps of greater significance was the ANCTs declared intention to cut expenditure on 
the public sector. As part of the medium term expenditure framework, worked out in 
collaboration with the World Bank, the government pledged itself to reducing the public 
sector deficit to 3.5% of GDP by the year 2000 (Standing et a/., 1996; Dexter, 1996). By 
making fiscal restraint the watchword of its administration, the government effectively 
starved the public sector of funds and made it impossible to deliver on economic 
transformation. The ensuing crisis that inevitably materialised, simply made it easier to 
argue that the most efficient way to deliver services was to privatise the state sector 
(COSATU, 6th National Congress Report: 1997b).
Yet, two areas had emerged as problematic for the ANC and threatened to jeopardise 
their plans to successfully introduce free market policies - their partnership with the 
trade unions and the financing of the public sector. The government was well aware 
that the trade unions posed one of the greatest threats to the implementation of 
privatisation policies. Already, the special relationship between the ANC and COSATU 
had prevented the South African government from implementing a privatisation 
programme at the pace demanded by the interests of capital. The trade unions, had 
pledged to resist privatisation, and although the strength and form of this resistance 
was relatively unknown, the ANC was not (as yet) confident enough to abandon its one 
time national liberation partners. In particular, the trade unions^ resolve to fight 
privatisation was especially strong in the public sector. By early 1996, the government 
could no longer escape the fact that their policies of tough fiscal discipline and 
retrenchments would - in the final analysis - contribute to the decline of the institutional 
capacity of the public sector to deliver first world services to all (COSATU, 6th National 
Congress Report, 1997b)
The solutions proposed to solve these two problems initially, seemed to indicate an 
eagerness on the part of the ANC to find the compromises which would allow it to avoid 
the hard choices between the politically desirable and what it viewed as economically 
necessary. In the case of the public sector it was slow in implementing the privatisation
Cited in Catchpowle and Cooper, 1999, footnote 17
of services and the 'selling off of the parastatals to the private sector. With regard to 
labour, the ANC seemed to be pinning its long-term hopes on compromises achieved 
through the conciliatory tactics contained within its new corporatist policies and labour 
legislation (Catchpowle and Cooper, 1999).
Whether in the final analysis, the level of corporatist initiatives adopted by the 
government would help the ANC escape the full spectrum of trade union challenges 
was - in 1995-7 - still open to supposition. Yet, such efforts to compromise with labour 
were becoming increasingly problematic as the government became ever more subject 
to the free-market pressures imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund; the snowballing advice from consulting accountants, stock-brokers and banks; 
and perhaps more importantly, the constraints of the economic system within which it 
now operated (Catchpowle and Cooper, 1999).
The following sections consider the implications of this deliberation on the trade unions 
and public sector.
In 1995 the public sector, with over 1.8 million employers, was an impressive 
organisation. Yet, the sector was experiencing major problems in all of its areas, with all 
sections being viewed - particularly by the government - as unrepresentative, 
unresponsive, inefficient and ineffective (Standing eta.I, 1996; Alder, 1998).
Although, the faults had clearly developed out of the apartheid policies the 
government's aim to implement a programme of change was challenged by the sheer 
size and heterogeneity of the public sector. The whole structure was viewed as 
unmanageable, with its separate components having distinctive methods of wage 
determination, employment conditions and forms of regulation and ownership. 
Furthermore, the fact that such changes were taking place within the context of 
economic restructuring - which included the fiscal constraints set down by the 
governments free market policy, GEAR - provided an additional complication 
(Standing etal., 1996; Alder, 1998).
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By far the greatest cost identified by the ANC was that of labour. One factor set the 
public sector apart from the private sector, it was the largest single employer in the 
country: in March 1995, according to the CSS, one out of every four officially 
recognised as employed in South Africa was being paid with public funds or employed 
by the state. The public sector may have been perceived, by many previously 
disenfranchised groups, as the principle agent of transformation but the crippling cost of 
labour was rendering the process inoperable (Alder, 1998).
Policy changes
In 1995 the government began to set out some broad policy guidelines to transform the 
public sector. A white paper on the Transformation of the Public Service1 was 
published; a Presidential Review Commission on the Public Service was established 
with joint task teams to look into all issues of conditions of service, including the 
improvement of salaries and wages to be addressed within a three year plan. More 
specifically, the National Framework Agreement (NFA) was signed with COSATU, 
which enabled restructuring (including privatisation) of national public assets (excluding 
local government restructuring). A white paper on restructuring local government was 
published in 1997, for the local authorities. All initiatives were seen as establishing a 
broad vision for the future development of the sector as a whole.(Standing et a/,,1996; 
Dexter, 1996; White Paper on Local Government: Discussion Document, 1997).
On the 4 February 1997, the new constitution finally gave the local authorities the status 
of a distinct sphere of government along side national and Provincial Governments. 
This meant local government was no longer just a line function, but possessed land, 
assets and other human and material resources and most important of all held an 
independent tax base. The primary role of the new municipalities was to ensure the 
provision of essential municipal services - water, sanitation, electricity, etc. - to all South 
Africans. Its secondary role was to promote economic and social development, and to 
participate in national and provincial development programmes. Yet, despite its 
improved status many municipalities still continued to experience severe difficulties 
(White Paper on Local Government: Discussion Document, 1997).
By far the greatest obstacle to the development of effective local government, was 
financial weakness. Poor financial management and control, as well as unrealistic 
budgeting and weak credit control, were identified as causing many problems.
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Despite the existence of independent tax bases, many municipalities simply did not 
have viable tax bases - especially in the rural municipalities. Overwhelmingly, the sheer 
poverty of the majority of black consumers of municipal services put impossible strains 
on finances. Furthermore, the flow of funds between the three spheres of government 
continued to be complex and confusing. Municipalities often experienced difficulties in 
accessing and understanding the transfer of funds from national and provincial 
government thus making inter-govemmental fiscal relations difficult (White Paper on 
Local Government:Discussion Document, 1997 : Section 3.2).
The solutions posed to overcome the problems associated with financial constraints 
were varied but chiefly rested on attempts to reduce the costs of labour and to shift the 
burden of finance to the private sector. Despite an initial commitment on the part of the 
ANC to use all areas of the public sector to redistribute wealth, rationalisation of jobs 
was - by 1995 - being employed to reduce the national debt. Although the extent and 
effectiveness of these cuts were difficult to quantify accurately - due to long term 
reliable comparisons not being available - it was still possible for the CSS to conclude 
that a number of public sector and local government job cuts had taken place (CSS: 
PO251, 1995; Wooldridge and Cranko, 1997; Swilling and Boya, 1997).
The other solution to overcome the problems in the public sector was somewhat more 
complex and mainly included the use of private funds or Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs). The local authorities were now advised to work more closely with the private 
sector in order to deliver services and a better infrastructure. Private sector finance and 
management resources were identified as a means of providing an efficient and 
cost-effective delivery of municipal services. It was seen as the municipality's 
responsibility to ensure that services were provided, and a range of private, public, 
NGOs or community organisations were used to actually deliver the services. The 
essential goal of the municipality was now to ^rnake sure that the best quality service 
would be provided at the lowest cost to the maximum number of residents'(White Paper 
on Local Government: Discussion document 1997: section 10:7).
Therefore, in the post-apartheid period, the South African state was pledged to reduce 
its commitment to public expenditure. In order to operate within the rules of global 
capital, the ANC government was being forced to remodel the public sector along the 
lines of the competitive market system - irrespective of the symbolic nature of the sector 
to many black South Africans. A crucial component in this operation was to be the
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redressing of the power between labour and the market - transformation now almost 
entirely relied on containing the cost of labour (White Paper on Local government: 
Discussion Document 1997: Wooldridge and Cranko, 1997). It is to the issue of the 
trade unions we now turn
By 1995 the trade unions had acquired a central role in South African civil society, as a 
major catalyst for change. Approximately 40% of the 8 million people with jobs in South 
Africa, and approximately 1-in-5 of the economically active population, belonged to a 
trade union of one description or another. Over a 10 year period, from 1985 to 1995, 
union membership has more than doubled and reached 3 million. South African union 
density was amongst the highest in the world and continued to have one of the most 
outstanding rates of any developing country, despite the high levels of unemployment 
(Baskin ,1996).
In post-apartheid South Africa, the union federation - COSATU - had been consistent in 
its demand for a new framework of labour law. Consequently, the Labour Relations Act 
(LRA) 1995, was seen as a decisive victory for the trade union movement, providing the 
membership with centralised bargaining, the right to join a union, to strike and to 
consultation in the workplace. The creation of an independent body the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) further aimed to provide a less legalistic 
framework to encourage speedier resolution of disputes. For those disputes which 
could not be resolved by CIMA, a new labour court - with supreme court status - was 
created (IDS, 1997). More fundamentally though, the legislation symbolised a 
willingness on the part of the government to legitimise and assimilate the trade unions 
into the 'new1 South African State.
Formalisation and institutionalisation - The new LRA
The Act took South Africa further down the corporatist route with * multi-layered 
institutionalised (collective) bargaining being a distinctive feature of post-apartheid. At a 
national level - the tri-partite forum for business, labour and government - NEDLAC 
(National Economic Development and Labour Council), concerned itself with economic 
and social planning. At a sectoral level collective bargaining was to be encouraged
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through bargaining councils and at the grassroots workplace forums created a drive 
towards worker participation and local decision making. These were all attempts to 
restore stability to the system, firstly by recognising and reinforcing union strength, 
secondly by promoting industrial-level centralised bargaining, and thirdly by hinting at 
the necessity of national bargaining through NEDU\C. But the legislation also 
combined a commitment to 'regulated flexibility1 , seeing the necessity of a more flexible 
labour market whilst, according to its defenders, achieving this within a more structured 
and union-friendly context (Baskin, 1996: Webster 1995).
The Act was not without controversy and evoked a degree of criticism. When the 
Labour Relations Bill was first published (1995) concern was immediately expressed 
over management's right to Mock-out1 employees. The 'lock-out' was originally sold as 
the employers' equivalent to the workers' 'right to strike', this was contested by the 
unions on the grounds that such power was not equal, since the employer could 
continue operating his business with a 'scab' labour force during the lock out, whereas 
the striking workers had no alternative source of income (Etkind, 1995).
After threatening strike action, the trade unions managed to secure limitations to the 
clause: there was to be no constitutional right to lock out; 48 hours' written notice was 
to be given to any union who was party to the dispute; and there was to be a removal of 
the employers' right to use a 'lock out1 to terminate the services of employees or restaff 
his plant (IDS, 1997,p.80). Nevertheless, the fact that such a clause lingered or had 
even been considered by a supposed radical government and militant trade union 
leadership remained worrying to some union activists (Interview, Victor, SAMWU 
Regional Secretary, 2/9/1997).
Perhaps of greater concern was the question of the effectiveness of the new formal 
institutions. Primarily, fear was expressed over the act's commitment to "voluntarism" - 
seeking to encourage the emergence of institutions rather than legislating them into 
existence. Such an approach led to a worry that those outside of the organised interest 
groups (i.e casual workers and the unemployed) would be left out of the distributional 
strategy, with large employers being able to find ways of bypassing the institutions. 
(The Shopsteward, 1995a; Standing etal., 1996).
The process of institutionalisation had serious implications for trade unions at all levels. 
At local level, the 1995 Labour Relations Act (LRA) provided for a statutory right to be
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consulted on a whole range of new issues, yet local stewards appeared to be 
overwhelmed by the sheer variety of issues leading to concern over whether they could 
cope with these changes (Business Day, 19/7/96). COSATU responded by developing 
a new structure, focusing on the regional level with the aim of equipping all its affiliate 
unions with the ability to deliver training. A newly founded National Education 
Committee (NEDCOM) was to initiate national planning and a new training college, 
DITSELA was to be opened (Catchpowie et a/., 1998).
By the end of 1995, COSATU was voicing a need for the local organisation to change. 
Trade union activists were being called upon to nurture a calmer industrial relations 
climate, one in which workers contributed to the decision-making process in order to 
produce a different model of productivity, completely devoid of industrial action or 
strikes. Previously, where education had been about political points scoring, there was 
now to be a move towards what was described as a more 'sophisticated steward', one 
decisively more competent in the 'new1 formal industrial relations forum (Catchpowie et 
a/., Stanworth, 1998).
Yet, stewards were still finding such institutionalised activities overwhelming and 
confusing, and what is more completely at odds with employers local policies of 'lean' 
management and flexibility. Many of the formal institutions were only viewed as useful 
by business if they remained compatible with other aspects of government fiscal and 
industrial policy, which to a large extent remained de-regulationist. Therefore, for many 
stewards and members alike, the cost of concessions appeared to be too high 
(Matthews, 1995b).
At a national level links with government were equally problematic. Not only was 
COSATU faced with the pressure of replacing a generation of experienced labour 
leaders who now formed part of the government, but since 1995, the alliance with the 
ANC had proven a complication for COSATU. The unfolding free market policies of the 
ANC had forced them to reconsider their own ideological and political position. For 
example, when the Government announced the restructuring of state assets (1995), 
whereas business simply saw this as a culmination of their campaign for privatisation, 
the union movements' response - unlike in previous years when the government could 
be dismissed as racist and illegitimate - was mixed and confused. (Shilowa, 1995)
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Consequently, COSATU leaders were now obliged to consider the formal relationship 
with the ANC, and what the alliance actually meant in practice. Many of the newly 
established bodies, at all levels, benefited workers only if organised labour remained 
strong in the workplace. Failure to do so would push the system to a feeble form of 
corporatism, with few incentives for employers to remain in centralised bargaining 
system with weak union partners (Baskin,1996). Certainly the leading trade union 
officials now had a personal interest in maintaining their close links with government 
and would probably strive to avoid an all out confrontation. In that sense the trade 
union leadership needed the ANC and appeared willing to make concessions in order 
to maintain the relationship. Yet, concessions would not stop the government s 
intention to privatise and cut public spending. The vision for South Africa was now to 
include a commitment to competitiveness and market policies. Tight fiscal policies were 
to be a critical component of this process, even if that meant the same budget that used 
to service 4 million whites would be extended to almost 40 million blacks. (WM&G, 
1997).
The picture of a tranquil industrial relations system with collective conflict withering way 
and being replaced by prescribed forms of dispute resolution and economic 
management, was in sharp contrast to the reality confronting the ANC in the mid- 
1990s. South African companies were now, more than ever, part of a much larger 
global system, the logic of which meant constantly adopting new methods of achieving 
profits and accumulation in order to survive. Large manufacturing corporate enterprises 
were embracing so-called 'post-Fordist' growth models complete with new technology 
and flexible accumulation' strategies. Moreover, most of these models were being 
accompanied by increases in subcontracting and casual working, especially in small 
businesses, where trade unions were weak and labour costs secure (Catchpowle et a/., 
1998).
By 1996 - although, COSATU had originally rejected flexibility without guaranteed job 
security or negotiation - trade unions appeared to be accepting the inexorable 
movement towards flexibility, and had switched to attempts to regulate it rather than 
prevent it. One of the claimed benefits was improved productivity. Employers were now 
demanding a larger portion of annual wage increases be linked to productivity 
improvements, entailing different methods of working and changes in terms and
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conditions. Hours of work and overtime were being linked to productivity, and already 
the demand for the 40-hour week was being dropped in the process of negotiation. In 
1995 NUMSA (National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa) signed a 3-year wage 
deal with the auto industry on the condition they did not strike over wages for three 
years. The overall package was indicative of more flexible reward systems being linked 
to changes in methods of working, and were increasingly being tabled in negotiations 
with trade unions. (Grice, 1995).
Overall, the response of the trade unions to such changes was largely supportive of 
conciliation and peaceful industrial relations. Strike action during the first quarter of 
1995 was down substantially (1.6 million worker days lost) over the corresponding 
period of the previous year (3.9 million in 1994). A contributory factor was the use of 
the new formal machinery, the major wage agreements were negotiated at centralised 
level and concluded without any strike action (IDS, 1997/8 p.85) According to 
consultants Andrew Levy and Associates, such settlements represented major 
concessions on the part of union negotiators, all agreements were within single digits, 
and no higher than inflation (Matthews, 1995b).
Yet, the downward trend in South Africa's strike figures, was not entirely consistent 
throughout the labour movement. The sudden surge in strike action in the public sector 
from July to September 1995 - with two especially bitter disputes involving Nurses and 
Municipal workers - was especially worrying for the new government. The public sector 
unions demonstrated high levels of militancy in 1995. A further sharp rise in strike 
activity was experienced - in all sectors - in the third quarter of 1996, giving a total of 1.7 
million for the year. The overall number of worker days lost due to industrial action 
therefore exceeded the figure of 1995 (Patel, 1996;IDS,1997/8,p.85). Distressing as 
these figures were to the ANC, it still did not detract from the presumption that South 
Africans were largely adopting more formal, peaceful means of settling disputes - 
particularly as figures continued to be well down on the previous years: 1992 (4.2 
million); 1993 (3.6 million);and 1994 (3.9 million), when statistics had continued to 
fluctuate between three and four million (IDS, 1997/8, p.86). Figure 10.1 summarises 
the fall in industrial action annually, from 1991 to 1996.
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Nevertheless, what was particularly interesting about the 1996 strike statistics, for 
example, was the atypical nature of the disputes - although pay issues dominated as 
usual (57.4%), grievances uncommonly contributed extensively to the overall figure 
(37%). Figure 10.1 shows the causes of strikes during 1996.
The IDS Report 1997/8 attributed some of the causes to the loss of many able and 
effective union officials to the government, but a more significant factor was identified 
as the introduction of new work methods, perceived or real discrimination, and failure of
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the union or government to deliver on expectations (IDS, 1997, pp. 86-7). Whether the 
strikes in 1995/6 were simply ad hoc reactions to change, or the beginnings of a more 
calculated generalised attempt to apply pressure on the employers and state, was at 
this point unclear. Yet, there was evidence to support the claim of increased resistance 
in many new and different areas of the labour force - much of it in the state sector (IDS, 
1997 pp. 86-87). Although, this action in no way paralleled the scale and extent of 
resistance against apartheid, issues of low pay and changing working conditions linked 
to 'privatisation1 - especially in the public sector - still threatened to become a major 
stumbling block for the ANC government.
Between 1995 and 1997 the South African government's desire to encourage foreign 
investment, and its inability to find trading partners outside of the capitalist system, had 
forced Mandela to realign his thinking and frame the problem within a neo-classical 
economic framework. This shift in ideology was not entirely new, its origins could be 
traced back, prior to the election when he had already begun telling overseas 
audiences that the ANC would be "slow to deliver the goods". Nevertheless, the 
electoral and political sensitivity of such a change in policy meant that the ANC 
hesitated in taking the message immediately to the voters in Soweto, Khayelitsha or 
Cradock (Catchpowle and Cooper, 1999).
Furthermore, despite an initial commitment to nationalisation on the part of the ANC, 
the policy of privatisation and 'commercialisation' gained momentum, with the state's 
declared intention to involve the free market in the planning and financing of the new 
public sector. The restructuring of both the public service and local authorities was 
identified as fundamentally a problem of finance - and the solution for the government 
was one of incorporating the ideals and practices of the private sector (White Paper on 
Local Government: Discussion Document, 1997).
State finance of the public sector was no longer to be a necessary precondition for the 
successful and sustainable economic development of South Africa. The government - 
whose relations are theorised as being not separate but tied up with capitalism - was 
being forced to adapt to the global system and accept its free market ideology. Such
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policies would require the country to cut public spending on health, education and 
welfare, carry out trade liberalisation measures, and introduce a flexible labour market - 
especially in state employment. The public sector was now to be subject to the 
demands of the market and if that was to the detriment of the poor, black majority - so 
be it.
It is the response of the public sector trade unions which is of interest here. Whether 
this area of civil society was to become an arena of struggle, mainly rested on the 
responses of its workforce. Although privatisation was being presented during this 
period (1995-7) as a panacea for eradicating the slow growth in the economy, reducing 
the public-sector deficit, and releasing new profit centres for South Africa, most public 
sector trade unionists remained unconvinced. The experience of workers world-wide 
had led them to understand that the introduction of a commercial ethos in the sector 
would simply lead to massive cuts in personnel, a deterioration of conditions and pay, 
and the unresponsive delivery of services to the poor (Hemson, 1998).
In point of fact, the government's success would in the final analysis be measured by 
its ability to control labour, notably to convince the unions to abandon their traditional 
use of strikes in favour of co-operation with the employers. The task would not be easy, 
and was arguably beyond a solution. Not only had it to introduce corporatist policies 
whilst embracing privatisation and flexibility to encourage the flow of foreign investment 
into the country; but it also needed to encourage improvements in productivity without 
provoking a net loss of jobs. Moreover, it needed to reduce the racially-imposed 
inequality in pay and conditions, whilst keeping the overall wage increases and cost of 
labour below the level of inflation; and perhaps most markedly of all, persuade its 
political ally, COSATU, to restrain its members - many of whom were expecting modest 
rewards for the political struggles of the past decades. (Matthews and Suzman,1995; 
IDS, 1997/8).
Therefore, in 1995 the solution to the ANC's problems largely relied on the government, 
through a combination of patronage and economic growth, being able to contain the 
union militancy by including union leaders into the forum of decision- making. But just 
how much freedom the ANC would ultimately have to continue using such tactics would 
really depend on the ideology currently dominant in capitalism. It is within the context of 
this discussion that SAMWU is once again examined as a means of analysing the 
transformation of the state's relationship with public sector trade unions.
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The second section of the case study (1995-7) begins by reviewing and summarising 
the branch's aims and objectives during the post-apartheid period. This is followed by 
an outline of part 2, detailing the subsequent chapters and the reasons for their 
einclusion.
In the post apartheid period, the changes in local government were set to transform 
both SAMWU nationally, and the Cape Town branch locally. The prospect of engaging 
more fully and legitimately in the industrial relations systems, along with the freedom to 
recruit all races and groups within the sector, meant the union had an opportunity to 
expand, making it more viable financially, and better equipped to service its members 
and co-ordinate its activities. By 1995, it was hoped that such developments would not 
only increase the power of its membership but help it address what had become by the 
end of apartheid, its core challenges of establishing a living wage'; and campaigning 
to stop privatisation (SAMWU National Congress Report, 1997a). Inevitably, such 
changes brought with it both threats and opportunities - some of which were not 
necessarily new.
During the 1995-7 period , SAMWU, as in 1992, continued to declare its commitment to 
a socialist state. Yet, if such a major social change was to be in any way realised in the 
'new1 South Africa, the leadership recognised the need to move beyond political 
sloganeering and conference speeches, to a situation where they were contributing 
tangibly to meeting the basic needs of the vast majority of South Africans, denied 
services under apartheid rule. To this end, SAMWU, at its 1997 Congress, expressed 
a desire to commit its resources to fighting for local government reorganisation. This 
principle was said to flow easily from its pledge to change society and transform the 
sector (SAMWU Congress: Secretariat Report, 1997c).
More especially, the Congress saw it as essential for the union to adopt strategies that 
did not just end with defending its members' economic interests, but actively advanced 
its vision of socialism. SAMWU's main campaigns - the Anti-privatisation and Living 
Wage - reflected this intention, their overall strategy being to continue struggling, even
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in the post apartheid era, for a radical transformation of the workplace and society 
(SAMWU Congress: Secretariat Report, 1997c). Nevertheless, related to such aims 
was the recognition on the part of the leadership, that effective union organisation 
would be needed to meet the challenge of the new threats and opportunities. 
Inevitably, as in 1992-4, the internal structure and external activities became, a further 
focus for debate.
INTERNAL STRUCTURE
In 1997, activists in Cape Town were acutely aware that the internal structure and 
organisation of the union needed to change if it was to take advantage of its new 
legitimacy (Interviews, 1997). Several problems had emerged relating to, the increased 
levels of administration and bureaucracy, the provision of adequate services to its 
varied membership, and most worrying the unevenness and lack of communication 
between the national, regional and branch levels. As a consequence, most members 
and shop stewards supported the national leadership's efforts to write a new national 
constitution in an attempt to improve the organisation and democracy of the union. 
Such moves were recognised as a means of enabling the union to represent its 
growing membership better. It was hoped that different structures and organisation, 
would not only supply better facilities and benefits, but also promote the dynamism 
needed 'to mount a successful challenge against privatisation and respond to the 
challenges of restructuring the sector1 (SAMWU Congress, 1997a'Organisational 
Issues').
UNION ACTIVITIES
In terms of its external union activities the Cape Town branch remained totally 
committed to the union's two key campaigns - the fight for a 'living wage' and the drive 
to stop privatisation. In many ways it was in the forefront of these initiatives and 
appeared - as in 1992 - willing to take industrial action to achieve these aims.
In 1995, the national union began to show signs of prioritising the use of formal 
channels by focusing on the establishment of a national bargaining council to negotiate 
pay and working conditions - but did not 'rule out1 the possibility of strike action to 
achieve its goals. Although the bargaining council did not materialise until 1997, 
considerable progress was made in Cape Town towards achieving a minimum wage
and bringing all workers nearer to a 'living wage'. Stewards also used any formal 
meetings to convince the council not to privatise (SAMWU Worker's News, (1997a; 
1997b; 1997i)
Yet, there still remained concerns about the overall area of formalisation. Whereas, 
increased recognition and greater incorporation into the formal industrial relations 
system by the union, was welcomed, some of those interviewed in Cape Town in 1997 
remained fearful that the accompanying bureaucracy might threaten its long tradition of 
worker control and democracy. Many stewards, and even the leadership, were anxious 
that such formal isation, both in its external activities and union structure and 
organisation, should not displace democratic workers' control and rank-and file struggle. 
The power of such activity was seen, not only of achieving the end of apartheid, but 
being the only effective means of preventing government privatisation (Interviews, 
1997).
Above all in the 1995-7 period, the branch perceived itself as being particularly 
vulnerable to the private sector's involvement in service delivery - and staunchly 
declared, as in 1992, its resolute opposition to such plans (interviews 1997). As a 
consequence, its involvement in anti-privatisation campaigns increased, as its 
resistance took the form of more strikes, marches and protests. Such activities were 
set to make the privatisation of local government services in Cape Town - and 
nationally - the subject of bitter political engagement, with the capacity to divide many 
municipal workers from the ANC government (Hemson, 1998).
Nonetheless, although from 1995 it had been fairly evident that the branch - indeed the 
union as a whole - would continue to resist such policies, it was not entirely clear what 
form this opposition would take. In 1992 the black trade unions' only real defence had 
been strike action, but in 1995 the ANC's new 'labour friendly' legislation (Labour 
Relations Act - LRA) legitimised the African unions and opened up to them, many new 
- previously inaccessible - industrial relations institutions. The government planned that 
the LRA (1995) should develop a more formal system of employee relations. The 
"framework for social partnership" - between unions, employers and the state - was to 
be used to create a peaceful industrial environment and overcome what many multi- 
national companies and international governments saw as unacceptably high levels of 
strike activity (Matthews, 1995b).
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Such issues are explored within the framework of the further development of SAMWU 
and its most prominent branch - Cape Town. revisits the post-apartheid 
ambience within which Cape Town SAMWU members lived and worked from 1995-7. 
It reviews the living conditions in Western Cape, and analyses and details the political 
circumstances surrounding the setting up of the new local government, its new 
structure and workplace environment.
considers once again the Cape Town branch, within the general 
development of the union, its changing membership, and evolving internal structure. 
examines the external activities of the branch; its involvement with the new 
formal industrial relations institutions, its increased levels of campaigning in response 
to privatisation and deregulation and its continual engagement in protests and strikes. 
As ever the overall aim of these chapters is to assist in evaluating the many different 
influences on the SAMWU workers, and their willingness to resist state policies of 
privatisation.
Such a willingness to engage in resistance though, is linked to the levels of class 
consciousness or solidarity amongst this group. Such a consciousness is not static. In 
times of intense conflict (such as during the industrial action against apartheid), the 
level of class struggle and pressure from below can, as Mann (1973) explains, lead to 
an 'explosion of consciousness'. It is a frequently noted phenomenon, that during such 
periods workers come to question the usual blind acceptance of their role as wage 
labour, and in an abrupt transformation of their consciousness move on to reject their 
own individual aspirations, in favour of a collective goal that has the power to challenge 
the system. But equally such consciousness is not uniform, especially as most 
workers' understanding of the dominant ideology of capitalism remains limited. A 
number of factors influence the levels of solidarity and collectivism. Notably different 
experiences - both in the home environment, workplace and unions - produces a 
contradictory consciousness about the system. It is this uneven consciousness that 
forces workers on the one hand to conform to the ideas of the prevailing system, but at 
the same time partially reject them (Mann, 1973). In an attempt to understand this 
uneven consciousness better, the next chapter (11) considers, the home and work
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environment of the SAMWU members in Cape Town from 1995-7, undoubtedly one of 
the main influences on the consciousness of any workforce.
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The historical development of the branch, continued as in 1992-4 to present a 
contradictory picture. On the one hand there were elements of breadth, unity, and 
solidarity; on the other there was parochialism, sectionalism and narrow lines of 
exclusivity - as a legacy of apartheid. This contradiction was equally apparent in the 
Western Cape province as a whole, where the racial and political complexities of the 
area continued to be reflected in the branch. The following section considers (once 
again) the economic, political and workplace environment in which the SAMWU branch 
and members are located: it highlights the changing economic and social location, the 
demographic profiles, and the political control and development of the council in Cape 
Town.
The area, in 1997, remained unique, with a minority of blacks (less than a million) and 
a majority of 'coloureds' (over 2 million) residing in the area. Although, the long white 
beaches and luxurious housing still attracted a number of whites (3% increase in 
migrants) most of the growth in the area had come from the Xhosa (African) or 
Coloured' migrants. In post-apartheid Cape Town, whites continued to enjoy the 
highest standard of living of any of the ethnic groups. But, whereas, the 'coloured' poor 
enjoyed marginally better conditions then the 'African1 poor - the reality was that both
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black and 'coloured' communities in the area continued to be plagued by poor housing, 
unemployment and lack of basic amenities (Wilhelm, 1997).
In 1996 (as in 1992) the Western Cape remained highly urbanised, with 88.9% of its 
population living in urban areas (CSS, Census, 1996). Yet there were changes, since 
the 1994 election, new - mainly black - squatter settlements had grown up in areas like 
Winelands and Overberg. Some of the inhabitants came from other overcrowded local 
settlements where squatter parents - and grandparents - had lived in destitution for 
decades. Others were African migrants, attracted to the area by promises of new job 
opportunities. Often as not such jobs failed to materialise and the squatters spent their 
time scavenging on nearby city dumps, collecting waste to sell to the 'new' middlemen, 
posing as aspiring black and 'coloured1 entrepreneurs (Wilhelm, 1997).
Throughout this period housing remained a highly contentious issue. As early as 1995 
a critical shortage of land suitable for low-income, medium-density housing was 
reported as seriously affecting the quality of life of Cape Town's poor (Financial Mail 
1995d). Those that were built were often of an inferior standard and totally 
inappropriate for families. One resident of the black township, Crossroads explained 
the problem - but acknowledged that the 'coloured 1 community were equally effected.
'they started to build some homes in Crossroads last year but they're 
too small, not even a real room, just a kitchen ...the 'coloured' areas 
have got electricity but their houses are also too small. There're just too 
small for everyone1
Despite the National Party's electoral claim to preserve the standard of living of the 
'coloureds', they too experienced impoverished conditions. The assumption in 1992-4, 
that whites and 'coloureds' would make common cause together, had not prevented 
the 'coloured' community's socio-economic conditions from faring little better than the 
Africans. In 1997, poor 'coloureds' still suffered high levels of unemployment, resided 
in bleak townships, endured a rapidly deteriorating environment - with hijacking, rape 
and random murder dominating the crime figures (Waldmeir, 1992; Wilhelm, 1997).
More especially such poor living conditions were not confined to the poorer 'coloured' 
areas of the Cape Flats. The once "safe" mainly 'coloured' suburbs of Woodstock were
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now also subject to greater levels of crime, indicating a deep malaise, especially 
amongst the unemployed disaffected 'coloured' youth. The city's seemingly 
prosperous 'coloured1 suburbs were struggling to provide adequate accommodation 
and jobs for their inhabitants (Wlihelm, 1997).
It was the reality of these material conditions that appeared once again to be giving a 
voice to racism in the area. Although, 'coloureds' had lived in poor conditions and had 
suffered greatly under apartheid, the reality of being one rung above the Africans - they 
lived in better houses, went to better schools and received higher pensions - was 
enough to preserve their feelings of superiority and placate fears of poverty. In post- 
apartheid South Africa, no such security blanket existed and large sections of the 
'coloured1 community feared their meagre economic positions would be marginalised 
by the newly economically aspiring Africans (The Economist, 1995 )
Yet, behind the material conditions of this racism was also an inter-related political 
motive. The white-led National Party, who governed the Western Cape persisted in 
nurturing the 'coloureds1 fear of black domination to good electoral effect; ironically 
now, providing a refuge for those coloureds who now claimed:
'Before we were too black to be white. Now we're too white to be black'
Such a view ensured a victory for the NP. Although the ANC had secured the major 
vote in the National Assembly, gaining seven out of nine provinces, the bulk of 
'coloureds' in the Western Cape Province, voted for NP. Moreover, just two years into 
majority rule the spirit of racism appeared to be thriving in Cape Town. The different 
languages, cultures and traditions of the 'coloureds1 were being used by the National 
Party to develop racial antagonisms among the two ethnic groups of workers - Africans 
and 'coloureds'. The continuing legacy of apartheid was offering 'coloured' workers the 
comfort of believing themselves part of a 'new' yet still superior group of Afrikaners; 
More directly, it provided a ready made scapegoat for the Nationalists' inability to 
deliver real economic growth to the area (Beresford,1996; The Economist, 1996) 
Consequently, although the home of the 'coloured' SAMWU workers, the Western 
Cape, remained in 1997 a breathtakingly beautiful setting for a city, it could not mask - 
even in the 'new' South Africa - the reality of a population divided in terms of location,
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economics, language, politics, and culture. The courageous battles against the 
apartheid government may have secured the electoral vote for all races but, as was 
glaringly obvious in Cape Town, economic apartheid was still very much alive (Wilhelm, 
1997).
In 1996 the 'new1 South Africa produced its first census which revealed some 
interesting, although not altogether surprising statistics about the life style and levels of 
poverty in the country as a whole - and the Western Cape in particular. Although the 
census statistics continued to show the Cape enjoying an above average standard of 
living - it had the country's highest human development index (a measure of life 
expectancy, level of education and income 40) - the figures in themselves were 
misleading and failed, as in 1992-4, to reveal the full extent of the disparities between 
the racial groups. The following section considers the population and the Human 
Development Index (HDI) in the area.
The population of the Western Cape was now the fifth largest province in South Africa 
(See Table 11.1). It had grown from its 1994 figure of 3.7 million to population of 
3,956,875 (9.7% of the whole country) with a population density of only 28 per km (CSS 
1996 census).
40 Because reliable statistics on levels of income for 'coloureds1 and blacks were unavailable for the 
1992-4 period, patterns of (un)employment were substituted as a measure of quality of life- to maintain 
consistency the same measures were used for 1995-7
Province
Total
KwaZulu-Natal
Gauteng
Eastern Cape
Northern Province
Western Cape
North West
Mpumalanga
Free State
Northern Cape
Pop. in OOOs
40,583,573
8,417,021
7 348 423
6302525
4 929 368
3,956 875
3 354 825
2800711
2633504
840,321
Percentage %
100
20.7
18.1
15.5
12.0
9.7
8.3
6.9
65
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Source: Census "96 Population of South Africa by gender and province
Such figures seemed to mirror the general increase in the population as a whole. The 
national census (published in Oct 1998) showed a population of 40.58 million with black 
people being by far the majority in South Africa (76.7%) followed by whites (10.9%); 
coloureds (8.9%) Indians (2.6%) and unspecified (0.9%) (CSS 1996 Census; Davis and 
Soggatt, 1997 - Weekly Mail and Guardian -1998). The final figure was two million 
fewer people than statisticians had previously calculated - the blame for the 
discrepancy had been put on the previous model devised by Professor Sadie 
(Stellenbosch University) for the 1991 census. Predictably, even in the collection of 
government statistics, apartheid stereotyping had played a part, and distorted the true 
picture - the apartheid census had over-estimated the increase in population, by using a 
model for its 1991 census which exaggerated the fertility rates of black women and 
estimated a population of 42 million in 1996.
Unfortunately such racist stereotyping also meant the statistics for the Western Cape - 
especially the comparative figures over time - were totally unreliable. The October 
Household Survey of 1993 and 1995 (used in part one of the case study) not only 
employed different methodologies to the 1996 survey, but also utilised the dubious
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1991 population estimates 41 (Davis and Soggot,1997). Nevertheless, despite these 
limitations some general observations are possible.
RACE AND GENDER
In the post-apartheid South Africa - although the gender figures were distinctive - it was 
the distribution of race within the province that continued, as in 1992, to emerge as 
significant by contrast with the rest of the country - shown in Table 11.2
Eastern 
Cape
Free State
Gauteng
Kwazulu 
Natal
Mpuma- 
langa
Northern 
Cape
Northern 
Province
North West
Western 
Cape
South Africa
African
5,448,495
2,223,940
5,147,444
6,880,652
2,497,834
278,633
4,756,255
3,058,686
826691
31,127,630
Coloured
468,532
79,038
278,692
117,951
20,283
435,368
7,821
46,652
2146109
3,600,446
Indian
19,356
2,805
161,289
790,813
13,083
2,268
5,510
10,097
40376
1 ,045,597
White
330,294
316,459
1,702,343
558,182
253,392
111,844
117,878
222,755
821551
4,434,698
Other
35,849
11,262
58,654
69,423
16,120
12,208
32,904
16,635
122148
375,203
Male
2,908,056
1,298,348
3,750,845
3,950,527
1 ,362,028
412,681
2,253,072
1 ,649,835
1935494
19,520,886
Female
3,394,469
1,335,156
3,597,578
4,466,493
1 ,438,683
427,639
2,676,296
1 ,704,990
2021381
21,062,685
Total
6,302,525
2,633,504
7,348,423
8,417,020
840,320
4,929,368
3,354,825
3,956,875
3956875
40,583,571
In terms of gender, there were more females (2 million) than males (1.9 million) in the 
Western Cape. Part of the reason for the dominance of women in the area may have 
been - as in 1992-4 -linked to the type of industry in the town. The garment and textile 
factories had historically overshadowed the region with many of the plants traditionally
41 Having no official data for black births, Professor Sadie had used the 1970 census to estimate the 
black South African birth rates (the largest part of the population), whilst for whites, 1 coloureds1 and 
Indians, statistics were based on 1980 figures. Yet, Professor Sadie refused to accept that the previous 
census officials were blinded by apartheid-era assumptions that black people were likely to produce 
more children. Instead he suggested that either "population control programmes' had been more 
effective then envisaged or simply, as with all censuses, the central office could not guarantee that 
thousands of workers in the field had done their job properly (Davis and Soggot,1997)
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employing large numbers of women, especially 'coloured' garment workers. Many of 
whom were known to marry municipal workers (the other large group of coloured labour 
in the area) (Golden, 1987; CSS Census 1996).
Overall though, in the post-apartheid period (1995-7), it was the race figures that 
remained exceptional - the Western Cape continued to record the highest 'coloured' 
population in the country. There were 2.146 million 'coloureds1 in the area and they 
constituted around 54% of the province - this compared with 21% Africans, 21% White 
people, and 1% Indian/Asian. Although, the percentage figures available in 1994 
seemed to indicate a fall in the population of the whites and 'coloureds' (24% and 57% 
perspectively) the comparisons were unreliable because of the different methodologies 
used by the census takers (CSS Census, 1996).
The reality of these figures - although not in themselves important - persisted in 
exercising a tremendous influence over the economic and social position of SAMWU 
workers. For over 80 years the dominance of 'coloureds1 in the area had led to 
ideological and political conflicts. It was in the Western Cape that the Nationalist ruling 
party had deliberately used the 'coloured identity' to embellish its policy of apartheid. 
Although in the 1980s, the protests and actions of 'coloured' workers had helped to 
undermine the racists effects of apartheid, it was equally true that the survival of the 
apartheid 'coloured identity1 in post-apartheid South Africa, depended on the continued 
support of many sections of the very same 'coloured' working-class (Golden 1987; The 
Economist, 1995). As one SAMWU member and Retreat ('coloured' area, next to the 
Cape Flats) resident explained, such a suggestion disturbed 'coloured' workers and 
many chose not to discuss its implications.
There's a lot of negativity amongst the community ...the disturbing thing 
is that you will not find any person who supported the apartheid regime. 
All of them suddenly say we never supported it ....but when you remind 
them of the past, you find they tell you that you must not remain in the 
past, or they say apartheid doesn't exist anymore and therefore don't 
talk about it.
Nevertheless, the reality of the 'coloured1 community's continued support for the 
National Party was significant. Whereas apartheid had previously offered the 'coloured' 
community a preferential lifestyle, it now - more alarmingly - had the potential to
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frustrate the organisation's desire to incorporate 'coloureds' politically and 
economically into the 'new1 South Africa (Hennie, Interview, 24/8/97)
In 1995, the Western Cape continued to have the highest HDI in the country - life 
expectancy, education and data on types and patterns of (un)employment - used to 
measure the quality of life42 .
LIFE EXPECTANCY
The age distribution of the Western Cape, like the rest of the South African population 
was starting to diverge from the pyramid structure typically associated with developing 
countries. Overall, there were proportionately fewer males (11%) and females (12%) in 
the age category 0-4 years than the age categories 5-9 or 10-13 years. There was also 
a relatively larger proportion, particularly of females in the age category 75 years or 
more. However, such figures remained misleading because the age pyramids varied 
greatly by population group, with African age distribution looking most like that of a 
developing nations, and the white age distribution looking most like that of a developed 
nation (CSS, Census, 1996).
EDUCATION
In terms of education the Western Cape - as in 1992-4 - appeared to fare well. 
Whereas in South Africa as a whole, almost 20% of South Africans aged 20 years and 
over had received no education (9.7 million men and 11.2 women); only 6.7% of the 
people in the Province aged 20 years and above had no schooling at all - the lowest 
figure of all the provinces. Furthermore, the Western Cape Province led the way in the 
education ratings with a total of 10.6% of people aged 20 years above having higher 
education qualifications. But, equally as in 1992-4, such figures were misleading, 
because the racial divide was evident with over 24% of blacks having received no 
education, as against 10% of 'coloureds', 7% of Indians and 1% Whites (CSS, 1996 
Census).
42 As with chapter 5, types and patterns of employment has been substituted as a measure of the 
quality of life. This is due to adequate data being available for African and "coloured 1 workers in this 
area during this period
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Even in the area of education racial tensions were evident, with many African students 
articulating their feelings of marginalisation in a historically 'coloured' dominated area; 
whilst numerous 'coloured' students felt that the interests of African students were 
being unfairly prioritised. Yet, such very different ethnic perceptions of the education 
system in Cape Town need to be considered within the context of scarce resources, 
and the likelihood that competition for such a resource could all too easily be articulated 
as racial tensions (The Economist, 1996). The reality of the situation was brought home 
by the comments of one Crossroads resident interviewed, who declared:-
...they've tried to build better schools, but its useless because they 
don't give us any teachers.
EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS IN THE WESTERN CAPE
Perhaps the most telling statistics that illustrated the continued economic divide in both 
South Africa and the Western Cape, were found in the labour market. The 1996 
census, as did the figures of 1992-4, revealed a racially segregated society divided 
between the rich and poor. According to the 1996 census of the 40.58 million South 
Africans, 57.4% aged between 15-65 were economically active, yet the types and 
levels of employment varied considerably, and largely depended on the racial group the 
employee belonged to.
The distribution of skills in 'new1 South Africa remained widely distorted. Whilst 4.6% of 
the working population were managers and 10.8% professionals, 30% operated as 
unskilled workers. In the Western Cape, the figures were slightly better with 29% being 
employed in unskilled elementary work; but only 9%, were employed as professionals. 
Nationally, it was the whites (nearly 50%) that continued to occupy management jobs - 
with only 11% of the working black population being managers or legislators. Overall, 
an enormous 73% of blacks continued to operate as unskilled or artisan workers, with 
34% of 'coloured' men in elementary occupations. In terms of gender, women 
appeared to be under-represented in the more highly paid skilled professions, with 
African being most affected - 57% of African women and 41% of 'coloured' women
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were in elementary occupations compared with 6% of Indian and 3% of white woman 
(CSS 1996 census: WM&G.1998).
The skills shortage in the Western Cape concerned SAMWU workers, several 
bemoaned the fact that their low skills and lack of education were affecting their 
opportunities to earn extra money.
We didn't go to school we just went to work in the council...they could 
(CCC) provide more training or study leave but they just see education 
as a privilege. You've got to finance yourself, do extra jobs at the 
weekends. The problem is the government are not prepared to invest. 
Unemployment
The most worrying figure for South Africa as a whole was the unemployment rate. 
Although the statistics varied considerably, the official figure was 34% of the 
economically active. In comparison the Western Cape province had low unemployment 
rates of 17.9% - compared with much higher figure of the Eastern Cape (49%) and 
Northern Province (46%) (WM&G, 1998).
Yet, the relatively low unemployment rate in Western Cape did not necessarily mean 
the absence of poverty. As in 1992-4 unemployment was disproportionately 
represented across different racial groups. Nationally, the greatest unemployment 
existed amongst the African population with the figure being particularly high for both 
African women (52%) and men (34%). The jobless rate for 'coloureds' in South Africa 
as a whole was high - 21% in 1996 - but still lower than the overall black rate of 42.5% 
(CSS, 1996 Census).
One black resident from the township, Guguletu, complained that the new government 
had done very little to eliminate the massive unemployment in black townships - but 
was quick to add that the government had not been in power long, and he was content 
to wait.
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Not much has changed really, especially not in Guguletu. Jobs are the 
top priority, then crime will go down.... If you lose your job you only get 
unemployment relief for six months...But we must be patient the ANC 
have only just gained power.
In the Western Cape, despite the supposed position of privilege throughout the 
apartheid years, the 'coloured' population was still incapable of escaping the threat of 
unemployment - of the economically active that were unemployed, 48.5% were 
'coloureds', 43% were African, 0.6% were Indians and 5.2% were white. The jobless 
rate for 'coloureds' workers in Cape Town was high, 21% in 1996, but this was still 
preferable to the black rate of 38%. Overall, Africans were disproportionately 
represented in the unemployment figures, given only 21% African as opposed to 54% 
'coloureds' and 21% whites resided in the province (CSS, 1996 census).
Yet, irrespective of such revealing statistics, the 'coloured1 communities remained on 
the whole distrustful of the socio-economic position of the Africans. Dangerous 
stereotypes were reinforced by the Nationalist Party, who tended to distort the real 
issues of poverty and neglect in this extremely volatile society. One SAMWU member 
explained that the real basis of the racism was fear, especially as the perceived 
perception of blacks was one of being better educated than 'coloureds1 , and capable of 
obtaining jobs, once reserved for 'coloureds'.
Most 'coloureds1 are frightened ...they know the blacks are under- 
privileged but they're seen as more qualified and capable of stealing the 
jobs we used to have.
In 1995, some attempts were made by the new provincial government to encourage the 
decentralisation of job creation, by directing commercial and industrial activities away 
from the city bowl towards the 'coloured' area of the Cape Flats, and the poorer south- 
east sector. But this was still grossly inadequate, since less than half of the industrial 
land was located in the north/northwest region, where areas like Mitchell's Plain 
(mainly 'coloured' area), Khayelistsha ('Black' area), Mascassar, Blue Downs and Delft 
- with over 700,000 inhabitants - continued to suffer a shortage of employment 
opportunities (Financial Mail, 1995d).
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The Western Cape may have emerged as one of the richest provinces - often 
described as a haven for the middle-class, a retreat from the rest of South Africa's tides 
of squalor, crime and insecurity - but for many it remained, a forbidding and desolate 
place. The region continued to be sharply divided along race lines with 'Africans' 
suffering the highest levels of poverty and deprivation, and 'coloureds' managing (just) 
to preserve their ranking in the ethnic scale given to them by apartheid. 'Coloureds', by 
most measures remained better-off than blacks - with lower unemployment levels, 
better housing and average yearly income more than twice that of Africans. Yet, 
despite the 'coloured' community's reputation for being upwardly mobile - with the city 
bowl area boasting a vibrant liberal community - the unemployment, crime rates, guns 
and narcotics had become common place in many traditional 'coloured' areas, with 
places like the Cape Flats suffering the most (The Economist, 1996).
The majority of SAMWU workers lived in the working-class areas of the Cape, and 
were affected by the poor economic and social conditions. The spread of tuberculosis 
43 , in both black and 'coloured' communities; the increase in Aids, malnutrition and 
illegal abortions in the low-lying, once informal settlements; and the high levels of 
alcoholism and depression all continued to exist as a testament to the state's inability to 
redistribute a greater proportion of its wealth from the rich to the poor - whatever their 
colour (Wilhelm, 1997).
Moreover, it was within the satellite towns and centres of Cape Town that a unique 
racial twist of history was being played out between the Nationalist Party and the 
'coloured' community. The one time party of apartheid now depended for its survival on 
nurturing the political ambitions - and some would suggest - nationalist aspirations of 
the 'coloured' people. In truth it was the material conditions of the area - the 
'coloureds' concern that the Western Cape was lagging behind the rest of the country, 
and the fear that blacks would encroach on their housing and job security - that was 
really giving rise to the uneven and often politically confusing views of the 'coloured' 
communities. (Financial Mail, 1996d).
The next section explores the political events surrounding the first non-racial local 
government elections, and the changing structure and work environment of the CCC, in
43 The Western Cape had the highest incidence of the disease in the world and accounted for a quarter 
of all the country^ cases in 1994 (Henri du Plessis (1994).
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the immediate post-apartheid period (1995-7). The events are seen as significant, partly 
because it provides an understanding of the changing politics of local government in the 
area, but largely because it is a useful means of grasping, a further insight into the 
uneven political consciousness of the municipal workers
The political events surrounding the birth of the first non-racial council in Cape Town, 
threatened from the beginning to affect the working lives of SAMWU members. 
Although, the shock surrounding the National Party*s victory in the provincial election 
had not waned, the battle for the old Cape Town City Council was for many 'coloured' 
SAMWU workers just as crucial as the national elections. The events leading up to 
these elections illuminated the political consciousness of the local 'coloured' population 
- which remained uneven and confused - with many SAMWU workers, interviewed in 
1997, expressing total dismay at the 'coloured' community's continued support for the 
National Party
Plans to restructure the old apartheid local government in the Cape were fraught from 
the onset. The Cape Town Council had originally forwarded a plan that was designed to 
restructure local government and restore services to more than 700,000 residents of 
the Peninsula townships. The Plan was dubbed the "enhanced service delivery model" 
and proposed abolishing the Western Cape RSC and the "coloured" management 
committees. However, such ambitious plans were soon abandoned after services in the 
townships were rumoured to be a risk to public health. Others, were more ready to 
believe that the true reason lay with the new local government planners' willingness to 
bow to political pressure, leaving the black townships untouched whilst they squabbled 
over who should finance them. Consequently, until May 1996 the old Cape Town City 
Council remained virtually intact whilst the struggling Black Local Authorities were left to 
run the old apartheid townships as "homelands" (Esterhuyse, 1994; Financial Mail, 
1996b).
By 1995, negotiations concerning the nature of the provinces' transitional local councils 
had reached deadlock, and it appeared unlikely that the November 1st local
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government elections would go ahead as scheduled. Most of the delay was due to the 
political manoeuvring between the NP and the 'new1 ANC government. In 1995 the 
Western Cape Legislature, regional finance minister Kobus Meiring, unveiled figures 
that showed the region would end the financial year with a deficit of more than R1bn, 
and perhaps the retrenchment of 5000 public sector workers. The National Party 
immediately blamed the central government's funding formula of the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission, which in 1995 had reduced the Cape's share of funding by 3.41% 
a year for the next 5 years. Meiring argued, that whereas other ANC dominated 
provinces had been allocated more funds (funding would grow by 1.05% in Eastern 
Cape and 8.16% in Gauteng) - the Western Cape would run out of money by the end of 
1996 C Financial Mail, 1995d). In the final analysis, the political tug-of-war over this and 
the financing of the black townships, rendered inoperative the provincial committee's 
attempts to ratify all boundaries and wards - which led in the end to the postponement 
of most of the local elections in the area (Financial Mail 1995a).
Originally, the ANC expected to control local government in the Western Cape. As a 
consequence of the agreement between the previous local government Minister, 
Tertius Delport and the ANC - 30% of local government seats were to be elected in 
black wards, 30% in white, 'coloureds' and Indian wards, with the remaining 40% being 
elected by proportional representation. Race groups would as a consequence be 
represented in city councils disproportionate to their numbers. Therefore, even in the 
Western Cape where blacks (traditionally ANC voters) constituted little more than 20% 
of the local population, it was anticipated the ANC would win 30% plus its share of 40% 
of proportionally-elected seats, and any ward seats it could pick up from 'coloured' 
areas (Esterhuyse, 1994; Financial Mail, 1996b).
Although, 75% of the Western Cape was unable to vote in November 1995, of those 
that did vote (25%) all indications were that the ANC had made significant gains and 
had managed to turn around the 'coloured' vote in the Western Cape. For the May 
1996, local elections (involving the other 75%), the ANC worked hard to win the 
'coloured1 vote. The ANC believed the 'coloured' voters were not committed to the NP, 
and began using its leading members, to win the 'hearts' of voters. Prior to the election 
Mandela visited the 'coloured1 area of Athlone - promising voters a 'pot of gold at the 
end of the rainbow nation' (Financial Mail, 1996b).
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The result
There was a 57% turnout of metropolitan voters - high for local elections, but most 
probably due to the ANC-NP contest which was being projected as one of national 
importance. The overall result was not good for the ANC - the white voters remained 
mistrustful of the ANC and even in the black areas, administration and chaos lost them 
some valuable votes (Financial Mail, 1996b). Yet, equally the metropolitan and rural 
elections were not the overwhelming triumph for the National Party (NP) that its leaders 
claimed. Compared with the 1994 general election, the ANC appears to have raised its 
percentage of the vote by four points to 37.7%, while the National Party's share fell 
from 56% to 48.2% . Nonetheless, such comparisons were virtually irrelevant, because 
the rules of the election were very different. In the end it was the continuing allegiance 
of the'coloured' community that ensured the National Party power - of the registered 
support 60% were 'coloureds' (Financial Mail, 1996c).
The real views of SAMWU workers were difficult to gauge during this period. Whereas, 
some SAMWU members interviewed in 1997, expressed sympathy with the National 
Party's position that Africans would be a threat to the lifestyle and culture of 'coloureds', 
they also demonstrated support for the ANC. Only days before the election, Cape 
Town braced itself for a strike and march of more than 18,000 municipal workers - 
SAMWU was protesting against local government re-organisation and supporting the 
ANC's claim, at the local government negotiating table, that it would jeopardise jobs 
(Financial Mail, 1996c).
For some SAMWU activists the possible assumptions were was too awful to 
contemplate. The party which had once deprived them of the vote, had now been 
provided with a substantial victory by the 'coloured 1 community. One SAMWU worker 
summed up the climate of suspicion and mistrust that surrounded the elections...
there is an undercurrent of fear and suspicion... if you speak to the 
workers you can pick it up. If you speak to those that voted N.P, they 
aren't seeing the N.P as the culprit that carried apartheid, but they see 
them as savours giving them a new opportunity because they see a 
reverse racism - because blacks are more important then what they are 
The'Coloured1 Vote
Despite, the high-profile appearances by Mandela in 'coloured areas' like Mitchells 
Plain, it was apparent from the racist jibes that most coloured voters remained resentful 
of blacks. They perceived themselves as the achievers while the Cape blacks were 
viewed as economic refugees, mainly from Ciskei and Transkei - who live in squatter 
camps and sprawling, under-serviced townships (Financial Mail, 1996b).
Some regional leaders blamed the ANC's national leadership for the defeat. They 
complained there was little understanding among national leaders of the peculiarities of 
the region, and far too much interference in decision-making, particularly about who 
should lead the Western Cape ANC. One executive committee member said he 
noticed in the run-up to the election how little the leadership understood the local 
politics.
"nationally, voters may welcome redeployment of teachers and 
affirmative action in the workplace, but those messages have to be 
amended to find resonance here... some of our national leaders came to 
the Cape to address public meetings with quite crude and conservative 
viewpoints on coloured nationalism...it does nothing to help our cause to 
eliminate racism in the region".
Another ANC member reported a real fear on the part of the 'coloured' voters that the 
ANC were going to redress the racial imbalance in the area by redistributing homes and 
jobs from the 'colou reds' to 'Africans'
'Coloured' voters are incredibly conservative....... They really believe that
their houses, jobs and schools are going to be taken away by the ANC 
and given to blacks. That's why we need leadership that can reassure 
them that the ANC is a party for them as well"
At the 1996 ANC Congress in the area, delegates attempted to analyse the reasons for 
the lack of support from the 'coloured' electorate. It was argued that while the N.P were 
allowed locally, to define the issues around which the local government campaign was 
to be fought, the ANC, nationally, remained defensive, unable to switch the debate to 
local issues and control. Moreover, the ANC did not forget that the Western Cape had
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once been a 'coloured labour preference area1 . This ignored the social ills, including 
gang violence, unemployment and lack of housing, and assumed, falsely, that because 
apartheid had been applied differentially, so should the solutions (Rossouw,1996). The 
outgoing provincial leader Nissen attempted in his final address to set the tone for 
action
'Gone are the days when we talk about so-called 'coloureds'. They are 
not superior to anyone or inferior, they have a culture to be proud of. 
The ANC needs to recognise this and give them its full support. The 
ANC must play a role in bringing communities together."
In the post-apartheid South Africa, the SAMWU workers of Cape Town found 
themselves in the midst of a complex political battle being played out between the ANC 
and the National Party - firstly on account of being 'coloureds1 , but secondly as public 
sector workers. In 1995-7, the long-term survival of the National Party in the Western 
Cape, was largely dependent on the one-time party of apartheid appealing to the 
racism of the 'coloured 1 people. The fear that the ANC would reverse the privileged 
position and make them suffer, appeared to have ensured a vote for the N.P, who were 
seen as the party that would preserve their advantage.
A further reason for the distrust of the ANC, on the part of the 'coloured' community, 
emanated from the economic crisis in the province's public sector. Such a crisis 
increasingly came to be associated with government national policies, and the view that 
the ANC was intent on financially starving a province it didn't control. Whether the ANC 
would be ultimately blamed, when the rumoured retrenchments took place, was not 
clear. However, the local papers were already predicting one certainty - the newly 
established local authority of Cape City of Cape Town (CCC) could expect to see many 
more marches and demonstrations, as the militant branch of SAMWU became 
increasingly more fearful for their livelihoods (Financial Mail, 1995d).
Nevertheless, although it seemed unlikely that the National party would be able to 
successfully exploit any protests or demonstrations in the area - by using 'coloured' 
fears to engender inter-racial tensions - it was still not inconceivable given the 
desperate competition for jobs and houses in the area. For SAMWU members and 
leaders, who had fought during the 1980s and early 90s for a more equal society, the 
scenario was disturbing. Some members interviewed (1997), believed the solution lay
in workers continuing to struggle collectively, against such racism. One Regional full- 
timer explained that such a consciousness could only come from the workers 
themselves.
I believe I share the majority ideas of the leadership and membership of 
SAMWU on this. That the working class can only liberate themselves by 
using their own power and strength... the membership have got to make 
the connections ..we've got to build again the traditions of the struggle 
amongst the South African working class.
The next section considers these views within the context of SAMWLTs changing work 
environment the Cape City of Cape Town (CCC). It details the overall structure of local 
authority in the region and summarises the organisation, structure and changing 
Human Resource Management style in the 'new1 council.
Cape Town was to have a new council - one more fitting with the ideology and politics 
of the democratic 'new' South Africa. A more professional management style was 
envisaged within a transparent open systems model. In 1997, all councils within the 
new Cape Metropolitan Council - including the City of Cape Town (CCC) - were 
expected to formulate a 3-5 year comprehensive strategic management framework, 
aimed at meeting the needs of a wide range of stakeholders. Of particular interest to 
SAMWU members was the plan's reference to a partnership with its employees and 
their organisations, as part of the council's new *human resources development 
programme 1 (CCC : 'Review of the 100 days Programme1 May 1997).
Yet, ironically such developmental planning was taking place against the background of 
the Government's new neo-liberal economic policy, GEAR. This emphasised the need 
to reduce public spending by diminishing the role of the state in the productive sector of 
the economy, as well as provision of basic services (COSATU Information Digest, 
1997). The government had proceeded to reinforce this message by urging local
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governments to employ sound financial budgeting and ways of achieving equity in a 
responsible way so they did not incur unnecessary debt. In Cape Town this meant 
(since 1996) reducing its staff by 15%. The reduction, supposedly achieved through a 
process of natural attrition, had made substantial savings for the council, and as the 
Chair of the Executive Committee proudly declared, ^for the first time in many, many 
years, the salaries and wages as a proportion of the budget has dropped' (CCC: Cape 
Town Mid-term review 1998).
In the post-apartheid period, 67% of all public sector workers were employed in the 
public service - teachers, health workers, prison personnel, police and workers 
employed in the defence force and intelligence agencies. State owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) accounted for approximately 15.4%; and local authorities - which included city 
town councils, municipalities, local health committees, regional water corporations and 
development and services boards, employed approximately 12.5% of public sector 
workers; with the balance of the workforce being in universities and technikons (3.1%) 
agricultural marketing boards (less than 0.1%) and parastatals (1.3%) (CSS:PO251, 
March 1995; Standing, 1996; Alder 1998)
The Cape Municipal Council (CMC)
The Cape Municipal Council (CMC) established in 1995 remained in essence the 
successor in law to the former Western Cape Regional services Council (WRSC), 
(which in turn had been the successor to three Divisional Councils of Cape, 
Stellenbosch and Paarl). The WRSC had played a developmental role for the former 
marginal communities, but as a services provider it had been severely restricted. 
Initially, the role of the CMC remained largely unaltered to that of the WRSC, and it was 
not until 1996 that it emerged as a proper metropolitan services provider - with bulk 
water supply, transport, metropolitan planning and new functions of tourism promotion 
being part of its brief (South Africa 1996 Municipal Year Book).
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Figure 11.1: THE 'NEW LOCALGOVERNMENT SPHERE. 1996
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District Council (consists of members elected 
by Local Councils, Representative Council 
Rural councils
Metropolitan Councils
Local Council Rural Councils
(No. of members
determined by
MEC
Elected in accord-
with system of
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Source: Adapted from Constitution of RSA. 1996 System of Government (Act 108.1996)
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Although, the CMC - along with the rest of local government now had its own 
autonomy, it was constrained both by the national policies of the ANC (who controlled 
the National Assembly and Government), and the local policies of the National Party 
(who governed the Western Cape provincial and executive council). In particular, the 
constitution had given the provinces wide powers over local authorities many of which 
impinged on traditional municipal functions, including the abattoirs, health, housing, 
markets and ponds, public transport, regional planning, road traffic, roads and urban 
development. Since the Western Cape had emerged as a power base for the National 
Party it was unlikely to neglect these responsibilities (South Africa 1996 Municipal Year 
Book).
Yet, joint administration in the area was now shared with other Metropolitan Local 
Councils: Cape City of Cape Town (CCC), Oostenberg Municipal, City of Tygerberg, 
Helderberg, Blaauberg, S. Peninsula Municipal (see figure 11.3). In the process of 
rationalisation of local government in Cape Metropolitan area there had been a 
redistribution of powers and functions between the Cape Metropolitan Council and the 
other six metropolitan local councils, based on economic viability and political ability - 
the old apartheid Divisional Councils and Regional Services Council had at last been 
removed (Interview, ANC Councillor, Aug, 1997; South Africa Official year Book, 1996).
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Other, smaller councils in the CMC in 1995 included: the Transitional Local Councils 
(TEC) and the District and Rural areas. They included the following areas:-
Albertininaia (Trans Local Council)
Ashton (TLC)
Atlantis - Cape Metropolitan Council Blaauwberg Municipality
Aurora - TLC
Barrydale - TLC
Beaufort West-TLC
Belhar - C.M Council, City of Tygerberg
Bellville Estate -TLC
Bitterfontein/Nuwerus - TLC
Blaubergstrand - CMC. Blaauwberg Munc
Bonievale - TLC
Bot River - TLC
Brakenfell - CMC, Oostenberg Municipality
Breckasdorp - TLC
Brenton - TLC
Galedon - TLC
Brede River
Klein Karoo
Cverberg Sentrale Karvo
S. Cape W. Coast
Winelands
27 of these
The SAMWU branch of Cape town was now situated in x new' Cape City of Cape Town 
(CCC) (at Bergersentrain 2 Hertzog Boulevard, Cape Town) which had a status of a 
Metropolitan Local Council and was the largest of the seven local authority bodies (the 
CMC and 6 other Metropolitan Councils). The old Cape Town City Council (C.C.C) had 
been absorbed into the new metre council, and was virtually kept intact. The CCC 
covered most of the old Cape Town City Council, Ikapa, Pinelands, Crossroads, and 
the Cape Rural areas.
For most of the 1995-6 period the overall structure remained largely the same as the 
1992-4, it was not until the first part of 1997 that the council finally managed to set up
231
and develop a macro organisation. Six departments were to exist: the Department of 
Housing, Corporate Services, Community services, Engineering, Urban and 
Environment, and Finance (see Fig. 11.2)
Housing Corp. 
Services
Community 
Services
Eng- 
ineering
Urban 
Envir
Finance
Under each department, clusters were created - for example housing services, had a 
cluster for development and maintenance, urbanisation and housing administration - 
the overall aim was to create a flatter more decentralised structure that would be less 
bureaucratic and more accessible to the general public (see table 11.5 below).
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THE MACRO-ORGANISATION 1996
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South Africa Official Municipal year Book, 1996.
A further objective of these new developments was to restructure departments into 
business units. Legally, the councils were to be more accountable with local authorities 
requiring to producing more strategic business plans as a means of justifying spending 
to the government and local people (White Paper on Local Government in South Africa 
- Discussion Document, 1997). As one newly elected ANC local councillor explained, 
all councils would have to commit themselves to developing a strategic management 
plan. The Redistribution and Development projects would dictate the budgets - but the 
local authority would still have to account for its spending and performance annually .
There is government legislation around an integrated development plan 
.. all local authorities must do that now. They must develop a business 
plan, community action agenda, and explain how it will affect the whole 
area within the municipality. This will become the strategic management 
plan for the principality. This is a legislative requirement and this will be 
the conscience of the local authority and it will also determine the 
budgets. It won't be that people develop the budget and then look for 
the projects, the projects and the problems will determine the budget, 
and it will also determine the priorities..... performances will be looked at 
every year ...the local authority will need to report back to the 
communities to check whether they are keeping to the plan of the RDP.
The 'New1 Management
Central to such a process was the requirement to establish a strong innovative 
leadership, not just amongst the new ANC councillors but more importantly amongst 
the existing managers. The municipal administration, was to be headed by a chief 
executive officer (C.E.O) who was to assist in overseeing the whole process. The 
C.E.O would be the accounting officer of the municipality as well as the legal link 
between the local political structure (council) and the administration. He would be 
responsible for co-ordinating and supervising the six Executive Directors who managed 
each of the six departments, respectively (CCC 'Review of 100 days Programme', 
1997).
Despite, what appeared to be a fairly traditional bureaucratic line of command, the aim 
was to design a more decentralised system of control. Although staff would ultimately 
be answerable to individual Executive Directors via their line managers, it was hoped 
that the clusters - in each of the departments - would allow the employees a certain 
amount of autonomy and control (CCC: Review 100 days Programme, 1997).
Yet, such changes were fraught with difficulties. The high profile given to the public 
sector by the ANC in post-apartheid South Africa, meant that Cape Town required an 
adequate management structure designed to ensure accountability to all its 
stakeholders. However there were questions about how effective this was in practice. 
One Cape Town resident and SAMWU member remained unconvinced about the 
business level autonomy,
The structure has been reorganised, its like a pyramid with the top 
flattened which means there will be more top management, mostly white 
managers. They are arguing there is not 'value for money1 , that there is 
inefficiency of administration and processing of work - we just see it as a 
complete 'shack-up'
Even the ANC councillor (interviewed 1997)- who was highly supportive of the new 
organisation, acknowledged the system did involve changes that might be problematic 
for staffing.
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we've built the organisation from out of the ground, and its got a lot of 
pitfalls because we're offering new conditions of service... you need to 
create stability, with a new labour force, you need to make sure that you 
are not adversely affecting the unions, or they will take industrial action 
...but you also need to ensure that you have a very good service in 
place., and not antagonise your rate payers.
The effectiveness of the 'new1 managerial structures was open to question. Although 
there was a desperate need for management to change, the lack of leadership and 
experience of the new political-administrative model made it difficult for most managers 
to be effective. Moreover, the absence of policies to remove or replace white senior 
managers, meant most of the top management came from the same personnel that 
had previously administered the old apartheid system; which no doubt contributed to 
the inability of local government to achieve any real change in its political and racial 
personnel or policies. Therefore, despite the initial optimism displayed by the new 
ANC councillor, he remained despondent over the failure of the administration to 
change in line with the political developments....
but you know I have been sitting for a year in this council, and I tell you 
it's the most frustrating exercise I've had in my life because you have 
legitimised a structure that has still got the same old order in place. 
Politically it's changed but the administration is basically the same. My 
observation is that it creates major problems because there is not a true 
commitment to deliver the products. So the end product is not what the 
politicians say it will be.... when the delivery comes it has a negative 
impact on the people at large.
Human Resource Management
Perhaps one of the most perplexing tasks for the new management was the 
reorganisation of human resources. The transfer of employees between different levels 
of the public sector and the re-organisation of labour within the council was flawed from 
the start (Ryan, 1994). It was not until July 1997 that negotiations around staff and 
budgets were eventually put into place - part of the problem surrounded the complexity 
of the terms and conditions of the various staff who had to be physically moved and 
integrated. As the ANC counsellor outlined
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You must understand there are different salaries, different structures, all 
those need to be rationalised, we can't fund them all.
Furthermore, despite attempts to create a decentralised and broad based system - 
built around clusters or teams - the Council like most municipal administrations 
remained horizontally divided with a range of job levels - sometimes up to twenty or 
more levels - complicating the overall process. Such large numbers made the process 
of job evaluation, grading, and initiation of pay systems extremely time consuming 
(White Paper on Local Government: Discussion Paper, 1997).
The major obstacle was one of resourcing, especially as there was a reluctance on the 
part of local or provincial government to take financial responsibility for the staffing of 
many of the major utilities in the area. One SAMWU worker, explained the problems 
associated with the reorganisation.....
The ambulance service, which the City Council operated is very much in 
the balance because no one wants to take responsibility... the province 
doesn't want to take responsibility and the local authority doesn't want 
it.. The other area that is of major concern is the fire department .....the 
whole fire department in the metro is very fragmented every municipality 
has its own fire department. We are now 6 municipalities each with their 
own service and staff....its crazy.
The police service experienced similar problems, there appeared to be numerous 
police personnel inherited from different areas - but very little co-ordinated direction 
from the local councils. An ANC councillor highlighted...
What you find is that we have a lot of law enforcers who do work in 
various areas,.... but there is no connection between the police and the 
local authority. We have a lot of problems with Shebeens (unregulated 
South African drinking dens), but the staff inherited from the City of 
Cape Town, from CMC Simons Town, and Fishoek tackle the problem
in very different ways
Change and consistency
Yet, such difficulties were to be overcome by creating a new and innovative type of 
Human Resource manager. Developmental local government was said to require 
managers with additional skills and different attitudes. This would mean actively 
training managers to take positive steps to remedy the inequalities and injustices of the 
past. Managers would now be required to implement and drive through re-organisation 
programmes - they were to instigate affirmative action programmes, re-evaluate all 
standards, attitudes and practices in recruitment, training, development, qualifications 
and promotions. Overall, there was to be an effort to transform the management of 
human resources in local government by taking measures to equip all staff managers 
for their new role. This role was to be governed by the democratic values and 
principles contained in the Constitution, specifically the equality clause in the Bill of 
Rights (McLennan, 1997; White Paper on Local Government: Discussion Document, 
1997).
In actual fact, such radical changes - at least in South African terms - were slow to 
permeate the ranks of managers, not only in Cape Town but in all local authorities. The 
problem remained that, although a number of the councillors had changed, most of the 
managers had not. They continued to perceive their role as one of controlling the 
workforce. As one SAMWU member explained..
Just before the 1994 elections there was quite a nice atmosphere in the 
council. The white managers were very friendly..but now we find the old 
racism coming to the fore ... ..they don't want to consult with you they 
just want to control you.
Unfortunately, many officials had been trained for the old style of local government - for 
service provision, control and regulation - and remained rigidly committed to such a 
system (McLennan, 1997). A major weakness lay with the vast majority of top 
management positions still being occupied by the same white males (Abrahams and 
Adair, 1997), and the re-establishment of a degree of NP stability and influence.
In reality though it must have been difficult for these managers to conceive of their role 
as being anything different to that of traditional control. Strategic Plans from the council
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may have declared a process of planned communication and consultation (Review of 
100 day Programme - 7.2.5,1997) but local government was equally committed 
towards 'developing a performance review process aimed at measuring results 
achieved, and tcorrection of unsatisfactory performance1 (Review of 100 day 
Programme -7.2.4,1997). Moreover, the governments intention to introduce a tight 
fiscal spending policy in the public sector - including working 'with local authorities and 
government parastatals to find new ways of organising projects to give the private 
sector a role in the different stages of planning, implementation, financing and 
management1- all seem to indicate an need on the part of the management to exercise 
greater, not less control over the behaviours and costs of labour (CCC/Review of 100 
days Programme1 May 1997).
In essence, developments in Human Resource managerial practices and training in 
1995-7, were taking place within the context of an uneven process of institutional 
reform at the national, regional and local levels - driven sectorially or through the 
various levels of government. Support systems for management were fragmented, with 
financial, administrative, personnel, salary payments, planning information and 
performance appraisal often incompatible. On the whole, managers - usually white - 
remained generally distrustful of black workers and unions, and uncomfortable with the 
'new1 consultation, and mediation and facilitation processes, which they perceived as 
foreign to the public sector environment (McLennan, 1997; Abrahams and Adair, 1997).
The new Cape Town Council had expressed a desire in its strategic Plan (1997) to 
move away from its traditional regulatory role to that of a developmental one. The shift 
included expanding the existing services and infrastructure and building strong 
partnerships with all stakeholders in the local government arena, especially employees. 
Yet, despite such a commitment, the truth was the current council's employee relations 
policies had little to do with developing human resources and addressing questions of 
consultation and participation - but more with controlling the spiralling costs of labour.
In the post-apartheid local government, municipalities were actively being encouraged 
by central government to pursue a variety of alternative partnership arrangements with 
the private sector, including management contracts, concessions, leases and 
privatisation . Cape Town Council was extremely pro-active in this area, involving itself 
in Public-private partnership projects (PPPs) and launching a private company - the 
Cape Town Community Housing Company (Pty) Ltd - to help introduce innovative plans
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in housing (CCC Mid-term Report - The Executive Committee - view from the 
Chairperson, 1998). Although, these initiatives were said to be aimed at improving 
service delivery and quality of life, many of the projects and contracts were equally 
useful in regulating and reducing the burden of costs - particularly those of labour - in 
local government (McLennan, 1997; White Paper on Local Government: Discussion 
Document, 1997).
More to the point, the fact that the government now expected the new post-apartheid 
managers - whatever their colour - to secure efficient and cost-effective delivery of 
municipal services, provided an additional incentive to curtail not only the costs of 
labour, but also it's activities and power (McLennan, 1997; Abrahams and Adair, 1997). 
In the Cape Town Council, the increased economic and organizational strength of 
SAMWU, with its highly publicised commitment to fight all types of privatisation, had 
almost certainly brought it to the notice of those managers anxious to control the power 
of labour in the council.
The ability of SAMWU workers to overcome the controls of management and resist 
government policies of privatisation depended not only on the organisation and 
leadership of the union, but the members' ability to recognise and utilise their collective 
strength. This entailed making the connections between the economic events in the 
workplace and those in their wider political and social environment.
The precise nature of a worker's class consciousness, encapsulates the concepts of 
productive forces and relations - which include labour, capital and their inter-relationship 
with all institutional forms (Clements, 1977). Therefore, to truly understand the 
development of such consciousness is in many ways beyond the scope of this theses, 
and entails reflecting on all elements of the municipal worker's life - within a historical 
framework. Nevertheless, in the absence of being able to deliberate fully on the totality 
of all factors in the Municipal worker's life, part one of this section of the case study has 
attempted to consider briefly the social, economic, political and workplace influences on 
the SAMWU worker. The aim being to secure a perception of the levels of class 
consciousness amongst this group in the immediate post-apartheid period.
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The province within which the SAMWU worker lived may have offered an affluent 
lifestyle for whites, but many 'coloured 1 workers continued to receive only scant 
rewards for long hours of labour. The material circumstances of most SAMWU workers 
meant that the majority experienced an inferior standard of living, with many struggling 
to adequately feed and house their families. Yet, such hardships do not necessarily 
lead to a coherent working-class ideology (Clements, 1977). In the case of the 
'coloured1 worker, intemalization and institutionalization of racism in the area continued 
to be an effective deterrent to united class action in the province.
More especially, the political aspirations of the 'coloured' community in the Western 
Cape were confusing - with the possible assumption that the one-time party of 
apartheid had been able to secure the support of many SAMWU members. If such an 
hegemony - on the part of the N.P - did exist, it emanated from the 'coloured' worker's 
fear of losing their meagre advantage in the labour market. This anxiety was made all 
the more real by the ANC's intention to pursue free market policies in the public sector; 
a major source of 'coloured' employment in the area. Whether, this racism would be 
used in the Cape Town Council to render any radical elements of the workforce 
impotent, was largely dependent on the strength of their - shifting and uncertain - 
ideology. Nevertheless, although the 'coloured' worker was said to be conservative, 
SAMWU workers had managed to expand their frames of reference in terms of class 
action in previous historical periods, and there was no reason why they should not do 
so again.
A development of a radical consciousness would also - almost certainly - be linked to 
the nature of the trade union organisation. Trade unions, however radical their origins, 
are constrained by their very role within capitalism, but this does not preclude the 
potential for working-class radicalism from developing within their ranks (Boggs, 1975). 
Class-consciousness can - as Marx theorised - be encouraged by trade union activity 
and struggle. The relationship is not a mechanical one, but rather a dialectical process 
in which consciousness becomes realised in the practice of struggle (praxis) (Clements, 
1977). Consequently, municipal workers in the process of wresting control from 
management in the council - as they struggle to fight privatisation - may well yet find a 
stronger class-consciousness developing, as their frames of references and activities 
expand.
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Chapters 12 and 13 proceeds to consider the further development of this 
consciousness within the organisation and activities of SAMWU.
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The National Executive Committee (NEC) had recognised as early as 1995 that their 
power to resist privatisation - and ensure the future survival and growth of the union 
would be effected by an efficient organisation and structure. By 1997, the character 
and identity of the union, and its membership were becoming more discernible. The 
tenets that supported the criteria of inclusion and exclusion, the power and control of 
leadership and rank-and -file members, and the lines of demarcation between the head 
office, regions and large branches (such as Cape Town), were all gradually becoming 
clearer.
The following section examines the changing internal organisation, the growth and 
change in membership, and changes in the structure and democracy of the union. A 
review of the national structure - including the services being supplied to the 
membership is included, highlighting the continuing tensions between the national, 
regional and branch levels. The aim is to show the further development of the internal 
structure of the organisation, whilst acknowledging that the union's overall growth and 
structural evolution had never really been planned or co-ordinated. In fact the 
development of the union throughout the whole 1992-97 period, was only truly 
discemable when viewed from a historical perspective, reaching back to its origins as a 
'coloured 1 union in Cape Town.
The size of the national union and the growth in its membership all carried the imprint of 
the historical development of unionism in South Africa. A constant struggle to recruit
members and become established in the face of often brutal and relentless obstacles, 
characterised the union's growth. The principles that underlay its recruitment 
strategies, continued as in 1992 to be based on open access - all municipal workers 
irrespective of race, class, sex or occupation were welcome to join the union. Such a 
principle helped explain why the union enjoyed a position of numerical and 
organizational strength in the local government sector in 1997.
1987 Launch
1989 Congress
1991 Congress
1995 Congress
1997 Congress
SAMWU was now COSATLTs sixth largest union organising all workers in the 
municipal sector. Yet, such dramatic growth should not be viewed as unique, all public 
sector membership had increased in the 1990s. In 1995, slightly over 50% belonged to 
a trade union - with public sector workers accounting for 19% of COSATUs 
membership. By 1997 - whereas other sectors, such as manufacturing and services 
were stagnating - the public sector figure had increased to 27% (before the Institute for 
Public Servants (ISP) affiliated). Overall, the membership had increased from 223 669 
in 1994 to 484 371 in 1997 (COSATU 6th National Congress Report, 1997d).
Sector
Public sector
Manufacturing
Service sector
Primary industry
Total
Membership by 
sector- 1994
223669
519203
224344
336057
1303273
% of membership 
by sector - 1994
17%
40%
17%
26%
Membership by 
sector - 1997
484371
604232
303750
371 202
1 763 555
% of membership by 
sector
27%
35%
17%
21%
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There were several reasons for the rapid unionisation of the public sector. The 
recognition of public service unions in the early 1990s obviously played a part. So too 
did the increased insecurity felt by public servants (black, and white) during the 
democratic transition period (Mokgalo, 1995). Yet, interestingly, despite overall growth, 
SAMWLTs membership, since 1995 had remained fairly constant, and had not mirrored 
the dramatic growth found elsewhere in the public sector. Although, direct reference to 
this fact was not openly acknowledged - and only alluded to in union documents - the 
General Secretary of the union admitted in 1997 that the figures remained fairly static.
It was hoped that the end of apartheid might bring an increase in the number of white- 
members. But the preferential treatment given to white and higher category employees 
by local government employers (and their staff associations) meant that large numbers 
of employees within the sector remained unorganised. In 1997, the racial and class 
character of the SAMWU remained largely the same. As in 1992, the union continued 
to organise predominately black or - in the case of Cape Town -'coloured' workers, 
concentrated largely in unskilled and semi-skilled, blue collar jobs (SAMWU Congress 
Report: Organisational Issues, 1997b).
Furthermore, there was even concern that the membership might decline, partly 
because many previously 'tame1 staff associations were recreating themselves as 
liberal unions and attempting to recruit SAMWLTs members - but also because the 
government had indicated its commitment to reduce the public sector jobs. The 
immediate solution to the stagnation in membership appeared to lie in establishing a 
national Public sector industrial union with NEHAWU, IPS, SAPSA, POPCRU, 
SADTU, and SAMWU.
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Union
IPS
NEHAWU
POPCRU
SADTU
SAMWU
SAPSA
Sector
organised
Institute for
Public Servants
Ed. Health &
Welfare
Police & Prison
(admitted 1995)
Teaching
Municipal
workers
Public servants
1994
_
63335
_
59427
100000
-
1997
13055
162530
49999
146000
116524
14318
% change since
1994
n/a
   155%
n/a
+146%
+16%
n/a
Although, growth has been most evident in NEHAWU and SADTU, and to a lesser 
extent SAMWU it was still felt by COSATU that all unions would benefit from the 
merger. Yet, plans to establish a single public sector union failed to materialise - and 
by 1997 - seemed unlikely to happen for some considerable period. The reasons were 
complicated, with in the short term, the prospect of amalgamation not solving 
SAMWU's problems of stagnating membership, but simply adding a further complexity 
to the issue. Although the merger decision flowed logically from the pattern of 
SAMWU's existing membership - with other public sector unions being industrially and 
occupationally complementary - the internal policies of (and perhaps even politics) of 
the unions failed to concur. Consequently, the much publicised merger between 
NEHAWU and SAMWU eventually broke down over demarcation issues, sizes of the 
branches and constitutional issues related to the structures, financial statements and 
budgets (Mokgalo, 1995; COSATU 6th National Congress Report: Activities Report, 
1997d).
Whilst both unions still agreed on the need to amalgamate in the long term, both had 
resolved by 1997 to postpone the process indefinitely, while at the same time 
attempting to enter into unity talks with other unions operating in their sectors.
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Consequently in terms of membership, and the external image, SAMWU was seen as 
the union that continued to organised mainly black and 'coloured1 , male and female, 
unskilled or semi-skilled blue collar municipal workers (COSATU 6th National Congress 
Report: Activities Report. 1997d).
By 1995 the broader changes within the wider environment in the country was also 
forcing a transformation of the Cape Town branch. A number of members had already 
been lost to other branches following the reorganisation of local government in the area 
- but the union had still managed to maintain its membership. Overall levels of 
unionisation in C.C.C were outlined by one SAMWU organiser...
The sector is well-organised between ourselves and the other union 
IMATU. I think the last time you were here it was called SAAME, they 
subsequently merged with another independent union. So the unions 
organise upwards in excess of 90%
The branch's membership was almost 10,000 members by 1997, yet its scope for 
growth was limited as the council was already well organised with over 90% of council 
employees now in a union of some kind. As was the norm throughout the country 
many old, predominantly white staff associations was reconstituting themselves as 
liberal unions - SAAME was no exception, it had recreated itself as the Independent 
Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU) and now organised approximately 4,000 
members (Dennis Arendise, Interview, Aug. 1997).
Cape Town - like the national union - had obviously looked to other groups to organise 
and as a consequence had managed to recruit a few white members - but scope for 
such expansion was limited, with the differentiation in wage levels cited as the main 
reason for not joining. One steward expressed the concern that if white workers were 
joining it was solely as a means of restoring their previous status - and the extent to 
which such members would adopt a militant proletarian orientation remained doubtful. 
Therefore, in 1997 the branch remained a predominantly 'coloured' unions with limited 
scope for growth (Dennis Arendise, Aug.lnterview 1997).
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These factors meant that even in the post-apartheid era of 1995 -97, the branch 
membership remained unique - yet this uniqueness brought with it dangers. With the 
membership being concentrated in such a clearly defined race group (overwhelmingly 
coloured), there was a risk of parochialism developing, which might serve to engender 
the exclusivity and sectional privilege, SAMWU had historically fought so hard to 
eradicate (SAMWU Congress Report 1997). More importantly, such a small restricted 
membership would be incapable of meeting the generalised threat posed by free 
market government policies. One member highlighted the problems....
The private contractors are everywhere. We should all be in one union. 
Many whites are thinking of joining the union but I don't think they will.... 
many 'coloureds' are frightened of affirmative action and are not linking 
up with the blacks - most of these (blacks) are under-privileged but they 
are the more qualified, they ('coloureds') are afraid that they'll get all the 
jobs.
Peter September, Interview, Sept. 1997.
Such sectionalism in trade unions can have divisive influence on the organisation, 
stifling the development of a radical perspective and permitting management to 
implement lay-offs and wage restrictions. In addition, sectional claims are more readily 
contained then generalised claims, because they tend not to challenge the institutional 
form in which such demands develop (Clements, 1977). Consequently, whereas the 
branch, with its dominant 'coloured' membership might - on its own - be able to 
achieve a modest local pay rise, it was unlikely, without the solidarity of other black 
workers to be able to stop the long-term, more universal threat of state privatisation 
and job losses
In the post-apartheid period of 1995-7 SAMWU nationally had become a powerful trade 
union, yet concern was expressed in 1996 that the union was stagnating and failing to 
take advantage of the expansion in public sector union membership. Despite efforts to 
locate further potential areas of recruitment - which included attempts to merge with 
other public sector unions, and recruit white members - SAMWU, nationally, remained 
a predominately black, municipal workers union. This tendency towards sectionalism 
was even more ingrained in Cape Town which continued to retain an image of a 
'coloured1 municipal union, organising principally in the CCC.
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The branch's ability to cope with changes in state policy was not solely dependent on 
the size and type of membership, but was also closely linked to the internal structure of 
the union as a whole. Achieving the correct internal organisation, control and levels of 
democracy within the union was important, especially if it was to be used to assist in 
mobilising disciplined collective action on the part of the members. The engendering of 
such a group consciousness can then result in members subordinating their own 
immediate interests to those of the more powerful common collective (Clarke and 
Clements, 1977). In the case of SAMWU, it was argued a more effective internal 
organisation might encourage a stronger collective identity, and render the union better 
able to mount a successful challenge to government's free market policies. Figure 12.1 
shows the new union structure in 1997.
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The leadership took this view in 1994, when a National Organising Forum had been 
launched to write a new constitution for the union. The main aim was to improve the 
organisation and democracy of the union, which would not only facilitate greater 
recruitment and service its existing membership more efficiently, but also engender a 
strong collective awareness which could be employed to fight its two chief campaigns - 
securing a Miving wage1 and stopping privatisation (SAMWU Congress: Organisational 
Report, 1997a).
However, the Forum discovered a number of weaknesses, many of which, in common 
with the 1992-4 period, centred around the internal structure and control of the union. 
They were identified as increased levels of administration and bureaucracy; the 
problems of servicing its expanding membership adequately; and the broadening of 
divisions and accountability between the national, regional and branch levels (SAMWU 
Congress: Organisational Report, 1997a).
In essence, the leadership found the widening of gaps and uneven control and 
resources within different levels of the union, most worrying. The union's strategy of 
workplace control and increased participation in centralised collective bargaining at the 
national and sectoral level had achieved substantial gains and strengthened the self- 
confidence of leadership. However, by 1997 there was serious concern over the 
relationship between the branch, region and head office. These changes particularly 
affected the Cape Town branch ((SAMWU Congress: Organisational Report, 1997a).
During the post-apartheid period the national structure and organisation of the union 
became increasingly important - especially as it was now clearly differentiated from the 
Cape Town branch and origins. Any re-organisation at the national level was still sure 
to have a fundamental impact on the Cape Town branch.
Since the 1996 Policy Conference in Bloemfontein the impression had been created 
that the membership was on the decline and the national structures were in need of 
attention. The leadership had sought to deal with this problem by considering whether
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the union's overall national structures and services had been unresponsive to the 
needs of the membership. Chiefly, it questioned whether the union - under the old 
constitution - was still capable of meeting the challenges now confronting it (SAMWU 
Congress Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a) The next part of this section considers 
the changing leadership and support structures and services at a national level
12.4.1 Leadership
As a result of these concerns discussion focussed on the role of the national 
leadership. The changing union appeared to be creating a centralised bureaucracy 
with an entrenched leadership. There were fears that, left unchecked, the union would 
adopt a rigid bureaucratic form of organisation at the expense of worker autonomy and 
* self-government' (SAMWU Congress Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
In 1995 the union leadership consisted of 5 national office bearers based at Head 
Office - they included the General Secretary, Assistant General Secretary, National 
Treasurer, President and Vice President. Both Roger Ronnie (General Secretary) and 
Jimmy Mohajane (Assistant General Secretary) had been elected unopposed. In 1996 
the position of Assistant General Secretary became vacant when Jimmy Mohajane left 
to take up employment with the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council - as an 
Affirmative Action Officer. The departure of an eminent full-time officer was a loss to 
the union, but was not untypical of a general tendency, common amongst COSATU 
affiliated trade unions (Catchpowle et a/., 1998; SAMWU Congress Report: 
Organisational Issues, 1997a).
The de-racialisation of society meant more and more experienced full-time black trade 
unionist were now taking advantage of new employment opportunities in other fields. 
The dire effects of this * brain-drain' on the trade unions generally highlighted the 
tendency for power to be concentrated into the hands of a few, many of whom had 
managed to make themselves invaluable to the organisation. SAMWU^s unopposed 
leadership elections and the void created by the loss of its Assistant General 
Secretary, meant the union - although fired by the political doctrine of socialism - was 
not totally immune from the drift towards entrenched bureaucratic authority on the part 
of the leadership (Buhlangu, 1999).
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The post of the Assistant General Secretary was eventually filled by Comrade Nontsele 
(acting), from Port Elizabeth - but this immediately created problems for the 
organisation and served to underscore the over-centralisation of personnel and 
resources. The Secretariat now had two centres of operation both in Cape Town and 
Port Elizabeth, the problem was compounded by the fact that the Port Elizabeth Office 
had no support staff, and the Assistant General Secretary was left to cope almost 
single-handed. The issue raised further questions about control being concentrated in 
the Western Cape, and led to calls for greater decentralisation in the union and a shift 
away from Cape Town as the main focus (SAMWU Congress Report: Organisational 
Issues, 1997a).
Further evidence of increased bureaucracy and centralised control was also apparent 
in the leadership's claims to be overburdened by the sheer volume of the work 
(Interviews 1997). Although similar complaints were also expressed in 1993 (Interviews 
1993), many of the tasks being undertaken by the Secretariat in the post-apartheid 
period was of a more administrative nature - which was reported as restricting their 
ability to engage in political debate or develop policies (Interviews, 1997 : SAMWU 
Report on Organisational Issues, 1997a). The Gauteng Regional Secretary believed 
this frustrated the leadership as both the General Secretary and the Assistant were 
committed to the principle of worker control and saw the importance of engaging in 
struggle.
Unfortunately, the problem that we have is that many of our secretaries 
in their day-to-day work are more like administrators then people who 
can sit down, debate, do research and develop policy papers for 
discussion - which then can be policy for the union. I think that is the 
weakness that we have in SAMWU. I don't think that Roger enjoys 
being the General Secretary of SAMWU... I don't think the other 
Secretary enjoys it. They are more involved in administration, they never 
have time to concentrate on developing policy . There is never the time. 
...... still we are fortunate that we have comrades that are committed to
the rank and file struggles and day-to-day service.
The analysis was extremely problematic for SAMWU. Although the full-time officials 
constituted a distinct stratum of union leadership, whose job it was to ensure proper co- 
ordination and efficient administration, in South Africa theirs had always been an 
overtly political role. Not only had this role been associated with leading the struggles
against management, but also included expounding the opposition to the apartheid 
system. In the process, it was widely acknowledged that the leadership should be 
personally accountable to the rank-and-file membership, and their activities conducted 
within the principles of democracy and accountability (Baskin, 1991).
Yet, in 1997 the increasing complexities of the new issues confronting SAMWU 
appeared to be putting a strain on the leadership. In particular, the determined attempt 
on the part of government to incorporate trade union leaders - via the LRA (1995) - into 
the state structure, was forcing those interviewed in 1997 to question the new objective 
of the SAMWU leadership. One full-time official who was re-evaluating his role in the 
new South Africa, explained...
Our role has changed with the local government transition.... but can we 
honestly say we still represent the members on the ground?
What the point illustrated was that general aspects of the leadership's work had 
changed. Union work was no longer simply about membership recruitment, political 
education and negotiating. Inclusion in the formal institutions of South African industrial 
relations, now required basic research skills, preparation of detailed proposals, use of 
computers, and reading of company and government information. Such activities 
brought risks as well as opportunities - in particular the potential development of a 
highly skilled and sophisticated official needed to be tempered by the discipline of 
worker control and clear mandating, especially if the union was to avoid even greater 
divisions between the leadership and their members (Buhlungu, 1999).
Immediate solutions
The leadership were aware of the dangers of increased bureaucracy and concentration 
of power. Consequently - as result of the work of the 1994 Forum - SAMWU adopted a 
new constitution in 1997. The document replaced the National Executive by a Central 
Executive Committee (CEC). This was a new body whose aim was to reduce the 
bureaucracy of the leadership's meetings and activities and provide a platform for more 
open and vigorous debates. The National Co-ordinating Committees which originally 
co-ordinated much of this work was disbanded in an attempt to reduce administration. 
The work was to be now carried out by the National Office Bearers (NOBs) who were to
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continue meeting on a regular basis, but take time to visit the regions and branches 
(SAMWU Congress Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
In order to reduce the administrative burden on the leadership further it was decided to 
re-introduce the post of an Administrative Secretary - a position that had previously 
been approved but never filled. In addition, to prevent the concentration of power into 
the hands of a few, the role of Assistant General Secretary was to be shared. 
Consequently, the new Constitution made provision for six and not five (as was 
previously the case) National Office Bearers (NOBs), two of whom were to now be 
called first and second vice-presidents (SAMWU Congress Report: Organisational 
Issues, 1997a; SAMWU Workers News, 1997g)
It was questionable whether this new constitution could stem the drift towards fixed 
bureaucratic control and authority. - especially as such changes appeared to increase, 
not lessen the number of leaders at the national level. Nevertheless the full-time 
officers and some shop stewards expressed confidence in the constitution's ability to 
tackle this problem and supported - as part of this process - the leadership's attempts 
to review the union's national support structures and services (SAMWU Congress, 
Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
From 1995-1997 a question mark also hung over the union's actual internal capacity to 
deliver many of its highly publicised initiatives. There was a fear that lack of resources 
and inefficient support structures from the centre may be leading to membership 
dissatisfaction and decline. This point was made by a former Cape Town shop 
steward, who felt the union had to change if it was to continue meeting the needs of its 
members - however, he saw its capacity to do so, being seriously hampered by a lack 
of resources and services.
a real adjustment must happen....because of the capacity and the 
resources that they have they find it very difficult to interact with the 
workers in the way they used to. I think that the trade union situation is 
changing very rapidly
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At the 1997 SAMWU congress, the issue of adequate services for members was 
discussed. The debate centred on the need for the national union to respond more 
efficiently to membership demands, with the 'services' described by a number of 
delegates as an essential backbone to the union - one that retained members.
In fairness to the leadership, a review of the services available to members, even 
before the national congress, had already been taking place at the national level (Roger 
Ronnie -Interview, 20/8/97). Several areas were identified as needing attention. They 
included: the staffing of the union; the organisation of the national finances, the 
education of members and stewards, publicity and communication, and the general 
benefits for members.
Although, full-time staff (this includes general secretaries, regional secretaries, 
organisers - plus the support staff such as clerks administrations, researchers and legal 
officers etc.) had continued to grow throughout this period, the national union was still 
said to be under-resourced and not really meeting the needs of the members.
Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
Total staff
10
17
38
54
76
81
103
107
129
131
Total members
23638
29529
59014
67178
69156
73342
100410
110032
113056
120109
Staff as a % of Members
0.04%
0.06
006%
0.08%
0.11
0.11
0.10%
0.10
0.11
0.11
Ratio of staff :members
1:2364
1:1734
1:1553
1:1244
1:910
1:905
1:975(1994 onwards is uneven)
1:1028
1:876
1:917
This perception was not an illusion, in reality the complement of staff had not really 
increased as a percentage of the membership for several years: in 1997 it remained, as
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in 1992 at 0.11 % . Some of the posts were proving extremely difficult to fill with 
remuneration being identified as the key factor. It was therefore little wonder that staff 
morale and working conditions had been identified as an area of discontent (SAMWU 
Congress Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
The leadership also identified a definite distinction between those full-timers who were 
associated with - what was described as - Year trade union work, and those designated 
as administrative or support roles.
Designation:
General Regional & Branch 
Secretary.
Administrators
Organisers
Specialist Posts(including 
Education Officers)
Maintenance/Security
Total
18
41
46
17
6
A review of the staff complement revealed that the bulk of women were employed in 
administrative positions. Consequently, it was suggested that a quota system be 
adopted with adequate monitoring mechanisms set up to ensure the employment of a 
greater number of women as organisers. The move was associated with the fact that 
the work of administration was now to be viewed as equally important as the work of 
trade union organisers. It was recommended that the administrative staff - the majority 
of whom were women - should be integrated into broader trade union work and be 
treated on an equal footing with organisers (SAMWU Congress Report: Organisation 
Issues Report, 1997a; SAMWU Worker News, 1997f).
The lack of administration skills throughout the union offices was identified as a further 
problem - the fact that it could sometimes take a day to locate a document was 
identified as an area of great concern. Here the Secretariat proposed that all 
responsibilities relating to the internal administration now be delegated to a newly 
designed administrator post. The administrator would have the responsibility for all 
internal administrative issues including functioning of the office and responsibility over
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all administrative staff. This post was to be duplicated in the Regional offices. The 
administrative problems especially highlighted the need to upgrade the skill of the 
existing staff. Training and the use of the COSATUs national training centre, DITSELA 
was recommended (SAMWU Congress Report:: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
The Union also reviewed the employment practices overall - a task that had not be 
carried out since the launching of the Union in 1987. There was a recommendation to 
move towards a more flexible approach to appointments in an effort to attract skilled 
labour. The process included proposals for skills development and a re-grading of staff 
to allow them to specialise in various fields. In conclusion the leadership recognised 
that they needed to equip their officers and employees better to meet the new 
challenges. It was suggested that sufficient funds be set aside for such purpose and the 
education department take a more proactive role (Congress Report: Organisation 
Issues, 1997a).
The finances of the union also came under closer scrutiny during this period. The union 
had changed considerably since 1992, when most of the work had been devolved 
down to the individual branches and carried out by the local full-time organisers and 
branch secretaries. During the apartheid era the main pre-occupation had been raising 
money from overseas organisations to help build the union and the fight against 
apartheid. The nature of their activities - which usually encompassed some form of 
industrial action - meant it was not uncommon for local branches to exhaust their funds, 
making the accumulation of sufficient monies to support long-term strategies, 
impossible (SAMWU Congress Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
Now with the end of apartheid and luxury of increased membership and subscriptions 
financial solvency had become an organizational objective. Consequently, there was an 
inexorable trend towards centralisation of financial control, which extended to central 
co-ordination and policy. The area of responsibility now covered such aspects as the 
preparation of financial statements, staff issues, disbursements to regions, managing 
equipment and office leases and the settlement of accounts. Although, the department 
now had a permanent staff complement of three - inclusive of the Departmental Head - 
the work was still described as arduous, but increasingly important. (SAMWU Congress 
Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
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However, there was always the probability - as with any expanding trade union - that 
the pursuit of financial solvency and strength would become a fixation, an end in itself. 
Consequently, in an attempt to co-ordinate, yet disseminate some of its power, the 
department under the guidance of the national treasurer, held workshops in the regions. 
The aim was two-fold - to develop financial expertise within the regions and also ensure 
compatible systems were being used throughout the union. The task was crucial 
because despite the centralisation of its finances, the national union still relied heavily 
on information received from the regions. Unfortunately the lack of co-ordination meant 
the information - even after the workshops - were still not forthcoming (SAMWU 
Congress Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a). Whether, the regions were incapable 
of administering these systems or simply wanted to retain some of its control, is open to 
speculation.
Education was a further area of concern. Education was pivotal in the development of 
the union and with the expansion of employment rights - courtesy of the LRA - its 
function was set to increase. The department in 1997 was headed by the National 
Education Officer and now had a staff of four - including an administrator and Media 
Officer. This department had been seen by the leadership as responding to many of the 
challenges effecting the union. The fact that the Union has been able to mount effective 
responses on a number of fronts - such as the establishment of a national bargaining 
council, staffing proposals and local government restructuring, and co-ordinating the 
training of Shop stewards around the LRA - was seen as evidence of this (SAMWU 
Congress Report: Secretariats Report, 1997c).
But, despite such praise, problems were noted with regard - once again - to the 
centralised nature of the department and its inability to service the regions. It was 
suggested by the leadership that much greater thought was needed to develop a more 
structured link between education and the overall organising strategy of the union. The 
solution was to decentralise some of the work and resources of this department to the 
regions, so they would have the capacity to deliver their own training more efficiently 
(SAMWU Congress: Organisational Report, SAMWU 1997a).
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12.5.4 Media Unit
One area the leadership did express satisfaction with was the new Media Unit. 
Increased publicity and communication was seen as one of the greatest 
accomplishments during 1996,. The setting up of a media unit - one of the long term 
objective of the union - was finally achieved. The union had initially received donor 
funding to establish the department, and following the appointment of a new Media 
Officer two initiatives were implemented, the union magazine and the SAMWU website. 
Not only were these projects designed to keep the members better informed, but more 
importantly were to become a focus for the unions' anti-privatisation work, providing 
them with both national and international recognition in this area (SAMWU Congress 
Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
12.5.5 Servicing Department
Ultimately though, it was the servicing department which caused most concern. During 
this period, it was reorganised and sub-divided into three units: the Legal Unit, 
Membership Unit, Health, Safety and Environment Unit and the Collective Bargaining 
Unit. Each unit has a co-ordinator who was responsible for researching, co-ordinating, 
planning and implementing agreed programmes. The overall co-ordinator, both 
administratively and politically of this department, was initially the Assistant General 
Secretary (soon to be renamed Vice President), but in May 1997 after the appointment 
of an administrative co-ordinator, only the political side remained with the Assistant 
General Secretary. In 1997 there were three unit co-ordinators and two administrators, 
but the post for collective bargaining unit proved difficult to fill (SAMWU Congress 
Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
Changes were instigated within all the units. But co-ordination between the national 
and regional co-ordination levels remained problematic. The legal Unit had been 
reported as failing to play a proactive role in integrating legal matters in the 
organisational activities of the union. The leadership had previously suggested in 1995, 
that the unit should develop a framework to integrate the work at regional and national 
level. But by September 1997 the system was still not working properly. The unit was 
allowing itself to be drawn into local disputes and problems without really having an 
intimate understanding of the issues involved (SAMWU Congress Report: 
Organisational Issues, 1997a).
The Collective Bargaining Unit presented a further problem. In 1995, the main 
campaign unit was challenging the employers to comply with he provisions of the LRA 
in respect of the disclosure of information by employers. Progress overall, was slow - 
partly because a vacancy existed to co-ordinate this department, but mainly because 
the employers despite the provisions of the LRA, remained reluctant to provide 
information to the unions.
With regard to the membership unit, SAMWU had been participating in a pilot project 
with COSATU since 1994. The original intention of the project, was to provide a generic 
Membership Tracking System common to all COSATU affiliates. However, the scheme 
was eventually abandoned leaving SAMWU as the only participant. Consequently, the 
entire membership system was re-located from the COSATU Head Office in 
Johannesburg to the SAMWU Head Office. But, although this included a Computer 
Programmer (a post secured through donor funding from Germany), the union still had 
difficulties securing reliable data, from its regions and branches.
A particularly important campaign was launched during this period - ^the Total 
Workforce Campaign1 - the aim was to monitor the number of SAMWU members in 
relation to the total workforce within Local Government. This was to give some 
indication as to the thresholds of representation per workplace as contained in the 
Labour Relations Act. The priority goal of this campaign was to ensure that SAMWU 
secured the majority membership in all Local Authorities. However once again 
problems were experienced at the regional level, with many failing to provide the 
necessary information (SAMWU Congress Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
Between 1995-7 the union had - in contrast to the 1992-4 period - developed a more 
sophisticated national structure. The embryo of a truly national union was - although 
somewhat haphazardly - beginning to evolve, with clear evidence to support the 
existence of a macro trade union structure, capable of providing services and support to 
its members throughout South Africa. Yet, although the national union was developing 
- and attempts were actively being made to distance it from the purely sectoral interests 
of the 'coloured' community in Cape Town - the national leadership was still 
experiencing problems. As, the union expanded in strength and status, difficulties 
continued to emerge around issues of increased centralisation, professionalization of
leadership functions - and the inability of national services and functions to meet the 
local needs of its members. As in 1992, the lack of communication and co-ordination 
between the national, regional and branch levels remained problematic. The next 
section considers the changing regions and their tensions with the centre.
By 1997, the role and function of the regions were identified as in need of urgent 
intervention on the part of the national union. Since 1992, the power of the regions had 
been uneven, with those located within industrialised areas being stronger than those in 
the semi-rural areas. Moreover, large branches like Cape Town remained better 
resourced than most regions. There were now to be nine regions each with full 
constitutional status - they were to reflect the geographical changes in the country and 
roughly correspond to the nine provinces (Victor Mhlonga - Gauteng Regional 
Secretary, Interview Sept, 1997).
Although the national leadership believed the regions had responded well to the 
programmes of action, especially the anti-privatisation and living wage campaigns, it 
remained dissatisfied with the levels of accountability to the leadership. The SAMWU 
Secretariat Report 1997c reported that x (we are)  at the mercy of regions as they 
decide what suits them to report and what not to report1 .
All areas had experienced some problems and in the case of two regions - KwaZulu- 
Natal and Eastern Cape - some form of investigation into their activities were 
necessary. The national leadership claimed that the intervention had been purely as a 
result of their failure to properly discharge their duties - although it was unfortunate that 
these actions had been viewed as some sort of witch-hunt against certain individuals 
(SAMWU Congress Report, Organisational Issues, 1997a).
The main problem was one of co-ordination of systems between the national and 
regional levels. There was mainly a concern over the activities of the regions especially 
with their reluctance - or even ability - to use the same systems as the Head Office. The 
membership and financial units were experiencing particular problems over obtaining 
information from Regions - many of whom had been charged with the responsibility of 
obtaining information about members from the employers. Although such information
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was difficult to obtain - mainly because the employers lacked reliable information about 
their own black employees - inefficiency and reluctance to be accountable to head 
office appeared to be frustrating the problem.
It was hoped that the reorganisation of the central administration would be capable of 
changing the face of regional offices, especially as the system was to be duplicated in 
the Provinces. The administrative staff at the regional offices, would now compose of 
an office administrator, financial administrator, receptionist and loans/benefits 
administrator. However, problems still prevailed and the centre continued to report 
that many regions were failing to co-operate enough to make the activity a success 
(SAMWU Congress Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
Part of the problem was clearly linked to resources, in particular, the regions 
experienced problems in attracting and retaining suitably skilled persons. 
Remuneration was a key factor - especially as educated black workers could now find 
work in the more highly paid government or private sector. As one union official 
explained
In the past people worked for 'the struggle' now they want a profession 
It was indeed true that the end of apartheid meant that many black activists were now 
free to consider a 'career1 rather than a life as an overworked, poorly paid union official. 
For the first time ever full-time officials were calling for a level of permanence and 
security in their work. This needed to be accompanied by high wages and fringe 
benefits if it was to continue attracting the best cadre from the black working classes - a 
demand the regions were ill-resourced to provide (Interview, Regional Secretary, 
2/9/97).
It was also equally true that a number of regions - and even branches - were better 
resourced then others. Some regions were able to employ more staff - with the Western 
Cape enjoying the highest number. Yet, this was not necessarily linked to higher levels 
of efficiency. Gauteng with the lowest ratio of staff to members (1:1,742) was reported 
as being amongst the most responsive to efforts to achieve national co-ordination and 
policy. Geographical location was obviously a further consideration, with isolated 
regions like Northern Province experiencing a number of communication problems.
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Region:
Northern Province
Mpumalanga
North West
Northern Cape
Free State
Eastern Cape
Head Office
Kwa Zulu-Natal
Gauteng
W.Cape
Total staff
5
5
5
7
7
11
16
18
22
27
Total Members
2732
5398
5231
3908
9861
10968
18110
38334
25567
Ratio of staff to 
members
546
1,080
1,046
558
1,409
997
1,006
1,742
947
Poor communications meant that in isolated regions, members reported inferior 
servicing - with their Regional Office Bearers (ROB^s) remaining completely unknown to 
large numbers of members. Some regions were undoubtedly failing to operate as a 
collective and were disintegrating into blocks. This meant they were incapable of taking 
advantage of the benefits of economies of scale, and failed to fully utilise the existing 
limited resources. Overall all regions were reported as having internal problems that 
required attention (SAMWU National Congress Report: Organisational Issues, 1997a).
In an attempt to address some of these issues, almost all regional offices were given 
more resources which included basic office equipment, with at least one computer. It 
was hoped this would help the regions monitor and measure their own performance. 
Yet, there still remained a need for regions to be made to comply with existing 
constitutional requirements, especially those relating to the submission of minutes of 
Regional Executive Council (REC) meetings, to the General Secretary. Failure to 
adhere to such requirements was to meet with some form of sanction - perhaps even 
disciplinary steps against the responsible Regional Office Bearers (RGBs) (SAMWU 
Congress Report: Organisation Issues, 1997a).
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In general, there appeared a requirement on the part of regions to become much more 
responsive to the changing union structure and democracy. It was clear that the 
expansion of the union, coupled with the geographical re-organisation of the country 
with its emphasis on provinces, was having an effect on the regions. But so too was 
the gradual centralisation of the union and pressure from the leadership to achieve 
higher levels of administrative efficiency. The result was their modes of operation, 
governance and lines of communication needed to undergo a rapid change - but in both 
cases the regions were either incapable or reluctant to conform to such changes.
Yet, these issues needed to be addressed if the union was to function effectively - it 
was highly essential to the growth and stability of the union. If the union was going to 
be able to defeat state policies of privatisation there needed to be a strong feeling of 
common identity, not just at the centre but at all levels. Failure to win over the support 
of the regions may well impede any future action taken by the union. Therefore, the 
task for the union leadership with - regard to the regions - was to achieve the goal of 
efficient organization, whilst ensuring an adequate spread of control and power was 
operating at all levels. Unfortunately such problems were not solely confined to the 
regions, the role of the constituent branch - of which Cape Town was a typical example 
- was also in need of attention.
During this period the Cape Town branch of SAMWU, experienced many changes. 
Some were linked to the changing role of the branch within the national union - but still 
others were concerned with the increasing bureaucratisation of its' shop-stewards - the 
transformation of their skills and duties - and their changing relationship with the rank- 
and-file membership.
In 1997, the SAMWU leadership recognised a need to change the role and function of 
the branches within the national structure. In the earlier constitution branches had been 
practically the same as regions - with city branches like Cape Town being larger than 
most regions. For historical reasons the Cape Town branch had 'grown up' as an 
integral part of the union, it had often dominated the structures and policies of the local 
region and union as a whole. The new constitution was designed to redress this
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imbalance - with the Head Office being especially keen to liberate itself from its 
parochial image of a 'coloured' Cape Town union, the effects of which it feared was 
threatening national recruitment (SAMWU Congress Report:: Organisational Issues, 
1997a; SAMWU Workers News, Sept.1997g).
Yet, the branches - not just in Cape Town, but throughout the union - had always 
played a central role in the development of SAMWU. The branch had traditionally been 
the formal link between the ordinary members and their union, it had generated and 
nurtured the rank-and-file democratic movement that had helped defeat the apartheid 
system. It was the power of this group that had continued to resist the pressures of 
bureaucratic rationality and collaboration - and it would be the rank-and-file movement, 
that would be capable of initiating and carrying through strike action against 
privatisation. (Hinton, 1973; Murray, 1994).
The leadership recognised this fact, and whilst wishing to change the internal structure 
of the union, wanted still to preserve the valuable function of the branch. As a 
consequence, the new constitution set up more branches in many new areas - 
especially the rural areas. There was no longer to be a minimum membership 
requirement - simply a condition that the branch was close enough for members to 
travel to and meet easily (SAMWU Congress Report Organisational Report, 1997a; 
SAMWU Worker's News June,1997g)
This was also to be an attempt to improve the status of rural areas. Where there were 
too many small branches, more smaller Area Councils - whose job had always been to 
co-ordinate the work of rural branches - would be created to funnel representation from 
smaller groups. The overall aim was build on the strength of the branch to Yeach out1 
and recruit from what was considered the neglected rural areas. More importantly, the 
democratic functions of the union was to be embellished, with meetings being made 
more accessible, with more debate and discussion being encouraged at a lower level 
(SAMWU Congress Report Organisational Report, 1997a; SAMWU Worker's News 
June,1997g)
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Closely aligned to the democratic role of the branch in SAMWU was the shop stewards' 
movement. Pityana and Orkin, 1992 claimed there were over twenty-five thousand 
shop-stewards in COSATU at the beginning of the nineties, despite their numbers 
having fallen since the election. The involvement of shop-stewards in issues beyond the 
workplace had always marked the South African steward as distinctive from his or her 
European counterpart. The movement was also distinguishable from the rest of Africa, 
in that its struggle against colonial rule involved the mobilisation of grass roots working 
class movement with a distinct class politics. South African shop stewards were 
characterised by their power and position, rooted in the workplace and dependent on 
the continuing support of their members - for many rank-and-file members, especially in 
the rural areas, their first and only contact with the union was the shop steward (Pityana 
and Orkin, 1992; Baskin , 1996).
Increasing bureaucrat! sat ion
As with most shop stewards in South Africa, those in the Cape Town branch still 
appeared to hold a commitment to worker control and accountability (Interviews, 1997; 
SAMWU Congress Report, 1997). The role of the steward was essential to this process 
- but in common with many other unions was changing. The tradition of worker control 
had been created precisely to diminish the power of full-time officials and prevent them 
from dominating COSATU structures, but whether this culture would endure, depended 
on the changes taking place during the period of transformation (Baskin, 1991).
In 1995-7, the democratic accountability of the stewards in the branch appeared to be 
holding. Cape Town was described by one ex- steward as being more directly 
democratic then most other unions - especially the other employee organisation in the 
council - IMATU. There continued to be a tradition of stewards being mandated from 
the branch and a belief that the union should be controlled by the rank and file 
membership.
Yes we still have the process of holding meetings which the other union 
(IMATU) does not... they only circulate people with memos. We have a 
constitution, meetings where shop stewards have to report back to their 
constituencies - they have mandated positions. We have our regional 
executives our branch executives, all those accountability meetings. Our
focus is our organisation should be run by workers and is worker 
controlled
Yet, despite the evidence of democratic control and procedures, there was still a 
danger- even in Cape Town - of bureaucrats44 dominating the branch. Shop-steward 
organisations are capable of displaying considerable levels of bureaucratisation, 
especially as management will often permit one or more chief stewards to act as full- 
time union representatives. As a consequence, the shop stewards are subject to the 
same institutional pressures - in microcosm - as affects national union officers. 
Moreover, as there is rarely competition for stewards positions, most are elected 
unopposed and can begin to enjoy an entrenched position of power which in turn can 
develop into a highly-bureaucratic shop stewards' organisation (Hyman and Fryer, 
1975).
Because of the history and size of the Cape Town branch a number of stewards had 
consistently been full-time officials, either paid by the employer or the union itself. The 
Council had for a many years given shop stewards time-off facilities. Most of these 
stewards obviously came from the ranks of the active membership. It was often 
common practice for aspiring unionists to volunteer their services free of charge and 
then, when a vacancy appeared (with the endorsement of the branch), move into paid 
employment. Yet, there was a concern on the part of one retired member, that such a 
tendency would intensify in the post-apartheid period and would be accompanied by 
greater levels of bureaucracy and formalisation.
Now the stewards have moved into a much higher level... it's more 
professional than it used to be..I mean most of these shop stewards are 
daily in meetings It never used to be like this.
44 In this case, the bureaucrat is defined as a full-time official, often separated in life-style from those 
they represent. As trade union organizations grow, the leadership and authority of bureaucrats 
becomes increasingly centralised , enabling them to initiate actions not approved of by the majority of 
members. Equally, Michels (1962) commented on the conservative tendencies of bureaucratic 
organisations: administrations that tended to become ends in themselves rather than means to achieve 
the known ends of the membership
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Yet, this did not mean that stewards could be entirely complacent in their new positions. 
In 1997, the branch had experienced problems with time-off arrangements, with the 
council claiming that all stewards should henceforth apply on a month-to month basis 
for time-off facilities. The union threatened to withdraw from all negotiations and called 
on its members to demonstrate on the night of the celebrations, for the bid for the 
Olympics in Cape Town. The council finally backed down and reinstated their rights for 
time-off facilities.
'We said we would withdraw from negotiations in the council..they can't 
operate without us...we also threatened to march on Friday, on eve of 
the Olympics bid. They immediately phoned the top people and met with 
us at 4 p.m that day. They gave us time-off rights on the same basis 
until we can agree proper time-off agreements
Crucially, what the whole episode did serve to show was the stewards time-off facilities 
was not simply a product of management's goodwill. Moreover, the stewards', 
confidence that their members would support them in their fight to retain such facilities, 
indicated an active level of association with their members in the workplace.
However, the leadership nationally continued to express concern over the number of 
full-time posts being created, and in 1997, there was a general question over whether 
office bearers at all levels needed to be full-time. There was a suggestion that there 
should be a cut-off point, with only the chairperson and treasurer of all branches and 
regions being considered for full time shop stewards status (SAMWU Congress Report 
:Organisational Issues, 1997a).
Changing role of the branch shopsteward
In the post-apartheid era the role of the branch shopsteward appeared to be changing. 
Many branch stewards had been politicised by their involvement in the liberation 
struggle in a white dominated economy. Unlike their counterparts elsewhere, they had 
political roles imposed on them by the specific historical circumstances in South Africa. 
Because of their strong shop-floor base and their active community involvement, shop- 
stewards were the most organised cadres of the liberation movement (Piryana and 
Orkin, 1992). Yet, it was equally true that the increasing formalisation of the industrial 
relations system in the 1995-7 period was putting strains on their role.
With the advent of a new legislation, conciliation rather than conflict appeared to be 
what the new black government and trade union leadership wanted. Thus the position 
facing many shop stewards at the branch level was highly strained. The role model 
now being "handed down ' by their federation COSATU was a new type of workplace 
representative, more sophisticated, highly trained and equipped to cope with 
negotiating new management practices whilst meeting the needs of a potentially 
changing workforce (Catchpowle etal, 1998).
Whether this sophistication and training had reached down to the level of the branches, 
was open to debate. In contrast to full-time officials, shop stewards in SAMWU spent 
most of their time on the shopfloor with the result that they had very little time to devote 
their attention to union business and administration. In addition, most of them had 
neither the specialist skills, knowledge nor public profile to match the full-time union 
official. Training and education was obviously desperately needed - especially around 
the 1995 Labour Relations Act - but as one organiser stressed the lack of funding 
meant the whole exercise was inadequate.
We've gone through and emphasised just how important the LRA 
is...we get outside speakers...but the follow-up is difficult..funding is a 
problem...we need to empower people on a regular basis
The actual organisation of training courses was also problematic for the Cape Town 
branch. Although all stewards had a right to time-off under the LRA, it was the cost 
of travel to the workshops that was particularly restrictive - especially for stewards 
from the rural areas, covered by the branch45 . The lack of transport made organising 
one-day workshops during the week too expensive, far better to organise a more 
cost-effective weekend workshops, where the taxi's (mini-buses used as the main 
mode of transport in Africa) could be hired and the cost of travel shared and halved. 
The full-time organiser (Dennis) explained....
the problem we have encountered with training is money. The time-off is 
not a problem, but we still need money for transport, especially with 
people travelling from the rural areas. As I say, loss of pay is not a 
problem because we negotiate time-off for people but really we have to 
take a weekend, a Saturday or Sunday ....if we take it in the working
45 C.C.C - new structure left the old CCC virtually in tact and continued to cover some rural areas
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five day period, it has to be done for one day on a continuous basis, and 
that makes travel expensive.
Despite the time-off arrangements the work remained arduous, mainly because the 
stewards were traditionally active in both their branch in Cape Town, and the union 
generally - one SAMWU organiser reported being over-burdened and possibly having 
to resign in a few years time because of the pressure of work.
Tm full time now, paid by the union, 10 years now with SAMWU I used 
to work for council for 16 and half years To be quite honest I gave 
myself another 7 years in the trade union movement....it is the strain of 
being full-time
What had become abundantly clear, was many of the branch stewards were becoming 
overwhelmed by the sheer variety of issues they had to address in the 'New1 South 
Africa. Whereas, the previous trade union education had concentrated on socialism and 
the struggle for black power, there was now a shift to a need for more basic skills 
training with a legalistic underpinning. In actual fact, the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 
provided for a statutory right to be consulted on a whole range of issues, and there was 
a general union concern over whether most stewards could cope (Catchpowle et a/., 
1998). Of even greater distress to the branch was the realisation that the stewards 
inability to manage was possibly having an adverse affect on the branch's relationship 
with its membership (Cape Town, steward - Arthur Fillies Interview, 1 6/9/97).
For many members, the local shop steward is the union. By definition the steward is 
chosen by his or her fellow-workers because s/he is trusted and perceived to be the 
best person to represent their interests in negotiation with management (Hyman & 
Fryer, 1975). However, concerns expressed by stewards and members interviewed in 
1997, seemed to indicate a level of dissatisfaction with the service the membership 
were receiving from their representatives. Lack of communication appeared to be the 
main factor that was affecting the branch, especially as council officials were known to 
deliberately misreport information, one steward explained......
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It is a worrying factor... we must just inform our members of every 
development because there are so many rumours of packages..there is 
a lot of mis-information to workers and deliberate confusion, especially 
from the council officials., they Ye trying to make our people despondent. 
In some incidents they tell the members .... 'no your steward has made 
the deal, no your steward has made certain agreements' ....they lie there 
is no agreement....
Some members complained that the union was no longer defending their interests. 
Whereas, the employers were seen as being ready to employ aggressive tactics in 
order to control and reduce the number of workers, the branch was described as 
becoming weak and neglecting the membership....
During apartheid when the country was N.P controlled, the union was 
very strong, they cared very much for us and defended us, but now they 
don't defend us . People are being disciplined and they do nothing. 
They just get sacked.... this is the way they reduce the labour.
The issue was particularly crucial in Cape Town, where the union, IMATU (previously, a 
'whites only' staff Association -SAAME) had reconstituted itself as an 'open1 union, and 
was attempting to poach existing SAMWU workers, with offers of a better service and 
representation. One full-time Organiser, explained how the Cape Town branch was 
finding this extremely difficult...
To us it is a problem. It is power-playing with other unions now in a local 
government. Specifically with IMATU - that used to be SAAME - they 
used to only recruit members from certain categories but since they 
have been 'open1 , they recruit people from the labour category. They 
offer financial benefits and loans....
SAMWU 12/8/97
This problem did not appear to be solely confined to Cape Town - throughout the labour 
movement, trade unions were being compelled by their membership to deliver more 
and better individual services and benefits - with financial services being seen as 
essential. Whether, this represented a shift towards a more business style of unionism 
in South Africa, seemed unlikely - especially given the complex issues surrounding the
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provision of such benefits. In general, because of the lack of welfare support provided 
by the state to black workers, the members had always relied heavily on the financial 
support provided by the union, and had traditionally seen it as part of its role. The 
General Secretary Roger Ronnie supported this point...
Research has shown that some of the workers focus on financial 
aspects, benefits, loans, any fringe benefits. The perception of the 
members is that unions should look after them in terms of benefits.
In 1996, as part of its drive to attract members the branches were instructed to publicize 
this role. By mid-1997 Cape Town was able to provide a number of benefits for their 
members, chief amongst these was the national loan scheme, now initiated through an 
agreement with the South African bank, Unibank. Other benefits included the funeral 
scheme and the National Provident Fund - which was seen as filling a large gap in the 
retirement needs of members. Benefits, such as the credit unions, medical benefits and 
short term Insurance were also being considered for the future (SAMWU Congress 
Report, 1997a).
Nonetheless, as in 1992-4, such schemes were not without their problems, they 
continued to be fraught with difficulties, due to the lack of administration and experience 
within the branches to manage such ventures and deals with commercial bodies. 
Further problems focused on the lack of centralised co-ordination and the poor 
monitoring of the accounting systems, payment of claims and limiting of fraud cases. 
But perhaps the greatest dilemma concerned the ethics of SAMWLTs involvement in 
the management of commercial ventures (SAMWU Congress Report, Organisational 
Issues, 1997a).
At the 1997 Congress, despite a recognition of the need to provide benefits, some of 
the delegates expressed unease at the direction in which the union was progressing. 
Generally they believed there was a potential for a conflict of interests, between the 
union's stated vision of socialism and the active promotion of schemes - which in the 
case of some financial loan companies used - prioritised the opposite. Although 
acknowledging the point the General Secretary, Roger Ronnie (Interview, 20/8/97), 
saw very little alternative - many of the members were poor and relied on such benefits, 
particularly loans. Moreover, since other unions were actively using these benefits to 
recruit members , SAMWU, whatever its political views, was forced to do likewise
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The hallmark of Black South African unions was their emphasis on strong local 
structures directly accountable to the rank-and-file membership. Such forums had 
become powerful forces for worker organisation and discussion and had helped to bring 
about change in the political and economic complexion of country (Kraak, 1993). The 
SAMWU leadership had recognised the importance of these forums and had - from the 
beginning - made constitutional provision for this tier of democracy, by emphasising the 
right of decision-making at a local level. However, the general growth and legitimisation 
of the union, appeared to be necessitating a need for change in the structure and role 
of the branches. Consequently, the national leadership - although anxious to preserve 
the effectiveness of existing city branches, like Cape Town - had instigated a change in 
the constitution of the union aimed at increasing the number, size and strength of the 
rural branches.
Traditionally, the shop-stewards were an integral part of the branch and local 
democracy. The scope for direct participation and control by the rank-and-file depended 
for a large part on the effectiveness of the shopstewards - their experience of the 
organisation and the structures which they had painstakingly built at a local level placed 
them in a strong position (Kraak, 1993). But, such a history did not prevent the 
leadership from expressing concern over union's increasing levels of bureaucratisation, 
and its' failure to cope with the demands of the new Labour Relations Act (1995).
Closely aligned to this concern was the possible changing needs of the rank-and-file 
membership, and the accusation that the branch and its steward's - in Cape Town at 
least - were failing to fully represent the member's interests. Yet, where it may be true 
that members increasingly expected - in the absence of state support - their unions to 
provide individual services and benefits, this demand was not new and could not 
entirely account for levels of dissatisfaction expressed by members in the branch 
(interviews 1997). Perhaps a more convincing explanation for member's discontent 
and apathy could be found in the increasingly levels of formalisation in South African 
industrial relations, and the development of a more bureaucratic shop-stewards 
organisation in branches like Cape Town. Especially as the expanding workload was 
generating very little competition for steward's positions.
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By 1997, despite tremendous progress, several internal organisational problems 
existed - some linked to the inability to recruit further from an already exhausted 
section of the local government labour market - but others due to a lack of cohesion 
between the Head Office, its regions and branches. Many of the difficulties were clearly 
the result of changes in the local government structure, where local provinces and 
authorities had changed suddenly. Other problems stemmed from the increased 
bureaucracy and formalisation of the South African Industrial Relations system.
Size and membership
SAMWU remained a predominately black, municipal workers union, and as a 
consequence was unlikely to grow in the immediate future. The tendency towards 
sectionalism was even more pronounced in Cape Town, where 'coloured' workers 
were in danger of defining their interests primarily in narrow sectional terms, within the 
council. This issue was in urgent need of attention. Failure to recruit different groups, or 
even build closer alliances with other unions, would mean the branch may succeed in 
obtaining improvements in relation to other groups, but the division and disunity at a 
broader collective level could weaken its power to stop state privatisation of local 
government (Hyman and Fryer, 1975).
Whether such sectionalism could be overcome, was at this stage debatable. If the 
branch could manage - as it had done in the past - to rise above its own sectional 
interests and make the links with the rest of the union and black workers nationally, it 
might be possible to undermine the divisive elements of the existing labour market. As 
a consequence it might then be plausible to continue - even after apartheid - to 
generate a working class consciousness and solidarity, sensitive to the broader 
interests and problems of the class as a whole (Hyman and Fryer, 1975). Such a 
stronghold of unionism isolated from the divisions of the broader labour market may 
well then have the power to frustrate the stated overall plans to privatise the public 
sector.
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Lack of cohesion between national, region and branch levels
Yet, the lack of cohesion between the different levels of the union, had the potential to 
hinder these efforts. The problem was partly a result of the union's increased growth 
and maturity - with its inevitable centralisation and formality threatening to undermine 
local control and democracy. An immediate solution - other than a new constitution and 
more decentralised power, was not really forthcoming, partly as Hyman and 
Fryer(1975) explains, there can be no satisfactory solution to the perennial problem of 
combining participatory democracy with large-scale and efficient trade union 
organisation.
Nevertheless, some solutions needed to be found - especially at the regional level 
where the pressure from the leadership to achieve higher levels of administrative 
proficiency was causing dissent. Many of the problems were associated with their 
changing focus, increased responsibility, and lack of administrative efficiency - with 
most Regional offices simply not equipped to respond fully to the expanding needs of 
members. The delegation of responsibilities was a major problem, with the regional 
secretary being given all responsibilities, including political oversight of the region. At 
the centre of this issue was the demand for more decentralisation and the need to 
ensure that regions were better able to service the branches and deal with problems on 
their own (SAMWU Congress Report, Organisational Issues: 1997a).
The solution to this problem was even more critical at the branch level, where 
accusations of increased bureaucracy, lack of competency and failure to represent 
members' interests, were gaining momentum in Cape Town. With government 
encouragement, the branch and its shopfloor representatives had been incorporated 
into the bargaining structure by the development of formal industrial procedures, 
contained within the LRA (1996). The changes were designed to bring about a more 
direct, yet legitimate participation of local membership in central decision-making. In 
reality, there was a greater possibility that the institutionalisation of the shopsteward's 
system would simply result in the integration of labour into the existing formal structure 
of industrial relations, at the expense of taking action. As a consequence, the branch's 
exclusive focus on the immediate institutions and processes of industrial relations might 
ultimately serve to neglect the wider concerns of its members - especially those centred 
around privatisation and deregulation of local services and labour (Goldthorpe, 1974)
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Therefore, in 1995-7 the size, membership and internal organisation of SAMWU was in 
a state of transformation. It was a transformation that needed careful monitoring, if the 
union was to resist detracting from its prime goal of fighting privatisation, and even 
longer-term goal of struggling for a socialist society. A clear indication of the likelihood 
of SAMWU abandoning these goals was impossible at this stage, especially as the 
relative strength of conservative tendencies and the opposing pressures that govern 
such decisions, tends to vary between unions, and are usually circumstantially 
determined. But, what was equally meaningless was to study - at any stage - 
SAMWLTs internal organisation in isolation of other environmental factors, especially as 
such an approach tends to tear the analysis of the formal organization 1 from its social 
context. In truth, to provide any real understanding of the union's future strategies and 
ideologies, it was essential to examine the totality of its activities and institutions, within 
which its' collective forces interact. It is for that reason that chapter 13 concentrates 
on the external activities of the branch
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In 1997 SAMWU had two stated objectives, to eradicate the low wages and poor 
working conditions of its members, and to prevent public sector privatisation. The 
success of such campaigns rested not only, on the union leaderships ability to develop 
a more effective internal organisation, but also on the types of external activities it 
chose to engage in. As a consequence the utilisation of the 'new' formal industrial 
relations machinery and the continued use of industrial resistance was of interest..
The types of activities that trade unions generally adopt, largely reflects their ambiguous 
position in bourgeois civil society. As an organisation they function to preserve the 
existing system, whilst concurrently providing an arena for struggle and the growth of 
class-consciousness (Boggs, 1975) - in this SAMWU was no exception. It may have 
increased its institutionalisation and incorporation into the new industrial relation system 
by employing tactics of compromise and conciliation, but simultaneously it exhibited 
characteristics of strife and conflict by leading the call for industrial action against 
privatisation. However, the activities which the union would eventually prioritise would 
largely be influenced by the attitudes and experiences of its membership - which in turn 
would be a reflection of the workers' ideology and levels of class consciousness. In the 
case of the municipal workers in Cape Town, the types of action the membership would 
engage in, would be directly linked to their leadership, levels of organisation and the 
extent of collective solidarity.
The next section explores these issues further. It examines the formal conciliatory 
activities of SAMWU, the deregulation and privatisation of local government and Cape 
Town, and finally the conflictual activities employed during this period to improve pay 
and conditions, and resist free market changes. The aim is to consider the 
contradictory role of trade unions in bourgeois civil society, and its part in achieving
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what had transpired as SAM WIT s twin goals of eradicating the apartheid wage gap, 
and fighting privatisation
In the post-apartheid era, the ANC government had assumed a policy of collaboration 
with trade unions leaders, as a means of procuring their voluntary compliance. In 1995 - 
partly as an incentive for further co-operation - the government passed a substantial 
body of legislation supportive of trade unionism, generally. The changes had a 
significant impact on the public sector, where unions like SAMWU found their new 
rights in the workplace broadened extensively their presence in industrial relations.
The aim of the Labour Relations Act (1995) - which became law in 1996 - was to 
stimulate the development of formal trade union structures, with union officialdom 
assuming an increasingly collaborative role with government and employers at a central 
level. The Act legitimised the trade union position in the workplace and provided for 
trade union representatives to enter employer premises for the purposes of recruiting, 
communicating with, and giving support to their members. Employers were encouraged 
- although not ultimately required - to engage in collective bargaining where unions 
were registered, and could demonstrate they were "representative" of the workforce. 
Shop stewards were given a right of representation and subject to 'reasonable 
conditions', time off work with pay in order to fulfil responsibilities and to receive training. 
The number of shop stewards were not to be left to employer discretion but set out in 
accordance to a scale ranging from one representative for a workplace with ten 
employees, to 12 shop stewards for a workplace with one thousand employees - and 
one additional representative for every extra 500 employees, with a maximum of 20 
stewards. The Act further provided for disclosure of information to shop stewards and to 
trade union officials, where the union had majority representation within a workplace 
(IDS, 1997, pp. 42-85.)
The 1995 Labour Relations Act also gave trade union representatives the power to 
trigger the creation of a workplace forum. This body was intended to democratise the 
workplace and to encourage co-operative and participation rather than adversial 
workplace relations, an ambitious proposition in light of the historical legacy of
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apartheid. The forums were an addition rather than an alternative to collective 
bargaining. Where a forum was established an employer had a statutory obligation to 
consult on a wide range of non-wage issues ranging from workplace restructuring, 
through to issues such as work organisation, plant closures, transfer of ownership, 
redundancies, job grading and affirmative actions (IDS, 1997 pp. 6-69).
Such rights obviously increased the extent of SAMWUs formal activities and power, 
whilst providing it with the potential to contribute to the re-design and management of 
work. But, conversely it also raised the question of whether the union's leaders would 
be incorporated into the control structure, and - in the process - used to contain any 
working-class resistance to government's policies, like privatisation. This question is 
explored further within the context of SAMWLTs and Cape Town's involvement in the 
formal industrial relations system. Particular attention is given to its use of NEDLAC 
(tri-partite body for negotiation and consultation between the unions, employers and 
government, at a national level), the local works forums, and collective bargaining 
structures - the main conciliatory platforms available to SAMWU, during this period.
As an affiliate of COSATU, SAMWU now enjoyed representation at the national level 
via NEDLAC. The National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), 
launched on 18/2/95, was a multi-partite body, combining representatives from 
organised business, labour, government and development bodies. NEDLAC contained 
four chambers: Trade and Industry, Development, Public Finance and Monetary Policy, 
and Labour Market. Its purpose was to seek consensus and make agreements on 
broad issues of economic policy (IDS, 1997, p48).
SAMWlf s attitude to this level of representation was unclear. Although, it appeared to 
be cautious about NEDLAC, choosing to view it as a mere extension of the collective 
bargaining process and opposing any process towards institutionalised co- 
determination - it took a decision during the 1996-7 period to become more 
meaningfully involved in its proceedings. Nevertheless, its participation continued to be 
largely erratic, with no official being identified or integrated into the mechanism. The 
lack of clarity of the link between NEDLAC and the union's general bargaining strategy 
was identified as a reason, with SAMWU calling upon COSATU to see it only as terrain
of struggle. Overall, there appeared to be a confusion in SAMWU - and also many of 
the unions - over whether its function was for Year constitutionalisation of labour, or to 
be intended as an advisory forum. The union's main view was that COSATU should not 
take co-responsibility for managing a capitalist economy in crisis (Barchicesi, 1999; 
SAMWU Congress Report: Socio-economic Issues, 1997b)
SAMWU also demonstrated similar misgivings about the local workplace forums. South 
Africa's forums were partially inspired by the German and Swedish experiences. The 
forums attempted to institutionalise a consultative role at the workplace, making 
provision for the representative trade union, whilst remaining alongside a centralised 
bargaining structure (Matthews, 1995a; Wood and Mahabir, 2001). In 1996, there was 
a major shift in SAMWU policy - when the union conceded that most of the bargaining, 
outside of formal pay and conditions, might conceivably take place in the workplace 
forums. Nevertheless, the union continued to express concern over the dangers of 
taking joint responsibility for management decision-making. Further fears centred 
around the threat of co-option of worker leaders and the possibility of deflecting the 
militancy of workers. In the end, SAMWU's, position on workplace forums was that they 
wanted a thorough review of how these bodies could be effectively used with 
management - but in the meantime would not be initiating them in workplaces where 
the union enjoyed the majority membership (SAMWU: Policy Conference, 1996).
Overall, SAMWU appeared to demonstrate a element of caution towards the institutions 
of NEDLAC and the Workers Forums. In particular, the General Secretary expressed a 
lack of confidence in the nature of the reforms and the people involved. With regard to 
NEDU\C, he remained troubled that labour might be forced to accept responsibility for 
a system they did not control. Moreover, such ambivalence was made worse by his 
general mistrust of the government ministers involved
Its quite frightening, the arrogance of some ministers , and how rapidly 
they've swung. Take Vali Wosa who came up through the ranks of the 
UDF, totally familiar with the struggle but now takes a completely 
pragmatic approach to the politics. Its frightening.
In Cape Town too, there appeared to be very little direct evidence of enthusiasm for the 
new partnership initiatives of NEDLAC or the Workers Forums. Stewards interviewed
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saw little possibility of conciliatory relations developing in the council, and continued to 
express contempt for management (interview, 1997) - although one member was 
adamant that the fault lay with the council officials and not the new government.
this game playing is still going on and once again as I say its not the 
politicians, its the council officials in those senior positions that are the 
stumbling blocks
Overall, most lay members interviewed were uncertain about the new changes, 
particularly those concerning the setting up of works forums. One member's reaction 
when asked about the new partnership initiatives - was fairly typical..
Well I suppose so, but I don't really know. The Stewards get the
training and explain it to us.
These views appeared to concur with those held nationally. Throughout the whole of 
the union movement forums were only operational in a small minority of workplaces - 
reaching its height in 1998 with only eight forums adopted. Overall there remained a 
deeply entrenched culture of non-collaboration within the union movement (Wood and 
Mahabir, 2001). In SAMWU, the use of co-determination institutions was minimal and 
tended to reflect the concern that such bodies may serve to erode the union's traditional 
role (Victor, Regional Secretary, interview, 2/9/97).
As a consequence, it was the national and local collective bargaining - incorporated into 
the formal negotiation process - that attracted SAMWU the most. Such activities 
presented the union with some of its greatest opportunities, yet equally posed a number 
of difficulties. The new LRA encouraged collective bargaining in all sections of the 
public sector by transforming the old industrial councils into bargaining councils. With 
the proposed reconstitution of the state, the new LRA was to utilise the bargaining 
council to harmonise and formalise negotiations in all sections. In the public service it
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was through the creation of the Central Bargaining Council (CBC), and in local 
government the National Bargaining Council (NBC).
In September 1997, a national Bargaining Council was concluded at local government 
level. Unions, represented by SAMWU, NEHAWU, POPCRU and IMATU, and 
employers, represented by SALGA (South Africa Local government Association), had 
at last reached an agreement on the constitution for South African Bargaining Council. 
The agreement provided the union with formal legitimacy, and was viewed by SAMWU 
as a tremendous victory, especially since it had been one of its long-standing demands. 
Whereas, the union had previously been forced to struggle for recognition, SAMWU 
now has a right to negotiate at both local and national levels. One union organiser saw 
this as signalling a move towards a much higher level of unionisation.
SAMWU was instrumental in that... as far as the local government is 
concerned we negotiate at all levels; national, local, metropolitan, 
regional, at all levels...with the national bargaining forum we have 
moved into a much higher level, a much more professional level then it 
use to be.
Yet, despite such achievements, the union still reported difficulties, especially as the 
national bargaining council was only concluded in September 1997. The first challenge 
to the members of the bargaining council, would be to agree on standard conditions of 
service for all municipal workers. The main complication lay in deciding a common set 
of proposals which would incorporate workers employed at all levels - national, 
provincial, and local. This task was especially difficult for SAMWU, who had never been 
party to many of previous negotiations which now governed the conditions of service at 
provincial and national level (SAMWU Congress Report: socio-economic Issues, 
1997b).
Collective bargaining was further complicated by the fact that the public sector was in 
the process of being totally reorganised. As a consequence sections remained 
fragmented, with the mergers of the public sector unions lagging behind much of the 
legislation. Already at SAMWU's 1997 national conference, it was reported that there 
was an element of confusion amongst most of the members and officials. One of the 
main problems was the fact that SAMWU continued to organise in other sectors which
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did not form part of the formal local government sector. This prompted a call for 
centralised bargaining arrangements to extend to those sectors currently falling outside 
the jurisdiction of the bargaining council. This was seen as especially crucial for 
members who were now employed by new water boards where services to local 
government were being contracted-out or privatised (SAMWU, Congress, Report: 
Socio-economic Issues, 1997b).
Although the intention was still to merge SAMWU and NEHAWU, and to include 
POPCRU and SADTU, the rapid growth of public sector trade unionism along with 
increased collective bargaining rights had increased the complexity of membership for 
many unions. Consequently, branches were now under pressure to bargain on behalf 
of a considerably more diverse set of members. Possible solutions have been 
suggested by NEHAWU, which included unions being responsible at provincial level for 
organising and transforming all groups, with the responsibility for bargaining being co- 
ordinated through a newly created Provincial Sector Shopstewards Councils (PSSCs). 
Central to this structure would be the establishment of provincial sector branches and 
regions - linked to 'compatible clusters' of industries, which would collapse into broadly 
defined sectors across the economy (Ray and Adair 1998)
The proposed NEHAWU structure remained confusing and far from satisfactory, with 
concern over whether the new system would weaken or strengthen the representation. 
In actual fact, unions with multi-layered constituencies, such as SAMWU and 
NEHAWU, stood to benefit from such demarcations, whilst unions with craft identities - 
like SADTU - were disadvantaged (Ray and Adair, 1998)
Wage bargaining - eradication of the apartheid wage gap
Although, SAMWU had managed to secure a centralised bargaining forum, work still 
remained to be done over job and local government grading. Despite an increase in 
'African' employment figures in local government (CSS: PO251,1994-97), the ethnic, 
gender and racial composition of staff in local government, still indicated a 
considerable need for further affirmative action to redress the imbalances created by 
apartheid. In reality - the previous entrenched divisions within the apartheid labour 
market made it extremely difficult to ensure that the structural deficiencies would be 
corrected without a clearly regulated programme of affirmative action (White Paper on 
Local Government: Discussion Document 1997).
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Linked to the racial inequality in employment was the wage gap between different 
ethnic groups employed in local government. The eradication of the so called Apartheid 
wage-gap1 continued to be the major battle waged by black public sector unions within 
this period. For SAMWU, equalising the pay systems became a top priority, with the 
union concentrating its efforts not only on the wage gap between black and white 
employees - but also between urban and rural areas .
SAMWLTs solution was to devise a long term wage strategy, aimed at eradicating the 
gap between grades and achieving a 'social1 wage. Pay for most manual and clerical 
workers in the public sector was now to be tightly monitored by regulating collective 
bargaining at workplace or industry level - via the newly established bargaining 
councils. The main aim in the post 1994 era was the nation-wide call to bridge the wage 
disparities between mainly black unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and their white 
colleagues further up the pay ladder. SAMWU workers constituted more than 70% of 
the labour force in local authorities, but only made up 30% of the wage bill (SAMWU 
Worker's News, 1997J; SAMWU Congress Report: Socio-economic issues, 1997b).
In 1995, part of the national strategy was to ensure parity across local authorities. In 
small municipalities minimum wage was R550 a month compared with R1500 in 
greater Johannesburg. SAMWU saw the problem as being related to the local 
government national grading system, which determined local authorities economic 
status and funding, and consequently its ability to remunerate workers. SAMWU, 
attempted to utilise the official bargaining machinery at the national level, to push for a 
review of this procedure.
By 1996, significant improvements had been achieved. SAMWU's involvement in 
formal negotiations had assisted in achieving a substantial improvement in the 
minimum wages of municipal workers - a national 'living wage' of R1000 per month was 
established. Yet the struggle for an acceptable wage was far from over, especially as its 
application throughout the country was in no way uniform. In some local authorities the 
minimum wage had not been implemented due to lack of funds, in others - workers 
were receiving well over R1.500. Moreover, the wage differentials in the public sector 
continued to remain substantial, with SAMWU workers expressing a general discontent 
with their overall levels of pay. The source of this displeasure was obvious, especially 
as the average monthly wage of an unskilled - usually black or 'coloured' - general
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assistant was R1.167 (just over £100), while the average senior manager - usually 
white - earned ten times as much (SAMWU Worker's News 1997h; Standing etal 
,1996).
In 1997, the struggle for a 'living wage1 still continued. Some regions failed to achieve 
any substantial increases, for example in the Eastern Cape, management were only 
prepared to offer 2% - which gave workers on the minimum wage a mere R20 (or £2) a 
month increase. The union's demand had always been that workers who did the same 
work should receive the same pay, yet there was clear discrimination between, as well 
as within regions - with those in the rural areas being adversely affected. Nevertheless, 
despite such weaknesses, SAMWU's involvement in the formal bargaining machinery 
continued to achieve a general increase in the minimum wage - which was seen as 
providing a solid base for advancing the campaign to narrow the wage gap and secure 
a 'living wage1 for all municipal workers (SAMWU Worker's News, 1997J).
As with the union nationally - the main formal means of communication between 
management and the unions in Cape Town appeared to be the extension of formal 
collective bargaining - very little mention was made of workplace forums or other 
partnership arrangements with management. However, the need to equip stewards to 
take advantage of the new rights to collective bargaining was voiced as being essential 
(Interview, Dennis Ardense, SAMWU Organiser, 28/8/97).
Training courses known as 'capacity building programme for negotiators' were 
introduced to address issues around conditions of service, wage gaps between grades, 
levels of bargaining, issues to bargain and the newly emerging Agency Shop. 
Moreover, such training appeared to be achieving results, especially as Cape Town 
had managed to negotiate one of the highest minimum wages - the new metro 
minimum was R1850 in 1997. This compared well to many other areas such as 
KwaZulu-Natal - which achieved only R1.195; and even its own provincial (Western 
Cape) minimum - which incorporated many of the rural areas - which was R1257 
(SAMWU Worker's News, 1997J).
Yet, despite these advances, overall concern was still voiced over the 'difficulties' of 
negotiating with management locally. One steward explained that, although there had
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been improvements in relations, they were - on balance - still experiencing many 
problems. Chief amongst these was the council officials supposed' lack of authority to 
make decisions during the negotiating process. One steward replied, when asked 
whether bargaining relations had improved in the council...
No not really., there is movement now... but we still encounter the same 
problems when we deal with officials. They say they do not have a 
mandate to negotiate with us ...yet the policy-makers - the councillors - 
are not attending these meetings. Yet we can only deal with the council 
officials who don't have any mandated positions ..... its a total waste of 
tax-payers money and a loss of man hours...The trade union movement 
have to take a delegation, and the management have to withdraw from 
their duties - you sit in a meeting for 3 hours and achieve absolutely 
nothing.
The stewards also experienced a total disregard on management's part for the 
provisions of the LRA in respect of the disclosure of information by employers. For 
example, the local branch was particularly keen to obtain information about private 
sector involvement in council activities - they believed that private companies were 
being used to carry out some of the activities previously provided by the public sector, 
but were unsure.
The problem is the municipalities are not being honest they will not 
disclose any information about what they are using... you see (we 
believe) the private companies are just taking over the role of the 
existing principalities.... we don't know. From a union perspective we 
are encountering tremendous problems - there are no openers 
SAMWU 
SAMWUs national leadership acknowledged that they would have to take steps to 
correct this situation - both in Cape Town and elsewhere, generally (Denise Ardense, 
SAMWU Organiser, Interview, 21/8/97). A campaign to ensure that employers 
complied with the LRA provisions in respect of the disclosure of information, was 
viewed as crucial to the union, especially if they were to obtain information to fight 
privatisation (SAMWU Congress, Report: Secretariat Report, 1997c).
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Pay and conditions 1995 -1997
In Cape Town - the branch achieved a higher than average minimum wage (R1850) in 
1997 - but it was still struggling to eliminate the apartheid wage gap in its annual pay 
claims. Progress was slow with many black and 'coloured' members continuing to do 
the same work as whites, but receiving less pay. The problem had been made 
especially difficult by the reorganisation of local government in the area, and the 
transfer of workers from different authorities - in particular from the black authorities, 
and the rural workers from the previous Western Cape RSC.
our major problem with the restructuring is comparability. There is 
different pay where people are performing the same function.... certain 
municipalities and certain grades are different, that has caused so many 
problems with members from other local authorities
In most cases the legacy of apartheid meant that black and 'coloured1 employees in 
Cape Town were performing higher skills but failing to be paid at the higher rate. Other 
workers had actually been trained but - because of the existing structure of the council - 
were being prohibited from doing the work. Consequently, the branch was now calling 
for a proper skills audit. Although, the full-time organiser acknowledged the complexities 
of such an exercise, he still continued to reiterate its importance in addressing the 
needs of the low paid.
Our emphasis to the municipality is, why don't you people do a proper 
skills audit? Do a proper assessment, because we find people have got 
certain skills and are not being credited for it.... or people have certain 
trades - gone through the training - but because of the set-up in 
municipalities cannot be made a tradesmen. We know they cannot do it 
overnight - we in the organisation are reasonable - its a phasing out 
period. But lets bring people on, specifically the lower down people, lets
bring them all together
It was amongst the low paid that the inequalities of the apartheid wage gap was most 
evident. Consequently, the branch had concentrated on achieving an 'across the 
board' flat rate pay agreement with the council in order to benefit the low paid, and by 
1997 was able to register some success.
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our focus this year is that - we fight for across the board....The grading 
system that this council is operating is done on a basis of the 
percentage but we want the flat rate. Basically what we have achieved 
this year is R280 across the board and 8% whatever is the greatest.
On balance, - despite the problems highlighted - the branclfs involvement in the "new' 
collective bargaining forums appeared to be yielding some successes. The official 
unions focus on formal wage negotiations appeared to show that SAMWU might be 
able to secure x some' control over wages and conditions. The introduction of 
employment legislation - aimed at achieving peaceful, legitimate industrial relations - 
could be argued to have benefited workers in Cape Town. Moreover, it might be 
contended that the new employee relations climate symbolised - at the very least - a 
step away from the adversarial relations common to the 1992-4 period.
None the less, although collective bargaining can just as easily be associated with 
industrial confrontation it can - like other industrial democratic initiatives, such as 
NEDLAC and Works forums - serve to bring the union representatives closer to the 
realities of the market and force them to take joint responsibility with management for 
its effects. As a consequence even the most radical trade unions can be obliged to 
assume more managerial functions, and temper the actions of their members, in return 
for negotiated settlements. Plainly, collective bargaining, although a very different form 
of conciliation from co-determination initiatives like NEDLAC, can still yield co-operative 
relations (Clarke, T. ,1977).
It could also equally be asserted, that such forums were simply * useful' means of 
controlling the power and militancy of SAMWU. In practice, collective bargaining can 
clearly perform a conjunctive function - where conflict can be channelled into institutions 
where it may be more effectively controlled (Clarke, T, 1977). As Hyman points out - 
when commenting on general legislation governing trade unions, The legislation of 
unions may in itself mute some of the radicalism associated with their former "outlaw" 
status'. Conceding terms - which allow for the consolidation of the unions 
membership and reinforces its organisational security - may involve little direct cost to 
the employer; especially if such concessions can be traded against Year material
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improvements in worker's conditions, and the adoption of conciliatory and 
accommodative policies on the part of the union ( Hyman, 1975, pp. 89-90).
In the case of Cape Town, municipal workers may have appeared to have achieved 
legitimate representation in the workplace - the extension of collective bargaining into 
areas from which they had been previously excluded and the establishment of 
institutional innovations like workers forums and NEDLAC - but many still remained in a 
position of political and economic subjection in their working lives. As Clarke and 
Clements (1977, pp. 225-8) observed, the main union focus on formal wage negotiation 
frequently forces the workforce to endure harsh working conditions alone, especially 
since formal wage bargaining concedes that the control of such processes remain firmly 
within the 'managerial prerogative. In reality, such initiatives - whilst welcomed by 
many public sector trade unionists - had singularly failed to prevent the onslaught of 
deteriorating terms and conditions associated with privatisation and deregulation. The 
next section explores the acceleration of free market policies in Cape Town - and local 
government generally - within the context of an increasingly formal conciliatory 
industrial relations climate, supposedly designed to increase an employee's stake in 
the organisation.
From 1995-7, alongside the fervour for greater partnership initiatives and the 
incorporation of trade unions in the workplace, there appeared to be a renewed 
enthusiasm, on the part of the government for outsourcing and privatisation. The 
eagerness was associated with the idea that the public sector was incapable of 
delivering services alone, and that government would need to look to the private sector. 
In local government a series of projects were presented as a panacea, they varied from 
the granting of contracts to multi-national companies to manage public utilities like 
water and electricity, to the introduction of public private partnerships (PPPs) - complex 
financial agreements with business partners, designed to release resources from the 
private sector to finance major public developments. In addition, black empowerment - 
where small black businesses tendered for local government services - was 
encouraged as a means of procuring a stake for Africans in the 'new' economy 
(Hemson, 1998).
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Such schemes were promoted as improving service delivery and offering greater 
efficiency and productivity in the public sector. Yet, in reality, the increased productivity 
or savings were to be achieved by the expansion of temporary and casual workers - 
along with the downsizing and flexible use of existing local government workers, 
generally (Martin 1995: Hemson, 1998). Re-organisation along these lines - particularly 
the use of casual and temporary labour - threatened to undermine the power of the 
unions and to produce new divisions within the workforce. SAMWU remained 
committed to fighting all such changes - although the true extent of the problem was 
difficult to ascertain, largely due to the lack of detailed, comparative local figures in 
South Africa. The next section highlights the effects of such policies in local government 
generally, and Cape Town in particular.
13.3.1 Changes in Local Government employment (1995-7)
Statistics for local government were particularly misleading and revealed very little 
evidence of downsizing, especially amongst the African workforce. In the post-apartheid 
period employment in local government demonstrated very similar tendencies to that of 
public sector as a whole. 'Whites' were disproportionably represented in local 
government in relation to their overall number. Racial stratification of the labour market 
had been rigidly regulated, creating disparities in work and wage practices and layered 
contradictions in the national structure. Table 13.1 shows the total employed in local 
authority city councils from 1994-7.
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June 94
Sept 94
Dec 94
Mar 95
June 95
Sept 95
Dec-95
Mar'96
June 96
Sept 96
Dec, 96
Mar 97
June 97
Sept 97
Blacks
78644
78553
77416
77063
71254
69874 
(68423
67456
67385
71 778 *
74538
74462
74126
75070
75673
'Coloureds'
35571
36150
35804
35864
34704
34237 
(35238)
35808
35772
35605*
36100
36437
36089
35767
34433
Asians
7140
7080
6794
6897
6855
7027 
(6892
6872
6859
6967
6943
6969
7058
7195
6809
Whites
47408
46874
45173
41331
38576
39036 
(38694)
38362
37607
37658*
37790
37700
36541
36081
35621
Others
49883
58132
65671
68301
79481
79009 
(79371
81 112
81353
79891
80993
81931
84675
84195
81 148
Total local 
authorities
218646
226 789
230858
229 456
230870
230183 
(228618)
229310
228 976
231 899 *
236364
237 499
238489
238308
233684
As with the public sector generally, employees in all race groups fell between June 
1994 and September 1995. The figure for whites fell the most drastically, by 
approximately 18% - but this figure was probably misleading because, whilst 
employees almost certainly took advantage of the increased severance packages on 
offer during this period, many others employees would have been relocated to other 
sections of the public sector during the reorganisation of local government.
From September 1995 to March 1997, there appeared to be a slight rise in employment 
for all race groups, apart from whites, this may have reflected the governments 
response to increased strike action during this period. However, figures began to fall 
again in March 1997 in all groups apart from 'Africans'. Overall the figures for the 
period from Sept 1995 to September 1997 (post-local election period) registered a fall 
in all groups except Africans: 2.2% amongst Coloureds1 ; 1.2% amongst 'Indians'; 8% 
amongst whites; and a rise of 10.5% amongst Africans. The increase in 'Africans'
being employed in local authorities would almost probably have been due to the 
implementation of affirmative action policies.
Nevertheless, despite the lack of reliable statistics to support the evidence of 
downsizing, the government's enthusiasm for privatisation could not be denied. The 
discussion document on the white paper on Local Government in South Africa (1997) 
had specifically identified local government as failing and advised municipalities to 
change their role in order to concentrate on the regulation of municipal services - rather 
than providing them. South African municipalities were persuaded to become more 
strategic and to act innovatively. A variety of joint arrangements were to be used, 
including management contracts, contracting-out and leases (White Paper on Local 
Government Discussion Document, 1997: section 10.7). From this point on, it was 
private contractors and consortiums - and not the council - that were to be encouraged 
to take responsibility for employing labour to deliver services.
Such changes in the financing and organisation of local government were to have far- 
reaching consequences for SAMWU and its members. In June 1997, although the 
employers, at the South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC), 
continued to reiterate their commitment to basic services remaining the responsibility of 
local government, they increasingly involved the private sector in the running of 
municipalities. Throughout the year they continued to employ consultants to advise on 
privatisation or awarding contracts to private sector firms. In local government, specific 
municipal services - such as meter reading, water, sanitation and refuse - were 
especially earmarked for 'contracting out'. Responsibility for extending and delivering 
the service was to be taken away from the municipality and given to private contractors, 
who were set to reduce costs by employing a smaller more flexible labour force 
(SAMWU Worker News, June, 1997d).
The contracts varied - some were quite short, less than one year others, such as the 
Water and Sanitation Services South Africa(Pty) Ltd, in Queenstown (Eastern Cape), 
were contracted to operate for 25 years. Lyonnaise des Eaux, a large multi-national, 
had by 1997 already secured a handful of water delivery contracts with municipalities in 
KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern and the Western Cape. This French based company - 
which specialised in the delivery of water and water-based sanitation systems - had
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agreements all over the developing world, and argued that a similar venture in South 
Africa, could provide valuable services at a time when local government - due to the 
merging of racially separated authorities - was in disarray (Edmunds, 1996)
Initially, it appeared that the councils were chiefly 'contracting out' to smaller local 
businesses - even ex-municipal managers - but the smaller companies were often 
being financed and controlled by the larger contractors. Large organisations like Billy 
Hattingh & Associates and Wade Refuse (Pty) Ltd. - under the guise of assisting black 
empowerment - acted as brokers and consultants to small individual businesses. 
Wade Refuse Co. for example, had managed to negotiate a 5 year contract between 
the Greater Benoni Council and a small company, Daveyton & Etwatwa Refuse 
Removers (DERR). DERR had originally consisted of five local residents who had 
been prohibited from collecting refuse because of their practice of dumping rubbish, 
illegally. Unperturbed, Wade Refuse had helped the five individuals form a company 
and secure a contract with the council. Although no real party to the proceeding, Wade 
benefited from the financial and managerial assistance they gave to the five local 
residents (SAMWU Worker News June 1997d).
A number of these companies claimed to influenced by altruistic motives wanting only 
to encourage black, local entrepreneurs, and limiting their support to training and 
equipment. Far from encouraging black empowerment, the local black businesses 
were usually wholly dependent on the larger companies for continual financial help and 
support. Moreover, such services still had to be paid for by the impoverished township 
residents - a service which now included the basic cost, plus the added profits of both 
the local entrepreneurs and the larger consultants. Finally, with the prospect of 
municipalities no longer employing direct labour for the services, the likelihood of 
obtaining, secure, union negotiated pay and conditions, was set to diminish for many 
black workers (SAMWU Worker's News 1997b; 1997c ;1997d)
13.3.4 Cape Town privatisation and deregulation
In Cape Town, both stewards and SAMWU workers interviewed in 1997, were adamant 
that casual working, outsourcing and subcontracting had increased during this period. 
Such practices seemed to undermine their position in the labour market and 
accentuated their feelings of insecurity. One full-time steward explained how the 
council was now employing more temporary workers on special projects for up to six
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months, without the added burden of permanent contracts. The union remained 
opposed to such practices.
We have casual workers..the council contracts special projects by which 
they get these guys in on a special basis ... once these guys are in they 
just extend their contracts for 6 months, again not taking people on a 
permanent basis. But our focus is we are totally against this exercise. If 
the need is there they should take these men on permanent basis 
because people want a job, they need a job
SAMWU workers, interviewed whilst carrying out maintenance work on a small site in 
Mowbray, Cape Town in September 1997 appeared frightened...
Everything is getting worse . Jobs are insecure. Some of these workers 
are still casual workers yet they've been employed for 5-6 years. We 
need more jobs, secure jobs.
Permanent council workers were often employed alongside casuals, many of whom 
came from poorer African states and were willing to accept meagre pay and conditions.
He's a Zimbabwian, he's a casual, they work for a day and then sign a 
contract for 2-3 weeks
This group of employees were extremely vulnerable - subject to tight control they 
remained fearful of managements constant supervision and ability to easily replace 
them. One member's comments illustrated this vulnerability well.
...[tell the lady what you do].... He won't talk to you -he's afraid - he 
thinks you're the 'entrapment' woman out to retrench him. He might talk 
if you make him a cup of tea.
SAMWU 
Such a culture of fear also served to remind the permanent workers of their own 
vulnerability, and helped to increase their own feelings of powerlessness and lack of job 
control. These anxieties had recently intensified due to management's practice of hiring
private individuals, who posed as members of the public and enticed the unknowing 
council workers into carrying out ^ private' work, on their behalf.
In the Electricity department a number of workers have been dismissed 
due to what they call the "enticement" or "entrapment" officer. They hire 
a private company to come around to people and offer them money to 
buy council stuff from workers. They take a video tape of people with 10 
to 30 years service., and the offering of money, 10, 20, 50 bucks 
But, such methods of managerial investigation and control were not uniform throughout 
the council. White-collar workers, usually white - presumably beyond suspicion - were 
excluded from such practices. One union organiser bemoaned this practice ...
Our arguments is why catch the blue-collar workers when your white 
collar have better access because they have signing powers. They are 
in charge of the operations and they can get away with thousands of the 
councils materials, but they Ye not doing the same exercise to the white- 
collar workers.
Yet, the same union official acknowledged that the white-collar worker were unlikely to 
be performing such an act, chiefly because his economic and financial position in the 
council was far more advantageous than the blue-collar worker
We know for a fact the white-collar worker won't fall into that trap, 
because the ultimate problem with the blue-collar is he earns so little 
money ...he can be bribed.
But, some SAMWU workers' response to this complete lack of trust and tight regulation 
was to resort to violence, which - although totally unorthodox - had been seemingly 
effective as the council had recently abandoned the practice as a result of such actions.
Our position is firm, we don^t condone it. We educate our members in 
meetings that if you go out to do that kind of thing you have to pay the 
price..... but we have to be honest... the practice has been stopped - for 
the moment. People's lives are at risk, ...investigators or council 
officials have been threatened by workers. We\e said to the managers, 
if you people are not going to stop this, many innocent people will get
hurt.
Whether this can be construed as the employee's attempts to seize back a fragment of 
control over the working environment, may be stretching a point, but it did illustrate the 
levels of alienation and frustration that continued to govern the employment relationship 
between the council and members of the mainly coloured, blue-collar, workforce in 
Cape Town council.
Private labour
Such a sense of worthlessness and powerlessness was especially evident around the 
issues of privatisation. The plans to commercialise public services, was now being 
identified, by many SAMWU workers, as the greatest peril facing them in Cape Town.
Its like the U.S ... council is doing the job but we don't see the profits. 
The council are starting to use more casuals, more and more contract 
workers are working with us. People are getting retrenched , there's 7 to 
8 in a team but lots are being retrenched.
Some were angry - they felt they could do the job better than the private companies.
we can do the jobs better then the private companies, they do a 
inefficient job, they spend more money in getting the contracts then in 
doing the work
Areas that had previously fallen under the Black Local Authorities were particularly 
susceptible in Cape Town.
The problems of commercialisation means that jobs are not uniform. 
Conditions of service are different throughout the country, especially in 
the old apartheid BLA's and rural areas
The council continued to deal with these localities separately, and remained reluctant 
(or unable) to upgrade their services to the standard of the former white areas. A 
planned "Clean and Green" campaign - backed by the ANC - proposed to recruit
jobless people to provide a refuse removal service for the townships and informal 
settlements. As the Branch Secretary of Cape Town explained, such policies was 
designed to exploit cheap unemployed labour.
The salary of R750 being offered is not enough to live on .....this 
proposal is clearly privatisation of the refuse removal services .... If the 
council is serious about cleaning up the area, why don^t they show 
some responsibility by employing more staff on a permanent basis?
Overall, the use of sub-contracted privatised labour remained the most worrying to 
SAMWU members, especially as most contracted labour were earning half of the 
permanent municipal workers' salary, with inferior working conditions. Roger Ronnie 
(General Secretary) explained that the private companies' claims, that they brought with 
them finance for investment and better conditions for workers, was simply untrue. He 
quoted a recent case of a water purification firm where the conditions of the workers 
had deteriorated. Despite the original promise of training and promotion, workers were 
now earning between R600 and R1.500 gross a month - whereas, the minimum wage 
in the municipalities of Cape Town, was R1.600 (Edmunds, 1996)
A further example was found in Khayelistsha - a black township in the Western Cape - 
where the municipality had simply gone ahead and privatised the whole of the refuse 
removal. No employment conditions were specified for the sub-contracted workers, 
and health and safety conditions were known to be considerably worse then those of 
the local authority workers. Although, SAMWU eventually won the case at arbitration - 
which ruled that the privatisation of refuse removal was an unilateral change in terms 
and conditions of workers engaged in refuse removal - the whole affair served to 
highlight the vulnerability of municipal workers, not just in Cape Town but throughout 
the country (van Drie, 1998).
Such observations clearly need to be placed in context -especially as the attempts at 
privatisation and deregulation, and the resulting feelings of vulnerability were not only
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confined to Cape Town. Overall, SAMWU reported a general discontent amongst its 
public sector workers, during the 1995-7 period. It was a discontent that was creating 
disquiet not just around issues of privatisation, but conditions in local government 
generally (SAMWU Worker's News, 1997b) Subsequently, it may have been the stirring 
of this dissatisfaction that helped to explain the extra-ordinary high levels of industrial 
action that began in 1995. During this year workers reacted angrily to public sector cuts 
being instigated by the ANC government (Mabogoane, 1995)
Although strikes in the post-apartheid public sector, fell from the one time recorded high 
of 24%, in 1990, there was still a marked shift in their pattern and concentration in 
1995. Moreover, the sudden rise in strikes during this period could not be attributed 
exclusively to the lifting of the old regime's ban on public sector strikes. Levels of 
insecurity and the state's success in holding down pay to below inflation in the public 
sector, almost certainly had an impact - especially as, unlike the private sector where 
union organisation was strong and workers were winning settlements of 10-12%, the 
public sector was receiving less than 5% pay rises (Mabogoane, 1995). This section 
reviews the level of strikes in 1995 generally, and in Cape Town Council in 1996. It then 
proceeds to explore the levels resistance to privatisation, both generally in the union 
and in Cape Town itself. Finally, it reviews the effects on SAMWLTs anti-privatisation 
stance on its relationship with COSATU and other affiliates.
The 1995 strikes in public sector were quite unexpected to the government - what 
began as a peaceful start to the year suddenly emitted into mass action. In local 
government, the strikes were part of a national campaign to improve conditions and pay 
above the minimum wage. Yet the threats to job security, posed by the introduction of 
the free market, and subsequent changing work patterns, often accompanied calls for 
action. On the 5th day of what was technically an illegal strike, 40,000 of SAMWLTs 
110,000 members joined the action (Financial Mail,, 1995c) *
Such strikes were incredibly successful, and spread throughout the country. The strikes 
were to ensure similar wage rates would be applied in all local authorities, a common 
wage grade rate with allowance for the bigger cities. In Natal they managed to achieve 
R1200 as an average minimum wage - up from R600-R800, - this meant increases 
between 40-70%. In Johannesburg - despite having earlier settled their own wage
based on a R1500 minimum - a thousand Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council members joined a sympathy strike. In Cape Town, Municipal 
workers along with nurses found themselves at the forefront of wage-related strikes. 
Such actions unleashed intense emotions and caused public disturbances. In many 
small towns, where strikers and demonstrators were visibly seen to clash with right- 
wing residents, it was often the first time that municipal workers had taken large-scale 
action (Financial Mail, 1995c; Mabogoane, 1995)
The attempts by the government to implement formal methods of resolution initially 
floundered. In all, the strike affected 250 municipalities. Statutory mediation imposed 
by the Labour Minister Tito Mboweni failed to bring an immediate end to the illegal 
strike. Consequently, despite the government's best efforts to institutionalise industrial 
conflict in South Africa - all the indications were that the public sector workers had not 
lost sight of their industrial strength and were refusing to surrender their militant tactics 
in return for conciliation and legal regulation (Financial Mail, 1995c).
Further strikes took place in 1996. On 16th August, the anger of SAMWU workers in 
Cape Town erupted, and resulted in them joining other local authorities in the region, in 
taking industrial action. The Western Cape regional secretary, Mr Stanley Yisaka said 
that approximately 18,000 members in the six municipalities of greater Cape Town and 
in the Cape Metropolitan Council would be striking. They wanted a minimum wage of 
R1600 and increase of R250 a month for those earning above the minimum. 
Management's offer stood at R1545, and R130 or 7%, for those earning above the 
minimum. The branch stressed the dispute was not just about Cape Town and 
SAMWU, but several employers and unions - including the Cape Metropolitan Council, 
the Cape Local Authorities Employers Organisation and the previous staff association, 
SAAME now Independent Municipal & Allied Trade Union (IMATU). Nevertheless, it 
was the Cape Town Municipality the largest of the seven local authority bodies that was 
most affected (Cape Times, 1996)
Although, the issues were still primarily about pay - thousands of municipal workers 
also proclaimed their concern over lack of job security. Previously, SAMWU - the 
largest of the council employee unions in the city - had demonstrated this fear by joining 
other municipalities in the region and marching through the city on the eve of the local
elections (June 3rd 1996). Then as now, many remained anxious about their 
livelihoods, as the 39 local authorities in the metropolitan became 6 "substructures." 
(Cape Times, 1996)
The strikes hit all six municipalities in the greater Cape Town and metropolitan council. 
Officials said 95% of SAMWU workers were on strike. Refuse collection was the first 
service to be disrupted, and all council pay offices closed as municipal workers 
embarked on a strike in the greater Cape Town area. What had become a tradition 
since the 1990 strike, saw between 3,000 to 4,000 municipal workers from the 
metropolitan area gathered on the ground-floor concourse of the civic centre. 50 of 
them occupied the offices of the mayor and town clerk. Mr Trevor Serfontein, the 
workers' chief negotiator and regional treasurer of SAMWU addressed the workers and 
said the union could not guarantee the safety of those that did not observe the strike 
(Cape Times, 1996).
Councillor, Judy Sibisi of the ANC spoke for the employers - and offered a minimum 
monthly wage of R1600 an increase of 7.5% or R185, or whichever was greater. She 
argued the offer represented a "significant increase" that ranged from 13% to 43% 
across the municipalities. SAM WIT s key demand for equal wages for equal work 
throughout the metropole had been met. On the 22nd Aug 1996, municipal workers 
returned to work. They finally settled for R1,600 monthly minimum and a R220 a month 
or 8% annual increase, or whichever was the greater. Cape Town's branch 
chairperson, Mr Lance Veotti: led the SAMWU members victoriously back to work. 
(Cape Times , 1996)
What had emerged as significant about the strike was the union's apparent ability and 
willingness to still take illegal action. Throughout the dispute very few of the formal legal 
procedures had been followed. SAMWU's negotiator, Serfontein conceded that a 
strike ballot had not been held - although he was reluctant to accept the action had 
been a wildcat strike.
Interestingly, IMATU with its 4,000 members, including firemen, ambulancemen and 
white-collar workers in the metropole, continued to call for 10% or R220 a month which 
ever the greater, and minimum wage R1600. Despite not having a tradition of striking 
IMATU refused to return to work until they had held a ballot to decide on the offer. The 
employers took a tough stand and got a court order that required all union members to
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"perform their duties in accordance with their terms and conditions of service". IMATU 
complained that council negotiators have a different criteria for dealing with different 
unions and pointed out that the council didn't take any legal action against SAMWUs 
3-day strike (Cape Times, 1997). As one SAMWU member commented ...
We are still the union with power. In all the council chambers when 
SAMWU threatens any action they take us serious
The explanations for the explosion of conflict in Cape Town - and for that matter the 
public sector as whole - were quite complex. For many strikers, although the dispute 
was clearly one of economics - wages and conditions - it also brought to the fore the 
questions of control and job security in the post-apartheid era. In this matter very little 
had changed for the SAMWU workers. Despite the supposed implementation of a new 
'union - friendly' labour Act, and greater partnership in the workplace, the SAMWU 
worker's material circumstances and his or her position within the council had not been 
significantly transformed
Moreover, the stifling and constraining effects of ideologies like racism and class 
superiority still existed. It might now be possible to discuss issues of worker 
participation and affirmative action quotas in new collective bargaining forums - but 
Managers still maintained their policy of close supervision and tight managerial control. 
Therefore, the Cape Town Council still held the power to introduce changes that could 
devastate the lives of many black municipal workers. In recognition of such a fact - 
SAMWU worker's responded to the lack of power over their working lives, by taking 
strike action. Chiefly because it was an action they knew - through historical experience 
- to be the most effective.
The ability of members to still engage in industrial action is still a fact. 
For the bulk of COSATU members nothing has changed...perhaps a 
strengthening of local SAMWU structures.... but in a number of areas 
tensions still remain...we are still under the control of apartheid.
The level of dissatisfaction was not confined solely to pay and conditions, issues of 
security linked to increased privatisation was also a concern. It is to the issue of 
resistance to privatisation that we now turn.
By 1997 - although several leading ANC/SACP members now actively supported the 
plans for privatisation - the resistance amongst SAMWU continued unabated. 
Throughout the post-apartheid period (1995-7) SAMWU had continued to be at 
forefront of direct opposition to all types of privatisation. In December 1995, SAMWU 
had been amongst the first to support COSATU's two-hour stoppage on the 15th 
December, and a further one-day strike on the 16th January 1996, both called to 
oppose government's plans to privatise a number of state assets - the Cape Town 
branch supported both strikes. Further strikes were subsequently planned, but were 
later called off after promises from the Government to establish a joint committee, on 
the future of the state sector (SAMWU Congress Report: Secretariat Report, 1997c).
SAMWU's opposition continued throughout 1996 - even when COSATU appeared to 
accept the inevitability of privatisation by signing a National Framework Agreement on 
the Restructuring of State Assets, with the government. SAMWU remained hostile to 
such agreements and continued to engage in campaigns, that ensured that the 
involvement of the private sector in the provisions of basic services did not undermine 
the public sector, or lead to job losses. In particular, SAMWU declared itself 
determined to block any moves to contract-out the basic municipal services to large or 
multi-national companies, like the French water and sanitation company, Lyonnaise 
des Eaux (SAMWU Congress Report: Socio-economic issues, 1997b).
In June, 1997, the dispute over privatisation shifted to the government Department of 
Constitutional Development, where SAMWU expressed further concern over its setting 
up of 'Project Viability', a body to be used to monitor the financial situation of local 
authorities. The project advocated privatisation as the main solution to the financial and 
service delivery problems being experienced in local government. SAMWU, was 
opposed to such moves and pushed instead, for a national tariff to finance all basic 
services, with provision for cross-subsidisation, from the richer to the poorer councils 
(SAMWU Worker's News , 1997b)
302
Throughout 1997, SAMWU maintained its fight against the privatisation of services. It 
was during this period that the union's resistance campaign began to show signs of 
consolidating - as it continued to battle for the notion that services should be provided to 
meet needs and not to create profits. All over the country it began to publicise and 
support pockets of resistance, with a view to preparing for united mass action 
(SAMWU Worker's News, 1997b)
In the Eastern Cape - Queenstown - where the council had attempted to privatise the 
refuse collection service, SAMWU joined forces with the ex-white local government 
union - IMATU - to oppose it. In other areas of the Eastern Cape, SAMWU members 
travelled from door-to-door delivering publicity and educating others about the dangers 
of privatisation. In the Free State, SAMWU managed to convince the Welkom City 
Council not to privatise the cemeteries maintenance. Finally, in KwaZulu-Natal, 
SAMWU marched on 9th May and gave a petition to the Mayor of the Municipality, after 
discovering that services were to be privatised in Newcastle, Matatiele, 
Scottburg/Umzinto North and Zinkwazi - they demanded a list of all the proposed 
privatisations (SAMWU Worker's News,1997b)
The fight against privatisation in Mpumalanga was also well known during this period, 
as SAMWU members made headline news with its anti-privatisation fight against the 
Nelspruit Transitional Local Council. The union had opposed all moves to privatise 
water and sanitation services to the British multi-national firm - Biwater (SAMWU 
Worker's News, 1997e)
In Gauteng Region, attempts to put water services out to tender and to privatise the 
'crushers' (coach and bus services) were opposed. In the black township of Alexandra, 
SAMWU fought the 'contracting out' of refuse removal and privatisation of electricity. 
These initiatives all culminated in a day of action on 1st Sept 1997, when services were 
seriously disrupted as thousands (32,000), of municipal workers took to the streets of 
Johannesburg to protest against privatisation. The water, electrical, refuse, bus 
services workers - and many more - supported the one-day strike and stopped services 
throughout the region (Russell, 1997; Thembo Nxumalo, Gautang Branch Secretary, 
interview 3/9/97).
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Resistance in Cape Town
After the 1996 strike, the union's campaign to stop privatisation appeared to gain 
momentum in Cape Town. Whether the success of the strike had led to an increase in 
members' confidence and further recognition of their power was difficult to measure - 
although all the indications are that workers' collective consciousness widens during a 
strike (Mann, 1973). Nevertheless, like the national union, anti-privatisation appeared to 
assume a central role in the policy of the branch. In particular, the interviews with 
stewards and members in Cape Town in 1997, seemed to indicate a need to prioritise 
anti-privatisation issues and begin building solidarity action with all groups effected by 
the new free-market policies.
Our role has changed with the local government transition, we have to 
fight. We have a new co-ordinator who is addressing the whole of 
privatisation - the subcontractors, services which private companies are 
taking over, contracting-out... He is focusing now to get an anti- 
privatisation campaign moving, with subcommittees and organisation. 
Arthur, SAMWU steward, interview, 6/9/97
Such committees were part of provincial wide campaign organised throughout the 
Western Cape. The aim was to involve as many interest groups as possible - other 
unions, community groups, township residents, anyone who was prepared to fight 
privatisation. During this period the union actively lobbied the council to find alternatives 
to privatisation. In September, it made a formal presentation to Cape Town's municipal 
task team - currently investigating different options for service delivery in the area. 
Unfortunately, such attempts at conciliation ended in deadlock, after the task team 
indicated their intention to appoint a consultant to investigate PPP's - SAMWU walked 
out of the meeting in disgust (SAMWU Worker's News , 1997i).
Incidents like these, seemed to indicate that SAMWU would have to organise more 
than just publicity and presentations if it was to stop privatisation. The size of the 
membership and their willingness - and ability - to take action, would obviously be an 
essential element. The success of any of these activities would be ultimately 
dependent on the active support of the unions' members. Struggles or campaigns 
would be worthless if they remained confined to the levels of the leadership. They
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would need to involve the rank and file membership - a point emphasised by a number 
of members interviewed in 1997 and reinforced by the Cape Town Organiser.
we're not talking simply of the leadership involvement here...it is the 
policy of this organisation that it should be worker to worker contact. I 
think these are the strengths of SAMWU. If we are successful we will be 
able to take the struggle forward.
Yet, the task was immense, especially since there was now a greater risk of losing 
members as a result of possible downsizing and use of sub-contracted labour. The 
branch recognised these dangers and began - as a point of urgency - to recruit many of 
the temporary and casual workers now being employed by the private contractors. In 
Cape Town, they concentrated on areas like water and sanitation - where the private 
companies were particularly prevalent.
We have signed up those members - they now all belong to the 
organisation. They pay subscriptions, they have a body that can see to 
their benefits, negotiate for better wages and conditions of services.
However, progress was slow, especially as union organisers were usually confronted 
by extremely high levels of hostility from the private contractors.
We've achieved a negotiation agreement, but we still encounter 
tremendous problems - and resistance. We are entitled to recruit in any 
sector or private company in local government - it is our right or 
constitution to organise those workers.
The extent of the popularity of privatisation amongst local people should also not be 
underestimated, especially as one steward recognised that township residents were 
often desperate for new services...
It is the magnitude of this, it has opened up the way for all these 
consultants to come in. For example the informal settlements in Cape 
Town - in 30 years there is one standpipe, no toilets, there is nothing
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and then comes someone who says they can put water in there - now 
people aren't going to worry about privatisation. It is that need that is 
now being exploited,
Nevertheless, the branch remained determined to fight privatisation. A number of 
members and stewards interviewed continued to express their opposition ...
The private companies are not there for job creation they are only there 
on the basis of profit they exploit people in terms of giving jobs to people 
because they underpay them - we've got to fight it.
Most feared privatisation would lead to job losses and a general fall in their standard of 
living.
we don't want privatisation, we'll lose our jobs. I don't know what we'll 
do if we lose our jobs. We need more investment, the council should 
invest more money into jobs and houses.
Some of the members and stewards interviewed, made social and political connections 
between the 'rights' of the community and privatisation.
Our ultimate goal as a trade union in the local government, is we feel 
that local government should be seen to be serving our communities, 
and we won't see any private enterprise taking over the role of local 
government.
Still others made overtly political links by acknowledging the role of the government and 
the power of the labour movement to force the ANC to find an alternative to 
privatisation.
But with the resistance building from the trade union movement they 
(the government) will not implement privatisation - because of the 
threats and the political problems they will encounter from the labour
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movement. They will have to listen to the labour movement, specifically 
to SAMWU, in the local government area. They'll realise they can't just 
go ahead with this type of thing they will need to consult and plan an 
alternative to privatisation - that is our focus.
The recognition of the political components of privatisation, seemed to indicate that 
some SAMWU members in Cape Town were not intending to limit their opposition to 
purely aggressive economism and defensive job control.
SAMWU will go full steam on this whole exercise of anti- 
privatisation...political as well as economic battles
In particular, local government MEC - Peter Marais - accused SAMWU of having a 
political agenda, unrelated to the best interests of workers and charged them with 
speaking only for the few who have jobs and not the many jobless (SAMWU Worker 
News' 1997b). Despite this accusation the union refused to be detracted from its main 
aim, and continued - as it had done in 1993 - to campaign against privatisation. This 
opposition was echoed and supported by many of the Cape Town members 
interviewed in 1997. A number of members expressed anger with the council, accusing 
them of nepotism and the willingness to be motivated purely by money.
The private contractors are everywhere especially where there is 
money, the council is giving its friends the work, even though we can do 
it better. I can give you names if you want, Musterd, Esterhaisen, Piper
Others expressed disgust and disappointment with the post-apartheid era. They had 
expected change - even a better system - but instead they had been confronted with 
the prospect of further misery and suffering as the result of possible further downsizing 
and flexible-working.
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Things is bad in Cape Town. We've suffered too long and now we've
got to suffer again
Links to the national union
Cape Town was not the only branch to appreciate the full extent of the threats of 
privatisation, to the livelihood of many black and 'coloured' workers. The pattern of 
determined resistance to commercialisation, evident from the interviews carried out in 
Cape Town, was replicated in other parts of the union too. The following statement, by 
the Regional Secretary in Gauteng, illustrated well the union's determination to stop 
privatisation, even if it meant opposing the 'new1 democratic government.
we're opposed to privatisation - the decision was not taken lightly, it was 
a long debate .... we believe that the struggle against privatisation will 
become the pivotal struggle. In fact the position of SAMWU is that the 
campaign against privatisation is the campaign of the year (1997). Not 
because we simply believe in the slogan against privatisation, but it is 
more a question of the effects that privatisation will have in terms of our 
jobs, working conditions, even our lives.... We are presenting this to the 
government in terms of how really serious SAMWU is in terms in anti- 
privatisation
Other SAMWU members - interviewed at the September 1st Rally in Gauteng 
(Johannesburg) in 1997 - also expressed their determination to fight privatisation.
We're striking because its the only way to stop privatisation 
The Branch Secretary of Greater Johannesburg, also explained how industrial action 
would force councillors to listen to them...
We're protesting and engaging with councillors. We've having 
discussions showing what our fears are and what other options we can 
offer them.... but they still won't sit down with us - but they will have to 
listen. We had a protest on the 1st July last year and we'll have more. 
Such sentiments were further reflected in comments of the SAMWU leadership. In 
1997 it called on all unions to support a Local Government Summit to develop an 
alliance programme of action at all levels. The general secretary explained that..
Our starting point is that the government should not be involved with 
privatisation and so we consistently oppose it. We want the public 
sector, we will fight for the public sector, if we loose it, well we fought for 
the public sector.
Nevertheless, despite such determined support throughout SAMWU, it was equally true 
that both the branch and its union were experiencing difficulties gaining solidarity within 
the wider union movement. Although there was clearly opposition to privatisation 
throughout the union movement, with COSATU claiming ....
COSATU's vision on public sector transformation and the role of the 
public service should be aggressively placed on the national Agenda 
... the resolve to fight privatisation was not nearly as strong as that of SAMWU's. One 
SAMWU organiser in Cape Town even indicated that SAMWU was being forced to 
fight the threat of privatisation alone...
No, SAMWU is the only public sector union in terms of opposing this 
whole privatisation movement, even in COSATU. It is likely we stand 
alone now. The other public sector unions don't seem to be worried 
about the privatisation movement.
Such comments were supported by a Cape Town ANC councillor - interviewed during 
the same period - he believed COSATU recognised the threat of privatisation, but 
unlike SAMWU was anxious to maintain a working relationship with the new 
government.
SAMWU has become a stumbling block for COSATU. COSATU is 
making noise but the COSATU leadership is basically keeping in step in 
government. There was a hugh outcry, but when it came to it they 
backed off.
COSATU's initial response to the governments free market policy, GEAR, in 1995, 
was to un-characteristically urge its members not to directly oppose its implementation, 
but rather to engage 'in progressive dialogue with its new partners in the hope of 
changing their minds'. COSATU claimed, that it would 'not be possible to shift 
development of policy, without engagement with GEAR and the philosophy that 
underpins its general acceptance'. Consequently, it encouraged its affiliate unions to 
'propose progressive policies in key areas of social and economic development ..(and) 
in that way hope to shift the parameters of GEAR'. (COSATU 6th National Congress 
Report:, 1997c).
Even more alarmingly was COSATU's seeming concessions to government's 
privatisation plans, when it declared its intention to establish a team to work with the 
National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI) in order to develop 
overall perspectives and strategies for the "restructuring of state assets' (COSATU's 6th 
National Congress Report, 1997b).
In essence, the reason for the vacillation and weak support from the COSATU 
leadership for SAMWU's campaign was clearly linked to COSATU's close alignment 
with the ANC, and its growing engagement with new institutional responsibilities. The 
militant impetus predominant during the resistance politics was now being replaced with 
a new attitude of compromise and non-adversarialism, both at a centralised level and in 
the workplace. Yet, COSATU's long-standing goal of being recognised as a player, 
together with business and government in centralised tripartite policy-making, appeared 
to mean an acquiescence to free-market policies of GEAR. The free market was 
clearly linked to tight fiscal discipline, public spending restraint and privatisation 
(Barchiesi, 1999). Consequently, the impossibility of balancing its position between an 
allegiance to the ruling coalition and a vague commitment to socio-economic 
transformation, made it increasingly difficult to fully support the rank-and file militancy 
being championed by SAMWU, in response to privatisation.
The Gauteng Regional Secretary reiterated this point, explaining that SAMWU was 
basically being ostracised because of its belligerent opposition to privatisation and its 
wider commitment to the working class and socialism -
ahh privatisation - we, unfortunately are not having a good reputation in 
COSATU. We seem like the black sheep because we fortunately (or 
unfortunately) have a leadership that is committed to the struggle of the 
working class of South Africa. A leadership that is committed to the goal 
of achieving socialism. And therefore the way that we argue, the way 
that we conduct ourselves is not always popular.....
Yet, whether COSATU's prioritisation of pragmatism and institutional negotiation would 
coincide with the rank-and file views of trade unionism - especially in places like Cape 
Town where members were entering a period of instability and uncertainty - still 
remained to be seen. Nonetheless, the Regional Secretary of Gauteng - for his part - 
remained confident that the current situation could not prevail, especially as high 
unemployment and the free market constraints on labour would force the traditions of 
socialism back on the agenda.
we may be feeling isolated at the present time but we believe that the 
traditions of socialism , the struggle of socialism will come back. In fact 
the spirit and consciousness that prevailed in 1985 - when Cosatu was 
formed - will come back and SAMWU will not find itself as an individual
Trade union action in Cape Town had traditionally produced gains for 'coloured' 
workers in the Council. During apartheid, strikes had been the principle means of 
mobilising this often isolated group of workers, and posing a substantial threat to the 
stability of the council. Strikes in the post-apartheid period appeared to be yielding 
similar results , and were often being perceived as fundamental stands against 
exploitation in a labour market increasingly influenced by neo-liberal policies (Interviews 
1997).
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Yet - as in 1992-4 - strikes in the post-apartheid period appeared to have a political as 
well as an economic dimension. Whereas, the 1996 Cape Town strike obviously 
represented the branch's traditional concern with wages and conditions, there was also 
evidence of an increased awareness of the threats to themselves and the community 
generally, posed by government policies of privatisation (Interviews, September 1997). 
Overall the branch's - and SAMWUs - fight against privatisation could be interpreted of 
defending not only basic terms and conditions, but of raising issues of power and 
control within the council, and the country as whole.
But whether the experiences of taking industrial action, particularly in the post-apartheid 
period would raise the 'coloured' workers' consciousness to even greater political 
levels was not immediately apparent in 1997. It could equally be true to argue, that 
despite the militant discourse and obvious willingness of SAMWU workers to still 
engage in industrial action, the gap between the activity and the consciousness of such 
members in Cape Town was still very uneven. Whilst the day-to-day activities and 
relations in the council seemed to indicate a high level of instability and a willingness to 
oppose privatisation, events were still - in 1997 - unclear. Whether these members 
would continue to rise above their own prejudices - forming links with other, mainly 
black workers - and presenting a generalised threat to the government and their 
policies of privatisation, was still open to speculation.
Conciliation or strikes?
Throughout the post-apartheid period (1995-7) SAMWU had continued to be at 
forefront of direct opposition to privatisation. Yet, such actions were clearly against the 
political spirit of the Labour Relations Act (1995), which could be broadly defined as 
being designed to create a non-adversial industrial relations framework - where issues 
of worker co-operation and participation would be central. Institutions like NEDLAC, 
centralised collective bargaining and workplace forums were bodies aimed at facilitating 
the establishment of a 'conflict-free1 work environment, whose central role was to 
develop a climate of social stability conducive to growth and foreign investment 
(Financial Mail, 1995c; Macun and Webster, 1999).
Therefore, in many ways the new LRA acquired a much broader scope than was 
usually envisaged for labour legislation, it was to be used to encourage different levels
of responsibility and self-discipline on the part of the labour movement. The aim being 
in order to broker an economy of stabilisation and industrial peace, for the sake of 
growth and development. This was to be part of the trade unions' new conciliatory, 
institutionalised role. In return for social pacts, workplace participation and centralised 
negotiation, COSATU union affiliates were now expected to assist in mediating 
between its traditionally radical workforce, and the powerful economic actors linked to 
multi-national capital and finance (Barchiesi, 1999).
As a consequence, the SAMWU leadership's continued emphasis on adversarial 
industrial relations, and its extremely truculent declarations of intentions to strike 
against the black liberation government's policies, was almost certainly in direct 
contradiction to the spirit of new legislation (van Driel, 1998). Yet, this opposition was 
not confined to the national leadership - in Cape Town too - interviews conducted in 
1997, seemed to support a growing hostility towards government policies, and a 
determination to use industrial action to oppose them.
Nevertheless, it was only after the Cape Town strike in 1996, that the campaign to stop 
privatisation began to gain real impetus - with some branch members beginning to 
move beyond pure economics to articulating a political dimension to the issues. 
Moreover, - although matters of pay were foremost in the minds of strikers in 1996, the 
material realities of job insecurities and lack of control over their working environment, 
did highlight how little conditions had changed for the SAMWU workers. Despite, a 
major transformation of the apartheid system, the fact remained that the managers - still 
retained control over the lives of every council worker in Cape Town (Wilhelm, 1997).
Moreover, the experiences of SAMWU in Cape Town - namely increased privatisation 
and casualisation - brought into question the ability of formal institutions to stem the 
inevitable effects of the free-market policies, largely based on cost-cutting and 
outsourcing. Commitments - on the part of the ANC government - to downsize public 
employment provided little support for the advocates of conciliatory institutions like 
NEDLAC and workplace forums. On the contrary, all the indications were that such 
structures had been developed as vehicles for the acceptance of free market policies of 
wage restraint and increased flexibility (Adler, 1998; Barchiesi, 1999).
Consequently, rather than heralding a new era in managerial thinking, South African 
experiments with co-determination were more easily understood as part of a continuum
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in strategies of control. As a consequence, the adoption of 'union friendly1 partnership 
initiatives could be conceived has having more to do with controlling and co-opting 
strong shop stewards and shopfloor structures, then ensuring a fundamental shift in 
managerial thinking and power. So it was hardly surprising that SAMWU expressed 
ambiguities surrounding the use of partnership initiatives, like NEDLAC and works 
forums. A view reflected by other unions who also reported limited scope for effective 
engagement in industrial and economic policy-making (Barchiesi, 1999)
On reflection, the largest stumbling block to efforts to engineer flexible negotiations with 
government and business, on the socio-economic reconstruction of the workplace, 
remained the ANC's insistence that the free-market policies - such as GEAR, was 
'non-negotiable'. As a consequence the attempts to use conciliatory methods to 
placate a radical labour movement may had been largely unachievable. Chiefly 
because the realities of the escalating retrenchments and historically high 
unemployment - being witnessed in South Africa during this period - made it extremely 
difficult (although not impossible) to peacefully'negotiate away1 major changes in work 
practices. In particular, the government's devotion to municipal privatisation, left 
unions like SAMWU, with little choice but to take industrial action. This was especially 
because profitability and market performance - and certainly not 'friendly1 partnerships 
with business - has become the main criteria for deciding labour adjustment, wages and 
conditions (Barchiesi, 1999). The next chapter (14) gives an overall summary of part 2 
(1995-7) and where appropriate compares with the 1992-4 period.
The willingness to resist and strike against privatisation was by 1997 - as in 1992 - fairly 
evident from the interviews carried out in Cape Town. Yet, the ability of SAMWU 
workers to overcome government policies of privatisation would largely depend on a 
combination of factors - namely the overall levels of collective consciousness and 
solidarity amongst the membership, its interaction with organisation and leadership of 
the union, and finally the state's response to such pressures.
Throughout the whole of the 1992-7 period under investigation, the degree of collective 
consciousness amongst SAMWU workers in Cape Town was unquestionably uneven. 
By 1997, it was still unclear whether the membership would manage to transcend the 
bigotry of their immediate environment, by choosing instead to generalise from their 
own experiences and struggles, and makes connections between the economic events 
in the workplace, and those in the wider political environment.
The province within which the SAMWU worker lived and worked in 1997, was in many 
ways similar to 1992. The material circumstances of most SAMWU workers remained 
poor and inferior to whites. Yet, these actualities did not lead automatically to a working 
class ideology, indeed the dominant ideology of capitalism - even apartheid - appeared
to be surviving. In the case of the Coloured' worker, the racism in the area clearly had 
the ability to continue undermining any nucleus of united class action in the region. 
More especially, the political consciousness of the 'coloured' community in the Western 
Cape - rather than becoming clearer in the post-apartheid era, had become even more 
complex. The 'coloured' worker's fear of losing their meagre advantage in the labour 
market, was already weakening the potential for solidarity action with other black 
workers.
Such difficulties were historically typical of the Western Cape, its origins lay in the 
historical nature of apartheid, and how its peculiarities had contributed to the social 
formation of a distinct 'coloured' identity. Yet, understanding and removing the divisive 
racial ideology that governs this identity, means also recognising that the specific 
structures of labour division and control developed under apartheid in Cape Town - 
were in no way inconsequential to capitalism, and were indeed functional to the 
workings of capitalism in South Africa. Consequently, this means continuing - even 
after 1994 - to analyse the relation between capital accumulation and racial domination, 
and challenging the view that there was a contradiction between capitalism and 
apartheid (Legassick, 1974, p. 269).
Yet, the growth of a class consciousness amongst this group did not rest solely on their 
broader economic and social or political environment, but also relied on the 'coloured' 
workers' interaction with his or her trade union organisation - and with the policies of 
their employers and state. As previously explained the precise nature of a workers' 
class consciousness, encapsulates the concepts of productive forces and relations - 
which includes labour, capital and their inter-relationship with institutional forms, such 
as trade unions (Clements, 1977). Throughout the whole of the 1992-7, the union was 
undergoing a fundamental transformation, but whereas the union's prime aim in 1992 - 
to overthrow the apartheid state - had been clear, by 1997 its goals, whilst less 
formidable, were in many ways more complex (Interviews, 1997)
The targeting of privatisation and the 'living wage1 in 1995 may have represented a 
change of focus for the union, but in other respects illustrated a degree of continuity
the nature of which was forcing the union to confront those issues already evident in 
1992. Disturbingly, privatisation still remained a problem by 1997. Despite an initial 
commitment on the part of the ANC to public spending, it became clear that local 
government had been selected for deregulation and private finance. In 1995 - as in 
1992 - SAMWU vigorously opposed all attempts to privatise by building a campaign to 
defend local government services and jobs. In 1996, the union continued to argue that 
'the only real way to meet all elements of the RDP was to move away from reliance on 
the private sector and to focus more strongly on state-based delivery systems' (quoted 
in Hemson, 1998). The key issue was, whereas in the 1992-4 period, privatisation had 
played an prominent role within the aims and objectives of the union, by 1997, it had 
become economically and ideologically crucial to the union and its members. The 
privatisation of services now held the potential for a bitter economic and political 
engagement with the government (Hemson, 1998; van Driel 1999).
Threats to working conditions - posed by the introduction of privatisation - also served 
to highlight SAMWLTs other major area of concern: the eradication of the apartheid 
wage gap and the establishment of a "living wage" for all groups and races. Here there 
were elements of both continuity and change. The 1994 election may have heralded 
the end of political segregation but as in 1992, the economic effects of apartheid still 
predominated. Not only was the continuing apartheid wage gap an enormous obstacle 
to equality in the workplace, but the emphasis on equal terms and conditions in 1995, 
brought to the fore the changing economic and social position of the 'coloured 1 
members in Cape Town.
Yet, such aims were also dependent on the development of an effective union 
organisation. The 1995-7 period, was particularly symbolic because, unlike the early 
nineties when unions had struggled for recognition, the new state was now actively 
encouraging the role of black trade unions in the workplace. But the new legitimacy of 
the union also posed new problems. The growth in its membership, and an emphasis 
on core activities, presented fresh organisational difficulties for SAMWU, many of which 
had not been encountered before - or at least not to the same level. In 1995 the union 
began to voice concern over its ability to co-ordinate the work of the national, region
and branch organisation, in particular to service many new groups in one union. There 
was a fear- on the part of the leadership and many shop stewards interviewed - that 
the increased workload, as a result of the growing membership and increasingly 
complex procedures, was creating a potentially damaging bureaucratic organisation 
(SAMWU, Congress Reports 1997b interviews 1997).
Part of the problem was linked to the increased formalisation of the industrial relations 
system. Although the leadership continued to emphasise the importance of rank-and- 
file shop floor work, the union found its activities becoming more and more formalistic 
with the possibility of being drawn into policy-making forums at all levels. The new 
Labour Relations Act (1995) may have given SAMWU an opportunity to influence policy 
in the national decision-making forums - such as the national bargaining councils (NBC) 
- and locally in work forums; but in so doing it risked the loss of one of its greatest 
strengths, its reliance on shopfloor power. To neglect such a legacy could well threaten 
the very life blood of the union itself - and more importantly diminish its ability to fight 
privatisation and smash the apartheid wage gap (The ShopSteward,1995a).
Nonetheless, the involvement of SAMWU in the new legitimate channels of 
communication - especially formal national collective bargaining - appeared initially to 
be producing gains for their members, especially in terms of pay. However, the success 
of the formal collective negotiations needed to placed within its historical context. It 
could be argued that the securing of better terms and conditions, and a legitimate role 
in employee relations, especially in Cape Town, would scarcely have been possible, 
without the threat of exceptionally high levels of industrial action in the public sector. 
This action dated back to the early nineties.
In the past many black South African trade unions had by means of resistance, 
managed to extend *the frontiers of control 1 (Goodrich, 1975), on a whole range of 
managerial and production questions. The high levels of resistance in SAMWU during 
1995-7, seemed to indicate the remnants of such a doctrine had survived in Cape 
Town. Despite the use of formal collective bargaining, and the veneer of normality
between management-worker relations, rank-and file resistance and strike action 
continued to underscore the unions relationship with management.
Moreover, any attempts to achieve a peaceful, formal industrial relations environment, 
were in reality being seriously undermined by the ANC's neo-liberal agenda, implicit in 
the governments new 'Growth, Employment and redistribution1 policy (GEAR) - 
actively being introduced alongside the 'liberal' labour legislation. The ANC's public 
declaration in, December 1995, to privatise its services - which included subjecting the 
public sector to privatisation and wider market forces - profoundly threatened those 
efforts to achieve conciliation and partnership in the workplace (SAMWU Congress 
Report: 1997b). In the process the branch and its union were forced to re-assess their 
tactics - leading to an upsurge in resistance to employers and government in the public 
sector, between 1995-7.
Yet, the 'real' explanations for the explosion of opposition in Cape Town - and the 
public sector as whole - were not entirely straight forward. Although the dispute for 
many of the strikers was clearly one of economics - wages, conditions and job security 
- it also appeared to bring to the fore questions of control in the post-apartheid era. 
Unfortunately, with regard to all these issues very little had changed [from the 
apartheid era] for the SAMWU workers. Despite the supposed implementation of a 
new 'union - friendly' labour Act, and greater partnership in the workplace, the SAMWU 
workers' material circumstances, and in particular his or her position within the council, 
had not been significantly transformed (Interviews, 1997).
And although, initially the maintenance of wages appeared to be the common cause 
that united this group against their managers in Cape Town, the combined and 
increased repression of the bourgeoisie - around issues of apartheid and later 
privatisation - also helped to develop a collective awareness among SAMWU 
members. It was during these periods of resistance, reaching back throughout the 
whole of the period under review, that the class solidarity of SAMWU workers 
appeared to develop most. The clearest examples were found immediately after, the 
1992 strike and the industrial action taken in 1996. During these periods, interviews 
with the leadership and membership, indicated an upsurge in solidarity, not simply 
around economic concerns of pay and conditions, but more generally around political 
issues concerning anti-apartheid and state privatisation.
Therefore, despite trade unions being reformist organisations - with a tendency to 
narrow conflict down to aggressive economism (Simon, 1988; Luxemburg, 1989) - it 
was still possible, as South Africa had shown, for working-class radicalism to develop 
within its ranks. Furthermore, strikes, which arise out of the conflict within capitalism, 
often signify the beginning of more working-class struggles, opening the eyes of the 
workers to the nature not only of capitalists, but of governments also (Lenin, 1961). 
And although, strikes in of themselves will not eradicate the power of capitalism, it 
might be the case in South Africa - that during the process of resisting apartheid, low 
pay and privatisation - the municipal workers' experience of solidarity engendered a 
stronger class-cohesiveness, one that could be used to undermine the government's 
ability to implement privatisation in the public sector.
SAMWLTs continued use of industrial action was clearly at odds with the policy of its 
national federation - COSATU. Around issues of privatisation the federation had 
advised all of its public sector affiliates to engage with the government and employers, 
to develop their capacity to formulate polices on procurement, tendering and private 
sector partnerships, and to train representatives to sit on the relevant structures. As a 
consequence by 1995 SAMWLTs insistence in rejecting all types of privatisation was 
creating divisions between it and COSATU. Whereas, both organisations continued to 
voice their opposition to privatisation they now - unlike 1992 - had different perspectives 
on their interpretations of how to tackle such polices. In 1997, COSATU stated that it 
was not opposed to ^forms of partnerships with the private sector1 that were aimed at 
levering resources for'... improved and greater levels of service delivery1 . SAMWU, on 
the other hand remained adamant that it was opposed to all privatisation - irrespective 
of what form it took - and continued to devote a national anti-privatisation campaign to 
this end (Patel, 1996: COSATU - September Commission, 1997a; van Driel 1999).
The reason for COSATU's hesitation over forthright opposition to privatisation, was 
linked to its close alignment with the ANC, and its growing engagement with new 
institutional responsibilities (Barchiesi, 1999). However, COSATU^s partnership with 
the government, far from protecting labour from privatisation, appeared only to 
accelerate the negative effects of the free market on members; and eventually forced
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COSATU to concede that they, with regards to GEAR, at least needed to shift their 
strategy to one of greater opposition (COSATU's 6th National Congress Report, 
1997c).
Nonetheless, its close alliance with the ANC government, continued to make it 
increasingly difficult for COSATU to fully support the hostile rank-and file militancy being 
championed by SAMWU in 1997. As a consequence, over issues of privatisation, both 
the branch and SAMWU, remained unique and often 'out of step' with much of the rest 
of the union movement. As in 1992, what continued to distinguish this union from 
others was, the reiteration that only industrial action would stop free-market government 
policies (interviews, 1997).
In the final analysis the union's willingness to strike, even if it meant challenging the 
aims of COSATU and threatening the new government, continued to be restated by the 
leadership in 1997. In an interview with the General Secretary in September of that 
year, Roger Ronnie indicated that there would probably be no alternative, but to take 
action because the government had stopped listening to them, choosing instead to 
favour the opinions and activities of the private consultants
In South Africa there is this fear, there is this uncertainty - but more and 
more we are thinking it will have to come down to mass action. Our 
meetings with government departments have been one in which they 
listen and the moment we are out of the door they continue. 
Interview 20/8/97
However, it may well be that the resolve to resort to strike action on the part of the 
leadership, and their confidence in the membership to do so was linked to the material 
circumstances posed by privatisation - namely downsizing, retrenchments and 
outsourcing. There existed a recognition, voiced not only by the leadership, but also the 
stewards and members interviewed in 1995-7, that privatisation would lead to a gradual 
deterioration of jobs, conditions and services for the poor, and only mass action could 
force the government to abandon such policies. This certainty that they as a collective
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group would be aversely affected by such policies, was linked to the realisation 
(expressed by a number of those interviewed) that the South African state had not 
fundamentally changed. Although apartheid had been removed, the power and control 
of the present system still lay with the same managers and owners of capital who had 
previously used apartheid to exploit Black and 'coloured' workers The point was 
further reinforced by Victor - the Gauteng Regional Secretary - in 1997, who saw the 
ANCTs adoption of free-market policies like GEAR, as highly predictable because, 
contrary to popular opinion, the government had never been committed to removing the 
owners of capital, only the system of apartheid. He made the argument forcefully, that 
since the ANC was a capitalist government, one should not be surprised that South 
African state had continued to adopt capitalist policies of privatisation.
Now the reason why we have GEAR, is that within government, and 
within the ANC, and within Mandela we still have capitalism. If you 
remember in 1990 Mandela was released, he was asked the question if 
he still believed in nationalisation and he said 'No1 . He was asked that in 
1955 and he indicated he was only interested in the black 
bourgeoisie...so from that point of view, it is no surprise that the 
government and the ANC itself has moved in the direction of adopting 
the capitalist policies, and abandoned the RDP......And why one should
not be surprised at the speed the RDP has been abandoned, is that we 
have a people in government and also in the ANC that have never 
believed in the struggle to overthrow capitalism - but instead have been 
pro-capitalism and see nothing wrong with GEAR
CONCLUSION
The thesis explored the changing relationship between the public sector trade unions 
and the government in South Africa - during the historical transition of the South African 
state from 1992-7. The research was located in debates concerning the current state 
ideology and the ANC's governments apparent shift from a policy of nationalisation to 
endorsement of the Tree-market1 economy in the post apartheid period.
By 1992 the system of apartheid had been notably discredited, as a result of sustained 
political resistance and the system's inability to facilitate the capitalists' need to produce 
profits. The ANC, had emerged as a key player in the new state apparatus and 
attempted to devise policies aimed at rejuvenating a rapidly deteriorating economy. At 
the pre-election stage at least, the ANC's reconstruction plans contained a commitment 
to state economic intervention and a promise to redistribute wealth. But the 
reintegration of South Africa into global capitalism brought subsequent pressure on the 
post-apartheid African government to implement an environment, more favourable to 
business interests. As a consequence in 1994/5, the ANC, anxious to transform itself 
from an exiled liberation movement into a legitimate government, adopted the neo- 
liberal economic policy, GEAR (Growth Employment and Redistribution). This was a 
policy highly supportive of market forces, and proposing the role of the public sector 
might be reduced through privatisation.
Nonetheless, the shift to a free market ideology was fraught with difficulties. The ANC, 
due to the historical circumstances of apartheid, had pledged itself to a coalition with 
the trade union federation, COSATU, yet the rank and file membership remained 
resolutely opposed to privatisation policies. The ANC could not easily dismiss these 
objections because, for the time at least, it needed the support of the trade union to
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provide it with a level of credibility in the immediate post-apartheid period. Fortunately 
for the government, the trade union bureaucracy was willing to furnish such support in 
exchange for a place at the country^ central decision-making forums.
To secure the consent of the trade unions, a corporatist model of employee relations 
was introduced in post-apartheid South Africa. The policies - seen as a method of 
shifting the economy away from adversarial labour relations by placating a strong 
labour movement - were not unconditional. In return for encouraging union-employer 
social contracts, the new government expected the trade union leadership to concede 
to a deregulated, flexible labour market. Ultimately the changes raised fundamental 
questions about the nature of the ^new1 state and whether the trade unions would - or 
could - resist their free market policies.
In order to address this question, the final chapter of the dissertation, firstly summarises 
the case study and the main questions that emerged from it with regard to the state 
and trade unions. It then subsequently revisits the conceptual framework, with a view 
to answering these questions, and refining the theoretical understanding of the 
changing relationship between the state and public sector unions.
In an attempt to expound these issues, the study of the Cape Town branch of the 
municipal union - SAMWU - was considered useful. The distinctive features of this 
branch made it inherently important as a focus for study. Its characteristics helped to 
demonstrate the complexities of the changing relationship between the state and public 
sector trade unionists. The value of studying SAMWU in this area was multi-faceted, 
not only did the case study serve to illustrate the labyrinthine nature of apartheid - and 
the multiple functions it historically performed for the state and capitalism in South 
Africa - but it also took account of the state's on-going free market policies of 
privatisation and commercialisation, and their continuing threats to the public sector.
Cape Town, the founder branch of SAMWU, illustrated well the contradictions and 
inconsistencies propagated within the apartheid system. The experiences of racial 
segregation in this region controlled and shaped the lives of its (almost exclusively)
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'coloured' membership by offering concessions and privileges over Africans on the one 
hand, whilst continuing to discriminate and oppress its members on the other. Yet, 
such a brutal racist regime did not go entirely unchallenged, the union with its stewards 
and rank and file members constituted one of the pivotal forces against apartheid in the 
Western Cape during the this period.
Nonetheless, this branch was also different primarily because its resistance did not 
remain confined to fighting apartheid. The union and its members had consistently - 
since the policy was originally introduced by the apartheid government in the 1980s - 
recognised and resisted the dangers of local government privatisation. With the 
abolition of apartheid it was hoped that such polices would disappear but - with 
attempts by the new black leadership to attract inward investment - the South African 
government began adopting strategies commonly associated with the free market 
policies of Thatcherism' and Japanese flexible labour practices. More significantly, 
public sector shop stewards and members, previously nurtured in the skills of militancy 
and disruption, were now being asked to respond to such initiatives with compliance 
and co-operation.
The essential questions that arose from these observations was whether SAMWU, as 
an affiliate of COSATU, would reject strategies of co-operation and conciliation and 
choose instead, as it had done so under apartheid, rank and file resistance as the main 
agency for opposing state policies of privatisation. This in turn posed a further related 
question, linked to whether the state would be free to respond positively to this 
resistance if the alternative economic policies being advocated by labour, differed 
fundamentally from those of global capitals'.
Although no clear answers were immediately forthcoming by 1997, the case study 
description and analysis did provide a useful vehicle to explore further the theory of the 
state and its inter-relationship with the trade unions. The overall deliberation had 
generated questions related to two areas, which needed attention in the dissertation:
1) The state:
  whether the state was free to decide its own national policy if it differed from 
global capital
  or more theoretically whether a state's political superstructure could ever be 
independent of the capitalist economic system?
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2) The trade unions:
whether the public sector trade unions (in this case the Cape Town branch of 
SAMWU) had the collective strength, leadership and organisation capable, of 
utilising resistance (conflict) to stop local government privatisation and 
deregulation. Which was linked to the question of........
whether the peculiarly skewed membership (mainly 'coloured') would affect the 
members' class consciousness, and as a consequence its ability to use 
resistance to stop privatisation. Which prompted the further question of....
whether trade unions could realistically improve their members' material 
circumstances by the use of corporatist agreements with governments?
The following sections consider these two areas and attempt to address the related 
questions, in the process of refining the theoretical understanding of the relationship 
between the state and public sector trade unions in South Africa.
The thesis used the Marxist method of historical materialism to explain the changing 
relationship between the state and public sector unions in South Africa. In sum it was 
the shifts in the mechanism of bourgeois/capitalist control that accounted for the recent 
actions of the state and its public sector trade unions. To explain more fully, Marx, 
identified material production as the dynamic in society - it was the adoption of new 
tools, technologies, or forces of production that produced new and different 'relations', 
or modes of regulation. Nevertheless, the relationship is not simple, such changes in 
the various modes of regulation of capitalism are also founded on the tensions and 
contradictions intrinsic to the capital-labour relations.
An understanding of these contradictions rests on an acceptance of the social world as 
being, not an aggregate of unconnected happenings but a totality. Such a Marxist, 
dialectical approach relies on the historical understanding of all the parts and relations 
of the present system. As Hegel wrote Things and events only become 
comprehensible when set in the context of the web of relationships that bind them 
together into a single interconnected whole (Hegel, 1977, s20, p. 11). This totality is a 
contradictory one - the essence of dialectical thinking consisting of the recognition that
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the conflict and struggle contained within the contradiction, is at the root of all 
movement. It is only in so far that there is a contradiction that anything moves. For Marx 
these contradictions were located in the tendency of the prevailing social relations of 
production to become a fetter on the further expansion of productive forces, and in the 
class struggle which develops within the framework of the conflict between exploiters 
and exploited (Harman, 1991). These contradictions between the forces and relations 
of production, and between classes are the driving forces of social transformation, and 
are central to understanding why capitalism and its states - as part of that system - 
changes. Such an analysis helps us to develop an understanding of the nature of the 
state and trade unions in South Africa from 1992-7.
The conceptual framework, developed in the literature review (Chapter 3), had 
previously theorised the (class) nature of the state as a means of explaining not only 
why the South African state changed its policy, but also the levels of freedom the 
government might have to decide those policies. The study began by reviewing the 
literature and deducing that the modem nation state, in this case the South African 
state, remained relevant and intrinsic to capitalism. It was only with the development of 
modem capitalist society that the division of labour and differentiation of social 
institutions had reached their highest point yet, and now more than at any other time, 
needed to be underpinned by the political structures of the state.
15. 4.1 'State derivation' debate
In keeping with this analysis the dissertation held that the materialist approach to the 
subject, offered by the * state derivation' theory - promoted by Bonefield and 
Holloway,1996 ; Bumham, 1996; Bumham, 2001; and Holloway and Picciotto, 1980 - 
provided a further discerning evaluation of the state and its actions. The 'state 
derivation 1 theorists viewed the different parts of the system not as things but as 
relations - relations that involved the exploitation of labour at the point of production. 
Yet, to explain the relative freedom the state appeared to occasionally enjoy from 
economics, it identified two totally distinct logics within capitalism - the rule of law, and 
the rule of money - two capital 'forms' enjoying a separate existence whilst springing
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logically and historically from the nature of that relation - a sort of 'two heads on one 
body1 .
However, the dissertation remained critical of the * state deviation' theorists for several 
related reasons. Firstly, the level of abstraction of the theory means the state is only 
ever conceptualised as one single form. Secondly - and this is linked to the problem 
of abstraction identified in the first criticism - because the theory perceives a structural 
differentiation between the state and business as a point of principle - its forms being 
separate but equal - difficulty is found in locating the precise causal links between their 
two respective modes of regulation (the rule of law, and the rule of money). This makes 
it hard to identify the reasons for the shift in regulation from one to the other, in this 
case the shift from state regulation to free market privatisation. More especially, the 
emphasis on the distinctiveness of the two separate modes of regulation, rules out the 
possibility of the two modes of regulation ever merging - or the state ever acting as 
capital. Which makes [the concept of] different types of states, such as Nazi Germany 
or Soviet Russia - when the two modes of regulation did in fact merge - impossible to 
theorise. Thirdly - and finally - for the 'state derivation' theorists (in particular 
Holloway and Bonefield, 1996) the policy of the state is the result of class struggle, the 
state being an aspect of the capital relations, and that in of itself a relation of class 
struggle. But herein lies 'part' of the problem because such an approach only allows for 
'part' of the answer - it only recognises the capital-labour relations. Although the 'state 
derivation' approach takes account of the essential 'vertical' capital-labour relationship it 
neglects the 'horizontal' struggles between exploiters (capitalists), and even between 
the states themselves (Catchpowle, Cooper and Wright, 1999).
In order to address these related points it is essential, firstly to identify the basic 
impasse in the 'state derivation' analysis, the nature of which lies in its inappropriate 
level of abstraction that defines separate modes of regulation and results in the state 
being perceived in the singular. However, as Barker (1978 p.118) argues, capitalism is 
not made up of a singular model of the state, it is in fact a world system of states, with 
any discussion of its form having to take account of the state both as an apparatus of 
class domination, as well as the state as an apparatus of competition, between 
segments of the bourgeoisie. Indeed it is the set of very different nation-states that 
make up the "international political community" of world capitalism. The nation-state 
system is a product of development, and is global in scope, in just the same way that 
capital (as a social relation) is.
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To explain more fully, it might be better to consider firstly the nature of capital, which 
according to Marx (Marx 1973,p.421) can only exist as many capitals, through the 
interaction between many capitals, The capital relation is not just alienated, exploited 
relations at the point of the production (Marx, 1976, p.477), it is a summary expression 
for the whole nexus of social relation, founded in the production of surplus-value, 
embodied in the whole circuit of capital. This circuit of capital then is more than the 
*moment1 of capitalist production, it is also the other 'moments' of the capital circuit 
(exchange, realisation, price formation etc) (Barker, 1978, p120). Therefore, a single 
universal capital is a contradiction in terms, it is the characteristic of capitalism that it 
develops through competition where competition is the source and expression of the 
anarchy of capitalism. The social relation of capital has the dual form: anarchy and 
despotism - between many capitals there is anarchy, within each capital despotism.
Now if capital relations have this form, so too does the state, the state is also part of 
that anarchy and despotism. The very form of the state expresses the fact that the 
capitalist state is not something above and separate from the relations of capitalist 
production, but is itself directly part of those relations. But equally, because the state is 
not one singular state, it can never represent the ^ whole1 bourgeoisie. The 
bourgeoisie like the proletariat is an international class, and so a single state cannot 
manage the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie, it is only part of some capital(s), a 
segment of the whole of the bourgeoisie. Individual states are part of a capitalist state 
system, with different states taking different forms, due to being shaped by a fusion or 
mobilisation of a particular segment of the bourgeoisie, and other classes, into a nation, 
formed moreover in opposition to other states (Barker, 1978).
What is crucial to remember is that in the process of accumulation, not all states adopt 
methods of capital accumulation in the same way, capitalism is characteristically 
uneven. In the past century there has been those states which have been totally 
centralised into one nation state capital (such as Stalinist Russia); and more commonly 
national states of western capitalism, around which are formed, more or less articulated 
and enlarged blocks of capital, which are either direct legal property of the state (such 
as nationalised industries in the 1970s), or (more usually now) effectively state property, 
given their dependence on the state for investment capital, orders etc. (Barker, 1978, 
p123). In the case of South Africa, although the state remains a part of capital - with 
failure, to adapt to the constantly changing conditions and ideology necessary to create
the surplus for capital accumulation, resulting ultimately in the collapse of that state - it 
does not mean that it adopts that model of capital accumulation in exactly the same 
way and pace, as other states. It is in fact influenced by its competitive relationships 
with other capitals and states, and the balance of class forces within that country, 
which effects the method of class domination it chooses.
That brings us to the second criticism, (although linked essentially to the first). Here 
the level of abstraction in the theory, which attempts to define - however tenuously - 
separate forms of capital, makes it also difficult to locate the precise causal links 
between their two respective modes of regulation. What this conveys, even if 
unintentionally, is the political form is in some way separate from the basic relations of 
capitalism, and as such distinctive from the business of 'economic exploitation'. Yet, as 
events in South African from 1992-7 have shown, both the apartheid and post- 
apartheid state and their political forms are not independent from their economic base, 
in reality they can never escape from their role of maintaining the overall conditions for 
capital accumulation. The state, along with everyone else is dependent upon the 
activities of capitalism for its revenue. There is a structural dependence of the state on 
capitalism, even when the state seems to be in charge, even when economics and 
politics are fused - as in Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia.
More directly though, what in fact this separation between economic and political does 
is rule out theoretically, the state ever acting as capital. In particular it fails to 
acknowledge the tendency, particularly within 20th century capitalism, for capital to be 
organised directly by nation-states, by taking the form of state capital, or to put it more 
simply, it fails to acknowledge the many different ways states adopt methods of 
capital accumulation. In actual fact it is only by rejecting the distinctiveness - however 
ambiguous - between the separate capital 'forms', that one can find the causes for the 
shift in state regulation and policy, from the 'rule of law' to the 'rule of money'. But, 
because the state derivation theorists analysis continues to treat the state as external to 
the process of accumulation (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977, p96), it quite simply 
prevents them from recognising that it is the bourgeoisie's competitive struggles, with 
other bourgeoisie, other nations, other capitals - which shapes the structure of any 
particular nation-state, and forces it to shift its policies and actions.
This brings us to a third, but once again related criticism - the 'state derivation' 
theorists" neglect of the "horizontal" relations between and within capitalism. Such a
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view can lead to the unintentional neglect of the totality, a concept central to the 
dialectical method of analysis outlined above. The "vertical" relationship between labour 
and capital are not the only relations to consider, the "horizontal" relations between and 
within capitals also constitute an essential element, and although founded on - and 
subjected to - the basic tensions and contradictions intrinsic to the capitalism, it still 
needs to be recognised.
The totality of the dialectic dictates that the state policy cannot be understood 
independently of other relations, the activities of labour are not self-contained practices, 
the labour-capital relation is not the only influence on the state - the relations 
(competition) within and between the capitalist classes - and between states 
themselves - also has an impact. However, with the state derivation theory the world 
market appears only as afterthought (in particular Holloway and Picciotto, 1977 p.93), it 
is not central to the analysis of the state and its relation to capital (Barker, 1978)
However, what had become apparent in South Africa by 1997, was that the ANC's 
political and economic relations were now unquestionably tied up with those of 
capitalism - and any developments or changes in that system, in the competition 
between the bourgeoisie (national and international), between firms (national and 
international) and different world states, were bound to have an impact on the 
government and its freedom to decide policy. In particular, the intense global market 
pressures which were propelling changes in relations and activities between firms 
world-wide, were also forcing a shift in world ideology - one that favoured and 
accommodated free market needs - and one that South Africa, as always part of the 
capitalist system, may adapt to in its own peculiar way, but could not afford to ignore.
Therefore, in keeping with the totality of relationships, relationships within and between 
capitals, states, and bourgeoisie also have to be considered, all of which have an 
impact on the form that the state takes. Each productive capital may be seen as 
growing up within the confines of a particular state or territory, but they grow up 
alongside other capitals. They are all mutually dependent on each other for resources, 
finances and markets, and act together to try to shape the social and political conditions 
to suit their purposes -they inevitably become what Marx described as ^warring 
brothers'. The specific character of each capital is influenced by its interaction with the 
other capitals - they boost their competitive positions by establishing alliances both with 
each other and prestigious figures. Furthermore, such co-operative relations do not
exist in a vacuum - "struggles" between rival exploiters, both nationally and 
internationally are also part of the relationship (Harman, 1991 ;Ruigrok and van Tudler, 
1995).
Yet because productive capital grows up within the confines of a particular territory - 
along side other capitals - the nation state and different nationally based capitals are 
intertwined with - and dependent on - each other. The one is not independent of the 
other, whereas states are dependent on the surplus created by capitalism, capitals are 
equally bound up with states. Individual capitals may be able to uproot themselves 
temporary from nation state and settle in another, but in truth it cannot operate for long 
without having some nation state (or states) to support them. Capital is not increasingly 
dispensing with the services of the nation state, multi-nationals still need a 'national 
base1 to operate from, the state still plays a key role in establishing and maintaining key 
firms, providing the necessary home base for research and development, specialist 
skills and education, beneficial laws and finance etc. (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; 
Ruigrok and van Tudler, 1995)
And precisely because states and capitals can influence, are influenced by each other - 
are dependent and inter-dependent - they are affected by the same crises (Ruigrok and 
van Tudler, 1995). Recently, (the relations of) competition between firms have been 
changing - partly as a result of the economic crisis since the 1970s and 80s, which 
helped create more intense market pressures. Changes in the material production and 
accumulation by firms, the increased coercion between businesses as they search for 
new sources of profits, has made competition between capitals more acute. That said, 
there is nothing new in these changes, the contradictory exploitative relationship at the 
root of capitalism, as it strives for never-ending profits and accumulation means the 
system is always transforming itself. Capitals are part of a global system whose logic 
forces individual capitals to continually adopt new methods of achieving profits and 
accumulation.
But as a consequence - and as a result - of the recent economic changes, governments 
have found it progressively more difficult to try to 'manage1 its own national economy - 
although, controlling their national capitals has always been problematic for states. 
Failure to handle the constant restructuring and periodic recessions has meant that 
states have retreated from promises to do so and have returned to talking about market 
forces. The changes have led to a shift in ideology in favour of the free market, a trend
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from which even the South African state - with its interesting mixture of corporatism and 
privatisation - has not been exempt from in the post-apartheid era.
Consequently, the changes in (the relations of) competition between firms have an 
impact on the South African state and its actions - and accounted for the ANC 
governments' shift in 1995 to another mode of regulation, essentially a shift to the 'rule 
of money' and the free market. Because of the structural inter-dependence between 
states and capitals, the ways in which capitals are being forced, locally and 
internationally - as a result of changes in competition within capitals - to (re)organise 
their methods of production, influenced the South African governments actions both in 
1992 and 1997. Such changes forced the National Party to retreat from apartheid and 
adopt the ideology of the free market. Likewise the ANC government was obliged to 
shift its position in favour of the market. It was precisely because the state's relations 
were intrinsically tied up with those of capitalism, that changes in relations within and 
between capitals also impacted on the relations within and between the state and 
capitals - bringing about a change in state regulation in favour of the market and the 
'rule of money'. Consequently, the changes in the form of, and relation between capital 
(due to changes in the world economy) can also have a bearing on government policy.
Therefore, directly because the South African state was part of - and integral to - the 
capitalism system, changes in the relations between capitals, both domestically and 
globally, were bound to affect the relations between the government and these capitals. 
And, although the ANC badly needed to adopt corporatist policies in order to contain 
the resistance from a strong trade union movement - it was still being pressurised by 
international capital, and its own domestic capitals to abandon such social democratic 
policies and shift to state regulation in favour of the market and the 'rule of money1 
(Catchpowle and Cooper, 1999).
To conclude, in response to the analysis developed by the 'state derivation ' theorists, 
the theory provided a useful tool, but for the reasons outlined, neglected the state's 
basic structural dependence on capitalism. This was perceived by the author as chiefly 
linked to the theory's level of abstraction which neglected not only to recognise, the 
different forms the nation-state can take in its pursuit of capital accumulation; but also 
failed to conceptualise, that the two modes of regulation - rule of money and rule of law 
were not -however tenuously - separate, and could in fact merge. Finally by only 
recognising the vertical relations between 'labour and capital' it neglected the concept
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of the 'totality' contained within the historical materialist approach, which demands that 
all relations - capital, state and labour- should be considered. Ultimately, the models 
and actions of the nation states can not be understood in isolation, the Marxist method 
of dialectical materialism requires that all relations should be understood in relation to 
each other. All are structurally and mutually intertwined with each other and what drives 
society as a whole, namely the changes in the 'forces of production 1 that presently 
creates the profits and capital accumulation in a capitalist society.
  In sum, the answer to the original question, of whether the state is free to decide its 
own policy if it differs from global capital - or more directly whether the political 
superstructure of the state can ever be independent of the capitalist economic 
system - must be (as derived from the theoretical discussion) no. True, it might be 
possible for the state to adopt its methods in different ways, or at a different pace, 
but ultimately, if it neglects to conform to the global system whose logic continually 
forces individual states to adopt new methods of capital accumulation, it will not 
survive.
But what does this mean for trade unions like SAMWU if the South African state can 
never be independent of capitalism? Is it pointless for it to pressurise the government 
to abandon privatisation, especially as the current 'forces and relations of production' 
and ultimately profits continue to be governed by the free market ideology? Dialectical 
Materialism provides an answer. In keeping with the principle of the 'totality' - and as a 
consequence still recognising the power of the changing relationships between capitals, 
and their ultimate impact on states - the vertical relationship between capital and labour 
still remains crucial.
More especially, the 'contradictory1 element of the system is important and can impact 
on the relations between capitals and states, and within capitals - especially as relations 
within and between capitals and states are usually bound up with exploitative relations 
between classes and the process for surplus extraction. It is only when we consider 
relations between labour and capital - along with relations within capitals and between 
capitals and states, that we begin to fully understand the actions and freedoms of the 
South African state (Rees, 1998; Cooper et a/., 2000).
334
In essence it is the basis of this exploitative, conflictual relationship within capitalism 
that has the potential - within the dialectic - to create movement and change .Moreover, 
it was this exploitative relationship, which helped to create, in the case of South 
Africa, a level of collective consciousness amongst workers in Cape Town - which in 
turn originated the momentum to resist privatisation. Therefore, the question of 
whether SAMWU would be capable of utilising resistance to stop privatisation was 
directly linked to the levels of class consciousness and solidarity within this group.
What the case study revealed was a level - albeit at this stage, uneven and 
contradictory - of a class-consciousness amongst the SAMWU workers in Cape Town. 
But as Gramsci explained, to understand the uneven consciousness of workers it is 
important to embrace all aspects of society, all dimensions of human existence, and 
social relations. Like Marx, Gramsci used a totalising' theory which incorporated all 
areas of society within a historical framework. He used the notion of Ensemble of 
relations'ihai assimilated all economics, politics, culture, social relations, ideology etc 
(Boggs,1976; Simon, 1988). On reflection although, the brief analysis of the social, 
political and economic environment of the region - was not adequate enough to fully 
measure the Cape Town members^ level of class consciousness - it did at least provide 
some insight.
15.5.1 Issues of race
The issue of class and collective consciousness within this group was inherently tied 
up with the issues of race, in particular the Coloured identity'. This ^ coloured' 
community in South Africa have historically held a position between whites and blacks, 
with 'coloureds' generally enjoying a marked material and social advantage over 
blacks, which appears to have influenced their political affinity with the NP, and 
prevented class solidarity with the majority of the black population in South Africa.
The dissertation has from the beginning conceptualised apartheid and the issues of 
race as a function of capitalism (Leggasick, 1974; Wolpe, 1975; Callinicos, 1986). The 
reality of the Western Cape, a region that had been subject to the longest continuous 
colonial occupation since 1652, makes a complete nonsense - with its blending of 
descendants of the original Khoisan inhabitants, Xhosa-speaking Africans, Malay 
slaves, Indian traders and indentured labourers, Dutch settlers and French Huguenot
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refugees - of the apartheid regimes' cultural and racial classification of a separate 
'coloureds' identity (Callinicos, 1986). A pertinent foundation for social analysis in this 
area can be framed as racial division helping to facilitate capitalist growth in South 
Africa, by securing a cheap, weak divided labour force, which assured for the white 
bourgeoisie a material and political advantage.
Further proof that the white bourgeoisie only utilised apartheid for the benefit of 
capitalism, can be perceived from Botha's (South African President) willingness to 
abandon the ideology of race, if it meant preserving the economy's ability to create 
profits. In 1983 - in a response to international criticism and capital flight from the 
country - Botha was willing to desert the long-standing principles of apartheid, by 
granting limited 'power sharing' with 'coloured' leaders, and granting concessions to 
skilled black workers. In both cases he changed the legislation, in order to create a 
tricameral parliament for 'coloureds1 and Indians, and to grant rights of residence in 
urban areas for skilled Africans. The aim was to replace legal racial discrimination, with 
the internationally more defensible socio-economic inequalities, which it was hoped 
would cut across the black-white divide, and replace race with class as the main 
antagonism (Callinicos, 1988 p147)
Unfortunately, the use that capitalism made of the race ideology - the direct links 
between racism and capitalism in South Africa - meant the demise of white rule was 
unlikely to signal the end of economic inequality. Whereas a change in the regime may 
have taken place in South Africa in 1994, the mass of workers, not just in the Western 
Cape but South Africa as a whole, have yet to see any significant improvement in their 
lives. It follows that while it proved possible in the end, to remove the political 
institutions of apartheid from the capitalist framework, the social and economic 
inequality, remained (Callinicos, 1996). Consequently, whereas the courage and 
political sacrifice of Mandela and ANC leaders are not in question, the failure of the 
ANC to pursue any real attempt to transform society - other than tokenistic attempts of 
affirmative action and black empowerment - has meant the socio-economic position of 
the 'coloured1 community - along with many Africans - has not changed. The result 
being 'coloureds' in Cape Town continued to retreat to racial discrimination, in a 
pathetic effort to boost their relatively poor position in the economy.
and in response to the question of whether the peculiarly skewed
f coloured') membership would affect the members' class consciousness, undoubtedly
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the preservation of a 'coloured' identity in the region, had (and has) the potential to 
negate against the SAMWU workers ability to develop a collective consciousness and 
solidarity to fight against privatisation.
Nevertheless, an understanding of this groups collective and class-consciousness, 
should not simply be confined to an analysis of being 'coloured', a further measure can 
be gleamed from the members' interaction with the Cape Town branch itself. The 
dissertation traced the progression of Cape Town, from a small, yet significant branch 
to one of immense importance, capable of influencing and originating national 
leadership and policy. It continued to measure (however inadequate given the limited 
time period under review) whether the branch within the context of the union, would not 
only have the structure, organisation, leadership and collective strength to resist local 
government privatisation, but whether these factors would sufficiently interact with each 
other, in order to do so successfully? The issues of conflict and conciliation were 
crucial to the discussion. The case study attempted to provide an understanding of 
such elements whilst continuing to reflect on the contradictions prevalent in the relations 
between capital and labour in South Africa, generally.
Conflict
A comprehension of conflict in South Africa was linked to an understanding of the 
relatively spontaneous development of mass struggles around apartheid, and the 
subsequent protests emerging around the apartheid wage gap, and privatisation. Both 
being examples of when the underlying conflict between capital46 and labour had 
surfaced during the 1992-7 period under review. Yet it also recognised that the power 
and success of such activities hinged on the balance of class forces, the leadership and 
the organisation through which class consciousness could be strengthened and 
articulated (Callinicos, 1999).
In the midst of this scenario the historical power of the mass struggles in South Africa 
and the effective leadership were central. Whereas it might be true that, the leadership 
and mass strikes had failed to bring about a revolutionary change in South African
46 This obviously includes the local South African state, since the state is theorized as an integral part of capital
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society - they had nevertheless been central to bringing an end to one of the most 
repressive ideologies and regimes of the twentieth century - apartheid. It could not be 
denied, that it was the strength and endurance of the black organised labour that had 
first brought de Klerk to the negotiating table. Furthermore, the events and interviews in 
the 1992-7 period, continued to reveal a confidence in such strikes to bring about 
change - which in turn could be interpreted as a level of collective consciousness - 
however uneven and confusing - in Cape Town. Many of the Coloured' members and 
stewards when asked - in 1993 - what they were fighting for, made it clear they 
wanted more than just new laws and constitutions, they wanted to change their lives 
dramatically. Some were prepared to put it into more theoretical terms saying they had 
been fighting for socialism as well as national liberation. More especially, a number of 
SAMWU shop stewards and rank-and-file members, interviewed in both 1993 and 97, 
believed that strike action and other forms of resistance, were the only ways to stop 
privatisation. And why should they doubt it - especially as many had already witnessed 
mass action bringing an end to the almighty power of apartheid? Such views help to 
support Gramscrs argument that the ideological domination of the capitalist class 
remained precarious - resting as it does on a relative balance of rival conceptions of the 
world, on the part of the working classes.
although it was impossible in 1997 to conclude whether the branch, 
indeed the union as a whole, would have the leadership and organisation to 
complement the collective strength of the membership to successfully resist 
privatisation, the actions taken and comments made by both the leadership (General 
Secretary, Regional secretary etc.) and members (interviewed in Cape Town and 
Gauteng), appeared to indicate this was the case. The re-organisation of the union in 
order to remain rooted in rank-and-file activity, the campaigns instigated to fight 
privatisation (often in isolation of COSATU), the declared intention to use strike action 
to stop privatisation, all seemed to imply that the union leadership and its members 
(interviewed), at the very least, had confidence in the collective strength of SAMWU to 
resist local government privatisation
Conciliation
Yet equally the involvement and success of mass action are not the only impact on 
levels of collective and class consciousness, other elements need to be considered 
during this period. Essentially the issues of the COSATU leadership and formal
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organisation could not be ignored. In South Africa, all trade union organisations were 
becoming increasingly sophisticated and formalised - with some form of 
accommodation taking place between employers, labour and their organisations. In 
particular, the COSATU leadership appeared to be viewing a partnership between 
labour, the state and employers as essential, especially as they moved further from a 
potential revolutionary union activity towards formal bureaucratic accommodation. 
(Ajulu, 1993; Murray, 1994).
As explained in the conceptual framework, the establishment of a constitutional 
democracy had obviously created some of the necessary conditions for the emergence 
of a strong and 'civilising' civil society. But the incorporation of the trade unions - as a 
branch of civil society - into the state through forums such as NEDLAC, was also a 
source of concern for a number of stewards interviewed in SAMWU. Many feared 
corporatist institutions would erode their Veal' power base, rooted in the rank and file 
mass struggle. More especially, the use of state institutionalised regulation might 
possibly be used to conceal the centrality of conflict - the real driving force of change - 
in the fundamental structures of capitalist relations of production (Hyman, 1975).
In contrast Schreiner (1994), argued that (left) anti-corporatism was misfounded, 
because of its infantile leftism and workerism. Instead, as outlined in the literature 
review, he saw a role for the market, running along side the corporatist experiments. 
Although he and other advocates of tri-partism, social contracts, and centralised 
bargaining, recognised there were dangers, they were seen as being outweighed by 
the tactics of mobilisation, consultation, participation, and by remaining accountable 
and democratic (Gall, 1997).
Nevertheless, even a 'modified' corporatist model still involves imposing certain social 
priorities on the market, which in turn would entail establishing a new accumulation 
strategy for capitalism with state-directed investment towards manufacturing and social 
infrastructure, and improvements in living standards (Callinicos, 1992b). The essential 
problem as Gall (1997) explains, is trying to make the South African economy more 
productive so as to provide resources for such social progress within a capitalist local 
and world order. Inevitably, workers will be made to make unacceptable sacrifices over 
the extent and pace of the progress of the project. Equally, such a national 
accumulation strategy fails to recognise that the South Africa state is part of an 
international world market, subject to the pressures and competition from international
and national bourgeoisie and firms, as well as other states themselves (Barker, 1987). 
Already, despite a long established model of co-determination, the far wealthier 
German state is under competitive pressure from its own bourgeoisie, firms and 
international states to engage in a process of restructuring, with employers introducing 
new working arrangements, detrimental to labour (Upchurch, 2000).
Almost certainly then, reformist experiments of corporatism, will force the South African 
trade union bureaucracy to concede ever greater concessions to the market, in return 
for apparent partnership arrangements with capital and the state. Such a relationship 
can be highly restrictive - even going as far as forcing the leadership to discipline their 
own powerful rank-and-file membership, should they threaten disruption (Palmer, 
1983). As Fine (1992), suggests ^democratic corporatism' may be seen as a way of 
empowering civil society, but its true purpose is usually to formalise the participation of 
interests which already have power, and whose demands the state needs to 
incorporate, if it is to safeguard the interests of capitalism effectively.
Consequently, it might be necessary to query whether the mechanism of social contract 
and partnerships can ever actually lead to a shift in the balance of power, favouring 
labour over capital (Kelly, 1988). Moreover, in the case of South Africa, the concern still 
remains over whether the COSATU leadership - once institutionally involved in 
corporatist structures - would be forced to take joint responsibility for the consequences 
of the state's shift to the free-market. Repercussions from such actions may lead to 
criticism and loss of support from their membership. Trade unions - then failing to bind 
their constituents to negotiated agreements - may find employers abandoning 
partnerships agreements, and resorting all the more easily to ever more repressive 
means of controlling a now, weaker disillusioned workforce (Friedman and Reitzes, 
1996; Gall, 1997).
although in 1997, it was too soon to speculate whether trade unions- and the 
Cape Town branch in particular - could realistically improve their members material 
circumstances by use of corporatist agreements with the government (in return for an 
acquiescence to free market principles as Schreiner suggests) many SAMWU leaders 
and members interviewed from 1992-7 believed it could not. A number of leaders and 
members interviewed, even predicted that such experiments would eventually lead to 
the demise of the collective strength of the South African trade unions .
In sum, when addressing the general questions associated with the changing 
relationship between the government and public sector trade unions, the case study of 
SAMWU provided a useful tool for furthering the analysis of the state and its trade 
unions. Whereas, in 1997 it was impossible to answer irrefutably whether SAMWU 
would reject co-operation and conciliation, and choose instead rank- and- file resistance 
to oppose state policies of privatisation, it was possible to deduce that the recent strong 
bureaucratisation of trade unions - linking increased formalisation, social contracts and 
partnerships - had done little to prevent free market ideologies and practices from 
being introduced in the workplace. Yet, whether SAMWU, would opt decisively for 
strategies of strikes and resistance, would in the final analysis be inescapably tied to 
the levels of collective and class consciousness - and its links to an effective leadership 
and organisation. At this point, the empirical data from the case study, indicated all 
three areas were uncertain and indeterminate. However, it was possible to conclude 
theoretically, that the pressure for resistance would continue (as was the case during 
apartheid) to rest on the workforce's collective confidence in its own ability to challenge 
the hegemony of both the state and the trade union bureaucracy (Ronnie, 1996; 
Miliband, 1983).
Whether the state would be free to respond to this resistance, if the alternative 
economic policies advocated differed fundamentally from those of global capitals, was a 
further related question. The answer was once again linked to the contradictory nature 
of capitalism and the balance of class forces. The theoretical conclusion of this thesis, 
was the state was not independent of capitalism, that it - along with business and 
labour - was ultimately bound up with the relations of capital. And whilst the state's 
material relationship with capitalism meant it was not a mere reflection of the economic 
base - being able to influence and be influenced by capitalism - it was still not free 
from the means and relations of production, on account of being dependent on the 
surplus produced under that system.
Nevertheless, as an integral part of capitalism it was also bound up with the 
'contradictions' of capitalism, found within the exploitative relations between capital and 
labour. Such 'contradictions' are important because they influence the levels of 
conflict within society, which is the engine for changing the balance of class forces, and
subsequent system. In this process the role of the state is crucial because its central 
function is to control any major threat to the power of the capitalist classes. 
Consequently, although it may frequently force labour to undertake policies that 
continue to support the dominance of the surplus-appropriating classes it may also - 
due to being directly enmeshed in the class contradictions of capitalism - choose to 
meet the challenge of labour by seeking reform and compromise in order to minimise 
the resistance to capitalism.
As a consequence, the ANC government - as an integral part of capitalism - could not 
afford, long term at least, to ignore the class threat posed by an increasingly strong 
trade union, like SAMWU. Especially as the exploitative relationship between labour 
and capital, being pushed to the fore on account of changing conditions and ideologies 
in capitalism, would be sure to mean that the traditionally volatile South African 
industrial relations environment, would remain a contested terrain (Goodrich, 1975) 
long after 1997.
In short as to whether the state would respond to public sector union pressure to 
abandon privatisation, the answer in 1997 remained inconclusive, but any future 
deduction would almost certainly rely on continually analysing all the parts of the 
relationships within capitalism. The 'contradictory' element of the system between 
labour and capital would remain important, but so too would the relations between and 
within capitals and states and even the local and international bourgeoisie - as they 
are all bound up with exploitative relations between classes and the process for 
surplus extraction. It is only when relations within and between capitals, between 
capitals and states, and between states themselves - along with relations between 
labour and capital - are surveyed together, that we begin to fully understand the 
balance of class forces and how it might effect the South African state and its actions 
towards business and trade unions. In conclusion, it only the interaction of all parties - 
historically overtime - that can give rise to a qualitatively new situation. In a dialectical 
system, the entire nature of the part can only be understood by its relationships with 
other parts. It is only when we bring the parts into relation with each other, overtime, 
that their real meaning is perceived and the situation transformed (Rees, 1998; Cooper 
efa/.,2000).
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Throughout the rest of the millennium the ANC remained committed to privatisation. 
In the year 2000 the ANC leader, President Mbeki felt confident and bold enough to 
announce that the country was in a better position to tackle poverty and mass 
unemployment because of the partnership between public and private sectors 
(Mckinley, 2000). SAMWU and many other unions disagreed, they remained 
convinced that the involvement of the private sector had resulted in dire 
consequences for their members and users of public services (WM&G, 2001 a)
In 1998 a programme of privatisation had been enthusiastically introduced in 
Johannesburg (van Driel,1999). Despite union protests the Johannesburg City 
Council remained determined to implement its "Igoli 2002" masterplan . The 
transformation scheme entailed a privatisation drive set to commercialise water, 
sanitation, electricity, waste management, parks and cemeteries , the civic theatre, 
the zoo, metro bus service, and the fresh produce market. The council also 
identified specific plans to cut 40% of the workforce - of the 27,000 workers only 
15,000 were to be left, once privatisation has been completed (WM&G, 2000). The 
decision was endorsed by the ANC, whose Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, had 
agreed to provide R550 million to the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, 
on condition that the iGoli 2002 plan continued (Davis, 2000).
A further Unicity plan was introduced in Cape Town. Plans to restructure the City 
were designed by a team of consultants with no input from the unions or community 
groups (Services for All, Sept. 2000, p.6). In March 2000, the Democratic Alliance 
controlled council unveiled its plans to "corporatise" Cape Town's water and 
sanitation, electricity, and solid waste disposal services. Senior council sources told 
the Mail & Guardian, that they had opted for the corporatist route because this would 
be more palatable to the unions, than privatisation in its pure form. However they 
intended, once the new business units were established, to involve the private 
sector (Streek, 2001).
Opposition to such privatisation plans has since led to a series of protests, 
occupations, and a wave of industrial action, on the part of SAMWU and other 
unions. In Johannesburg, in January 2000 SAMWU representative, Victor
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Mhlongo declared that the union had withdrawn from all negotiations regarding Igoli 
2002, and were planning further protest action (WM&G, 2000)
In June 2000, SAMWU members occupied Johannesburg council's executive offices 
in protest against the privatisation of services. The occupation only ended after the 
MEC for Local Government in Gauteng, Trevor Fowler gave a written undertaking to 
the unions, that all implementation of Igoli 2002 would be stopped. SAMWU also 
demanded that central government stop putting pressure on local government to 
implement their policies of privatisation. (Davis, 2000).
In Cape Town, SAMWU had already blocked the privatisation of refusal removal in 
Khayelitsha, in 1998 (Gumede, 1998). On the 29th July , 2000, the Local 
Government Transformation Forum was launched to fight the privatisation initiative 
of the Unicity, and to ensure Cape Town's municipal services remained in the hands 
of local government. The forum consisted of SAMWU, community based 
organisations, churches and other trade unions. On the 14th Aug 2000, 200 shop 
stewards occupied the offices of the Unicity Commission in Cape Town. They were 
protesting to keep local government in the hands of the people (Services for All, 
Sept. 2000, p.6).
Intriguingly, during the protests against privatisation, the liberal reputation of Cape 
Town Council appeared to evaporate. On October 2000, SAMWU reported that 
WELOGO (the employer organisation representing the seven municipalities in the 
Cape Metro Area) and the Unicity Commission, intended to institute disciplinary 
action against SAMWU shop stewards. The reason was linked to the stewards 
(presumably unauthorised ) attendance at a shop stewards council meeting, in 
order to obtain a mandate on the union's approach to bargaining for the new Unicity 
(SAMWU, 2000).
Finally, on the 29th Aug 2001, millions of workers downed tools in a national strike to 
protest against privatisation of state assets (WM&G, 2001 b). It was an attempt by 
COSATU's two million members to force the government to engage with alternatives 
to privatisation. SAMWU for its part, said it could not wait until Aug 29 and 30 to 
strike, it was doing so immediately. The protest was over the Khara Hais (formerly 
Upington) municipality in Northern Cape, where the council - after writing off a debt 
of R 150,000 owed to it by Enterprises (a company that taken over the privatised
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Gordonia Resort last year) - was planning to privatise the traffic department. Despite 
a further meeting between the ANC, COSATU and SACP, the parties failed to 
resolve the privatisation issue, no agreement was reached and the national strike 
proceeded (WM&G, 2001 b).
SAMWU and the Cape Town branch remain at the forefront of the struggle against 
privatisation. The union continues to commit itself to a policy of opposing all forms 
of privatisation. Such a pledge maintains the potential for a bitter economic and 
political confrontation with the ANC. To date SAMWU remains on collision course 
with the government, over the issue of privatisation of public services.
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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees in alphabetical order (by first name)
Name of interviewee
(by first name in 
alphabetical order)
Alfred
And re
Angie
Anoymous
Anonymous
Anonymous
Archie Flax
Arthur, Fillies
Brenda
Cheryl
David Sesman
Dennis, Arendise
Denis, Joseph
Position or identity
Black unemployed 
worker
SAMWU member, 
Muizenburg 
Depot
UCT 'coloured' 
student
ex- SAMWU shop 
Steward, Maintenance 
Worker
Zimbabwean casual 
worker
3 x SAMWU members 
working in 
Muizenburg Depot
SAMWU member, 
Ambulance Service
SAMWU member, 
Maintenance Worker, 
Electrical Dept.
Domestic Worker, 
Crossroads Township 
resident
SAMWU member, on 
Jo'burg 
Demonstration.
Chauffeur for 'Old 
Mutual' Insurance
company
Full-time SAMWU 
Organiser,
SAMWU member, 
Waterworks
Interview 
date in 1993/4
2/3/94
20/12/93
17/10/93
4/1/93
3/3/94
15/11/93
5/11/93
5/2/94
Interview 
date in 1997
16/8/97
4/9/97
4/9/97
4/9/97
6/9/97.
20/8/97
1/9/98
21/8/97
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J.P. Kanderman 
Jackie, Kelly 
James 
James, Moures
Jennifer, Soghuwas
Jeremy 
John
Dept.SAMWU 
member, on Jo'burg 
Demo.
Black student, ANC 
supporter
ANC activist - led the 
potato revolt in 1950s 
, Crossroads township 
resident
SAMWU member in 
Muizenburg Depot.
SAMWU Full-time 
Administrator
Black student, ANC 
supporter
Nehawu steward 
(white)
SAMWU Shop 
Steward in Electricity 
Dept.
Retired Steward/ANC 
Counsellor
Researcher: 
privatisation, ALA
Strike Researcher, 
ALA
SAMWU member
NEHAWU steward, 
Univeristy of Cape 
Town
Resident of 
Crossroads Township 
Cape Town
Shop Steward, 
Treasury Dept.
SAMWU member, 
Electrical Dept.
20/12/93
4/1/94
3/9/9
7/3/94
7/3/94
15/1/94
10/9/93
19/8/97
19/8/97 
17/8/97
24/8/97
15/8/97
5/9/97
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Crossroads township 
resident
SAMWU member, on
UCT white student
SAMWU member, 
Electrical Depart.
SAMWU member in 
Waterworks
SAMWU member, 
maintence worker, 
Electrical Dept
Crossroads township 
resident
SAMWU member, 
Town Planner
4/1/94
367
Piet 
Prenden
Pumiani
Roger Ronnie 
Then as
Renee Graivitzky 
Ray, Jaftha
Richard Hiongwane 
Sam
Samaria 
Sentu
Sipho 
Tami
Tankeiso 
Temba
Thandeki 
Thembo, Nxumalo
Thobile
Striker, who worked 
for South African Beer 
(SAB) 'Coloured'
Striker, who worked 
for South African Beer 
(SAB) 'Coloured'
Black unemployed 
worker
Full-time Regional 
Negotiator. 
General Secretary
Researcher for ALA
NEHAWU, Full time 
steward. University of 
Cape Town
Unemployed black 
worker Mbali (Durban) 
township resident
SAMWU member, 
Jo'burg Demo.
SAMWU member, on 
Jo'burg Demo.
Wife of Natural Healer 
Vander Biji Park 
township resident
Black unemployed 
worker
Black unemployed 
worker
UCT Black student
SAMWU. Muizenburg 
Depot
UCT Black student
SAMWU Greater 
Jo'burg Branch 
Secretary, Jo'burg 
Demo.
Natural Healer, Vander 
Bifi Park township
20/12/93
1/9/97
17/8/97
1/9/97
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SAMWU -
Full time
Officers
Roger Ronnie 
(8/10/93)
F.T.O - Regional
Negotiator
Dennis Arendise
(5/11/93)
Organiser
Frank Pontax
(4/1/94)
-Administrator
SAMWU -
lay officials &
members
LAY OFFICIALS
Hennie
(3/9/93)
Steward/Executive
member - Elect.
Dept (C.C.C)
Jeremy
(10/9/93)
Steward -Treasury
Depart. (C.C.C)
Lance Veotte
(10/11/93)
Regional
Education Officer
Waterworks Dept.
MEMBERS
Phaldie Telip
(6/12/93)
Town Planner
Archie Flax
(4/1/94)
Ambulance Service
Denis Joseph
(5/2/94)
Waterworks Dept.
Khalk
(7/1/94)
Admin worker CCC
Motaung
(17/11/93)
waterworks Dept
Andre, Frank,
Peter, Temba
(20/12/93)
Muizenburg Depot
OTHER UNIONS
Ray Jaftha 
(17/2/94)
University of
CapeTown (UCT)
F/Time Steward
NEHAWU
James Moures
(15/1/94)
Nehawu steward
(UCT)
OTHERS
Larry Palk 
(18/1/94)
Mang. Consultant
Andrew Levy
Assoc.(ALA)
Portfolio for C.C.C
Jackie Kelly
(7/3/94)
Strike Researcher
for ALA
Renee Graivitzky
(7/3/94)
Researcher for
ALA
J.P Kandaman
(7/3/94)
ALA Researcher -
Privatisation
David Sesman
(15/11/93)
'Old Mutual'
Insurance Co
USERS OF THE
SERVICES
(City & Township)
Citv- CaoeTown
Angie
(17/10/93)
' coloured' student
Tankeiso
(20/10/93)
black student
Paul
(4/1/94)
White student
Lisa
(4/1/94)
white resident
Wilfred & Tyrone
(3/394)
2 'coloured'
unemployed
Townships
Crossroads
Brenda
(3/3/94)
domestic,
Patience &
Lindwe
(17/2/94)
residents
Tami, Alfred &
Thandeka
(2/3/94)
black unemployed
Ezekiel Morolong
(17/2/94)
ANC activist led
the potato Revolt
in 1950s
Total = 35 
interviees
370
FULL-TIME SAMWU MEMBERS
SAMWU members
OTHER UNION MEMBERS
USERS OF THE SERCVICES
a) City of Cape Town
b) Township
FTO - Regional Negotiator
FTO - Organiser
SAMWU Steward & exec.member
NEHAWU steward (UCT)
coloured' student 
Black student 
white student 
white resident
Domestic 
unemployed
General Secretary 
FTO - Organiser
Retired, ANC Counsellor
NEHAWU steward (UCT)
unemployed/casual
student
IT employee
Student & P/T tutor
Domestic 
Art student
SAMWU 
Full time Officers
Roger Ronnie
(20/8/97)
General Secretary
Dennis Arendise 
(21 /8/ 97)
Organiser
Victor Mhlongo -
(2/9/97)
Gauteng Regional 
Secretary
Themba Nxumalo
(1/9/97)
SAMWU Branch 
Secretary, Greater 
Jo' burg
SAMWU
Lay official & 
members
Hennie (24/8/97)
Retired steward - 
ANC counscillor
Arthur Fillies 
(6/9/97)
Steward, 'coloured' 
maintenace 
worker, CCC 
Electrical Dept.
Peter September 
(5/9/97)
'coloured' 
maintenance 
worker - CCC
Electrical Dept.
Marcel & John 
(5/9/97)
"coloured" main, 
worker - CCC 
Electrical Dept.
Maintence
Worker for
Electrical
Department
(4/9/97)
ex-steward
(preferred to
remain
anonymous)
Zimbabwian
casual worker.
(4/9/97)
James & Lance
(15/8/97)
SAMWU "coloured 1
workers
OTHER UNIONS
Leonard
(6/8/97)
UCT Union Office - 
Nehawu Branch 
Secretary
James Moures 
(16/8/97)
Nehawu steward - 
UCT
Guy 
(17/8/97)
Nehawu steward 
(white)
Piet, Prenden & 
John 
(17/8/97)
- 3 South African 
Beer (SAB) strikers 
(coloured)
OTHERS
Township- Vander
Biji Park (nr.
Jo'burq)
Thobile 
(28/8/97)
Natural Healer, 
worked voluntary 
for the hospital
Sentu
(28/8/97)
Natural Healers' 
wife
Township - Mbali
(Pietermaritzberqnr
. Durban)
Richard 
Hlongwane 
(26/8/97)
unemployed
USERS OF THE 
SERVICES
(City & 
Township)
Citv. CapeTown
Angle 
(16/8/97)
"coloured 1 
unemployed/casua 
1 worker
Tankeiso 
(17/8/97)
black student
Paul 
(27/7/97)
White, IT 
employee
Lisa 
(27/7/97)
white, P/T tutor,
Joan - 
(27/7/97)
white ANC
member
Dumi & Fundsa
(19/8/97)
2 black students
(ANC supporters)
Township-
Crossroads
Brenda
(20/8/97)
domestic,
Lorn bo
(20/8/97)
(Brenda's son)
unemployed
(anonymous - did 
not want their 
names used)
- 4 SAMWU 
women - Jo'burg 
demo
Jo'burg Demo
Petrol pump 
attendant
Black student
black unemployed
black worker

